Evidence of meeting #23 for Foreign Affairs and International Development in the 39th Parliament, 2nd Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was darfur.

A recording is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

R.J. Hillier  Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence
David Mozersky  Project Director, Horn of Africa, International Crisis Group
Martin Amyot  Vice-President, Corporate Development, La Mancha Resources Inc.

3:30 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson

Good afternoon, my dear colleagues

Welcome. This is meeting 23 of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, on Thursday, April 10, 2008. Today we will hear from Canada's Chief of Defence Staff as part of our study on Canada's mission in Afghanistan, and later in the day we will have a briefing on the crisis in Sudan and investments.

We will have time for committee business towards the end of the meeting. I remind all members that we are televised today and we should ensure that our cellphones and our BlackBerrys, all communications devices, will not disrupt our meeting. I say that to members of the committee as well as members of the audience, and I guess with that, the chair had better be certain that his is off as well.

In our first hour we are continuing our study on Canada's mission in Afghanistan, and we have appearing before us, I believe for the third time, from the Department of National Defence, General Hillier, Chief of Defence Staff.

Certainly we welcome you here. When we began the study from Foreign Affairs and International Development on Afghanistan, I think you were the first witness, and this meeting will conclude witnesses. So it's not that the first shall be last and the last shall be first; it's both. You're first and last.

We thank you for coming before our committee today, and we certainly look forward to the comments you have. You've been here before, and you also understand that there will be questions coming at the close.

I would like to remind my colleagues that General Hillier must catch a plane, so right at 4:30 he will be concluding his comments.

Again, welcome, and we look forward to hearing what you have to say to us, General.

3:30 p.m.

General R.J. Hillier Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence

Mr. Chairman, thank you for that welcome. I've been called many worse things than bookends, that's for sure, so thank you for the opportunity to be here.

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for your invitation to appear here today. But I have to tell you that it is difficult for me to see where I can be of service after seeing how Canada's mission in Afghanistan has evolved since the beginning of the year. As you are well aware, the report of the independent panel on the mission was tabled in January and a good deal of debate ensued. As a result, you voted in favour of extending our mission to 2011. This decision to extend the mission sets a very precise timeline which will certainly help the Canadian Forces in our planning. Your decision was followed by the NATO summit in Bucharest last week, where member countries undertook to deploy about 1,000 additional troops in Kandahar. That increase will certainly improve security in the province by preventing the Taliban from launching any offensives.

Having said all of that, but also having just returned from a trip to Afghanistan, where I spent five days on the ground, I had the chance to discuss the situation with many of the key players and leaders and engaged men and women there and to travel significantly in the region around Kandahar City. I had a chance to see, if you will, what is sometimes described by our folks as Taliban country and to talk to almost every one of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and airwomen, and to almost all of the civilians who are engaged in that mission there.

Let me just give you four points of view from what I saw, and that would be my assessment, over time, of the progress with the Afghan national security forces, the visible development, and the main threats against our men and women. I'll also just finish up with a little something about our men and women.

Let me just say I am one of the few people who have had the great privilege to engage in this mission, really, from very early on. I'm one of the folks, because of my responsibilities, Mr. Chair, who gets to see it continually, consistently, and who gets to see all parts of it over a longer period of time. As perhaps you know, my first engagement started back in 2003. I spent a lot of time there in 2004 as the commander, and since we've re-established operations in Kandahar province itself, I've been back 20 to 25 times since August 2005.

Let me just tell you what I saw in the last 18 to 19 months in Kandahar province and use that as a bit of a measuring stick, which is what we do. When I went into Kandahar province in October 2006, we were at the tail end of Operation Medusa, during which the Taliban tried to isolate Kandahar City. They wanted to cut off Highway 1, which is the main highway that goes around Afghanistan, and they wanted to show NATO or, more importantly, show the Afghans that NATO could not stand up to them. Fighting had taken place for about seven or eight weeks in some intense combat involving our soldiers.

When I arrived in October 2006, the area of the Panjwai, Pashmul, and Zhari districts outside of Kandahar City was a combat zone. There was a lot of destruction. The roads were in poor repair. The only people who moved were the Taliban or our soldiers. We did not have any Afghan National Army soldiers or battalions with us; there were very few police with us, and most of those who were we did not trust. The number of people living there, from the population of that valley area--the triangle out there that normally has a population of about 45,000 to 50,000--was almost zero. They had all departed.

