Evidence of meeting #21 for National Defence in the 41st Parliament, 2nd Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was canada's.
A recording is available from Parliament.
11:05 a.m.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Rick Norlock
I'll call the meeting to order.
Thank you very much for being here this morning. We have with us today
Mr. Stéphane Roussel, Professor, École nationale d'administration publique.
Mr. Roussel, you have 10 minutes for your opening statement.
11:05 a.m.
Dr. Stéphane Roussel Professor, École nationale d'administration publique, As an Individual
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for having invited me. I know several of you because I participated in the committee's work previously.
I'll make my remarks in French. If you would prefer to ask any questions or to debate in English afterwards, that's absolutely no problem. It's just easier for me to do this in French.
I participated in your work, in particular the proceedings having to do with NATO and Canada's participation in various alliances. Today in examining the issue of Canada's cooperation with the United States, you are broaching a topic I know very well, since my doctoral thesis was about Canada-U.S. relations in the area of defence. Moreover, by extension, one of the topics involved is security in the Arctic, which is another of my research topics. Most of the topics on the committee's agenda are also familiar to me.
I would like to remind you briefly of my understanding of Canada-U.S. relations. Basically, when discussions are held with the United States, the work of the Canadian government must consist in seeking two basic points of equilibrium. On the one hand, Canada's relations with the United States have to be balanced with Canada's relationship with the rest of the world. There can be contradictions, or links between the two. In addition, the Canadian government's central concern has to be to attempt to balance matters of security, prosperity and national identity.
Very often, those considerations are contradictory. If we put the emphasis on one of those considerations—for instance, we can emphasize security and defence—we risk causing problems or difficulties involving prosperity or identity. I could come back to that later.
On several occasions I have declared publicly that I am a “continentalist”. That means that my concept of foreign policy and Canadian defence is based on the idea that Canada has to line up as closely as possible with U.S. policies. Prosperity and security and even Canadian identity is dependent on a very cautious, but real, closeness with the United States. I label myself a “continentalist”.
However, I generally advocate for a mature “continentalism”, that is to say that Canada must manage its relations with the U.S. in a cautious way. What I mean by that is a continentalism within which Canadian identity considerations—i.e. Canada's own identity—must be preserved. That is an important element not only for Canada's very existence, but also for Canada's national unity, as well as public opinion and the public support the Canadian government must have.
My concept of continentalism, contrary to what certain governments have done over the past few years, is not one that anticipates the requests or expectations of the United States. Offering gifts to the American government in the hopes of obtaining something in return is generally a strategy that does not work in Canada-U.S. relationships.
Moreover, I firmly believe—I believe in liberalism as a political philosophy—in multilateral and bilateral institutions. Certain actions or positions taken by the government over the past few years may lead one to believe that some institutions are no longer held in high regard, as they were before. Certain institutions may be seen as cumbersome, ineffectual or costly, but they also come with a lot of extremely important advantages particularly as concerns Canada-U.S. relations in the area of defence. The institutions thus play a very important role because they allow for balance in the relationship between the two countries. They make the relationship more predictable, and they set anchor points that we can use as benchmarks to develop a long-term relationship.
Finally, I firmly believe that the common values and vision held by Canada and the United States constitute a cornerstone we can use to build a long-term relationship. All of that, if you will, forms the basis of my thoughts on the matter.
Regarding the current state of Canada-U.S. relations, I will first of all discuss the Arctic and issues relating to security that come up periodically.
As you know, there is necessary debate on the nature of the problems and challenges that will arise in the Arctic over the coming years. We do not know what they will be yet, because this belongs to the future, but whatever we may think, those challenges will be important and will absolutely require international cooperation. That cooperation may be multilateral, via institutions such as the Arctic Council or the United Nations, but it is crucial that Canada examine more attentively the possibility of developing relations with the United States in that region.
Some progress has been made over the past years. For instance, the agreement signed with the United States in December 2012, or the Canada-U.S. Framework for Arctic Cooperation, 2012, are steps in the right direction. However, I would like to suggest that we go a bit further, as I did publicly before the committee several times by suggesting that a joint Canada-U.S. advisory committee be created on matters of security in the north. This would be a type of permanent joint committee on northern defence which would resemble a parity committee. Its mandate would be to explore matters of security that are of concern to both countries and to make recommendations to both governments. The committee would not be a decision-making body, but it would have the power to make recommendations.
You also want to examine missile defence. That is one topic on the list I was sent, and I will close on that point.
In 2004 or 2005, that question raised a lot of interest among Canadians when the bases were laid for the current Canada-U.S. relations. I consider this situation uncomfortable and incomplete. This would probably be the right time to go back to the issue and allow Canada to take part directly and openly in missile defence. I have in fact spoken out in favour of that participation on several occasions.
