An Act respecting cyber security, amending the Telecommunications Act and making consequential amendments to other Acts

Sponsor

Marco Mendicino  Liberal

Status

Report stage (House), as of April 19, 2024

Subscribe to a feed (what's a feed?) of speeches and votes in the House related to Bill C-26.

Summary

This is from the published bill. The Library of Parliament often publishes better independent summaries.

Part 1 amends the Telecommunications Act to add the promotion of the security of the Canadian telecommunications system as an objective of the Canadian telecommunications policy and to authorize the Governor in Council and the Minister of Industry to direct telecommunications service providers to do anything, or refrain from doing anything, that is necessary to secure the Canadian telecommunications system. It also establishes an administrative monetary penalty scheme to promote compliance with orders and regulations made by the Governor in Council and the Minister of Industry to secure the Canadian telecommunications system as well as rules for judicial review of those orders and regulations.
This Part also makes a consequential amendment to the Canada Evidence Act .
Part 2 enacts the Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act to provide a framework for the protection of the critical cyber systems of services and systems that are vital to national security or public safety and that are delivered or operated as part of a work, undertaking or business that is within the legislative authority of Parliament. It also, among other things,
(a) authorizes the Governor in Council to designate any service or system as a vital service or vital system;
(b) authorizes the Governor in Council to establish classes of operators in respect of a vital service or vital system;
(c) requires designated operators to, among other things, establish and implement cyber security programs, mitigate supply-chain and third-party risks, report cyber security incidents and comply with cyber security directions;
(d) provides for the exchange of information between relevant parties; and
(e) authorizes the enforcement of the obligations under the Act and imposes consequences for non-compliance.
This Part also makes consequential amendments to certain Acts.

Elsewhere

All sorts of information on this bill is available at LEGISinfo, an excellent resource from the Library of Parliament. You can also read the full text of the bill.

Votes

March 27, 2023 Passed 2nd reading of Bill C-26, An Act respecting cyber security, amending the Telecommunications Act and making consequential amendments to other Acts

Telecommunications ActGovernment Orders

December 1st, 2022 / 1 p.m.
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Conservative

Arnold Viersen Conservative Peace River—Westlock, AB

Madam Speaker, that is another prime example among many of why Canadians do not trust the Liberal government, whether it this particular case of accepting interesting money for an approval; the Huawei decision that needed to be made; the WE Charity scandal, where the Prime Minister was trying to give an organization $1 billion, an organization that had funded nearly half a million dollars to his personal family; or the sweetheart deal with Baylis Medical.

Over and over again, we see that the government is not trustworthy. When it comes forward with bills that do not have a lot of details and that just give blanket permission to cabinet ministers, I am sorry, but we do not trust it.

Telecommunications ActGovernment Orders

December 1st, 2022 / 1 p.m.
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NDP

Bonita Zarrillo NDP Port Moody—Coquitlam, BC

Madam Speaker, today in the House we have heard the NDP speak about its concerns, also about its concerns with oversight.

Are Conservatives also in support of those changes around oversight?

Telecommunications ActGovernment Orders

December 1st, 2022 / 1 p.m.
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Conservative

Arnold Viersen Conservative Peace River—Westlock, AB

Madam Speaker, yes, that is for sure the case. We are in support of more oversight. We would like to see a detailed bill, not a bill that just says that it would give the minister broad powers to do all the things.

That is not governing. That is not providing legislation. That is basically saying, “We love puppies. You should support us because we love puppies.”

Telecommunications ActGovernment Orders

December 1st, 2022 / 1:05 p.m.
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Conservative

Garnett Genuis Conservative Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB

Madam Speaker, I appreciate the opportunity to speak in the House today to a very serious subject, cybersecurity and the security of our country in general.

I will say, on a lighter note, that my friend from Peace River—Westlock spoke about snowmobiling companies and cyber-attacks. I have some personal experience with snowmobiling at his house, and I would say that the government's approach to security is the equivalent of driving a snowmobile over a four-foot retaining wall, which may or may not have happened the last time I tried to drive one of those machines.

The situation of security in this country is very much worth the House taking note of. For much of the time that I have been engaging with and following politics, the primary area of security we would talk about would be concerns about our readiness for and our response to the threat of terrorism. However, it is important to take stock of how things have changed and the fact that, while there are still concerns about terrorism and how we respond to potential acts of terrorism, the primary security threat we face as a country, and indeed that the western world faces, is the threat of foreign state-backed and directed interference in our national affairs. Our abiding concern should be the reality that various foreign states are trying to shape and interfere with our democratic life to try to bend not only our government institutions, but also our civil society institutions, toward their desired objective.