I was back again at Christmas. Not a whole lot had changed, except that we had taken the initiative away from the Taliban and they truly now were retrenching or trying to leave the area. We were seeing people come back into their homes in the morning time, but mostly they would still leave at night, and they'd come back in and try to repair a few things--maybe repair a wall, repair an irrigation ditch--and get ready for the future.

I was back again last spring several times, throughout the summer and early fall, at Christmastime, and then back again three weeks ago, and what I saw was this. Now in that valley, 45,000 to 50,000 of the people have moved back into their homes. They have repaired the damage that took place almost completely. They've actually gotten along with new construction, and that new construction is pretty small by some of our standards. Building a grape-drying hut is a big thing to a family who depends on drying gapes for their livelihood.

They're back in. They've rebuilt, with our assistance--and I mean a whole-of-government assistance--some of the schools in the area that were destroyed completely. I particularly went and saw one at Ma'sum Ghar, and now in that school there are three shifts of children going to school every day because that's the way they can get their education. Traffic back in the area--economic traffic, in particular--has grown enormously, kids are out waving on the streets, and men are actually working in the area. In fact, we have about 400 of them working for us now, building a road that they desperately need.

What was most striking as I stood there, in fact, with Minister MacKay at Christmastime was this. When we had looked out over that valley a year ago, it was completely dark at night. Now you look out over that valley and you see clumps of lighting--yes, the electricity is not all on throughout the place--and the valley actually looks almost like a normal lifestyle that you would see in Afghanistan, and that's an incredible change over just 18 months. They're back there, they're working, they're growing their crops, they're doing all the things necessary to earn a living, and they're getting their children on with the education they want them to have so they don't repeat that cycle.

That's just what I've seen, and I've seen that many times now as I've gone back and forth, and we have many measurements that go against that.

The Afghan national security forces....

For me, one of the most important benchmarks is the improvement in the Afghan national security forces. As I mentioned, in 2006, our forces conducted Operation Medusa with no meaningful support from Afghan forces. Currently, our forces and the Afghan National Army (ANA) regularly conduct operations together in Kandahar province. Canadians work in partnership with three infantry battalions, or kandaks, a combat support battalion and a service support battalion, and they provide a mentoring service at their brigade headquarters.

We have six operational mentoring and liaison teams with an Afghan National Army that has three battalions to manoeuvre in and around Kandahar and help provide their security. We've been working with one of the battalions for just over a year, the others less. They are not up to their full strength. They are certainly not up to the operational capabilities they'll need. They don't have all the equipment they must have to be able to do the essential work, but they have come a long way from the zero start we had 17 or 18 months ago in Kandahar province itself, and every day we work with them to improve the operations they can do. The improvement is significant, and we see them leading operations routinely now and conducting operations with us. Canadian troops never conduct operations alone.

For the visible development part, I can tell you there's nothing more visible and nothing more important than roads. When you talk about trying to change an economy from growing drugs to one that grows something that's legal, you don't need roads to take opium and get huge returns on it. You don't need roads to do that, because you can take out an immensely valuable crop worth millions of dollars on a mule train. If you want people to replace that crop with rice or watermelons or wheat, you need to build a transportation system to take 10,000 tonnes or so.

Standing on Route Summit, which traverses those districts immediately to the west of Afghanistan, where a large number of people live, and standing on the causeway, both of which we helped them build to connect that road, Route Summit, into the main transportation network, and being there just three weeks ago and watching 400 Afghan men working under our sort of security with the Afghan police and Afghan army participating in that, to build, rebuild, and pave Route Foster--all three projects were done at the request of Afghans for their livelihood, well-being, security, and their economic vitality--is to see very visible work of which they are very proud and which they protect. Of course, we believe it gives us long-term progress to be able to switch from a drug economy, to be able to get the terrorists away from those sources of money, and at the same time to improve security for the people who live there.

