Bill C-15 (Historical)

Strengthening Military Justice in the Defence of Canada Act

An Act to amend the National Defence Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts

This enactment amends provisions of the National Defence Act governing the military justice system. The amendments, among other things,
(a) provide for security of tenure for military judges until their retirement;
(b) permit the appointment of part-time military judges;
(c) specify the purposes, objectives and principles of the sentencing process;
(d) provide for additional sentencing options, including absolute discharges, intermittent sentences and restitution;
(e) modify the composition of a court martial panel according to the rank of the accused person; and
(f) modify the limitation period applicable to summary trials and allow an accused person to waive the limitation periods.
The enactment also sets out the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal’s duties and functions and clarifies his or her responsibilities. It also changes the name of the Canadian Forces Grievance Board to the Military Grievances External Review Committee.
Finally, it makes amendments to the delegation of the Chief of the Defence Staff’s powers as the final authority in the grievance process and makes consequential amendments to other Acts.

Strengthening Military Justice in the Defence of Canada Act

[The Acting Speaker, Conservative, Barry Devolin]

Order. The time for government orders has expired. The hon. member for Winnipeg Centre will have four minutes remaining when this matter returns before the House.

The House resumed from June 19 consideration of the motion that Bill C-15, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, be now read a second time and referred to a committee, and of the motion that the question be now put.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it is an honour to offer a few observations with respect to Bill C-15.

At the outset, the Liberal Party will support the bill. However, there are some issues that we wish to raise in a collegial fashion as much as possible in this place. There are some questions that do bear some exploration. Hopefully that will take place at committee and that the committee will be given a fulsome amount of time to discuss it.

The bill has been kicking around for a while, somewhat like the previous bill. Its previous iteration was Bill C-41 and before that I have lost track of what numbers it has seen over the course of several Parliaments.

I will confine my remarks to basically three points: first, with respect to sentencing; second, with respect to judges; and third with respect to the supervisory power of the vice chief of the Defence Staff as it relates to the provost marshal.

The first observation has to do with military sentencing generally. It is beyond arguable that military sentencing is harsher and less flexible than is civilian sentencing for comparable offences. The bill does make some effort to reconcile the sentencing that would take place in a military tribunal with sentencing that would take place in a civilian tribunal. That is by and large a good thing. We recognize that flexibility in sentencing is to the benefit of the justice system. It is to the benefit of the Crown and the accused.

However, I would note that it is somewhat ironic that the government on the one hand is introducing flexibility in sentencing with respect to Bill C-15 and military personnel, while simultaneously in other legislation introducing more and more minimum mandatories, all of which takes away from flexibility in sentencing where a judge, Crown and defence may arrive at a better sentencing option than possibly a minimum mandatory does.

To be consistent, the Liberal Party agrees there should be greater flexibility in sentencing, such as in Bill C-15, and where appropriate, the sentence should be more flexible and possibly less harsh.

We do hold our military personnel to a higher standard than that of civilians. There are cases where the sentence should reflect not only the civilian component, but also the code of discipline that applies to all military personnel. It is one thing to go running around the countryside as a drunk driver in a civilian motor vehicle, but it is another thing altogether to be drunk with a military vehicle, which could have far more serious consequences and is clearly a breach of discipline. The law should recognize that concern as it is an additional responsibility that a person in the military takes on. It should recognize that these are very serious accusations and breaches of not only the Criminal Code, but of the code of conduct expected of military personnel.

The second point I want to make is with respect to judges. It is a good idea that part-time judges be made available in various tribunals. There is, after all, a population of only about 68,000 serving personnel, while the gross population of the military is roughly 100,000. The availability of part-time judges is a good idea.

Interestingly, the bill maintains the retirement age of 60 years of age. Where I come from, judges are actually just coming into their judicial career somewhere between 55 and 65 years of age, because of the argument that not only does it takes quite a while to accumulate the knowledge base for reviewing Criminal Code offences, but also to arrive at wise and intelligent judicial discretion.

It is somewhat counterintuitive that we do not limit civilian judges until they are age 75, but we limit military judges to age 60. The argument is that the judges need to be deployable. At one level, that is probably a good argument. At another level, I do not know that they need to be terribly deployable while actually sitting as a military judge in places like Ottawa, Montreal, Toronto or any other base in Canada, where the issue of deployability is not as necessary.