Members of the government have said that the purpose of this interference is to cause total chaos and confusion. We should acknowledge that there are some cases of foreign interference that are aimed at causing chaos, but very often it is about simply trying to subvert and control the direction of institutions toward the will and the interests of that particular foreign power. We have discussed how the Chinese Communist Party is the biggest player when it comes to foreign state-backed interference, but it is far from the only player.

We have seen reports about Chinese government interference in our elections. There have also been recent reports about death threats from the Iranian regime targeting individuals in Canada. There are various other countries that CSIS and other organizations have identified as being involved in this activity of trying to interfere with, subvert and direct Canadian institutions, government really at all levels, as well as civil society organizations, universities and the like, toward their objective.

This kind of invisible, or sometimes a little more visible but often hard to detect, interference in the direction of our national life toward objectives that are not consistent with the objectives Canadians have established is a great threat to our security and our sovereignty. It is something that we should all be seized with and working to respond to.

Part of the context as well is that we are in what some analysts have described as a second cold war. Of course, there are many features of the current conflict between democratic and authoritarian values that are different from the last Cold War, but we have this reality of intensifying global competition between two different value systems that are represented by different countries at different times, and we have countries that are in the middle that are being pulled in different directions.

I tend to think that kind of cold war frame is a reasonably useful way of understanding the current tensions we face in the world. In the context of those tensions, we see how powers with political values that are fundamentally different from ours, where governments are trying to protect their own position, are trying to project their influence around the world. Again, this requires vigilance. It requires a strong response from Canada.

I have been struck by some of the recent comments from the Prime Minister on these matters. I think he has been showing a real lack of transparency around acknowledging what he knew when, and refusing to answer direct questions from the opposition about foreign interference, but he has also stated quite openly the reality that we have a serious problem with foreign interference. This is a reality that opposition members, in particular in the Conservative Party, have been raising for years. We have been asking the government to do more. We have been calling for strong legislative frameworks to respond to the problem of foreign state-backed interference.

We have also sought to elevate the voices of victims of foreign interference, people who have faced threats and intimidation from foreign state actors to try to silence their advocacy, which those foreign state actors see as contrary to their interests. It has been widely reported some of these victims really struggle to actually get proper support. They often get the runaround.

They go to their local police force, which does not necessarily have the capacity to handle a foreign state-backed organized campaign of threats and intimidation. Do they go to Global Affairs? Do they go to CSIS? Do they go to the RCMP? There can be a bit of confusion and passing of the buck concerning support for these victims of foreign state-backed interference.

We have a lot of work to do in legislation and policy, and our preparedness in general and our understanding of these issues. It is critical that we step up to strengthen our understanding of and response to the threats facing our country.

One thing we need to see more from the Prime Minister and the government is transparency because being transparent about this reality can help to counter the impact of that foreign interference. If we know it is happening, if we know what it is directed toward, then we can respond more effectively.

This is not only a responsibility of the federal government to respond to. Provincial and municipal governments need to be aware of the issues of foreign interference. Our universities need to step up as well. Private companies need to be aware of the risks around interference, theft of technology and the ways in which certain things may have a dual military use. There needs to be a broader awareness of this threat to the national interest, a threat to our values across all sectors of society, and a broader response to it.

The government has an important role to play in leading the response and making changes at the national level. We have been far behind, as far the national government goes, in responding to these threats. The Conservative opposition has been calling for a response to foreign interference for years. Now we are seeing the government start to talk about it a bit more.

I noted in some of the language in the Indo-Pacific strategy, for example, the government is starting, or trying, to sound a bit more like Conservatives in the way it talks about some of the challenges confronting us and the steps we need to take in the Indo-Pacific region. While the government is adopting some of that language, it is failing to substantively adjust its approach.

We have a bill in front of us today that deals with one avenue where we need to be engaged with and responding to the problem of foreign state-backed interference, and that is the issue of cybersecurity. I will be supporting this legislation at this stage to see it go to committee, mainly because we clearly need a new cybersecurity bill. We clearly need a new framework. The committee study will identify some of the significant gaps we see in the legislation right now, the ways the legislation needs to be improved and possibly the many additional steps required. I will just note that it is far past due that we have some kind of proposal for a framework on cybersecurity that, in a way, gives the committee the opportunity to add to and build on what the government has initially put forward.

