National Defence Committee on Nov. 4th, 2014

[Joyce Murray, Liberal, Vancouver Quadra, BC]

Thank you.

What role are our special forces playing? Are they involved with training the Iraqi and Kurdish fighters? Where is this training taking place? Are they providing close combat advising, or are they in a central location?

[MGen Michael Hood]

We've been focused on the RCAF portion of it, and it's important to remember that we have 69 special operations forces operating out of Erbil, the northern area of Iraq on the map behind you, which are working closely with Kurdish forces. They're in the vicinity of Erbil forward, and working with various peshmerga units in what we call an advise and assist role.

The peshmerga in that area are in essentially defensive positions. It gives us an opportunity, in many cases in a classroom or an open-air setting, to work on basic skills, depending on the forces that we're advising and assisting, but also eventually in the planning, the pre-mission planning, of future operations that the Iraqi security forces may contemplate.

[Joyce Murray, Liberal, Vancouver Quadra, BC]

So is this close combat advising at this point?

[MGen Michael Hood]

I wouldn't say it's close combat advising, no.

Again, certainly in the vicinity of what's recognized as Kurdish front lines...they're not at the front lines, but they have to go where the forces are. It's not risk-free, but it's not close combat. We haven't been involved in supporting them. That's not part of the mandate at this point.

[RAdm Gilles Couturier]

If I may add on the peshmerga, they are key to the success of that fight; they are one of the most proficient forces in the region. The fact that we have the opportunity to help them get to the point where they can be an effective force in the region is an important role that we see for our special forces.

[Joyce Murray, Liberal, Vancouver Quadra, BC]

Thank you.

The Liberals, a month ago, proposed that providing training support could be a unique and special contribution of the Canadian Armed Forces, a military non-combat contribution, since our armed forces were so effective with that in Afghanistan over the four-year period.

Is there a discussion about the armed forces providing additional contribution to training with the peshmerga, or with the Iraqi security forces themselves?

[MGen Michael Hood]

The mission right now and the parameters of the mission are familiar to all of you. We've been authorized for six months with the air element I've talked about, and the special operations forces. As the situation changes and advice is brought forward from the Chief of the Defence Staff to government, there may very well be other options that are contemplated—but not at this immediate time.

[Joyce Murray, Liberal, Vancouver Quadra, BC]

Also, I'm interested in other non-combat roles that our Canadian Armed Forces could play. My understanding is that the air strikes dispersed the open convoys weeks ago, so there may be other ways that Canada can provide more of a contribution. With respect to the humanitarian needs in the area and the civilian distress, is there a need for security for humanitarian assistance, and if so, is that a role that Canada would be able to help with?

[MGen Michael Hood]

Just let me provide some context first. Certainly, there are and continue to be targets to strike, so this notion that there aren't targets for air strikes is not, in fact, correct at this point.

With respect to security for humanitarian efforts, I'm going to ask my colleague to talk about that in a second, but it's important to note that the Iraqis and the Iraqi security forces don't want our support on the ground in the fight. They actually want to own that fight. They see it as an Iraqi fight to take forward.

[Joyce Murray, Liberal, Vancouver Quadra, BC]

I want to clarify that I'm not suggesting a combat role for the Canadian Armed Forces.

In one of the briefings a commentator was quoted as saying that a sophisticated online media and propaganda campaign underpins ISIL's success to date. What is your comment on that statement?

Second, what, if anything, can Canada and our intelligence agencies do to help counter that effectiveness with online propaganda?

[MGen Michael Hood]

I would agree wholeheartedly that there are many facets and many instruments of power that can be brought to bear in this campaign. The point that you talk of, which I think we'd call the information campaign, is certainly an area that allies recognize they need to address. They need to counter the ideology that is prevalent, that is causing young men and women in the region to fight for ISIL.

With respect to what other entities in the Government of Canada can do, it's not really my place to speak to public safety or the other services that are involved in that. I'm sure that would be considered in due course.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you, General.

The time is up, Ms. Murray.

Ms. Gallant, please.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I'm really pleased that the opposition Liberals have decided to support what our special forces are doing on the ground there.

With respect to the special forces, what sorts of successes can you describe that they've had in training the Kurds and the peshmergas?

[MGen Michael Hood]

There are a number of forces in the area; “peshmerga” is a generalized term. There are Kurdish security forces; there are peshmerga, which would be more akin to, I think, a militia. There are doctors and lawyers in Erbil who take their turn on the front line in a very traditional, defensive piece. There are varying levels of expertise there, including very high capability, as my colleague spoke to.

In terms of the successes that are taking place, we have a very willing partner who is actually asking us for as much as we can possibly do in the support to raise them for what I think they recognize is the eventual ground part of the campaign that they are going to play a large role in.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

How transient are the forces that they're training and working with? You mentioned that doctors and lawyers take their turn on the front line. Are they dealing with the same people for a week, several weeks, and then new people trickle in and people who have been there trickle out?

[MGen Michael Hood]

I think in large part the forces are static. I was trying to refer to an entity to give you a sense of the varying levels of capability and experience in terms of the type of mentoring that you could provide. But again, they're a hardened force. They've been at this for some time.

I think we've had experience. We're getting to know them better. We're getting to understand what their needs are. We'll continue to improve our level of support to them as we get more experienced in working with them.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

What have our special forces said about working with the Kurds?

[MGen Michael Hood]

I've only spoken with the commander of special operations force command in a broader, more general sense. I wouldn't have a vignette or a touchstone to bring to you on those lines. I can certainly try to get one for you, though.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Okay.

With respect to the capabilities of ISIL, they have heavy weapons, tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and tactical units. Are there any ISIL targets that are easier than others to hit with air strikes?

[MGen Michael Hood]

I think where you're trying to take me is to delve into the tactics and the rest of the ground campaign. We really talk in terms of deliberate or dynamic targets. Dynamic targets are those that aren't static. A deliberate target could be a command post, a checkpoint—something that we know is there and is not likely to move.

In that sense, a deliberate target would be easier, whereas a dynamic target is something that is not necessarily static.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

The dynamic targets are tougher to hit. Is that what you're saying?

[MGen Michael Hood]

Generally speaking.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Now, when we look at the map you've provided, recognizing that this is more or less our theatre of operations, would you be able to describe how the flow, the areas of influence, of ISIL came to pass? Was it centralized and then spread from the different directions? How did these two bands form?

[MGen Michael Hood]

Those red bands actually represent the two principal routes between Syria and into Baghdad. They converge at Baghdad. If you look closely at a map of Iraq, you'll notice that most of the cities and the infrastructure are really centralized on those two bands. Iraq has wide swaths of desert—for instance, to the south of that bottom band—where there simply isn't anyone there, really.

As to their area of influence, it's in fact the direct route they've taken between Syria and Baghdad.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Okay: so it's the areas that are mostly populated.

Given that this is our theatre of operation or our area of concern, if we were to look to where ISIL's influence extends further—because that may have some sort of impact on our operations in Iraq—how far would those bands go into Syria and other surrounding countries?