It strikes me as counterintuitive when we walk away from some very capable people who are, in fact, quite able to administer justice to those members of the military who find themselves on the wrong side of the law.

The final point I want to make has to do with section 18.5, which concerns the Canadian Forces provost marshal. In the ranking, the vice chief of the Defence Staff is, in effect, the second most powerful military figure in our hierarchy. He or she, as the case may be, under subsection (2), “may issue general instructions or guidelines in writing in respect of the responsibilities described in paragraphs 18.4(a) to (d). The Provost Marshal shall ensure that they are available to the public”.

As a general proposition, the vice chief may issue guidelines. Those guidelines are communicated to the provost marshal and the provost marshal in turn is able to make those public. This is the military police. This is telling the police officers what they are supposed to do in terms of investigations as a general proposition, which, if it were left there, would be perfectly acceptable.

However, there is a further section with respect to the same issue. It says, “The Vice Chief of the Defence Staff may issue instructions or guidelines in writing in respect of a particular investigation”. What is objectionable about that?

Let us cast our minds back to Somalia. We will recall that as a blight on the otherwise exemplary record of our forces operating abroad that led to an inquiry. It was not a happy outcome for any of the parties involved, particularly the military.

This section, in effect, gives the vice chief the option of shutting this whole thing down, shutting any investigation down on his or her say so. That, I would suggest, is a significant departure from what we expect of civilian police officers.

The analogy is imperfect but is an analogy which may help people appreciate the significance of this section. It is as if police officers were faced with an investigation and the mayor came along and said, “Don't do it”, or the premier came along and said, “We don't want you to do that one”, or the Prime Minister came along and said, “We don't want you to conduct this investigation”. That is inconsistent with the general independence of police officers, the independence that they have from political supervision.

The government from time to time will rightly say in question period and elsewhere that it has no authority to intervene if a case is under police investigation. That is a recognition of a file called Campbell and Shirose, the case that was decided by the Supreme Court, which gives an enormous amount of protection to the independence of a police officer to pursue a police investigation in the fashion and the manner and with the distance it requires in accordance with the views of the investigating officers. That, however, is being pulled back in this particular case, and it will be potentially circumscribed by the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, presumably on the instructions of the Chief of the Defence Staff.

Therefore every investigation that potentially could get launched and investigations that could go in directions that maybe the CDS or the Minister of National Defence or the government of the day does not want it to go, could be yanked. The way it could be yanked is through this particular section. It would violate some of the core concepts of police independence. It would allow the vice chief to issue instructions and guidelines in specific cases.

That is possibly one of the more difficult sections of this particular bill, which should be explored at committee. I am hoping members will be given a real opportunity to mine into this issue. For those who hold the independence of the police as, for want of a better term, sacrosanct, this is a very significant pullback of the authority of the police to do their job. Anytime the state intervenes in a police investigation, whether it is through a vice chief, the CDS, the military, the government or the minister, it is potentially a bad thing for our system of government and probably quite offensive to our way of government and our way of life here. Allowing the second highest ranking officer in the Canadian Forces to shut down a military police investigation, in our judgment, would not be the way to go.

We need to understand that we respect the RCMP, for instance. I am just using the RCMP as an example. There is no comparable section in the RCMP legislation, which would allow the minister of the day or the deputy minister of the day to shut down an RCMP investigation, and were it to happen, there would be a political price to pay.

We agree that, on the sentencing aspect, there should be a significant overlap between the code of discipline and the Criminal Code. We question the advisability of limiting judges to age 60. We really want to ask some questions with respect to Section 18.5(3), which gives the vice chief what I would argue are extraordinary abilities to limit investigation.

[Mark Strahl, Conservative, Chilliwack—Fraser Canyon, BC]

Mr. Speaker, Bill C-15 provides a statutory articulation of the objectives, purpose and principles of sentencing in the military justice system. This would provide military judges presiding over courts martial, presiding officers at summary trials and appellant judges in the Court Martial Appeal Court and the Supreme Court of Canada with parliamentary guidance similar to that which is provided to their civilian counterparts, while recognizing the unique characteristics and requirements of the military justice system.