This is really the first time we see any kind of legislation proposed by the government that substantively touches on this emergent problem of foreign state-backed interference. We need a much broader range of responses from the government. We need so much more to be done to counter this major security threat.

This is about preserving our country. It is about preserving the integrity of our institutions. It is about defending the principle that the direction of our democracy and the direction of our society should be shaped through the open deliberation of Canadians, not by foreign powers who have particular interests that may be contrary to our interests who are trying to push and pull that discussion in their preferred direction.

Having this framework that opens the door for the committee to discuss further, fill in some of the gaps and try to push the government to have greater specificity in the framework around what they are going to do provides us with the opportunity to do that. This is late, lacking in detail and really a small piece of the much broader picture that is required.

The government has been so delayed. I mentioned the decision around Huawei. We were way behind all of our allies in making the decision. It is important now, finally, at this late stage where the government is starting to mention the problem, that we actually see concrete action. Conservatives will be pushing the government to act in line with some of the words it has been saying.

Telecommunications ActGovernment Orders

December 1st, 2022 / 1:15 p.m.
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Winnipeg North Manitoba

Liberal

Kevin Lamoureux LiberalParliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons

Madam Speaker, I would just correct the member. Yes, this legislation is very important and we hope to see it get to the committee stage where it will no doubt be well discussed and debated. There will be presentations where members can digest information and see if there are ways in which we can improve upon the legislation. However, to try to give an impression that this is the only thing the government has done on the issue of cyber-threats is a bit of a false impression.

Not only have we been seeing a great deal of dialogue and actions from different departments to date in the form of formalized advisory groups, but we have seen literally tens of millions of dollars, not to mention the other incentive programs that were there, for the private sector, for example.

I wonder if the member would not agree that this issue is not new and this is just one very important aspect in taking a step forward.

Telecommunications ActGovernment Orders

December 1st, 2022 / 1:15 p.m.
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Conservative

Garnett Genuis Conservative Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB

Madam Speaker, the member is correct that this is not a new issue. That is precisely why I think the government is very late in coming to the table. The issue of foreign interference, which is part of the context of the cyber-threats we face, is also not a new issue. Again, we have been calling for action from the government, but we have not seen other action from it. The member says that the Liberals have done all these other things, such as maybe giving some money over here or over there, but he evidently could not articulate specific measures that the government had taken.

We are behind when it comes to defending our security. We are behind what we should have known much earlier. We are behind our allies. We were the last of the Five Eyes and very late to step up on recognizing the risks associated with Huawei.

When it comes to foreign interference, I will challenge the government on one point: Why has the government not expelled foreign diplomats involved in interference and intimidation in Canada? That would be a simple step and the government has not taken it.

Telecommunications ActGovernment Orders

December 1st, 2022 / 1:15 p.m.
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Bloc

Sébastien Lemire Bloc Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC

Madam Speaker, the bill before us seeks to reinforce our security systems and may affect critical infrastructure in Quebec such as Hydro-Québec. I always think about the Conservatives and their famous great energy corridor. That is the type of project in which the federal government could appropriate provincial responsibilities and critical infrastructure in the name of national security. This sets off major alarm bells in my mind.

Can the member reassure me about the Conservatives' intentions? Can he assure me that if they come to power some day, they would not misuse legislation like this piece of legislation?

Telecommunications ActGovernment Orders

December 1st, 2022 / 1:15 p.m.
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Conservative

Garnett Genuis Conservative Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB

Madam Speaker, the member asked what we would do if we were in government. We would make the right decision on every one of those.

With respect to the particulars the member raises with respect to what powers the federal government would have in intervening with provinces, this is an important issue for the committee to look at. I am supporting this legislation because we need to have a cybersecurity framework in Canada. It is important that this goes through to the committee and that those issues be looked at there.

I did not have time to go into it, but there are a significant number of problems in the legislation that do have to be worked out by the committee. No doubt there has to be a role for federal leadership around security, but it has to be a constructive, collaborative relationship, because there are steps for other levels of government. We see foreign interference at the very granular local level, so that collaboration across levels of government is really important.

