Foreign Affairs Committee on Oct. 20th, 2011

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Yes. For the first hour, just one hour.

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

Okay.

Otherwise, for Tuesday, given the events of today in Libya, maybe it would be very interesting to have an update on the situation in Libya and what appears to be the new phase beginning with the potential death of Colonel Gadhafi. We would suggest that. It could help also launch our longer-term study on the Arab Spring. I think the UN Security Council is discussing Yemen this week and we note that in Syria things are still unfolding, so I think spending some time on Libya next Tuesday could be useful.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Mr. Dechert.

[Bob Dechert, Conservative, Mississauga—Erindale, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I certainly don't have any concerns about having an update on Libya. I think that's a reasonable suggestion. There's something else that I think is perhaps a little more timely, and that I would like to see dealt with on Tuesday, and that is the recent events in Egypt with respect to the massacre that took place in Cairo last weekend.

We talked earlier in this session about having an update on Egypt from our officials in terms of the whole democratic situation in Egypt, the proposed elections, and what the status of the revolution was. Since that time, we've had this major event in Cairo. I know that a lot of Canadians are very concerned about that. I think maybe we could do an hour or an hour and a half on that on Tuesday.

The second thing that I think might be interesting to look at--and I would suggest that it's very timely--is that, as all of you know, the Commonwealth conference is taking place next week in Australia. A large Canadian delegation will be attending. We have the opportunity to have Senator Segal on the line on a video conference from the conference in Australia—I would suggest for maybe half an hour—to make a presentation and take some questions on what's going on at the conference.

If I could suggest this, maybe we could do that on Tuesday, and then move to Libya and Syria on Thursday.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

All right. We have a couple of suggestions there. We'll try to fit it in, then, based on availability of people. We have an hour on AIDS and tuberculosis on Thursday and then what we can do is fill another hour. The other slot was the one for looking at the work plan for Africa, which we also want to discuss.

We have a couple of ideas now, so I'll work with the clerk and the researchers to come up with something based on availability of witnesses. Maybe the update on Libya would be better the week after, but we all agree that it may be possible to get an update.

So we have a couple of things here. I will work with the clerk and the researchers to fill in the schedule for next week based on the suggestions we have here. Okay?

Let's suspend for five minutes and get our next group of witnesses in here.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

I will invite everyone to come back to the table. I want to welcome our witnesses for the second hour.

We have with us Lisa Shymko, executive director of the Canadian Friends of Ukraine and chair of the Canada-Ukraine Parliamentary Centre.

Welcome, Lisa.

We also have with us Taras Zalusky, the executive director of the national office for the Ukrainian Canadian Congress.

Welcome, sir.

Our last guest, appearing as an individual, is Taras Kuzio, senior visiting fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

Welcome to you, Taras.

I believe that you all have opening statements, so why don't I just start with Taras Zalusky?

[Taras Zalusky, Executive Director, National Office, Ukrainian Canadian Congress]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the invitation to participate in this important meeting of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development as it examines the situation in Ukraine.

My name is Taras Zalusky. I'm the executive director of the UCC. The Ukrainian Canadian Congress is the voice of Canada's Ukrainian community. The congress brings together under one umbrella all the national, provincial, and local Ukrainian Canadian organizations.

Among others, one of the purposes and objects of the UCC is to support the democratic, civil, social, economic, and state development of Ukraine. By extension, the Ukrainian Canadian community wishes to see this great country and its talented people succeed in overcoming the legacy of its difficult past and continue to build a democratic, stable, prosperous, and harmonious society within Ukraine, based on respect for national and religious minorities and strong mutually respectful relations with its neighbours and beyond. The Ukrainian community in Canada wishes to foster positive relations between Canada and Ukraine.

Despite the numerous statements by the Ukrainian government, which denies the situation, there is abundant information and evidence that Ukraine is returning to an authoritarian governance model.

Consequently, there are a number of negative implications for stability in the region. There are also risks of physical confrontation between civil society and Ukrainian authorities as the government systematically proceeds to reverse the democratic gains resulting from the Orange Revolution.