Does the hon. member agree that providing statutory articulation of the objectives, purpose and principles of sentencing to these important actors in the military justice system is something that should be supported by all members of the House?

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I thought that is what I just said in the last 15 minutes. I take it the hon. member missed the opening sentence of my speech, which was that the Liberal Party will be supporting this.

Frankly, we think articulation of the principles of sentencing is nothing but a good idea. If we go to the Criminal Code, we see there is an entire section on the sentencing guidelines appropriate to a particular offence. We think, as much as possible, there should be a parallel between the Criminal Code and the code of discipline, recognizing that the military has a unique and special role in our society, and that role still has to be recognized in a code of discipline that may impact on a sentence in any given case.

[Françoise Boivin, NDP, Gatineau, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the hon. member for Scarborough—Guildwood's answer. I would like to ask him if that amounts to the Liberal Party giving the Conservative government a blank cheque for the passage of Bill C-15.

Fairly recently, when a similar bill reached committee stage, the Liberal Party agreed that it needed a lot of amendments. There was also a Liberal government in place when the Honourable Justice Lamer presented some 95 recommendations, of which only a few dozen are being implemented in Bill C-15. I hope the Liberal Party is not giving the Conservative government a blank cheque.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it is far from a blank cheque. I think I have articulated at least three areas where there are legitimate questions to be raised. I do not think that is an exclusive list by any means.

I agree with the hon. member that the bill has seen a number of reiterations.

Mr. Justice Lamer's report was a good report. It was quite useful. I think a lot of the justice's recommendations see their way into Bill C-15. Without having my arm twisted behind my back, I would commend the government for actually recognizing that. I do wish, though, that it were not quite the last item on the government's agenda in each and every Parliament. However, we are here and let us hope we can get it into committee.

[Andrew Cash, NDP, Davenport, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it is true that this bill has seen many iterations. Unfortunately, many important amendments that the NDP moved in the last Parliament are not present in this current iteration.

We ask enormous things of our men and women in uniform. Many Canadians would be surprised to know that important due process is not granted to them in these summary trials.

I would like to know how the hon. member in the corner squares that circle.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I like our little corner down here. It seems to me that in another life this hon. member might have seen this corner as well, and maybe in the future.

Actually, there is a squaring of this particular circle in that there is, in effect, a merger of the sentencing guidelines that apply. First, we would have a military person who is charged, the standard of evidence would be heard in the normal fashion, the conviction would be entered or not in the normal fashion and then we would get to the sentencing. Up to the point of sentencing, it was actually a fairly parallel system.

Where it ceased to be parallel was in the harshness and inflexibility of the sentencing. I like to think that the Criminal Code guidelines that are applied to Criminal Code sentencing would actually be the guidelines for the military, unless either on the balance of probabilities or even beyond reasonable doubt, we can show that the code of discipline is something that should override in a particular case.

I also take note that there is a reconstituting of the panels, so that members of similar rank are, in effect, doing a peer review of each other. I do not want to call it a peer review because that is not quite the right language, but sergeants will be sitting in on corporals and privates, and colonels will be addressing issues with respect to officers. Therefore, I think this bill actually moves the yardsticks quite substantially toward a Criminal Code system.

[Andrew Cash, NDP, Davenport, ON]

Mr. Speaker, notwithstanding what the member has said, when we get into summary trials there are no transcripts, no record, and for members of the military who are tried on some minor variances and are stuck with a criminal record that could be harmful to them in the future, this is an issue we think is of serious concern. I wonder if the member agrees.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Mr. Speaker, actually I think the hon. member does make a legitimate point, and there are minor things that happen to a member of the military where there is no record and no ability to appeal that. It is in effect a double jeopardy. I do not disagree with that. However, it also is a function of being a member of the military, and when someone takes on that uniform, he or she in effect takes on a level of responsibility that civilians do not take on. The consequence of that is, when someone gets in a bit of trouble, the consequences are potentially more serious than if it were a parallel civilian offence.

I agree with the member as far as transcripts go, whether a record can be viewed or not viewed, particularly by a potential employer, and the relevance it has to any other aspect of the military person's life.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Winnipeg North, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I wonder if my colleague can provide comment in regard to Bill C-15 and what he perceives as one of the shortcomings of the bill, maybe something the government could have done, either in a more timely fashion or in general with regard to the bill. Does he have any thoughts in regard to that?

