National Defence Committee on March 27th, 2014

[John Williamson, Conservative, New Brunswick Southwest, NB]

General, do you have any comments to make on that?

[MGen Christian Rousseau]

I would possibly reinforce the concept of policing and monitoring, and the advance that we have made, first with Canadian technology in terms of the RADARSAT-2 that's up there now, but then the RADARSAT Constellation mission that's going to be operational in 2018, that will allow us to understand very much who transits the Arctic, and then be able to cue other resources to target and ask those specific questions. We'll be much more aware of what goes on in the approaches to North America than any other country can be.

[John Williamson, Conservative, New Brunswick Southwest, NB]

Mr. Wilczynski, on a different topic altogether, I'm curious to know if the intelligence bureau of the Department of Foreign Affairs monitors the situation of Canadians going overseas to engage in terrorist activities. How does the department work with other departments in this regard to monitor them when they're away and of course when they come home to Canada?

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

A brief response, please.

[Artur Wilczynski]

We don't have an intelligence gathering function so we don't monitor Canadians, period. What we do, though, is we are engaged in conversations with key partners, whether it's the United States, other allies, even countries of destination of Canadians who are travelling abroad for terrorist purposes, to try to get a better understanding of the phenomenon, to work in partnership to share information through our legal frameworks to address the threat they pose, particularly when they return.

This is one of the areas where we work very closely as a whole-of-government team with our security agencies, with RCMP, with CSIS, to make sure we share information about the phenomenon and put in place appropriate policies to address those challenges. Again, we work very closely with Public Safety in that regard.

It's a key element of Canada's counterterrorism strategy, to address that particular point. I participate in numerous multilateral and bilateral conversations where we exchange information about the phenomenon and compare notes about what are effective strategies to address it. It is a key component of our counterterrorism bureau.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you, Mr. Wilczynski, et maintenant Monsieur Larose.

[Jean-François Larose, NDP, Repentigny, QC]

Thank you to our guests.

I have three areas of questions, so could you make your answers brief since we don't have much time.

Concerning the Arctic, considering the ships that are going to be built will take a long period of time, and 15 to 20 years from now we have no idea what's going to be happening, what have been the alternatives put on the table and looked at?

I understand the capacity for cooperation, which generally can take a certain amount of time, but when it comes to rapid intervention, what has been looked at?

There have been suggestions to

to arm the Coast Guard and to see if the ships that are already available could be bought.

Is that being looked at so we have a strong capacity quickly?

[Jill Sinclair]

In terms of the capacity you're talking about, I'm not sure if you mean just militarily or more broadly.

[Jean-François Larose, NDP, Repentigny, QC]

More broadly.

[Jill Sinclair]

More broadly then. Certainly you're right. Things take a while to come online. That's where cooperation is so important, because as we look at some of the immediate challenges—and this isn't the purview of the department of any of the folks here—say the environmental issues for example, cooperation is absolutely essential.

This is an austere environment. It requires very highly specialized techniques. Some of those techniques are actually found in, say, Finland or Norway, or other countries. In that sense there is cooperation.

We have an Arctic SAR treaty, Arctic search and rescue treaty, which actually Canada helped facilitate. It was the now Chief of the Defence Staff who negotiated it for Canada, recognizing that if we're going to respond to those challenges, we need to do it in partnership with others.

[Jean-François Larose, NDP, Repentigny, QC]

Okay, but in that cooperation it doesn't mean we have.... There is no one commander who dictates the schedule of the cooperation of where the navies are, where the helicopters are, or whatever. If they happen to be there because we have cooperation, they may be able to intervene. We're talking about the Arctic here.

Is there anything else we're looking at so we have something a lot quicker?

[Jill Sinclair]

The exercise regimes are extremely important. You have the domain awareness. You're looking out to try to anticipate if there's going to be a problem or a crisis. Obviously, that's a little bit of what Christian was talking about, queueing the resources, so if you have a sense that there's a ship that's floundering or something that's coming in that's going to create a problem, and actually having those relationships in place so you can pick up the phone, or do whatever it is immediately to get the assets where they are required. That's exercised on a pretty regular basis.

There's no substitute for sort of 24-7 coverage everywhere, but it's the most practical way of—

[Jean-François Larose, NDP, Repentigny, QC]

For now.

[Jill Sinclair]

—trying to figure out exactly how to mitigate the threat while being ready.

[Jean-François Larose, NDP, Repentigny, QC]

Major-General, you mentioned actors, and I thought that was very important. I think the complexity of actors when it comes to the different threats that can exist, whether they have the capacity or the intent of using it.... You mentioned countries, but I think it's getting more and more complex where it's small groups, even criminal groups, that have military, or associations with terrorist groups. The complexity is there.

Do you think the threat would be more ballistic or in any other form? What's generally on the table in terms of nuclear, chemical, and even EMPs we haven't seen but could eventually be there? It could be in a suitcase, or in a van.

Is it more the probability within the capacity that's there than actually a country building up an armament with diplomatic intent?

[MGen Christian Rousseau]

It's a very important question, because whereas most of the complex threats emanated at one point from nation states, from states that could build it, some of it now could migrate to less capable nations, or even groups, as you mentioned.

For weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, biological weapons, and nuclear devices, we track very closely who produces those and where they could be proliferated, in what other parts of the world. We do that with others to make sure....