The difference between 2004 and 2005 and today's situation is that the opposition to missile defence in Canada was due in large measure to the hostility a good number of Canadians felt toward the Bush administration. That was also due to feelings that remained about the very controversial war in Iraq.
That situation has dissipated today and most European states have come out in favour of missile defence. Canada has not given itself the opportunity to talk about it openly because it has stayed outside of the program. Perhaps the time has come now to look at that issue.
Mr. Chairman, I think I have used my 10 minutes, so I'll stop.
Merci beaucoup.
11:10 a.m.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Rick Norlock
Just before we begin questions I will remind the committee that we have one witness today, and so we will have an extra 15 minutes with him. Then, after the witness, we have a substantial number of notices of motion and other business that we want to talk about, particularly our budget for the defence of North America study. This is just a reminder to you all.
We will begin questions with the government side.
Mr. Chisu.
11:10 a.m.
Conservative
Corneliu Chisu Conservative Pickering—Scarborough East, ON
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Thank you very much, professor, for your presentation.
I will start first with general questions referring basically to how the changing of the international security environment affects Canada and North America from a defence and security perspective.
I am looking at the recent changes that we can observe in Ukraine and the flexing by Russia of its muscles, and various military scenarios. How do you see these affecting, or have they affected, relations between Canada and the United States?
11:10 a.m.
Professor, École nationale d'administration publique, As an Individual
Thank you very much for the question.
Curiously, I am tempted to say that the environment is coming full circle. A lot of observers, with a wry smile, say that we are back to the cold war or that the situation somewhat resembles the situation that existed during the cold war.
That element, that is to say the deterioration of relations with Russia, is relatively new. Another new element is the international tension among governments, particularly the tension between Russia and western governments. I understand that this is what you are alluding to.
That changes raise a certain number of issues. In particular it brings us back to a topic you studied a few years ago, i.e. Canada's position within NATO. For a few years now Canada has blown hot and cold about NATO. NATO does not have the same polish or grandeur that it had in the past. For instance, Canada's opposition to the development of a NATO strategy in the Arctic indicated that it was feeling a certain malaise about that institution.
In fact, what the resurgence of tensions means is that Canada is going to have to clarify its position in the North Atlantic organization, which is being done today. The announcement that Canada has sent troops to Poland, I believe, or to Romania, is going to force a discussion on that topic.
For you and for Canada-U.S. relations, this may mean also that you will have to carefully consider the relation between, on the one hand, the defence of North America, the defence of the Arctic in particular, and on the other hand, the defence of Europe, or the situation in Europe.
This may also mean re-examining where Canada wants to invest. Does Canada want to re-invest in the defence of North America, or invest in its intervention capability abroad? That tension between both aspects of Canada's defence policy is always going to be there.
11:15 a.m.
Conservative
Corneliu Chisu Conservative Pickering—Scarborough East, ON
You were mentioning the Arctic; I have a particular interest in the Arctic. We have seen a reinforcement of the Russian interest in the Arctic with the refurbishing of bases in their part of the Arctic and the latest developments testing the airspace of various other countries in the Arctic.
What are the security threats that you envisage in the future, for Canada especially? How can we mitigate these threats?
How can we make common front with the United States? The United States is also part of the Arctic, in Alaska. How do you see us doing something positive in the Arctic?
Our government has a continuous interest in the Arctic, as has been shown by the Prime Minister's visits several times every year in the Arctic and also by certain measures that we took before the situation deteriorated in the present way with Russia, which is one of the main representatives in the Arctic.
I'm telling you this because I lived in the eastern bloc and I don't like this kind of evolution of the situation there, because we are going back, as you mentioned. I know that sometimes the intentions of Russia are long-term ones. We need somehow to defend against the kind of aggression being shown by Russia.
11:15 a.m.
Professor, École nationale d'administration publique, As an Individual
There are different dimensions to the question you just asked. Thanks for asking it.
My view on this is that we must be very careful. We should not fuel the fire. One of my strong pieces of advice is to please try to compartmentalize. Do not mix what's happened now in Ukraine and Russia with what happened in the Arctic.
To the extent possible, we need to address the two issues separately.
We shouldn't use the situation in Ukraine as an excuse to take a harder line in the Arctic. I would say that probably the best way to proceed is to deal with the two issues separately.
Does Russia pose a medium-term or long-term threat in the Arctic? Possibly, and we need to take that possibility into consideration. But it's critical to ensure that neither Canada nor the U.S. is to blame for triggering a potential arms race or escalating tensions in the Arctic.
