Foreign Affairs Committee on Dec. 4th, 2014

[Gary Schellenberger, Conservative, Perth—Wellington, ON]

Thank you.

And thank you very much for your testimony here this morning.

I have people who tell to me to put a fence around the area and let the factions fight it out and then work with the winner. What's your opinion on this statement?

[Matteo Legrenzi]

Well, I would respectfully disagree because at some point during the Syrian crisis, as our witness would be able to recollect, we tried in a way what we called “malign neglect”. We thought that the fact that we had Hezbollah backed by Iran fighting al-Qaeda groups in Iraq would then lead to a sort of sorting out. The thinking in Washington was “well, after all, it's not so bad because we have al-Qaeda fighting Hezbollah” and so on and so forth. But as in the case of, for example, North Korea and the Korean Peninsula, this strategy of malign neglect did not work and ISIL then spread quite quickly to Iraq. So, unfortunately, and I say this poignantly, we have no choice but to remain engaged. I'm also aware, from a grand strategy point of view, that this is probably not where Canada's national interest or American national interest is going to lie in 20 or 25 years. Everybody is trying to focus on Asia-Pacific but at the same time malign neglect did not work and I very much doubt that it will work in the future. Unfortunately, we do have to remain engaged, not only for humanitarian reasons but for strategic reasons as well.

[Gary Schellenberger, Conservative, Perth—Wellington, ON]

Would anyone else like to comment on that?

[Andrew Tabler]

Yes, I would echo what Professor Legrenzi has said. We tried to put a fence around it. We tried to contain the Syria crisis. It failed following the ISIL outbreak into Mosul because the war inside Syria was never just about an uprising. It was about a regionalized sectarian proxy war. Already half of Syria's population is displaced with about two-thirds in neighbouring countries. I'd say that containment failed a long time ago. We can wish it were different, but it's not.

The best course of action, the safest one for Canada and the United States, is a policy of assertiveness, not aggression, but assertiveness. Assertiveness means being engaged, as Professor Legrenzi said. But it means not only being engaged diplomatically but the smart use of military force at the right time to push things in a direction that leads to a final settlement.

This is not the first time or probably the last time that the United States or Canada or Europe or its allies would be involved in such an effort. It is complex stuff but it is time well spent because without it, as Professor Legrenzi mentioned, we are not going to be lined up with our long-term interests.

Instead, we'll make ourselves more and more susceptible to anything from terrorist attacks to the effects of a regionalized sectarian war on energy prices and economic damage. Beyond the moral example that showed that to stand aside while so many people were slaughtered by their supposedly legitimate governments and we said we could do relatively little, we could have done much more.

I think probably the worst incident and the most shameful one was the non-strike incident of September 2013 when the United States laid down a red line in Syria concerning the use of chemical weapons and then walked away from it. I don't discount the fact that a large swath of Syria's chemical weapons had been removed. But a lot still remains unaccounted for and in the end, it didn't settle the conflict. It didn't necessarily make it safer for Syrians. Instead the Assad regime was given other options to try to blast their way out of this uprising that so far has proven the country's and the regime's largest challenge to date.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Go ahead, just a quick response.

[Rabea Allos]

You cannot contain it. We had two terrorist attacks in Canada over the last six weeks. There are reports of about 100 or 200 Canadians who went to Iraq and Syria to fight. If those guys are not allowed to go, there might be more attacks inside Canada, so it definitely cannot be contained. We need to be aggressive.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you.

That's all the time.

We're going to start the third round with Mr. Anderson.

[David Anderson, Conservative, Cypress Hills—Grasslands, SK]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to thank our guests for being here with us today.

I'm not sure what the final resolution of this will be but certainly we've got some creative new language. I'm still trying to get my tongue and mind around the “uncoordinated deconfliction” term you used. We'll have to work on that a bit, I guess.

Professor Legrenzi, you said we have the right to demand specific action from the Iraqi government. I'm wondering if you could give us an idea what the key three or four things might be that you feel we have the right to demand from them. If you can, I'd like you to try to focus on some short- or medium-term things that would have an impact in the shorter term. We're talking about these long-term political solutions. What would you suggest we have the right to ask the Iraqi government to do in the near future?

[Matteo Legrenzi]

Certainly, in the near-term future we have to ask them to be a lot more accountable in terms of the behaviour of their security services, the behaviour of their army, and the behaviour of their security establishment overall. We cannot pour money and then when we demand accounting and specific action, have them shield themselves behind sovereignty.

From this point of view, as you said, the long-term political process is a much longer affair. But as long as we are engaged on the ground, and as long as we provide vital air support to prevent the overrun of major Iraqi cities, with all the problems this creates in the long run that have been highlighted by another member, they do need to be accountable.

I would stress again that we knew there was an insurgency brewing in the areas that are now controlled by the Iraqi state. It was very obvious. We had a lot of people on the ground and so on and so forth. When we confronted the Iraqi government with that information and we asked them what they intended to do about all of that, they told us not to worry and that everything was under control. This is unacceptable if we then have to move in and basically save them from extinction.