The direct threat is still very real. The mission continues in a positive direction, but that threat remains, especially obviously in the south part of Afghanistan and especially, from our perspective, in the west and north of Kandahar City itself. The Taliban have given up the direct engagements, by and large. Occasionally they will hit us in small ambushes, but now, because of the losses they have taken because of our successes, they prefer to engage in indirect attacks, with improvised explosive device attacks against us, with suicide bombers and small ambushes.

They don't care who they kill. Yesterday they targeted a vehicle in Kandahar City, international forces, and did not cause significant damage to that vehicle. But while they were executing that attack, they killed eight Afghans and wounded, severely in some cases, another 22. We deal with those threats in a variety of ways. There is no silver bullet.

It's imagination. It's ingenuity. It's tactics. It's leadership. It's equipment. It's intelligence. And it's joining up operations, making the best of our characteristics and the best of the Afghan security force characteristics.

For example, in IED attacks we put a lot of emphasis on before the blast, how our intelligence can predict what's going to occur, how we can get surveillance in using a variety of methods to prevent things from being put in, how we can spot the signs that are going to lead to that kind of attack.

During the attack itself, if we can't pre-empt or prevent it, we put a huge amount of emphasis on protecting our soldiers and the Afghans with whom they work, whether it's the kinds of vehicles, the enhanced route-opening capability, or upgrades in the LAV III. I know there are some folks here from General Dynamics Land Systems. I'll tell you the LAV III is an awesome vehicle, and our soldiers love that vehicle. We have improved it to the maximum extent we can.

Then post-blast, when it does occur—and you know they do—we do a thorough analysis. Within two hours we have an assessment team on site, and we pass those lessons around the theatre and pass those lessons back here.

We are keeping the initiative from the Taliban. We're denying them sanctuary and those secure lines of communications and areas from which to operate in Zhari, Panjwai, and Arghandab districts. We're having success with the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police, and we're doing all those things to help Afghans get on with their lives and be able to live a life free from fear. We're doing those things inside a whole-of-government approach; whether that's capacity-building for the police, where our police OMLTs work with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to help improve the training of the Afghan National Police, or working with the ANA, we're taking this approach.

Let me conclude and give you the option to ask me questions and focus on any area you would like.

Our men and women in this mission are Canada's greatest citizens, I believe. Now, I should be saying that, because I'm their Chief of Defence Staff, but I actually believe it.

To go and meet those two and half thousand young men and women is to go and leave with a source of inspiration, a source of pride in our country and the incredible young Canadians, many of them 20, 21, 22 years old, who wear our flag on their left shoulder, who represent our country in Afghanistan in just an incredible manner, and who really are the credentials of Canada.

They represent me, they represent you, and they represent every other Canadian around the country when they go off and do that mission. They need to know that they have your support, the support of Canadians throughout the nation.

I'll close by saying that the outpouring of support across the country over the past weeks, months, several years, has actually allowed these young Canadians to believe they are not alone. When they're 10,000 kilometres away from home, and they're on a dirty, dusty, dangerous trail, and somebody is shooting at them; when they could be forgiven for thinking that they're all alone, that they're all by themselves in this, the outpouring of support in the variety of ways that we have seen over these past months convinces them that the country is with them, that Canadians support them in what they ask them to do for our country.

I'll close there, sir, and I'd be delighted to get any questions. Merci beaucoup.

3:45 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson

Thank you, General Hillier.

Mr. Patry and Mr. Rae.

3:45 p.m.

Liberal

Bernard Patry Liberal Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I will ask my question and Mr. Rae will ask his right afterwards.

My question is about the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to the Associated Press, the U.S., Afghan, and Pakistani officers opened, last Saturday, the first of six joint military intelligence centres along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, an effort to cut down on militant movement in this region of rising terrorist activity.

Is Canada involved in the opening of these centres? When will such an intelligence centre be opened between the province of Kandahar and the Pakistani border?

3:45 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Rae's question as well, please.

3:45 p.m.

Liberal

Bob Rae Liberal Toronto Centre, ON

General, let me welcome you and say how proud all of us are of what you and the troops are doing. I'm sure I speak for all members of the official opposition when I say that. I look forward to an opportunity to visit with the troops as soon as that's possible.