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Mr. Speaker, my main comment had to do with the supervisory function of the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff as it relates to potential police investigations. Some very thoughtful people, and I think of the late Kent Roach as one, have given a great deal of thought to the issue of a vice chief being able at any given time in a point of investigation to issue “guidelines”. Guidelines is a nice word, but it can be used in a very expansive way. So we can actually circumscribe an investigation in a manner that is far more extensive than any other civilian police officer or civilian police would put up with. That is the main criticism of the bill.

[Françoise Boivin, NDP, Gatineau, QC]

Mr. Speaker, it is an honour to rise in the House today to speak to Bill C-15.

First, I would like to congratulate our national defence critic, the hon. member for St. John's East, who is doing an amazing and remarkable job on a file that can be difficult, given that we are dealing with a government that would rather act like G.I. Joe than seriously examine the country's national defence needs, analyze the cost to Canadian taxpayers and have a comprehensive view of Canada's defence role as it relates to the deployment of military personnel in our country and abroad.

I have tremendous respect for the Canadians who work for our Canadian Forces. I have met many of them, since there are obviously a number in my riding, it being in the national capital region. In my riding, it is not unusual for people to frequently come across Canadian Forces members. I really admire the work that they do, here, inside our borders, and around the world, especially in light of what has been going on. It takes a special person to put his or her life in danger to protect our values, rights and what we stand for every day.

That is why we cannot afford to let the government take so many years to introduce this bill. I said “so many years”, because in 2003, retired Chief Justice Lamer was asked to produce a report on the situation and to make recommendations regarding the bill.

The summary of Bill C-15, which was produced and which I will give a little background on shortly, states the following:

This enactment amends provisions of the National Defence Act governing the military justice system. The amendments, among other things,

(a) provide for security of tenure for military judges until their retirement;

(b) permit the appointment of part-time military judges;

(c) specify the purposes, objectives and principles of the sentencing process;

(d) provide for additional sentencing options, including absolute discharges, intermittent sentences and restitution;

(e) modify the composition of a court martial panel according to the rank of the accused person; and

(f) modify the limitation period applicable to summary trials and allow an accused person to waive the limitation periods.

The enactment also sets out the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal’s duties and functions and clarifies his or her responsibilities. It also changes the name of the Canadian Forces Grievance Board to the Military Grievances External Review Committee.

Finally, it makes amendments to the delegation of the Chief of the Defence Staff’s powers as the final authority in the grievance process and makes consequential amendments to other Acts.

As I said a moment ago, I believe this quite lengthy bill has been long due since 2003. However, “long due” does not mean we should hand out blank cheques, even though the bill concerns national defence and our men and women working for the Canadian Forces. The NDP is not in the habit of handing out blank cheques.

This bill has previously appeared in a number of forms, as bills C-7 and C-45, which died on the order paper when Parliament was prorogued in 2007 and when the election was called in 2008. In July 2008, Bill C-60 was introduced and it came back with a vengeance. Bill C-60 simplified the structure of courts martial and established the method for selecting the type of court martial that would harmonize best with the civilian justice system. In 2009, the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs examined the bill and recommended nine amendments to the National Defence Act.

This happened after 2003, when the Right Honourable Antonio Lamer tabled a report on his review of the National Defence Act, a report that contained 88 recommendations concerning military justice, the Military Police Complaints Commission, the grievance process and the Canadian Forces provost marshal.

Looking at Bill C-15 as it currently stands—because that is the one we have to consider—we realize that it is supposed to be a legislative response to those recommendations. However, only 28 recommendations have been included in the bill.

I will say it right away—and the critic said this—we will not support this bill at second reading because, in any case, the government will be referring it to committee. However, there are so many flaws, serious flaws, in this bill, and it is not because it should have been introduced so long ago that we should adopt any such poorly constructed legislation. That is our position on the matter.

In 2010, Bill C-41 was introduced in response to the 2003 Lamer report and to the Senate committee's 2009 report. It contained the military justice-related provisions respecting, for example, sentencing reform, judges, military panels, summary trials, the court martial panel, the Canadian Forces provost marshal and certain provisions respecting the Military Police Complaints Commission.