Today, many in Ukraine feel that their future is at risk. The rule of law and democratic freedoms, such as freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of speech, are being stifled. Opposition leaders are being arrested, jailed, and charged, and often in that order. Politically motivated selective justice is being meted out indiscriminately against opponents of the Yanukovych government.

President Yanukovych has overseen a number of actions that constitute a rejection of the fundamental principles of democratic government. Previous restrictions on the powers of the president have been repealed. This has accelerated the concentration of power in the hands of the president. The distinction and separation of powers among the president, prime minister, the government, and Parliament have been significantly reduced, if not nullified. Checks and balances between the executive and the judiciary have also been eroded.

There has been a crackdown on opposition politicians, manifested in the ongoing prosecution and recent conviction of, among others, Yulia Tymoshenko, the former prime minister; the arrest and imprisonment of Yuriy Lutsenko, former interior minister; and the flight into asylum in the Czech Republic of Bohdan Danylyshyn, the former economy minister. In the Tymoshenko case, the decision to sentence her to seven years' incarceration precludes her from holding public office for years.

Over the past weeks, many political leaders have condemned her trial, highlighting its political nature and the attempt to eliminate Mrs. Tymoshenko as an opposition leader. On October 11, 2011, European Union High Representative Catherine Ashton issued the following statement:

The verdict comes after a trial which did not respect the international standards as regards fair, transparent and independent legal process, which I repeatedly called for in my previous statements. This unfortunately confirms that justice is being applied selectively in politically motivated prosecutions of the leaders of the opposition and members of the former government.

Similar statements were also made--strong statements--by Canada's foreign minister, the Honourable John Baird, and Canada's Prime Minister, both publicly and in correspondence to President Yanukovych.

There has also been an increasing use of coercion against journalists and threats to media freedom in Ukraine.

One of the major achievements of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 was the establishment of truly independent media. The Ukrainians now have greater trust in the media than they have in their country's politicians, according to the polls conducted in 2010.

Independent media outlets have become a mainstay of the Ukraine civil society landscape and a trusted check on the government. However, since February 2010, a growing number of disturbing incidents have occurred that convey the impression that media freedoms are increasingly being jeopardized.

In July 2010, international media rights watchdog Reporters without Borders found documented cases of physical attacks on journalists, direct obstruction of their work, and acts of censorship of various kinds. According to the U.S. state department, the local elections of October 31, 2010 did not meet standards for openness and fairness set by the presidential elections earlier that year.

There are also serious fears about the next legislative elections in 2012. How can they be declared free and fair if the leaders of the two opposition parties, including the leader of the official opposition, are unable to take part in them?

As well, the government of President Yanukovych has targeted independent universities, research institutions, and others for harassment and intimidation, especially those working on restoring Ukraine's historical memory.

Last year, Prime Minister Harper visited the Ukrainian Catholic University and the National Lonsky Memorial Prison Museum, where both the rector of the university, Father Bores Gudziak, and the director of the museum, Ruslan Zabily, were subjected to government harassment and intimidation. In June of this year, Zabily and 16 staff members of the museum were interrogated by the secret police, despite messaging to the contrary from Prime Minister Azarov.

These are some of the latest actions demonstrating the efforts of the Government of Ukraine to step up actions against researchers and historians. These and other efforts to revert to Soviet-style tactics of intimidation need to be monitored, publicized, and addressed systematically.

What can Canada do? With respect to CIDA, the Canadian International Development Agency, its focus at present is on agriculture and food security and economic development for Ukraine.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Mr. Zalusky, could you slow down just a bit so the interpreters can keep up? I know that you have to get in a lot in a short period of time, but just a touch more slowly...?

[Taras Zalusky]

How am I doing for time?

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

You're about halfway there.

[Taras Zalusky]

I'll slow down, then.

We believe those priorities should be modified to include good governance, democratic development, judicial reform, and civil society support. Canada can help foster NGO sector development, especially groups working in the areas of human rights, education, and law reform, as a vibrant civil society is one of the best guarantors of Ukraine's long-term democratic evolution.

In the interim, we request that Canada use all of the diplomatic tools at its disposal to communicate both publicly and privately Canada's displeasure with some of the regressive developments in Ukraine, and to warn the Ukrainian government of the potential consequences of its divisive and anti-democratic actions.