There is a very good book by Professor Toby Dodge of the London School of Economics. It's a pretty short book and it takes Iraq from occupation to autocracy and it details—it's a very brief book so it's very readable and it's very policy oriented—how the Iraqi government, under al-Maliki, assumed much more of an authoritarian character.

In the short term, we have to ask them to be accountable. If we send people to train 20,000 people into a new division, we then need to be able to check that these guys do not become ghost soldiers, that they're there, and that they answer orders. Otherwise, pretty soon we'll go back to the situation we had previously.

[David Anderson, Conservative, Cypress Hills—Grasslands, SK]

Okay, thank you.

I don't know if anyone would consider themselves an expert in this area—I think Mr. Tabler said he's not an expert on Iraq—but I want to talk a little bit about the role of the Kurds, politically and militarily. I don't know if any of you can address that.

It looks as if they have a new resource agreement with the Iraqi government. I'm wondering how that changes things, or how that impacts things as well.

Please, go ahead.

[Matteo Legrenzi]

Yes, I can address that.

Unfortunately, we sometimes have these misconceptions. We all started studying the Middle East, or at least the people who are old enough, when the peshmerga were considered a formidable military force, and Mustafa Barzani, and all of that, going back all the way to the time of the Shah. That was our preconceived notion. But unfortunately the peshmerga of today are 20, 21, or 23-year-olds who have not had the military experience of their predecessors. This is why even the famed peshmerga were not really in a position to contain the advance of the Islamic State without the air strikes that they called upon.

The Kurdish regional government itself is now behaving de facto as an autonomous entity, and you very correctly pointed to what is the key aspect of this de facto sovereignty, which is the fact that they are able to dictate the terms of energy agreements, something that the central government in Iraq had always prevented previously. But now they're in a position to do that because, even in Baghdad, the people are battling for their lives and so on and so forth, so this is it.

This goes back to the previous dilemma. Certainly, air strikes prove important to steady the nerves on that front, but the Kurdish regional government itself needs to get its act together in terms of military training and military efficiency, because these are not the peshmerga of 20 years ago.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you. That's all the time we have.

Mr. Dewar, five minutes please.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Thank you.

I want to continue with this thread, the relationship between the Kurdish regional government and Baghdad.

We are cautiously hopeful that we'll see al-Abadi be more engaged. When Mr. Garneau, Minister Baird, and I met with officials back in September, including the president and the foreign affairs minister there as well as Barzani, the message was consistent that we want to see inclusion. I think that message is a good one, for reasons that we all know. But it was interesting that not that long ago we had Barzani musing about separation.

So we can see the cards being played. You mentioned energy; we also look at their threat to separate. But we now have people coalescing. Unfortunately it is around ISIS, but it is an opportunity.

We need to see confidence building, obviously. The oil deal, if it is true, is helpful. But if it is just seen as the regional government taking advantage of a vacuum, I think that could be a problem. I think I'm reading between the lines of what you're saying and I agree.

But what about the issue of the devolving of powers? One thing that has been brought up, and it touches on this whole notion of ghost soldiers and the problem with the military, is that we see regional entities taking care of security, obviously with governance support. There was the idea of a sort of “national guard”. I would try to avoid that language, because it seems just an import from the Americans, but it's the idea of making sure that security will be based on a reflection of the population but also have some accountability in the region they are trying to protect, so that we don't see a repeat of the disaster in Mosul.

What are your thoughts on that? Is it a national guard, or is it also police? Obviously, security can take different forms.

That question is to you, Professor Legrenzi.

[Matteo Legrenzi]

I think you are absolutely right. On the other hand, the situation there is such an emergency one; it was in the past as well. Look at all the corruption that we overlook in the Kurdish regional government areas because basically they were the only ones who were functioning and were providing a decent level of security for the people living in them. From that point of view it's a dilemma, and I don't have the answer. It's not that this part of Iraq is less corrupt, but at least it has been functional in terms of providing basic security to the people living there, and this has been going on for a while.

At a broader level, you cannot rob many Kurds of the dream of independence. That is something that is passed from father to son. Having lived in Canada and all being Canadians, I am sure you know what I am talking about. From the point of view of this dream or of backing forms of the culture—literature and so on—they are not going to get rid of it.

On the other hand, it must be said that it's very difficult to change myths. It's not in their interest, and they demonstrated this by on the one hand creating what you correctly stated is a de facto government and on the other hand trying to grab as much influence as they can in Baghdad. They've been pretty successful at that. Now they can play on two fronts. This is a technique that is also used in other parts of the world.

This is the situation. If you are asking me whether the Kurdish regional government is less corrupt than the central Iraqi one, the answer is no, it is corrupt. At the same time, it has been able to provide a level of security and in some ways also well-being to its population that is unparalleled in the rest of the country.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

This is a quick question to our guest Mr. Allos; it's shifting gears.

I think we have an obligation to adhere to the UN Security Council resolution with regard to ISIS Iraq. One thing you touched on was dealing with things here at home, with incitement.