It can nevertheless be said, for those who were here at that time—I was not—that bills C-41 and C-15 resemble each other and are similar to what was introduced by the Senate committee during the last Parliament.

The amendments stood included those concerning the composition of a court martial panel, and security of tenure for military judges until retirement.

However, other important amendments—and I want to emphasize this—adopted at the committee stage at the end of the last parliamentary session were not included in Bill C-15. That includes the NDP's amendments respecting the authority of the Chief of Defence Staff in the grievance process—a direct response to a Lamer report recommendation—changes in the composition of the grievance committee so that 60 % of members would be civilians and the provision to ensure that a person guilty of an offence on summary conviction would not unfairly be given a criminal record. That is the amendment under clause 75 of Bill C-41.

We have been in favour of bringing the military justice system up to date for a long time now. There is no doubt about that and I do not want to hear anybody say otherwise in this House. Members of the Canadian Forces are known to be subject to extremely strict rules of discipline and they deserve a justice system that is subject to comparable rules.

I remember when I first started out as a lawyer, doing criminal law, that there was a judge in the Outaouais district—he is still there–near Gatineau, where I am a member of Parliament, who used to tell us, because he had a military background, that nothing could be as secret and closed as military justice. This is understandable, because it operates in accordance with a very closed system of discipline. It is understandable. I think that members of the Canadian forces voluntarily submit to these extremely strict rules of discipline.

They often have absolutely critical work to do, and the chain of command is not very tolerant of exceptions. All of that is understandable and yet, sometimes there are certain types of behaviour problems—I repeat, “behaviour problems”. And those who are not accustomed to this environment can be completely flabbergasted at what can lead to a criminal record for a member of the Canadian Forces. Anyone practising criminal law in civil society, or dealing with labour rights or grievances, will find provisions in these bills that are rather surprising.

To begin with, they mention reform. For us, the problem is that the reform under discussion is of the summary trials system. The amendments in bill C-15 do not adequately address the injustice of summary trials. At the moment, a summary trial conviction in the Canadian Forces means a criminal record. Some might say, “good for them”. However, summary trials are held without the accused being allowed to seek legal or other counsel. They have no recourse and there are no transcripts of the trial. Moreover, the judge is the accused's commanding officer. This is too harsh for some members of the Canadian Forces who are convicted for minor offences. Once again, some may say that there is no room for exceptions, but there are times when it is completely ridiculous.

I have had people come and consult me, but the problem was that everything had already been taken care of.

Let us put ourselves in the place of a member of the Canadian Forces who has committed an offence, for example, absence without leave or a quarrel with another member. The member’s own commanding officer tells him he will have a summary trial. We cannot seriously think that a member of the Canadian Forces is going to go against what his own commanding officer suggests. We cannot really call this transparency. That may be too harsh for some members of the Canadian Forces who are convicted of minor offences. I will say it again, because it is important to know what we are talking about. These minor offences include insubordination, quarrels, misconduct, absence without leave, drunkenness, disobeying a command, and so on. This is certainly very important for military discipline, and I am not saying otherwise, but does it call for giving someone a criminal record? It is important that we ask ourselves that question.

Having a record will have an effect when the member leaves the Canadian Forces. He may have trouble finding a job once he rejoins the civilian world. Bill C-15 does provide an exemption so that if there is a minor sentence handed down under the act or a fine of less than $500, certain offences are not entered on the person’s record. This is one of the positive aspects of the bill, but we think it does not go far enough. We hope the committee will do its job. I do not know whether the Standing Committee on National Defence is as extraordinary as the justice committee. At the Standing Committee on National Defence, even when self-evident amendments are moved, they are not adopted.

Last March, at committee stage, the amendments to Bill C-41 proposed by the NDP called for the list of offences that could be considered to be minor, and so would not merit a criminal record if a minor sentence were imposed for the offence in question, to be increased to 27 from five. The amendment also adds to the list of sentences that a tribunal may impose without them being entered on the record: for example, a severe reprimand, a fine equivalent to a month’s salary and other minor sentences.

This was an important step forward for summary trials. However, the amendment to Bill C-15 was not accepted. It is therefore entirely to be expected that we would want to include it again. A criminal record can make life after a person’s military career very difficult. It can mean losing a job, being refused housing, having trouble travelling, and so on. If Canadians knew that members of the military who served our country so courageously are being treated this way for the kinds of misconduct I have referred to, I think some of them would be in shock, as I was when I read the bill and what had gone on over the last 10 years in this regard.

