Evidence of meeting #33 for National Defence in the 41st Parliament, 2nd Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was arctic.
A recording is available from Parliament.
4:20 p.m.
Liberal
4:20 p.m.
Professor, Director, Political Studies, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
That's the key question: what do we mean by participation? Certainly if Canada went to the United States and said that we think the effective defence of the United States can be enhanced if we provide them with territory or if we allow certain.... This is the issue of the third site, if or when it develops. Then, I think, the whole negotiating process changes.
But remember, in the context of the negotiations of 2003-04, they partially failed because, one, we were not going to get a guarantee from the United States that Canadian cities would be defended, and I can understand from an American perspective why they couldn't give you that guarantee. Also, command and control was not going to go to NORAD. That was out. Specifically what access Canada would have relative to the system—information-planning filtered by the United States—remained an open and ill-defined question until the negotiations stopped.
The United States has left that open for Canada. The United States position on this is that if you want to consider participation, involvement, they're open to discussing this.
But before Canada goes to discuss this, this is something that I think was part of the reasons negotiations failed: there were unrealistic expectations that the nation, the government, or the department had in the time of 2003-04 about what we were going to get, and there was this idea that we were going to get it for free.
Canada—the government, the Department of National Defence, and this committee—has to decide exactly what we want out of this. Then you can start to consider what Canada will need to invest in order to get what we want. It's relative to all the competing demands on resources and investments, which have a greater priority within the military in Canada, for example, than ballistic missile defence will have.
4:20 p.m.
Liberal
John McKay Liberal Scarborough—Guildwood, ON
Well, I've never understood why anybody would want to defend Buffalo over Toronto in the first place.
4:20 p.m.
Voices
Oh, oh!
4:20 p.m.
Liberal
4:20 p.m.
Liberal
John McKay Liberal Scarborough—Guildwood, ON
Yes, the very few seconds, Mr. Chair.
If NORAD didn't exist, we'd probably have to invent it, so really, the question becomes, “Do you have a NORAD with silos or do you have a NORAD without silos?” What's your preference?
4:20 p.m.
Professor, Director, Political Studies, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
Clarify for me. I'm not sure what you mean by “silos”.
4:20 p.m.
Liberal
John McKay Liberal Scarborough—Guildwood, ON
Well, it is said here that they would include the creation of a new “North American Early Warning Command” and an increased presence of civilian agencies, etc., Public Safety and Homeland Security would “require a significant investment”, and it would “reduce if not eliminate the silos that currently exist”.
There's the all-domain concept of expansion of NORAD into sea, land, water, or cyberspace—you name it.
4:20 p.m.
Professor, Director, Political Studies, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
In terms of Canadian security interests, we should prefer NORAD without silos, and for one specific reason, which is that NORAD is the only perspective that exists where people like General Jacoby, and American officers as well as Canadian, think “North America” rather than thinking “United States” or “Canada”.
Given the threat environment, the complicated nature of it, and the integrated nature of all the different types of threats, you need North American thinking, not national thinking.
4:20 p.m.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Peter Kent
Thank you.
We'll now move to the second round of questions with five-minute slots.
Mr. Payne, please.
October 28th, 2014 / 4:20 p.m.
Conservative
LaVar Payne Conservative Medicine Hat, AB
Thank you, Chair.
Thank you to the witnesses for coming to this important meeting and discussing North American air defence.
Dr. Fergusson, you talked about maritime warning, air, cyber, land, sea, and satellite. I hope I didn't miss anything there. When I think about all of that and potentially some threat coming through NORAD, what happens in terms of the chain of command for getting that information directly to the armed forces? In particular, I'm thinking about the Canadian Forces base in my riding, CFB Suffield. How does that information get to them and what happens in that process?
4:20 p.m.
Professor, Director, Political Studies, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
A lot of this is highly classified, so they don't tell us academics.
But what I would say to you is that in the North American and the traditional NORAD aerospace warning assessment mission—integrated tactical warning and attack assessment—the primary mission, based upon by and large relying on American assets, is to take a look at that threat environment, the aerospace threat environment, and assess whether or not Canada or North America is under attack.
That information then is transmitted to the national command authorities. In the air world, the person who's in command of that mission is also in command of the air response. It operates through standard operating procedures that have been developed and honed over decades and decades.
The maritime warning, however, doesn't work that way, and this is one of the reasons why we're going to look at this. NORAD gets the picture from the United States, the American maritime domain awareness picture and a Canadian picture, and we think that it sort of puts it together into a North American picture and then makes an assessment.
Where, then, does the assessment go? Well, it should go to the national command authorities or the particular actors involved in the responses. But as for how that works relative to the Canadian Joint Operations Command, the American command, the unifying command structures that exist, the issues of the Coast Guard in the United States and the U.S. Navy and the 500-mile limit between the two, where the line is drawn—everything from the land out 500 miles is Coast Guard and everything beyond that is U.S. Navy—that is an open puzzle right now.
4:25 p.m.
Conservative
LaVar Payne Conservative Medicine Hat, AB
Maybe I can get comments from both of you, Dr. Fergusson and Dr. Charron.
Last December, Vladimir Putin told reporters that a military presence in the Arctic is among the top priorities for their armed forces. I wonder if you could comment on that. We know what we've seen happen in Ukraine. What does that mean for North America?