We suggest that a Canadian parliamentary delegation visit Ukraine this fall to meet with Ukrainian parliamentarians and government officials to deliver a strong message that Ukraine can only be accepted in the international community if it has a functioning democracy and respects human rights.

We also call upon the government to attend important events and hearings, such as the trial of Yuriy Lutsenko, to signal that Canada, along with other western democracies, is closely following how justice is being dispensed under the Yanukovych government.

With respect to the free trade talks for Ukraine and Canada, which Madam mentioned earlier, we believe those negotiations should be made conditional upon the Ukrainian government committing to respecting democracy and human rights. Given the political context in Ukraine, we strongly encourage Canada to ensure that the proposed Canada-Ukraine FTA contains specific provisions guaranteeing human rights, rule of law, and adherence to fundamental democratic principles as a condition to the conclusion of such an agreement.

We similarly request that Canada use all of its influence within the Euro-Atlantic community and Euro-Atlantic agencies to maintain pressure on the government to respect democracy and human rights. European governments are now realizing that Ukraine's slide into authoritarianism does not serve their long-term interests, and they are beginning to respond accordingly. Canada should support European efforts to promote Ukraine's integration into European structures.

Finally, with respect to the 2012 elections, we call upon Canada to begin preparing now for the thorough monitoring of Ukraine's parliamentary elections in 2012.

In addition to sending a sizable delegation of Canadian short-term electoral observers, greater emphasis must be placed on long- and medium-term monitoring of the electoral process in Ukraine and on publicizing any anti-democratic machinations in the lead-up to the vote as they occur. It is recommended that greater emphasis be placed on these longer-term observations given the growing sophistication of Ukrainian politicians in manipulating the electoral process to achieve a desired outcome, rather than engaging in blatant and massive fraud on election day.

Finally, there are serious concerns with these upcoming elections. How can they be declared free and fair if the leaders of two opposition parties, including the leader of the official opposition, are not able to participate?

Thank you for your time.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you, sir.

We're going to move to Ms. Shymko.

The floor is yours for 10 minutes.

[Lisa Shymko, Executive Director, Chair, Canada-Ukraine Parliamentary Centre, Canadian Friends of Ukraine]

Mr. Chairman, on behalf of our organization, Canadian Friends of Ukraine, I want to thank you for inviting us to take part in this hearing before your parliamentary committee.

Thank you for the opportunity to address the foreign affairs and international development committee.

Thank you also to our parliamentarians for the emergency debate on the issue of Ukraine that took place a few days ago. As you know, that fact was reported quite widely in Ukraine's media in advance of the debate and following. I think it's essential that Ukraine's readers, both on the Internet and in official newspapers, have access to that information, and we're very happy that Canada took such an immediate stance in Parliament to have that debate occur.

My name is Lisa Shymko. I am here representing the Canadian Friends of Ukraine in my capacity as chair of the Canada-Ukraine Parliamentary Centre, which operates under the auspices of Canadian Friends of Ukraine.

I'd also like to acknowledge the presence of several of my colleagues from Canadian Friends of Ukraine, including our president, Margareta Shpir, and our director, Roman Waschuk. I thank them for being present today.

Canadian Friends of Ukraine is a non-profit, non-governmental organization established in 1990 to strengthen Canada-Ukraine relations by applying Canadian know-how to promote democracy and reform in Ukraine. Since its creation, Canadian Friends of Ukraine has taken the lead in fostering interparliamentary and intergovernmental cooperation between our two countries.

In 2000, Canadian Friends of Ukraine, in cooperation with CIDA, established the Canada-Ukraine Parliamentary Resource Centre at the National Parliamentary Library of Ukraine in Kiev. The state-of-the-art facility houses a collection comprising Canadian federal and provincial statutes. The centre strives to strengthen the process by which legislation is developed in Ukraine by improving access to information for parliamentarians, their staff, and the general public.

We're very proud of this centre. We feel that it's a showpiece for Canada. It has welcomed ambassadors from across the world, parliamentarians, and cabinet ministers. We've had several visitors, including not only visitors from western European states, but Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs as well.