In recent years, Canada has often been depicted, by the Europeans in particular, as the most aggressive state in the Arctic, the one with the strongest and firmest stance. And that attitude could trigger other behaviours, especially on Russia's part. It could use Canada's aggressive position to justify its own.
Canada's and Russia's respective identities are deeply intertwined with the Arctic. And that is not nearly as true for the other Arctic states. To be Canadian is to love the Arctic, and Canadians have a deep attachment to the Arctic. News of tensions or problems in the region always meets with strong reactions from Canadians coast to coast to coast, whether they live in Vancouver or Newfoundland, regardless of their language or preferences. The vast majority of Canadians care about what is happening in the Arctic, and that must be taken into consideration. That's also the case in Russia.
11:15 a.m.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Rick Norlock
I would ask you to continue that thought, perhaps, later on.
Mr. Harris, for seven minutes.
11:15 a.m.
NDP
Jack Harris NDP St. John's East, NL
Thank you, Chair.
Thank you, sir, for joining us today. We're pleased to have you here to present your views.
I'm interested in your notion of cautious continentalism, which is the catchphrase that struck me. We do cooperate, of course. It's important for us to cooperate on an international level with the United States. We have the larger land mass. We have the largest country in the world and the longest coastline.
How do we maintain the level of cooperation that we need with this superpower, with all of its assets and probably military planning well ahead of what we've even conceived, and at the same time maintain our independence in that relationship and not be overwhelmed? Is there any formula for that? Are there any words of advice you would offer? Obviously, you've thought about this, which is why you are cautious. Could you give us a little bit more in terms of a framework?
11:20 a.m.
Professor, École nationale d'administration publique, As an Individual
Sure. There are two arguments I can raise here. The first one is historical.
If you look at the history of Canada-U.S. relations, that imbalance between the powers of the two countries has existed since the end of the nineteenth century. Canada is still there and still independent. It still has it's own politics and is still different from the U.S. From the historical point of view, we should balance or mitigate that fear of the U.S. The risk to Canadian sovereignty from being close with the U.S. is less important than people usually think.
Second, what is the solution for this? In my view the solution, and again I'm looking at the history of Canada-U.S. relations, is institutions. The more we make clear to the Americans what we want and don't want and the rules between them and us, the better it is. Usually, the record of Canada-U.S. relations within the institutions is quite well.
Sometimes my American colleagues are frustrated, because they are looking at the dynamics of Canada-U.S. relations and saying, "You Canadians are winning much more of the game in the negotiations than we are", which indicates that institutions are protecting Canadian sovereignty or Canadian freedom.
11:20 a.m.
NDP
Jack Harris NDP St. John's East, NL
How do we achieve that balance?
One question is, where do you draw the line? What you're saying is that there should be a line, that it's important that there be a line, so people know what the rules are.
We could have a situation, and DND might be one example, where one country is perhaps more concerned or more fearful or more willing to put resources into something that's a very slim risk. We may be drawn into it because they think it's a good idea and because they are our partner we have to go along. Do we see that? Are there any elements of cooperation that have that aspect to them?
North Korea, for example, is the alleged threat requiring missile defence—not the Russians.
11:20 a.m.
Professor, École nationale d'administration publique, As an Individual
Generally speaking, Canada-U.S. relations rely on the premise that we, in Canada, recognize the Americans' strategic priorities. One of the fundamental elements of Canada-U.S. relations is that Washington determines what constitutes a threat, not Ottawa. Usually, we have to adapt to how Washington defines the threat.
Where Canada has some flexibility is in how it confronts that threat. Canada has always exercised that flexibility. We can't prevent the U.S. from taking action to defend North America, but we can negotiate the terms and conditions of our role in that defence.
As long as Canadians assert their desire to contribute to North America's security, they will have the Americans' respect. The Americans aren't really inclined to infringe on Canada's sovereignty as long as Canada asserts its responsibilities.
11:20 a.m.
NDP
Jack Harris NDP St. John's East, NL
Can I ask a question about sovereignty in the large space that we have, including air space, well out into the North Atlantic and the Arctic? Does the nature of Canada's geography and what we might have to do in the sense of sovereignty patrols and our ability to intercept, etc., have any influence on the strategic choice that Canada might make in choosing, for example, a successor to the F-18 fighter jet? What type, what capabilities, and what functions would be the priorities for Canada as opposed to some other country in choosing a jet? Do you have any views on that?
11:20 a.m.
