National Defence Committee on Dec. 9th, 2014

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

You hit on a whole host of answers within your questions.

First of all, on the charting, the general consensus of the coast guard is that we've got charted to modern standards approximately 5% to 10%, which means that we've got 95% to 90% that is not properly charted. So, you need to chart. The bottom line and the real quick answer is that we need to start treating the Arctic like we treat the Atlantic and the Pacific coasts. We need that type of relationship. We need that type of regulatory regime. The challenge we'll face is that we do not have any of the infrastructure along a vast area of what constitutes the Arctic to the degree that we have on either the east or west coast. So, you're also going to have to start addressing the infrastructure issue because eventually you are going to have port facilities that go beyond what we see in, say, Iqaluit or Tuktoyaktuk or any of the other regions that we do use as some sort of point of refuge. When the ice goes we are going to have to address that.

[Prof. Whitney Lackenbauer]

A colleague and I produced a report, which came out last week, called “On Uncertain Ice”. I'm very skeptical, at least within horizons where we have some sort of predictive capability, that the Northwest Passage as a transit route is going to be used for a high tempo of transits. It means distinguishing between the Northwest Passage, as it's often popularly understood, as just a route through versus Canada's Arctic waters. When you're talking about the Port of Churchill and other resupply activities for communities, that tempo of vessel activity has been going up, but there is not a sovereignty dimension to it. If they're coming into Canadian ports or landing in any Canadian communities they're having to declare that they're doing so on Canadian soil. There's not a strong defence component to a lot of those activities.

If, for some reason a lot of the obstacles—and there are many obstacles to navigation in Canada's Arctic waters still today, you mentioned a few—are overcome most of the activities are going to be constabulatory in nature. One would hope that if the tempo of activity does go up, and if there are threats, that we would have the Arctic offshore patrol vessels able to deploy into the region, and that we will have a heavy icebreaker to complement our medium icebreakers, to be able to go up and bring up police forces, or CBSA agents, or whoever else is needed to deal with whatever threat is perceived coming from that. For the most part these are not going to be core defence issues.

Where those do still come in...the potential for submarine activities, absolutely. I think Rob has already gestured appropriately to the northern watch technology demonstration project, which has been going on for a number of years now. I'm not privy to whatever classified findings they have from it, but it's taking all the different capabilities—subsurface, surface, space-based assets—taking all of that data being generated, and putting it together to have a better operating picture of what's going on. To me that's the first step for what we need to bring into place: harmonize a lot of the information-gathering and develop technologies that are appropriate to be able to supplement what we have now. When that activity picks up, even though it may not be a threat to our sovereignty and even though I don't anticipate large-scale international commercial transit shipping just passing through our waters, I still think that we want to be able to have eyes, and ears, and capabilities to respond to any sort of oil spills, search and rescue contingencies, and other threats that may pose themselves to Canadian communities, many of which are going to be outside the defence component of the spectrum.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you.

Mr. Bezan, please.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake, MB]

Thank you, Mr Chair.

I want to thank our witnesses for appearing today and presenting very differing views on defence, especially in the Arctic.

Professor Lackenbauer, you said that the whole premise of your presentation today is that President Putin is a reasonable, rational individual. Would you say his invasion and annexation of Crimea was done by a reasonable and rational individual who's behaving in a responsible manner from an international norm?

[Prof. Whitney Lackenbauer]

No, but I think the risk that he can play and whatever his motivations are—and there's lots of debate about intentionality—was it about getting access to certain seaports and getting access to certain gas resources that the shale revolution would allow Ukraine to go and exploit, and therefore use as a counterbalance to the influence of Moscow? There's lots of that.

All I'm mentioning is—and to answer your question, no I do not believe he is reasonable; rational, perhaps—Putin probably believes that he can get away with things in Crimea that he would not be able to get away with in other parts of the world.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake, MB]

It's not Crimea. He's already got the war going on in the Donbass, that region of Eastern Ukraine. There's a buildup of troops in Trans-Dniestr, and Moldova is seriously concerned about their situation. This weekend we had Russian Bears, flying close to the airspace of Estonia and Latvia, intercepted by CF-18 fighter jets. We also had Putin and the Russian military during the month of September fly over 20 sorties that came within NATO, as well as NORAD, airspace and flew right through Sweden, which was really an act of war. They flew right through Swedish airspace before they were intercepted in mid-country by a Griffin.

Here's an individual who is acting not rationally, not reasonably, and is being a bully. I question you saying he's not a threat to our sovereignty.

