Thank you very much for having me. It's a pleasure to be here on the other side. As you know, I spent four years as the finance critic for the Reform Party, spending many hours in this room.
I'd like to note that I am both a professor of economics emeritus at Simon Fraser University and a senior fellow at the Fraser Institute. Neither institution has official positions on anything. I am here in my personal capacity as an economist.
I'd like to begin my presentation with a very radical proposition. The question before this hearing should be whether to get rid of the backlist altogether, not how to make it shorter.
The question about the best immigration levels to shorten the list involves a moral, bureaucratic, political, and practical morass. As you will have noticed already, no witness has produced any objective criteria for determining the number of immigrants. The reason is simple: there are none. All recommendations of numbers are basically arbitrary and driven by hidden moral and political motives.
Let me suggest that instead of moral and political criteria we should adopt the following fundamental principles: first, let us set policies so that immigrants benefit Canada, not so that Canada benefits immigrants; second, let us use our country's desire to help foreigners only after we have provided adequately for the many of our compatriots who need health care, caregivers, housing, special education, and so on. If we want to contribute to the welfare of foreigners, let us continue to admit genuine refugees and send foreign aid to the needy abroad.
My suggestions are based on the realization that there is almost universal agreement among economists that immigration has no significant positive effects on the incomes of Canadians. But if they come in large numbers, these large numbers depress wages and raise profits, effects that most us don't really support.
This traditional view of the merit of immigration that I have taught and written about for decades as a professor has become obsolete with the existence of the welfare state, in which everyone in Canada is entitled to a large array of social benefits and the progressive income tax system requires recent immigrants with average low incomes to pay fewer taxes than the average Canadian.
In a joint study with Patrick, we have estimated that these provisions of the welfare state are putting a fiscal burden of about $20 billion to $30 billion on Canadians every year. That's what we'll spend over the next 15 years to renew our navy. We spend this every year because of the selection procedures we are using to admit immigrants.
All traditional arguments about the merits of immigration are bogus and do not stand up to careful analysis. To mention just a few, immigrants are not needed to fill job vacancies. In fact, they can create shortages with their demands for housing, infrastructure, and doctors. Ten years' worth of immigrants require 5,500 new doctors. Where are we going to get them? Immigrants do not solve the problem of unfunded liabilities of social programs, and may worsen it. Their contributions to multiculturalism are marginal and at the borderline of becoming negative. Many countries without immigration are doing very well indeed economically and socially, from Korea and Singapore to China and India.
For these reasons, I recommend that we should adopt policies that bring into Canada only immigrants who pay taxes high enough or have access to funds that match the costs they impose on our social programs.
Before I offer some thoughts on a system for attaining this objective, let me present my radical proposal for dealing with the backlog. Simply pass a law that repeals the existing legislation, promising that anyone who pays a fee is guaranteed consideration for an immigrant visa. Dissolve the existing backlog by sending each applicant a letter saying, in diplomatic language of course, that "Parliament has decided that Canada is no longer obligated to consider your application; attached to this letter is a refund of the fee you have paid, including interest".
Parliaments pass this kind of legislation all the time: the Wheat Board will be dissolved; the gun registry will be scrapped; the national energy policy no longer exists. When I was in Parliament in the 1990s, transfers to the provinces were changed. I could go on, but the point is clear: no past legislation is immune from change or repeal by new Parliaments.
All such changes are accompanied by much opposition and debate, and sometimes it is very heated, but this is not something to be regretted or feared. It is intrinsic to democracy. Elections are the ultimate arbiter of the public on the merit of such changes.
Now to a brief discussion of an immigration policy that brings benefits to Canadians living in the welfare state. I suggest that immigration visas be issued only to Africans who have a pre-approved employment contract, at a pay that is at least equal to the average earned by Canadians and is subject to their passing normal health and security standards. Parents and grandparents should be given visas only if their offspring post a bond that is large enough to cover their expected cost of health care and pays for the living expenses they might need. Under these provisions, immigrants no longer impose a fiscal burden on Canada.
The principle underlying my proposal is simple and clear: let market signals, not politicians, technocrats, and vested interests determine who should be admitted and how many immigrants should enter Canada annually. Relying on market signals in the operation of the economy has served Canadians and the rest of the world well; it should do so for the selection of immigrants.
Let me conclude with some observations about the immigration policy. Recent opinion surveys show clearly that most Canadians are in favour of reduced levels of immigration or the maintenance of current levels. In considering these results, it is important to note that these sentiments are strongest in the country's largest cities, where immigrants have settled in the past—