Canadian Friends of Ukraine is also the founder of the international statesmen dinner, which provides a Canadian forum for political leaders from Ukraine. In 2003, we hosted the visit of the former Prime Minister of Ukraine, Yulia Tymoshenko, to Canada and facilitated her meetings here in Ottawa with the Speaker, who hosted a luncheon for her. She also held meetings with the then foreign affairs minister, Mr. Bill Graham, and she also made a representation in front of representatives of CIDA and the Department of Foreign Affairs.

She subsequently addressed a very large audience at the Royal York Hotel, which included senators and ministers, parliamentarians from all parties, and media luminaries such as Peter Mansbridge and others. In her address, the audience heard Ms.Tymoshenko deliver an impassioned speech on the need to fight government corruption in a post-soviet Ukraine. It is ironic, as everyone before me has mentioned here, that eight years later Ms. Tymoshenko is now the subject of what Khrushchev's great-granddaughter recently called a modern-day Stalinist show trial.

A year ago, I and my colleague, the president of Canadian Friends of Ukraine, Margareta Shpir, had the honour of accompanying the Prime Minister on his historic trip to Ukraine, during which the Prime Minister so eloquently enunciated the democratic principles on which Canada's foreign policy is founded. We definitely never imagined, at least on the part of our NGO, that 10 months later my colleague and I would be sitting in a courtroom observing the trial of Ms. Tymoshenko. We did have an opportunity to speak to her briefly and she did want to thank Canada for monitoring the trial so diligently.

As you know, and as has been said prior to my addressing you today, the trial and the persecution of other officials have directly impacted the road map of priorities for Canada-Ukraine relations that was signed by the foreign ministers of Canada and Ukraine in 2009. Many of my comments are part of a 14-page brief that we have prepared for the members of the committee, which we hope to distribute to you later.

The emerging situation in Ukraine and its neighbouring country, Russia, have of course raised serious concerns not only about the future of Ukrainian democracy and political sovereignty, which if left unaddressed will have strategic geopolitical implications not only for Ukraine but for the entire region, but as the previous speaker alluded to, there are several troubling aspects to that erosion.

First is the persecution of opposition leaders and the selective justice. I won't repeat what you already know about Tymoshenko and other members of the former government, but I do want to indicate that in the area of impartiality, on the part of judicial proceedings Amnesty International has reported that only 0.2%--that's two in 1,000--of those indicted by the prosecution in Ukraine are found not guilty and set free. The average in the EU is over 40%.

I'd also like to draw attention to the fact that there are troubling violations of human rights and media freedom in Ukraine. In April of 2010, Ukraine's president abolished the national commission on freedom of speech and the rule of law, and that has been one of the questions from one of members of Parliament in terms of media freedom.

We are deeply concerned that there is a problem in terms of how the line between the state and media independence has been blurred. There is a media tycoon, for example, by the name of Valeriy Khoroshkovsky, who owns a pro-government TV channel known as Inter, and he was appointed head of the Security Service of Ukraine--a major conflict of interest. Now what we see is that the Security Service of Ukraine very often pressures the national television and radio broadcasting council and threatens to cut off their broadcasting licences if their television station interviews one too many opposition leaders.

It has also been mentioned today that Reporters without Borders has published a press freedom index and that has indicated a major deterioration in press freedom in Ukraine. Ukraine's ranking has fallen to 131st place, which is a sharp drop from its previous year's ranking of 89th place. To put this in perspective, Russia's rank remains notably worse, at 140th.

There are also many other issues that I'm not going to discuss today but are alluded to and discussed in detail in our brief in regard to an endemic police criminality. That is a big problem in Ukraine. There are countless cases of individuals who either have died in police custody or have been beaten by police officers and have not had follow-up investigations. Those cases are indicated in our brief.

There are, of course, other abuses of parliamentary democracy and the constitution, and a strong attack on national identity. These are also enunciated in our brief.

I'd also like to make reference to another issue that one of your members of Parliament asked about today, and that is what we call “the Russia factor”. Russia has very specific political and economic objectives in Ukraine, and this is not surprising. We do believe that the current political crisis in Ukraine, coupled with Russia's ambition for greater influence in that part of the world, may herald some troubling geopolitical shifts. I'd like to draw attention to a few aspects.