[Prof. Whitney Lackenbauer]

All of the things you are suggesting hold true for the region you're talking about. What is the end state that he gets out of those bullying tactics in the Arctic, in a space beyond sovereign jurisdiction of Russia, beyond its historic area, where it doesn't have any rights that can be misconstrued and sold to the Russian people as legitimate? If you're suggesting that there's a likelihood that he's going to take the same mindset from Ukraine, or the conception of interests in Estonia, and say that those apply to Ellesmere Island, I beg to differ.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake, MB]

I'd try Alaska. In 1870 it was part of Russia.

[Prof. Whitney Lackenbauer]

And you'd bring on the Third World War, and you're going to test those ballistic missile defences around Moscow—

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake, MB]

I'm talking about their nuclear capabilities. He uses it in his speeches all the time. His Friday address to the Kremlin was over the top, sabre-rattling, if you want to call it that, but here is an individual I think who is a real threat, and Canada has a responsibility to defend our sovereignty.

I just want to put that on the record.

I'm more closely aligned with what Professor Huebert has been saying. Professor, you said you're an honorary colonel of the Rangers. We had some witnesses here who said that we could do a lot more with our Rangers, including search and rescue and using UAVs.

I just want to get both your opinions on how the UAV component can play in defence, in monitoring and surveillance as well as search, from the concept of the Arctic, and how we incorporate the Rangers into that.

[Prof. Whitney Lackenbauer]

Great, thank you. I think it's a wonderful question.

Again, there are challenges and technical questions associated with UAVs. Given satellite capabilities and GPS when you get into really high latitudes, those, in my mind, are a very interesting science and technology question that Canadians can solve. Just as we are world leaders in terms of autonomous underwater vehicles, I'd like to see us playing a lot more in Arctic applications of UAVs, and to supplement that with all the different sensor systems and human surveillance systems, like the Rangers, to develop that common operating picture so we get that situational awareness. I'm strongly supportive of that and I think it is a wave of the future.

You've certainly heard from General Loos and General Beare about the challenges dealing with such a vast territory. Having unmanned or unpeopled systems that are able to go up and actually do a lot of that patrolling to supplement the human eyes and ears of the Rangers is a great opportunity. I think it's one that should be more fully explored, and it has great applications in terms of search and rescue, being mindful, of course, that DND has a mandate for air search and rescue; maritime search and rescue belongs to the coast guard; and ground search and rescue belongs to the police force, the RCMP, in the north. So being respectful of that, recognizing that some of the military systems can support those efforts as part of a whole-of-government piece, in my mind, is exactly the way we should be going.

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

The UAV is the wave of the future. Everybody knows there are unique challenges with the north. There is line of sight, limited population, the problems of GPS lock, and so forth, but these are all technical issues that Canada will figure out in time.

The problem, of course, is that a lot of this technology is out of sight.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you.

Ms. Gallant.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Through you, with respect to the Canadian government, it opened a Canadian Armed Forces Arctic training centre in Resolute Bay, in Nunavut. The commander of the army stated that, “The Arctic Training Centre is a tangible example of the Army’s increasing presence in the North. It will provide the Canadian Army with the necessary support and resources to protect the Arctic.”

In light of Russian investments in their military bases in the Arctic, which we spoke about before, how important was this investment? Is it enough, and what more can or should be done?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

Well, it's a critical first step. There is no question that at the end of the Cold War we lost the capability to operate our land forces in the north, with the exception of the Rangers, and I want to make that very clear. The Rangers always retained that capability, of course. But we simply lost the ability, and we saw that when we resumed exercises. In 2002 they were engaged in September, and the assumption was, well, if it's September you don't really have to bring your winter gear. We had some very near fatal accidents just because of misperceptions about the environment.

It's clear from our experience from 2002 onward, we need to actually be up there. Someone made reference to it being purely academic. You have to be there; you have to have the experience. Therefore, having a training base up in Resolute.... By the way, I'd say that the shared ability for them to work with the polar shelf project is outstanding. That's the way we need to proceed. You need to have that.

Also, I would add that our allies have been telling us that they are lining up to be able to exercise with us, so this is also a very important step for improving that relationship piece that Dr. Lackenbauer was talking about.

[Prof. Whitney Lackenbauer]

I think the training centre is a good example of a strong success story. They're budgeted at $62 million, delivered for $25 million, by partnering with the polar continental shelf project, not only enabling training but also setting up infrastructure that's civilian and military, dual purpose, that can be used as a forward-operating base if that very unlikely scenario presents itself where we need to deploy to the region and sustain operations for a significant period of time. In my mind, it is a great success story.