[Jean-François Larose, NDP, Repentigny, QC]

Where would the best investment be put? Would it be in diplomacy, other types of detection, or to pour in billions of dollars within the American program for BMD? We do not know if they function properly, they haven't been tested, and they don't have that many either.

[Jill Sinclair]

If I might, Mr. Chairman, it's always hard to know where to invest, but I think prevention is what you really want to do. When you look at things like whether it's ballistic missile technology proliferation, nuclear weapons capability proliferation, chemical, biological, Canada is a member of a number of arrangements that work with a large number of international partners to try to track and prevent sensitive material getting into the wrong hands. That includes state and non-state actors.

My own sense would be that prevention is always going to be the best way, which probably lies a little bit more on the diplomatic side, but there are what are called supplier control regimes that deal with missile technology control regimes. There is one to deal with the precursor chemicals for chemical weapons. Canada has a strong voice at these tables.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you very much, Ms. Sinclair and Mr. Larose.

Mr. Norlock, please.

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

Mr. Chair, through you to the witnesses, thank you for being here this morning.

I only have five minutes. I wish I had five hours. I'm going to concentrate on a couple of areas, and I ask these questions as if I'm speaking to the folks at home. In other words, through you to them.

What I usually tell folks is Canada has the same population and gross domestic product of the State of California, yet we have the second largest land mass in the world, and probably—I believe it is—the largest coastline in the world. We have to make use of all our assets. I was very happy to hear about the marine security operations centre and the way Ms. Sinclair explained it. Thank you very much for that because we have to keep in context our ability as a nation to afford the things and to do the things that we want to do.

What really struck my interest, thinking back to the cold war, was when you talked about the right of innocent passage. I recall during the cold war—and this is with a view to our Arctic and Ms. Sinclair saying provided somebody asked for permission, etc., in our waters—the Soviets would have an innocent looking fishing boat which really had radar or electronic eavesdropping, etc.

When we talk about the right of innocent passage, could you be succinct in explaining what it is and how you believe we can overcome some of those old...? Somebody may say this is just an oil tanker or a fishing boat going to look for northern cod or whatever fish is up there. Working with our allies, how do we approach that issue?

[MGen Christian Rousseau]

Thank you. I will start and you can jump in if you want at one point.

I mentioned the right of innocent passage in the context of submarines. If submarines are submerged, that's not considered innocent passage. They have to be sailing on the surface.

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

If I could just interject, but we do know that the surface is usually frozen at least half the year.

[MGen Christian Rousseau]

Yes. As we relate back to the Arctic, when ships do go into the Arctic, that ask permission, whether we think they're covert for something else, that fishing boat with lots of antennas, we have a fairly good idea of what is actually on that boat. We do track specifically where they would go and what they would be doing, and particularly if they're close to Canadian Forces operations, that also tips us off. That doesn't make it into the press every time somebody comes, but we have a very good idea of what goes on, who goes through the Arctic even if they pose as fishing boats.

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

Thank you very much.

Ms. Sinclair, your being the ADM, I think this question would be best put to you.

We have a very strict acquisition regime in this country. We were talking about the lag time for a ship to replace another ship. We all know what has transpired very recently with trying to get shipbuilding capacity back into Canada by purchasing ships that are made in Canada.

When people try to intimate that it takes 10 years to get a ship, well it does take quite a long time to do that because of all the rules we've set up around it. We might be able to go out in a year and a half—well, a year and a half is a bit too short, but two to three years—and buy an off-the-shelf ship that might meet somewhat our standards, probably not [Inaudible—Editor].

Could you address some of the reasons surrounding the acquisition of certain types of ships, and what Canada's policy currently is in acquiring those ships? Could you also address the time requirements?

[Jill Sinclair]

Mr. Chair, let me apologize in advance that I'm not the assistant deputy minister for materiel, who could give you a very detailed answer, but I will give you a general answer on that.

First of all, you talked about the long lead times. One of the interesting things in defence procurement, of course, is that with the help of people like General Rousseau, we try to project what the security environment is going to be 20 to 40 years out, because you need to be able to plan a long time out. Every military in the world keeps its equipment for a long time. It's expensive and it actually has a very long shelf life. You can continue to modernize the systems and keep those things floating and flying and doing what they need to do.

Defence procurement is highly complex. It requires many years to try to determine what the capabilities are that you require, and you challenge that: Do you really need all of that? Are you really looking at the future security environment? This is just to tell you that the overall time in any nation's procurement strategy is very long.

In terms of Canada, I would briefly say that on the ship front we had the national shipbuilding strategy, which was designed to situate Canadian shipyards, Canadian industry, and to give the Canadian Forces the capability, the Royal Canadian Navy the capability that it needed, by getting out of the boom and bust cycles, giving a bit of a heads up to industry to say that this is what we need and this is where we're going to invest. I think people are familiar that we have a Vancouver shipyard and we also have Irving. Between them they are working on the fleets of ships that we need for the next number of years.

In addition, I would just mention the government's announcement of the national procurement strategy, which is designed, again, to make sure that we get the folks of the Canadian Forces the capability and the equipment they need, but in a way that makes that investment real and brings it back to Canadian industry and builds Canadian jobs.