First, as you know, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is aggressively pushing for Gazprom, the Russian state-owned energy company to take over Ukraine's state energy company, Naftogaz, whose pipeline transports 80% of the natural gas used by the European Union countries. One of the commentators in the National Review, George Weigel, recently wrote that if this does happen, it is going to have profound implications for European energy security and for Russia's capacity to impose its will on Europe in the energy sector.

A second factor on the perspective of Russian influence is the fact that, as you know, Moscow is pursuing the creation of a Russian-led common market, customs union, and possible common currency. This would not only compromise Ukraine's sovereignty, but would also see Ukraine abandoning negotiations with the EU on association in a rather wide-encompassing trade agreement.

The other issue is the troubling record of the decline of human rights in Russia, which we believe is having a spillover effect into Ukraine. According to the committee for the protection of journalists, 22 journalists and media personnel were killed in Russia between 2000 and 2010, and there have been multiple attacks on human rights activists, lawyers, and others. I won't read you all the examples.

I don't know how much time I have left, but I'm getting to my conclusion.

We do believe that the road map is at risk. We do believe that the loss of Ukraine as a strategic partner of Canada and the EU would have far-reaching global consequences, but we also believe that a business-as-usual approach is not going to be adequate at this time. We talk about constructive engagement. We'd prefer to call it conditional engagement, and we have 14 proposals and recommendations to the department and to Parliament. I am just going to read the first essential ones and then leave you in peace.

Our first recommendation is that no invitations be extended to high-ranking Ukrainian government officials, particularly the President of Ukraine, for participation in official or state visits to Canada at this time.

Second is that further negotiations aimed at signing a free trade agreement between Canada and Ukraine be suspended until after the 2012 parliamentary elections in Ukraine, conditional on the participation of Ukraine's parliamentary opposition leader, Yulia Tymoshenko, in those elections.

Third, we believe that attempts to bar the opposition leader from participating in those elections should be considered as grounds for completely withdrawing from that process.

We also believe that Canada should take advantage of its participation at the upcoming G-20 Summit in Cannes to encourage world leaders, particularly those in the U.S. and Europe, as part of important leverage, to make future economic integration between Ukraine and EU countries conditional on the achievement of an impartial Ukrainian judicial system and open parliamentary elections. At the same time, we believe they should insist that Russia refrain from interfering in Ukraine's internal affairs.

We have many more recommendations, but I do want to say, since you spoke about NGOs, that it is important that you continue to engage with NGOs. We believe that the Canadian government, CIDA, and other bilateral channels should work more closely with Canadian NGOs that have a strong record of successfully implementing programs in Ukraine. We include our NGO in that group. We're very happy and pleased about our track record.

I thank you for the time.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you.

We'll move to Mr. Kuzio.

You have 10 minutes, sir.

[Dr. Taras Kuzio, Senior Visiting Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, As an Individual]

Mr. Chair, thank you for the invitation to give testimony to the committee.

My testimony is I think available to everybody, and what I've tried to focus on is a slightly different approach, because I think one of the main problems that western policy-makers have in dealing with the Yanukovych administration is to try to understand how they reach their decisions and their policies. How do we get inside their heads to try to act more decisively and correctly vis-à-vis them?

What I've done is divide up a ten-point step to try to understand the political culture and the mindsets of the current elites. Here we go.

Firstly, taking this term from the recent riots in Britain, Ukraine's elites are “feral elites”, to a tenth degree. These are elites--and I'm sure there are some people here from Ukraine who would agree with me--who have little connection to Ukrainian society and don't really give much of a damn about Ukrainian society.

So when we have this factor raised in the west about why Ukraine's elites are putting such an important document as the association agreement with the EU potentially under threat, it's because what's more important to them is what is of importance to them individually, not to societies at all. They believe that the world is a Machiavellian place where the end justifies the means. There was only one occasion in the last 20 years of Ukrainian independence when Ukraine's elites were afraid of Ukrainian citizens, and that was during the Orange Revolution, when they fled abroad—some committed suicide—and others even fled to Moscow.

Why is all of this important? Well, it's reflected in very low public levels of trust in state institutions in Ukraine. The Ukrainian parliament has a level of trust of something like 5%, for example. It's the same with political parties. Most Ukrainians do not believe they live in a democracy. Eighty per cent of Ukrainians believe that the country is not heading in the right direction, while only 10% do.