How would you deal with it? I note that recently we made changes to hate speech laws. There was a private member's bill that the government supported. But what would be the tool in the tool kit? Some of us were concerned at the time—no one predicted ISIS, let me be clear—that when we took out those provisions it would be more difficult to go after people who are inciting. I think you know what I'm referring to—oversight and the tools in the tool kit relating to human rights tribunals.

What tool can we use? Do we need to put that tool back in the tool kit, or do you have another idea for dealing with incitement and extremism here in Canada?

[Rabea Allos]

Extremism is definitely not all Islam, but there are certain groups in Islam...Wahabism and, to a lesser extent, the Muslim Brotherhood. They are definitely terrorist groups and they are hate groups. They should be stopped. We're getting a lot of monetary support from Saudi Arabia to open up mosques over here, and they're sending their own clerics over here, who are teaching Wahabi Islam to young kids They're enticing them into getting into terrorism, whether here or overseas. Obviously many of them are travelling overseas, but there were two incidents that happened over here. So this has to be stopped.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Do you understand my question on the tools in the tool kit? One was taken out recently, with regards to incitement and hate speech. Would you recommend putting that back in? Do you have an opinion?

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Can we come back here? We'll get another round. We're just over time here.

Mr. Hawn, five minutes, please.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I actually want to continue on that. That's an area I was going to talk about, but more from the point of view.... Mr. Allos, you have a lot of experience with Iraqi refugee settlement, and so on, in Canada. Kind of along the lines of what Mr. Dewar was talking about, is one of the tools in the tool kit potentially using them to tell the story to Canadians of radicalization of Islam, as one of the methods of making Canadians aware of what's going on? Is there a role for appropriate Iraqi refugees in Canada to play in that?

[Rabea Allos]

They are, but in some cases because of what they went through, they could be giving you the extreme picture. You need a more balanced approach. Certainly people were forced to leave their country and come over here. They're not going to give you a balanced picture. There's certainly a lot of hate.

But they certainly are. I've seen people in churches arguing about whether we should be sponsoring Muslim families. In one church in the Toronto area, for example, they sponsored a family. It turned out to be Muslim and people went berserk when they found out; and they are decent, good people.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Sure.

Mr. Tabler, I totally agree that policy fails when you draw a red line and then you refuse to do anything when the line gets crossed. I think when people perceive that weakness of leadership, obviously there's no reason for them to stop doing what they're doing. We've talked about the military action. We've talked about the air strikes, and the positive side and the potentially negative side of that. We've talked about boots on the ground and everybody, I think, agrees there needs to be friendly combat boots on the ground, but the issue, at least in Canada and in some other places, has been to whom those boots should belong.

I think most people here don't feel it should be western boots on the ground—Canadian, American, Brit, or whoever. No matter the intent and no matter what they do, they would be received badly by the local populations. Training boots on the ground is a different story, but combat boots on the ground....

What's your view of western boots versus the necessity for making them regional boots?

[Andrew Tabler]

That's a very good question.

Like you, I think that regional boots on the ground are much better than western boots on the ground in terms of an overall combat role. I think we need to avoid that at all costs in dealing with the ISIL threat and overall threats in the region.

The problem, then, with regional boots on the ground, or fighting from behind, or leading from behind, or whatever other slogan has been pushed out there about the style of the American president to date in terms of these issues, is that in order to entice and incentivize these countries into getting involved in the fight against ISIL in Iraq and Syria, you have to make concessions to them about what they want in those countries in terms of an end state and an overall regional balance. This is where we run into a big problem. They want President Assad to go. We want him to go as well, but for them, it's a much larger issue, with political ramifications. I believe that in order to incentivize them and to entice them into an alliance that truly defeats ISIL, we will be required to come up with a solution on Syria.

Iraq, like I said, and as we've talked about today, has a process that is unfolding. We don't know the end result yet, but there is the basis for something.

In Syria, I think the only solution is for President Assad and his cousins to leave power at some point. How we get there, and how we incentivize everyone to do what they need to do at a certain time, is a matter of fierce debate. But I simply don't see it. After all of this bloodshed, after them trying to shoot their way out of this uprising that turned into a horrible civil war, I don't see a final settlement coming. The longer President Assad stays, the much more likely it is that Syria will remain divided, with large swaths of his territory outside the control of the central government.

I think we need to come up with a plan to have President Assad step aside. It's a subject of much discussion, and it's one that I think is worth having. With that, I think then you would see regional parties coming to the table and being willing to do much, much more to defeat ISIL and to work with us in the future in terms of stabilizing the Middle East.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Okay.

I have a quick question for Mr. Allos. The others can chime in as well.

One of the regional parties in other places where we have taken out leadership, or where leadership has left and a vacuum has been created, is the Muslim Brotherhood, which is not listed in Canada yet as a terrorist organization.

Mr. Allos, do you think the Muslim Brotherhood should be listed as a terrorist organization in Canada?

[Rabea Allos]

I think so, yes. The UAE definitely listed it a few weeks ago.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Professor Legrenzi and Mr. Tabler, what are your views on that?