What is your understanding of the relationship between the OEF and the ISAF forces in Kandahar, and what exactly will be the relationship between the ISAF troops and the American troops that we have been told will be supplemental to our efforts in Kandahar?

I'd like to know in particular whether the rules of engagement are the same, whether the general philosophy and approach of the two groups will be the same, and just how that coordination is going to be taking place.

3:45 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson

Thank you, Mr. Rae.

General Hillier.

3:45 p.m.

Gen R.J. Hillier

Sir, I'll start with the second question first, if you don't mind. There are two military missions in Afghanistan: the OEF and the ISAF mission. The key issue here is to ensure coordination, so that we don't have a conflict during operations.

We work with the ISAF mission under the control of NATO. Our operational commander of Joint Task Force Kandahar works directly under Regional Command South, who works under COM ISAF. He gets his direction from there.

To deconflict operations, we work at both the ISAF in Kabul and at Regional Command South. This is also done directly with our commanders, so that if OEF should be conducting operations in the areas where we work, we know about it and can have that deconfliction. This way, there is no chance of blue on blue or things happening that we wouldn't have control of.

That system, we believe, has worked very well over the last 18 months or so. In fact, I cannot list for you any operation that has caused an issue because we didn't have synchronization or deconfliction between OEF and ISAF. We focus on the ISAF mission, of which we are a part, and we seek to make sure we have deconfliction for OEF.

On the ISAF and the assets coming in from the United States of America, all the details of how they will work are not yet hammered out, but they are coming in to work for the ISAF mission. In other words, they are declared to NATO forces, which means they work under the NATO rules of engagement. They are directed by the NATO commander both at ISAF headquarters in Kabul and at Regional Command South in Kandahar.

Therefore, they will fit with the ISAF campaign plan in the operations they conduct. That was all being walked through. In fact, when I was there three weeks ago, I had a chance to talk to all of those commanders, and they were seized with how to get the best impact from the marines that are starting to arrive but are not yet operational, and then from the forces that they were expecting. This was pre-Bucharest. They were expecting forces to be declared at Bucharest and come in later on. These forces are not working for OEF but for NATO and are under the same chain of command as we are, responding to the same campaign plan.

3:50 p.m.

Liberal

Bob Rae Liberal Toronto Centre, ON

Just as a quick supplemental, are the 3,000 that were supposed to be coming this summer, as I understand it, going to be under ISAF and not under OEF?

3:50 p.m.

Gen R.J. Hillier

Sir, there are actually two pieces. The first part is that the 3,000 divides down. There's a manoeuvre group. They will work for NATO, and then there are about another 1,000 out of that 3,000 that are actually going to go directly into training the police organizations, and that organization is still under OEF but is actually training police as opposed to conducting operations.

So with regard to the marines arriving for manoeuvre, any manoeuvre forces there will work for ISAF under the NATO mission.

3:50 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson

Thank you, General Hillier. To the first question, the Pakistan-Afghan border is part of...?

3:50 p.m.

Gen R.J. Hillier

Yes, sir. Can I just say, first of all, that I think the opening of the joint intelligence centres is actually an excellent move. It's a step forward. I was in Pakistan on the last day of the week that I was in Afghanistan, and I had the opportunity to talk to their chief of general staff who runs the army, General Kayani, and the head of their intelligent services, both of whom are much engaged in this. They are established.

We as a country specifically are not engaged in it. Our Canadian commander, Region Command South, who works for NATO, our NATO commander, is engaged in the oversight of what is occurring from that perspective. But we specifically as a country don't have a direct role in it right now, except to support the NATO part of this one. That is work going on.

We actually think the Pakistanis are stepping up their efforts on the border in a way that we have not yet seen. They are well aware of the challenge. They are very concerned--at least, this is what I got when I was there--about the threat they have in Pakistan that comes from the Taliban strength in the federally administered tribal areas where there is very little governance, very little development, and very little security, except what the Taliban bring. They realize this is a major threat to Pakistan, and that's their first concern, so their efforts to contain it and to actually bring governance into that area to help develop that area have been stepped up and are stepping up significantly. We see evidence of that.

The joint intelligence centres are one good example of making sure the border doesn't become an artificial separation that allows the Taliban to stay on one side or the other.

3:50 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson

Thank you, General Hillier.