Second is national interest. Personal and business interests are of far greater importance to Ukraine's feral elites than the national interests of the country. So revenge against Yulia Tymoshenko for removing the gas intermediary RosUkrEnergo in the 2009 gas contract is far more important than signing an association agreement with the European Union.

This plays out in many different areas. So it's not a question...I think sometimes it's very simplistically put forward that Yanukovych is pro-Russian or Yushchenko is pro-western. They are neither pro-Russian nor pro-western. They are “pro-me”. That's very important to understand: “what do I get out of it?” Yanukovych has actually said that on a number of occasions: what do I get from this agreement?

Thirdly, Ukraine is a milk cow for a place where you can steal raw materials, finances.... Ukraine's level of corruption has already been discussed here. Sadly, there's a negative side to this from our point of view, in that much of this money goes into the west. For Britain, it's not a coincidence that journalists have described London as Londongrad or Moscow on the Thames. A lot of this money goes into Britain. It goes into western Europe. Two Ukrainian oligarchs in the last three years bought two of the most expensive properties in British history for a total of over $400 million.

Cyprus, an EU member, is the largest foreign investor in Ukraine. Why? Because it's an offshore zone, where much of this corrupt money goes. I'll talk about this in the final conclusions about policy-making, but one needs to follow the money and, unfortunately, western Europe has been very bad in terms of not being stringent on the issues of money laundering.

Fourth is a banal question. I don't know whether the photographs of Viktor Yanukovych's mansion are on the brief that was translated, but his mansion near Kyiv was privatized when he was prime minister in 2006, illegally; this was a Soviet-era residence that was used to host foreign dignitaries in Soviet Ukraine.

This is his personal home—stolen—and it's something that's very dear to him. He believes that if Tymoshenko is released from prison and becomes president in 2015, she will nationalize it, take it back to the state--and she probably will. So that's already a personal reason for him not to want Tymoshenko to stand in elections.

The residence has become a scandal in the Ukraine just by the fact of how much money is being put in there. For example, recent reports talked of €300,000 spent on a bathroom and €80,000 spent on chandeliers. Obviously Yanukovych cannot afford to pay for this with his presidential salary. It undermines his claim that he's battling corruption with the sentencing of Tymoshenko

Next is “ostentatious”. Yanukovych comes from a different elite background than the previous Ukrainian presidents. Presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma both came from the Soviet nomenklatura elite. They therefore had a far higher level of education and far greater access to resources and advisers.

Yanukovych was twice convicted as a teenager and imprisoned. He comes from a very humble background. That's reflected in how he approaches things, reflected in many ways. Particularly, he has very narrow horizons, is not prone to compromise, and he has, I would say, a very uneducated response to western criticism.

Sixth is “machismo”. Again, don't underestimate these kinds of things. The Donetsk clan's Party of Regions shows heavy male machismo in terms of how it undertakes foreign policy decisions and domestic policy matters and how it reacts to foreign criticism.

This is especially important in the Tymoshenko case. Tymoshenko is unique in that part of the world as a woman who has reached the pinnacle of Ukrainian politics. There's simply nobody else like her in the former U.S.S.R., maybe not even in eastern Europe. Women who, for example, became leaders in the Baltic States were from the emigration, from the diaspora, including from Canada. She is even unique in western democracies. Very few women have reached the pinnacles of political power in western democracies.

When you have a culture as you have in the Ukraine, that relates to women in the sense of where our relationship to women was prior to the 1960s, very chauvinistic and very critical, then you can understand that Tymoshenko is seen as a personal threat to this very male-dominated society. For example, Yanukovych was supposed to have debated on state television, in the second round of the 2010 elections, with Tymoshenko. He refused. When he was asked why he refused, he replied that a woman's place was in the kitchen, not in politics.

The current government, which is of course pro-presidential, is the first of 14 Ukrainian governments without a single woman in the government. That culture very much has a problem, then, with Tymoshenko--as did Yushchenko, by the way, on that gender point.

Number seven is “power”. Power, in the minds of the current Donetsk clan's Party of Regions, should be maximized to the fullest extent in both politics and economics, and, once you have obtained power, you do not give it up. Threats to remaining in power indefinitely are very important, and therefore you need to remove those threats.