Telecommunications ActGovernment Orders

December 1st, 2022 / 1:15 p.m.
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Conservative

Larry Maguire Conservative Brandon—Souris, MB

Madam Speaker, this morning my colleague from Kildonan—St. Paul made an excellent presentation on this bill. She talked about the transparency that may be lacking in certain areas and the effects on small businesses and how they may not be able to afford the cost like a larger company. I wonder if my colleague could expand on that.

Telecommunications ActGovernment Orders

December 1st, 2022 / 1:15 p.m.
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Conservative

Garnett Genuis Conservative Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB

Madam Speaker, that is an excellent point. I did not have a chance in my remarks to talk specifically about the transparency issues. Again, we need to support this bill through the second reading stage out of agreement with the general principle that we need to do more on cybersecurity, recognizing how far behind the government has been.

However, there are significant issues with respect to ensuring transparency. There are significant issues on whether the bill is clear and specific enough about the steps that are required, instead of just leaving it, as we see often with the government and legislation, and giving an open-ended blank cheque to the government.

There are definitely issues. This requires a detailed committee study. I hope Conservative proposals will be adopted and we will be able to strengthen the bill as a result.

Telecommunications ActGovernment Orders

December 1st, 2022 / 1:20 p.m.
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Bloc

Kristina Michaud Bloc Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC

Madam Speaker, I will begin by saying that I will be sharing my time with the hon. member for Abitibi—Témiscamingue.

I am pleased to speak to this bill, which, I must say, was eagerly awaited by my party.

The Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security had the opportunity to study the issue of cyber security. We heard from experts in this field, who told us what they think about Canada's cyber security preparedness or posture. The idea came from my Conservative colleagues, and it was a very good one.

Given what is happening in Ukraine with the Russian invasion, we know that there are still military threats in the 21st century. However, we are also dealing with the emergence of new technologies that pose non-military threats. I had the opportunity to talk about these non-military threats at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly last week in Warsaw, Poland. I discussed non-military threats and how different countries must prepare for or guard against them.

What the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security heard is how difficult it is to prepare for these threats, because they are evolving so quickly. No one had anything particularly positive to say about Canada's preparedness.

I think that the willingness is there, and that is what the experts told us: Canada is trying to prepare for and guard against potential cyber-attacks. I said “potential” cyber-attacks, but they are already happening. We know there have been cyber-attacks on various infrastructure and companies in Quebec and Canada, especially in the private sector, in the past. Canada is not as prepared as it could be to face these attacks, but we were told that it may never be totally prepared. The same is true for all countries because, as I said, the technology is changing so rapidly.

For this reason, I think that adopting a cybersecurity framework is an extremely positive step. That is what the government promised. In its national cyber security strategy, it pledged to better regulate cyber systems in the federally regulated private sector. The 2019 budget earmarked $144.9 million to develop a new framework to protect critical infrastructure. That is exactly what the two main parts of this bill do. They are aimed at strengthening the security of the Canadian telecommunications system.

Part 1 of the bill amends the Telecommunications Act to add the promotion of security, authorizing the government to direct Internet service providers to do anything, or refrain from doing anything, that is necessary to secure Canada's telecommunications system. Part 2 enacts the new critical cyber systems protection act to provide a framework for the protection of critical cyber-infrastructure and companies under federal jurisdiction.

The act is essentially a regulatory framework. As my colleague from Abitibi—Témiscamingue mentioned earlier in his question to our Conservative colleague, we will have to see what impact this bill could have on Quebec, especially companies and organizations like Hydro-Québec, since it designates interprovincial power line systems as vital services and vital systems. More on that later.

We will also have to see in committee whether the vast regulation-making powers provided for in Bill C-26 are justified or whether they bypass Parliament for no reason. Certain groups that raised concerns in the media have contacted us as well. Their concerns about this bill are well founded. I will get back to this a little later on.

I would say that it is important to proceed carefully and properly with this bill. Any amendments made to the bill will have a direct impact on every transmission facility in Quebec, including those that will soon be built in my riding to offer adequate cell service to those who are still waiting. Some Canadian ridings are unfortunately still without cell service in 2022. Since my riding is one of them, the bill will have a significant impact.

Local telephone service providers, IP-based voice services, Internet service providers, long distance providers and wireless services will be subject to the amendments to the act.

This means that the amendments would allow authorities to secure the system if there is reason to believe that the security of the telecommunications system is under threat of interference, manipulation or disruption. In that case, telecommunication service providers could be prohibited from using or supplying certain goods or services.