There are modest amounts of training that are going on at the centre to date. Certainly there are opportunities to augment that, but they have to fit, of course, with Canada's global priorities and what we're choosing to do in the coming years with our forces. Is our primary focus going to be on preparing for Arctic operations? Or are we going to find ourselves dragged into other parts of the world like Ukraine? As I said before, it's an operation that I certainly support, recognizing that we can do more for defending the Canadian north and the rest of Canada—North American defence—by going out beyond our borders than adopting a “fortress Canada” mentality and looking within as though we need to be standing ready on guard in the farthest reaches of our Arctic.

I think we're training, and the training that's going on there not only serves to develop Arctic capabilities, as Rob said, it's also a great training opportunity to build small unit cohesion, esprit de corps, and individual capabilities for Canadians to be able to go abroad and use that training to great effect for our country.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

The Canadian Coast Guard's largest and most capable icebreaker, the CCGS Louis S. St-Laurent is scheduled for decommissioning in 2017. The CCG will be acquiring a new polar icebreaker capable of operating in the Arctic for a longer period and in more difficult conditions than is currently the case.

How will our upgraded icebreaker capability compare to that of other Arctic nations? Bearing in mind that by the time Finland's icebreakers were finally ready for launch they no longer had a need for them because of the open waters, do you feel that it's important for Canada? How will this compare to other nations and will we be in the same situation where by the time the work is finally done we won't have a need for them?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

That's an excellent question but I've got to update you. The Finns have just gone through a major debate and have reversed that decision. In other words, they're about to engage upon a large-scale recapitalization because the paradox is less ice actually means more ice. You have the situation that when you get into the environment where the ice is melting, you actually need more icebreakers. I know it sounds counterintuitive, but this is what coast guards will tell you.

What it means for Canada, when we get the Diefenbaker, that will be replacing the Louis St-Laurent. What we absolutely need is to have a series of replacements for our mid-level icebreakers, the real workhorses. That's not politically attractive. People don't like talking about getting these medium ships but that is absolutely necessary.

Now, comparison, to the point of your question, the Russians are going ahead. Once again, if we look at the capital expenditures, the Russians are building two follow-ups to their largest—it's the 50-year anniversary—which is the world's most powerful icebreaker. It's nuclear powered. It's what we used to call a Polar 10, very powerful. They're currently building two new ones. They're also building a new mid-level series of icebreakers to respond to the very definitive increase of trans-polar shipping in the northern sea route.

The Americans have got themselves totally locked into this chaos that no one can understand. They are about to drop down to one functioning icebreaker, maybe one and a half, depending if they can get the Polar Sea to actually work, and they're going into a crisis environment. No one knows how they're going to dig out of it. The Finns are going to start re-evaluating. The Norwegians will be about the same as us but what's interesting is to watch the Chinese. They're talking about starting to expand their icebreaking fleet. It will be interesting to see whether or not that's just talk, as some people think, or whether they'll continue.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

And it's time.

In the last minute, gentlemen, while we have you here, I'd like to exercise the chair's prerogative. We've heard suggestions from various previous witnesses about the several options with regards to NORAD, whether to expand to an all-threat capability, whether to maintain the maritime warning system, or whether to revert to the simple original North American air defence concept.

I wonder if I could get from each of you briefly your recommendations, for the record, in the context of comparing Russia's current military capabilities in the north, the original threat—the Soviet Union is the original threat—to Canada's current capability?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

That's an easy one. We have to go to the all-encompassing. I look beyond just simply...the Russians are the ones with their increase of long-range bomber patrols, and, I would add, for the first time ever, fighter patrols. They actually sent a MiG up this time which they never even did during the Cold War. That's the first one, but we also have to take into account that when we talk about the aerospace, the geography of the Arctic means that even for a crisis with North Korea, and remember, Canada has never signed a peace treaty following the 1950 Korean War...if that escalates again....

Also, of course, that's the path coming in. That's where NORAD kicks in. So you talk North Korean, a future potential aerospace challenge from the Chinese...NORAD is the answer. It has to address this issue and it has to look at aerospace, maritime, and any other conceivable ability.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Professor Lackenbauer?

[Prof. Whitney Lackenbauer]

Canada and the United States both refer to one another as their premier partners in the Arctic, particularly in the defence domain. I think NORAD is a great success story. I fully agree with Rob that it should be an all-threat capability.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

All right. Thank you both for attending and informing us today.

Colleagues, we will suspend briefly and resume with committee business.

[Proceedings continue in camera]