We now move to the Bloc.

Ms. Bourgeois, you have seven minutes.

3:50 p.m.

Bloc

Diane Bourgeois Bloc Terrebonne—Blainville, QC

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Good afternoon, General Hillier. You mentioned a mission that is going on at the moment. Is the real threat in the south, the west or the north?

3:50 p.m.

Gen R.J. Hillier

Unfortunately, I did not understand you completely, Madam.

3:50 p.m.

Bloc

Diane Bourgeois Bloc Terrebonne—Blainville, QC

You have just told us that the mission was going on at the moment and that there was a threat in the south, the west and the north. Are there pockets of resistance in the north? Is the situation more critical in the south than it is in the north or the west? Where is it most critical?

3:50 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson

General Hillier.

3:50 p.m.

Gen R.J. Hillier

Sir, Madam, what I would do is quote President Karsai, who said that Kandahar province is “the centre of gravity” for his country. There is where the Taliban first developed. That is their homestay, if you will, and that is where the threat is most significant. That is where the efforts are required, because as Kandahar province goes, so will the rest of the country. There are threats, much less organized and much less lethal in most cases, that occur from time to time around the rest of the country. But in the south--Helmand province, Kandahar province, Zabul province, and Oruzgan province, certainly the south part of Oruzgan province--is where the main part of the Taliban efforts are focused and where we see most of their commanders, fighters being recruited or forced to fight for them, and therefore where we see most of the security operations.

If you actually take a look at the statistics that NATO just put out, something like 94% of the attacks against either the Afghan government officials, humanitarian aid agencies, or international military forces took place in about 10% of the districts across Afghanistan. So slightly less than one-tenth of the country is a major threat, and most of that is in that southern area of Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, and Oruzgan provinces.

3:55 p.m.

Bloc

Diane Bourgeois Bloc Terrebonne—Blainville, QC

Thank you.

I am going to echo the question from the Liberal Party. I understand that some American troops are going to withdraw from Kandahar next October. Is that correct?

3:55 p.m.

Gen R.J. Hillier

What I've heard about the American forces in the south is that the marine unit that is coming in now has been given a mission that takes them through to November. What I understand about the commitment from the Americans at the NATO summit is that by the end of January 2009, they would have met what our ask was of NATO to have another manoeuvre battalion in Kandahar province itself.

So the marines are in. Whether they are extended in the next several months and stay on through or whether they leave and then are replaced is a question that the United States armed services would work through.

3:55 p.m.

Bloc

Diane Bourgeois Bloc Terrebonne—Blainville, QC

We know that Canada has received 1,000 more troops in the south. Next October or November, the Americans are going to pull a number of troops out of Afghanistan, specifically from Kandahar. I want to know how many they are going to withdraw.

3:55 p.m.

Gen R.J. Hillier

I can't give you a detailed answer, Madam, except to say that my understanding is that the 3,000 marines who are going in now for a seven-month mission are the ones who are scheduled to come out in November also.

3:55 p.m.

Bloc

Diane Bourgeois Bloc Terrebonne—Blainville, QC

OK.

You talked earlier about working with the Afghan government. You have a top-down approach. This week, we met someone from Oxfam-Québec who prefers a bottom-up approach, working with representatives, the community or tribal elders' council, for example, so that all social and community work goes back into Afghan communities.

Have you had contacts with the various NGOs on the ground who prefer working in that way?

3:55 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson

General Hillier.

3:55 p.m.

Gen R.J. Hillier

Mr. Chairman, first of all, I would say that we, as soldiers, but then we as part of the whole-of-government approach from Canada, working with the Department of Foreign Affairs and CIDA, work with the government structures inside of Kandahar province right up through to the national level in Kabul all the time.

We work with the district leaders and their shuras, the gatherings of the elders who help run that district. We work with the provincial governor, Governor Khalid, and the government of Kandahar province. And obviously we work with the national government. We work with them to facilitate all the things they want and need to do, including the return of refugees, some of whom have been out of the country for 30 years or more. So we do that all the time.

What we do not see much of on the ground in Kandahar province are the international or non-governmental organizations that could facilitate that direct work on the ground itself. There are not many of them in Kandahar province itself, and we'd like to see more there.