As I understand the wording of the bill, which is rather complex, telecommunication service providers could even be prohibited from supplying services to a specific individual. It is important to realize that these are vast powers, and I hope that, when the bill is sent to committee for study, it will be detailed enough to include the factors that will be taken into account before such powers are granted.

As I was saying earlier, the act will make it possible to designate certain systems and services under federal jurisdiction as critical to national security or public safety. The new Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act will protect critical cyber systems in the private sector.

What, then, is a critical cyber system? I found it difficult to find a clear definition in French of what a critical cyber system is, but the government defines the term itself in the bill. It appears that it is a “system that, if...compromised, could affect the continuity or security of a vital service or vital system.”

The bills lists six vital services and systems in its schedule. These obviously include telecommunications services, interprovincial or international pipeline and power line systems, nuclear energy systems, transportation systems that are under federal jurisdiction, banking systems, and clearing and settlement systems.

These are the areas this bill addresses. That is a lot to verify, and several actors are involved. Several ministers will be involved in the regulatory process after that, so it is important to study the bill carefully.

At this stage, a number of questions arise. For example, what impact will the bill have on certain interprovincial infrastructures, such as power lines and power grids? The act could impact Hydro-Québec and other non-federal infrastructures, such as aluminum smelters. As I understand it, the bill itself would designate interprovincial power lines as a vital service. That could have an impact.

In principle, the bill is not a problem for my party. When we call experts to testify before the committee, we will be able to determine whether or not it will have a positive impact. I think it could be very positive, but we need to look at its scope.

The Bloc Québécois has often supported the government in its efforts to ensure stricter control of broadcasting for certain vital infrastructures that could be in the crosshairs of foreign nations. Let us consider China and Russia, as I mentioned earlier. There is the Huawei saga and the development of the 5G network. The government's indecision for so many years proves that it would have been better to act beforehand rather than to react to the current situation. China's increasing power and its attempts at interference on several occasions, as well as Canada's vulnerabilities in terms of cybersecurity, are real. For example, we know that Hydro-Québec has been a potential target for Chinese espionage. The same could happen directly in our infrastructures. I think that this bill is relevant. We are very happy that the government introduced it. That is why the Bloc Québécois will vote in favour of sending the bill to a parliamentary committee so that we can hear what the experts have to say.

I would like to take these final moments to talk about the concerns voiced by certain groups. Professor Christopher Parsons of the University of Toronto said that the bill was so imperfect that authoritarian governments around the world could cite it to justify their own repressive laws. That is a worrisome statement. I will elaborate during questions and comments.

Telecommunications ActGovernment Orders

December 1st, 2022 / 1:30 p.m.
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Conservative

Marilyn Gladu Conservative Sarnia—Lambton, ON

Madam Speaker, I thank the member for her speech.

My question is the following. Is the member concerned that this bill gives too much power to the federal government and the minister?

Telecommunications ActGovernment Orders

December 1st, 2022 / 1:30 p.m.
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Bloc

Kristina Michaud Bloc Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC

Madam Speaker, yes, that is a concern.

It was mentioned by the University of Toronto professor I cited earlier and certain groups that seek to protect individual freedoms. This bill may give too much power to the minister. We will have to properly study it in committee.

We must bear in mind that this bill seeks to secure and protect Canada's critical infrastructure. I believe that the government is acting in good faith. It is prepared to authorize the circulation of some information so we can help one another and safeguard businesses from potential cyber-attacks. I believe it is a good objective. We will have to ensure that there is nothing sinister about wanting more information.

Telecommunications ActGovernment Orders

December 1st, 2022 / 1:30 p.m.
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NDP

Bonita Zarrillo NDP Port Moody—Coquitlam, BC

Madam Speaker, my question for the member is around protection of seniors. I wonder if the member has some comments on how the bill would protect vulnerable groups, like seniors, from scams.

Telecommunications ActGovernment Orders

December 1st, 2022 / 1:30 p.m.
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Bloc

Kristina Michaud Bloc Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC

Madam Speaker, that is an excellent question.

Based on what I have seen of the bill so far, I could not say. Quite honestly, I have no idea if this bill will do more to protect seniors from scams.

I know these kinds of scams are happening in my riding in the Lower St. Lawrence region. People call seniors, posing as grandsons in custody or living in another country. They ask their victims to transfer money because they need it right away, and some seniors fall for it.

I have no idea if this bill will help with that kind of thing. If not, the government really should do something to put a stop to it.