Dr. Charron.
4:25 p.m.
Associate Professor, Deputy Director, Political Studies, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
The working assumption of both Canada and the U.S. that has been made about Russia is that it's a state like others that we always watch, but it's not necessarily an automatic concern. We have other organizations like the Arctic Council. We have agreements like the Ilulissat declaration, and all states, including Russia, have pledged to abide by international law and cooperation.
The events of Ukraine are certainly worrisome, but when it comes to the Arctic, it's actually Russia that has the most to lose. They have put all of their eggs in the Arctic GDP basket, and it benefits Russia the most if law and order continue to function in the Arctic. Also, certainly, their behaviour with respect to things like the process for the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf suggests they would prefer to follow law and order rather than try to dictate by force.
So yes, we all have to remember that often messages are more for a domestic audience than for an international audience, and I think this is the case in the Arctic, in that both Canada and Russia tend to be speaking to their domestic audiences first. Then it's up to the international community to sort of filter that out.
4:25 p.m.
Conservative
4:25 p.m.
Professor, Director, Political Studies, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
I agree with my colleague.
The only thing I would add is that when we talk about the Arctic question, about opening up the Arctic, the need to invest in infrastructure, and which departments and government institutions are going to take lead roles and what roles they should take, one of the things we naturally turn to is talking about the military. There's a variety of reasons why that military capability—not for military purposes, traditional war fighting, or defence purposes—is always a dominant consideration by government.
The Russians are doing the same thing. They face the same problems of infrastructure, investments, how to manage this, and where to turn. Like us, they'll turn to the military to do it, and not necessarily in a threatening manner.
4:25 p.m.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Peter Kent
Thank you, Professor.
Mr. Lapointe, go ahead. You have five minutes.
4:25 p.m.
NDP
François Lapointe NDP Montmagny—L'Islet—Kamouraska—Rivière-du-Loup, QC
Mr. Chair, I have a point of order. Can we do the test for the interpreters before my five minutes? I see the witnesses have not put on the earphones.
Do you both understand French?
Are you okay? We're good to go? Thank you.
You made a few observations in your report and please correct me if I miss something.
The report says that state actors are not a direct threat to North America, but that the risk of other armed non-state actors acquiring high-technology weapons, such as cruise missiles, is increasing.
Could you elaborate on that? For instance, are the threats from Iran and Korea growing? That is not what I am reading, but do you have any information on that?
Also, is the situation so serious that we must consider it when we are wondering whether or not we should think about participating in a North American ballistic missile defence system?
We can start with Ms. Charron. Mr. Fergusson can answer next.
4:30 p.m.
Associate Professor, Deputy Director, Political Studies, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
When it comes to ballistic missile defence, I'll leave that to Jim.
But this is what 9/11 taught us about the nature of states and nature of threats: that they can be both state based and non-state based. Also, this is why, with the increased concern on homeland security, NORAD now has to worry about state-based threats and also non-state based threats. They're still learning how to track this. NORAD is acutely aware of the need to be prepared for both types of threats.
4:30 p.m.
NDP
François Lapointe NDP Montmagny—L'Islet—Kamouraska—Rivière-du-Loup, QC
Is there any indication that non-state organizations might possess ballistic missiles that could cross oceans, or is that just speculation?
4:30 p.m.
Associate Professor, Deputy Director, Political Studies, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
I'll let Jim answer on the tracking of missiles, but NORAD has both an air and a maritime picture, and it doesn't discount something that looks odd by saying, “Oh, this is a non-state actor, so we're not going to pay attention to it.” Anything now that looks like a threat to North America is literally a blip on the screen, and they pay attention to that, absolutely.
4:30 p.m.
NDP
François Lapointe NDP Montmagny—L'Islet—Kamouraska—Rivière-du-Loup, QC
Thank you, Ms. Charron.
Mr. Fergusson, could you comment on that?
4:30 p.m.
Professor, Director, Political Studies, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
Very quickly, generally threats today are perceived in terms of capabilities that could pose a threat.
In the state world, these are capabilities in the absence of political intent, except for concerns about North Korea and, to a lesser degree, Iran. In the non-state world, they are also capability based. We imagine different ways terrorists.... We can identify terrorists who have said they are going to get us. Al-Qaeda and, more recently, ISIS are on that list. That's why we tend to focus more attention on them. Both of them, along with the planning and thinking and investments, are really a function of being able to identify a large set of capabilities that could threaten North America. That's great, but then what do we do?
In terms of the ballistic missile question, we know that North Korea has tested a long-range ICBM. Terrorists don't get ballistic missiles. We know they have tested nuclear devices. Can they reach North America? Can they target Canada? Will they target Canada? Those things remain to be seen. Iran is somewhat of a step down from North Korea in that. Should we be concerned about a potential North Korean bolt out of the blue? Possibly. Is it a major concern, a major threat to North America? The United States sees this a little differently from the way I do. I would say, for the time being, no.
4:30 p.m.
NDP
François Lapointe NDP Montmagny—L'Islet—Kamouraska—Rivière-du-Loup, QC
Do I have time for one more question, Mr. Chair? Do I have one minute?