Tymoshenko was the main threat. Let's recall that she lost only by 3% in the 2010 elections, even though she was the sitting prime minister just after a global financial crisis. This shocked Yanukovych. He expected to win by more than 10% and yet he barely scraped through. He knows damn well that in 2015, if he were to face her, he would probably lose in a free election, because he would be five years in power and she would be then the opposition leader.

There have been many criticisms...and I'll go on to this question about next year's elections. The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems both, in September-October of this year, condemned the new draft election law that's being put forward. The aim of the draft election law is to ensure that the Party of Regions receives a whopping constitutional majority, or a 50% majority, in next year's parliament.

As well, the sentencing of Tymoshenko is geared towards this. She's been sentenced deliberately for seven years' imprisonment and three years' banning from government. Why this configuration? Because it bans her from the next four elections, two parliamentary and two presidential. It means that Yanukovych has no threats from her for the next nine years, up until 2020.

Another factor is that it's bad for one's health to be out of power. That's the way they feel. They've opened a Pandora's box by laying charges against Tymoshenko and other leaders. If an ex-president or ex-prime minister can be put on trial now, then it could be the same, when they are out of power, against them, especially as they've corrupted the constitution and infringed numerous laws since they've been in power. So it's not a good idea to be no longer in power, especially in the mindset of these individuals.

The inferiority complex is very neo-Soviet. Just look at the kinds of counter-reactions we've had regarding criticism about this Tymoshenko sentence, such as, “How dare you interfere in our internal affairs?” and “This is all double standards”, etc. We heard this when the Soviet Union still existed.

The EU ambassador to Ukraine this week said that what they seem to fail to understand is that integration into the European Union is not a case of an à la carte menu from which you just choose things you like and ignore other things. It's a fixed menu; you have to take what the EU is offering.

Finally, let me address the question of their possibly believing that the imprisonment of Tymoshenko might lead to a better gas contract. I have three policy recommendations that I would add to this.

First, going on from what I have said, I don't think Tymoshenko will be released. The key factor the west should be looking at is next year's parliamentary elections. The EU ambassador to Ukraine said that the door is practically closed, but the window is still open. I think the window will be open only until next year's elections.

So I would offer three policy recommendations.

Coordination is a key factor here. The Yanukovych administration has been saying repeatedly that the EU and the west—the U.S., Canada, and the EU—are divided in their approaches toward what's going on in Ukraine. It's very important that the EU, the U.S., and Canada have a coordinated position—even, I would say, a joint statement—to make it perfectly clear that they're all on the same page.

This is also true regarding the free trade agreement. The deep and comprehensive free trade agreement between the EU and Ukraine is now practically suspended; it's frozen. There was a belief that the Polish presidency of the European Council would lead to its negotiations being completed by December, but then ratification would not take place. It's very unlikely that even the final step of negotiations will be completed. If the EU is not likely to sign a deep free trade agreement with the Ukraine, then I don't think Canada should either. There should be a coordination of the same position on this. It would look rather odd if Canada went ahead and the EU didn't.

Finally, let's come back to my question of money. If you really want to hurt the Yanukovych administration, you can do so far more than you can hurt Belarus. Belarus doesn't have oligarchs; the Ukraine has. Those oligarchs from Ukraine have homes and businesses in London, in Monaco, and elsewhere. They have children in private schools. They travel to western Europe.

You need to, first, start thinking about a visa blacklist. That will really hurt them. The oligarchs in Ukraine, we are being told, are pro-European. They're afraid of Russia and Russian economic imperialism. Yet the oligarchs have been very silent and passive until now. If the oligarchs start to feel that their own personal interests are threatened, they will then impact upon the Yanukovych administration.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much.

I want to point out to the members that we have about 24 minutes left and that we're going to have bells at 10:40. I'm going to suggest we still go to 10:45 since they're half-hour bells, if that's okay, which means that we're probably going to have time for just one round. We'll go from there.

We're going to start with Ms. Sims.

[Jinny Sims, NDP, Newton—North Delta, BC]

Thank you very much.