There is also the question of reforming the grievance system. As a labour lawyer, I have always advocated the greatest possible transparency and independent arbitrators, because it affects the labour relations between the parties. The same is true when we talk about a Military Grievances External Review Committee. At this time, the Canadian Forces Grievance Board does not allow for external review. The people who sit on the Military Grievances External Review Committee are retired Canadian Forces employees and some very recent retirees. So if the Canadian Forces Grievance Board is to be seen as an external, independent civilian body, as it should, the appointment process definitely needs to be amended to reflect that. The committee should therefore be composed, in part, of civilian members.

The amendment that the NDP suggested, and that it will certainly suggest again when the bill is examined in committee, is that at least 60% of the grievance committee members never have been officers or members of the Canadian Forces. I repeat: it is the Military Grievances External Review Committee. The amendment was adopted in March 2011, for Bill C-41, but it was not incorporated into Bill C-15.

It is extremely important that people from the outside be part of the external review committee, and I am persuaded that my colleagues will agree with me. It is therefore important that the amendment be included again.

There is the whole question of the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff in the grievance resolution process. There is a major weakness in the military grievance system. The Lamer report contained a recommendation concerning the fact that the Chief of the Defence Staff does not have the power to settle financial claims in grievances. In spite of the fact that the Minister of National Defence approved the recommendation, no concrete action has been taken in the last eight years to implement it.

The ministers responsible for certain portfolios who come before our committees need to agree to the amendments we recommend. When it comes time to amend legislation, those ministers need to remember what they have said.

During committee examination, the NDP proposed an amendment, which was adopted in March 2011. Nonetheless, the amendment was not incorporated into Bill C-15. If this bill is referred to committee, the NDP, under the leadership of the official opposition’s national defence critic, the member for St. John's East, will continue to fight for this.

There is also the question of strengthening the Military Police Complaints Commission. Very little has been said about granting that commission greater powers so that it acts as an oversight body. The commission’s powers must be expanded by legislation so that it is able to investigate legitimately and report to Parliament.

The NDP is not alone in making the case for the need to amend Bill C-15. A number of organizations support our positions, including the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, which has said that fundamental fairness requires that systems that impose serious penalties on individuals provide better procedural protection.

In R. v. Wigglesworth, the Supreme Court of Canada, an arm of our democracy, confirmed that, if an individual is to be subject to penal consequences such as imprisonment, he or she should be entitled to the highest procedural protection known to our law. I believe that will come as a shock to no one.

That is often where the problem lies. Military justice is often opaque or not very transparent. No one knows exactly what goes on, except those curious individuals who want to know more. It is important that justice indeed be done. That is even more important for the members of our Canadian Forces who dedicate themselves body and soul to each and every one of us, to all the Canadians we represent. They go to other countries to promote fundamental values and rights, democracy, the right to a fair trial and so on. And yet, once back in Canada, those members, for all kinds of reasons, are sentenced without receiving the advice of counsel or being able to obtain a transcript. When a former Canadian Forces member consults a civilian lawyer, that lawyer has trouble representing the member because the member’s file contains absolutely nothing other than what he or she has said.

I would not go as far as my colleague from Scarborough—Guildwood, who spoke before me, but I believe that is a small step. Many years have elapsed since the Lamer report, and I believe the members of the Canadian Forces deserve a lot better than Bill C-15.

[Andrew Cash, NDP, Davenport, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I think it is important in this place that we remember why the previous iterations of this bill died. In first instance, it died because the government decided to prorogue Parliament, and in the second instance it died because the government was found in contempt of Parliament. That is why these iterations of this bill died.

We supported those iterations. They were better than what we have right now. The reason they were better is that the government was listening to wise counsel from the opposition, something it would be well advised to do in this instance.

The reason we are not supporting the bill at second reading, though there are some things in it that we do support, is that we want to see this go to committee and see some of the issues rectified that my hon. colleague laid out in a very clear fashion.

Why does the government consistently waste taxpayers' money continually redoing these bills and actually watering them down and making them less effective than they were in the first instance?