Professor, École nationale d'administration publique, As an Individual
Yes, absolutely. Canada's geographic reality should indeed influence our choices. The significance of the geographical aspects you mentioned, including the size of our territory and the tremendous distance it spans, hinges on the answer to this question: what is our priority? Defending Canadian territory, which would seem to make sense, or participating in overseas missions? In the case of the F-35 jets, it would seem that Canada's participation in foreign missions trumps considerations around defending our territory.
Before geographical considerations can factor into decisions as technical as the acquisition of a successor to the F-18s, we must decide what we want to focus on. Is our main focus protecting Canada's territory, yes or no? And that question has yet to be answered.
11:25 a.m.
NDP
Jack Harris NDP St. John's East, NL
I asked this question before and I have three documents in front of me: the “United States Coast Guard: Arctic Strategy”; “National Strategy for the Arctic Region” from the President of the United States; and the “Implementation Plan for The National Strategy for the Arctic Region”.
I don't think there are more than two or three words there that mention Canada. They seem to be going it alone with their Arctic strategy. Does that tell us anything about what we should be doing with our own priorities and whether we should be making it—
11:25 a.m.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Rick Norlock
You will have to wait until the next round before you answer that question.
11:25 a.m.
Professor, École nationale d'administration publique, As an Individual
I'll note that one. It's very interesting.
11:25 a.m.
Conservative
John Williamson Conservative New Brunswick Southwest, NB
Thank you, Chair.
In fact, my question might allow you to answer it. Is it your view that institutions protect in advance the interests, particularly, of smaller countries, such as Canada, and that we can move our priorities to those institutions, particularly with the U.S., whether within NATO, NORAD, or a free trade agreement with the United States?
Perhaps through that question, you can also respond. How would these institutions bring American priorities into line with what Canadians would like in the north? You could do that perhaps by also referencing some of the documents Mr. Harris just referred to as well? I'd like to hear more of your thoughts on institutions and our using those to advance our interests with the Americans.
11:25 a.m.
Professor, École nationale d'administration publique, As an Individual
I have a couple of points on this.
First, about the U.S. strategies regarding the north, and the different documents mentioned, the first thing that strikes me about the Americans regarding the Arctic is that they are absent. It's very difficult to find somebody in Washington who'll pay attention to the Arctic. Usually, it's the representatives from Alaska who bring the issue to the table and make noise to attract their colleagues' attention. So these documents represent, I think, a marginal view, in a certain way. It's hard to say that the president is really paying attention to what's happening in the north. That is the first element of my response.
Secondly, Canadians, as far as I know, haven't tried very much to bring the Americans into their game. For example, one of the missing opportunities we had over the last two years was to create a North American chairmanship of the Arctic Council. Canada is now chairing the Arctic Council. Have you hear about this? There are a few things coming out in regard to it, but one, among many things, I think we've missed on this one is to talk with the Americans, because the Americans will be the next chair of the Arctic Council. We need to try to do the same thing that the Scandinavians did in coordinating their chairmanship as a Scandinavian one for over six years, or perhaps it was only two years.
With the Americans we could have done the same, by saying, “Okay, let's try to figure out what could be a North American approach to the north within that.” I spoke to people in Washington, and they told me, “No, we didn't hear anything from Ottawa.” So the fact that Canada is not mentioned in that document is not really surprising, since Canada is not engaging the Americans on this. We should be more proactive, I think, on this issue.
That brings me to the idea that I put on the table before, that maybe we can engage in a discussion with the Americans on creating a binational committee to debate Arctic issues.
11:25 a.m.
Conservative
John Williamson Conservative New Brunswick Southwest, NB
Thank you.
You had mentioned—and I'm curious to get your thoughts on this—that there's little benefit in offering gifts, des cadeaux aux États-Unis, but I wasn't really sure in what context you were saying that. Can you give any examples of what you meant by that?
11:25 a.m.
Professor, École nationale d'administration publique, As an Individual
Usually the strategy of the continentalists is to say that to be relevant at the world level, we should be relevant in Washington. How can we be relevant in Washington? It's by giving the Americans what they want. That strategy was used by countries such as Australia, for example, to say, okay, we should prove to the Americans that we are a super ally, that we are behind them, that we're supporting them. In a certain way that strategy was used by the early Martin government in 2004-05, saying that we should really show the Americans that we support them, and we can then move on other issues, the deepening of North American integration, trade issues, and so on. But it never worked as we can't expect the Americans to pay attentions to what Ottawa is doing by building an American strategy in Ottawa, except when they ask for it. The risk for Canada is giving the Americans things that they don't need. The Australians did that. They changed some of their regulations, tried to show how strong they were in the anti-terrorist war. No one has paid attention to that in Washington, so they didn't receive the benefits of such an attitude.