First of all, thank you for your presentations. My heart goes out both to you and to the Ukrainian diaspora who are feeling this pain, as well as to those of you who are working very closely in the Ukraine, and of course, to the people of Ukraine as well.

I want to ask a really concrete question about CIDA right now.

You asked specifically, Taras, that CIDA modify its mandate to the Ukraine so that we're looking more at good governance, democratic development, judicial reform, and support of civil society. From you, we've heard that there should be more support for NGOs so that we can build a stronger civil society. Can you elaborate on why this is important? Also, can you give examples of what Canada could be doing and where the focus should be?

I also want to comment that most of our CIDA projects that were in the area of governance, democracy, and the judiciary either have finished or will be finished in the next couple of months. This is a great concern to us as we now look at what's happening in the Ukraine.

[Taras Zalusky]

Just to begin, Canada has a record of training, for example, members of the central electoral commission. In fact, Mr. Davidovich, the former head of the electoral commission, and the one who called fraud in 2004, actually participated in our programming on the need for that independence.

We have had programs on the role of an independent judiciary and the transition from a Soviet-style judicial system. These have been moderately successful but probably need to be continued.

More or equally important are the civil society groups. There were, in the past, groups such as the Committee of Voters of Ukraine and other groups that were civic activists, were favourable to democracy, and actually did training among young people to teach them about their rights as citizens and as voters.

In addition, right now there is at least one project I'm aware of in which some training is being done at the administrative level to try to help with the independence of the public service. But obviously that's a difficult row to hoe right now.

[Lois Brown, Conservative, Newmarket—Aurora, ON]

On a point of order, I would like to correct the record for the member, just to let her know that quite a number of CIDA projects are ongoing in the Ukraine. Many of them have only just been signed, going right through to 2015 at this point, and I have a list of the projects if she'd like to see it.

This is just to correct the record to note that there are projects that are ongoing and are not finishing in the next couple of months.

[Jinny Sims, NDP, Newton—North Delta, BC]

As a quick response to that, again on a point of order, I have a list of the full projects. The ones I was specifically concerned about were: the one on judicial cooperation, which ends in 2011; the one on building democracy, which will end in 2011; strengthening the election process, which ends this year as well; and the one that ended in 2008, which was assistance for the term prior to parliamentary elections.

I know that we have a number of others, but I was specifically referring to democracy and judiciary.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Go ahead.

[Jinny Sims, NDP, Newton—North Delta, BC]

I'm going to pass it over to Alexandrine.

[Alexandrine Latendresse, NDP, Louis-Saint-Laurent, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I also want to thank our witnesses for their interesting presentations today. I'm pleased that we've discussed support for civil society. I believe that should be the cornerstone of our action in Ukraine. I particularly agreed with the statement by Mr. Zalusky, who said that a dynamic civil society was a guarantee of a country's democratic progress.

I know there currently are provisions facilitating access to student visas for Ukrainians who want to come and study in Canada. I see that as a good opportunity to promote and encourage youths and students wishing to study here to come to Canada. That would enable them to take a close look at the way our democratic institutions operate and then to report that back to Ukraine. I would like to hear your opinion and comments on the impact that kind of program could have on Ukrainian civil society.

[Dr. Taras Kuzio]

The best response to this is in comparing Georgia and Ukraine. The average age of a member of the government in Georgia is 30, while the average age in Ukraine is 60. This means that the Brezhnev generation is in government in Ukraine. The generation in government in Georgia is a generation whose members were all trained and educated in the west. They all speak English, from the president down.

The consequences of that are profound. Georgia today has one of the lowest levels of corruption in the world, on a par with those of Canada, the U.S., and many western European countries, if you go to Transparency International, for example--and in other areas, such as rule of law, as well. So generation, language, and education are key. Bringing young Ukrainians to Canada, to America, and to western Europe is absolutely important, because hopefully one day they will be in power.

[Alexandrine Latendresse, NDP, Louis-Saint-Laurent, QC]

Earlier you provided a list of the reasons why you thought it was highly unlikely Ms. Tymoshenko would be released. Are there any opportunities or is there something concrete that could be done to democratize the process to a higher degree? What could bring about fewer political trials such as this one and what in concrete terms could perhaps be done to help her?