A brief response, please.
Evidence of meeting #43 for National Defence in the 41st Parliament, 2nd Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was arctic.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Evidence of meeting #43 for National Defence in the 41st Parliament, 2nd Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was arctic.
A recording is available from Parliament.
4:10 p.m.
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, As an Individual
The impact would be quite dramatic.
The rule of thumb for the navy is for every three vessels that it has it can have one at sea. You can surge, there is that capability, but when you are talking about reducing back from eight to having about three, it means you're going to be able to, at any given time, have one vessel available. And that, of course, given the size of what we're talking about, is a huge problem.
4:10 p.m.
Conservative
4:10 p.m.
Professor, Department of History, St. Jerome's University, As an Individual
Yes. I'm concerned because every year projects like that are delayed, costs increase. Again, I don't think we're increasingly vulnerable because we don't have those hulls in the water by a certain fixed date. Again, that would belie my overall threat assessment to say we don't face an acute military threat in the region. What I worry about is that every year projects like this get pushed back. Escalators mean that we're going see a reduction. Again, these are important deliverables, I think they fit within the whole-of-government context. These are very versatile platforms that play a very important role. It would be very unfortunate if they slipped away over time.
4:10 p.m.
Conservative
4:10 p.m.
Conservative
John Williamson Conservative New Brunswick Southwest, NB
Thank you, Chair.
Although I'm tempted to discuss the number of ships that the Irving shipbuilding...or the shipbuilders will ultimately deliver, I would suggest just for the record that we consider inviting them to this committee at some point in the new year, given their importance in the defence of the Arctic, our sovereignty there, and to get a sense of their plans.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for coming today. The picture you're giving us is rather interesting, but I'm wondering, Dr. Huebert, where does it all lead? You talk about the potential of there being a lot of traffic in the north, a Russian military or navy that is more robust and more active. What does that mean on the ground for Canada in the Arctic, through the Northwest Passage, within what we view as the 200-mile limit? Can you continue on that with more micro detail?
4:10 p.m.
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, As an Individual
Absolutely. There are two drivers, and this is what's going to bedevil Canadian defence planners, because you are going to have to have the types of capabilities that Dr. Lackenbauer has talked about. You will need constabulary capabilities to deal with the inevitable ship issues that arise, maybe a grounding, a sinking...these are areas that have little infrastructure, little capability. We've been very lucky to date with the groundings that we've had, that they've been in good conditions. We haven't had to worry about loss of life. That will be coming.
So we're going to have to have a constabulary capability, the type of which we have on both the east and the west coasts of Canada. In other words, the Arctic Ocean is going to become much like the Pacific and Atlantic and that will require a certain set of capabilities. The more challenging capability and one view that Dr. Lackenbauer and I do disagree on, though, is we're going to have to figure out more in terms of our overall strategic orientation. We are not going to be able to sidestep the issue, for example, of participation with the American ABM system. The Americans are building it. It's causing a reaction and I dare say we may have to start looking at what the Norwegians are thinking about doing, and that is retrofitting their existing frigates to give them an ABM capability. They're good ships already and they're going to tie them in. That's the rumour I'm hearing at this point.
The question is, how do you have a naval arm and air capability that then can deal with both the constabulary capabilities that are going to be day-to-day—those are the ones that are going to get the most media attention—but also deal with the longer-term strategic changes? The Americans are moving away from nuclear deterrence. If they're successful with their ABM capability, despite what they say, that changes the balance. We, sharing a continent with them, will have to figure out what that means for our defence posture.
Now that's getting away a little bit from the Arctic, but a lot of our capabilities that we are going to have to be dealing with that will be Arctic-based. We will have to re-examine the north warning system under the NORAD nexus. We are going to have to revisit the decision that was made not to participate with the ABM. We are going to have to re-examine the decision that Canada had to say that we agree with NATO's position on ABM, which I would argue is somewhat contradictory.
All these issues are both the big and little and you have to do it at the same time with expensive kit, and that's going to be the real devil of dealing with these issues.
4:15 p.m.
Conservative
John Williamson Conservative New Brunswick Southwest, NB
Dr. Lackenbauer, do you have anything to add?
4:15 p.m.
Professor, Department of History, St. Jerome's University, As an Individual
Yes, please. I think some of the answers are airframes to intercept potential Russian bombers that are going to test boundaries. They're not transgressing Canadian airspace. That would be an act of war, but coming up to it, we need to be able to meet them absolutely as a demonstration of our defensive resolve. That's no question. That's something that has been well-scripted since the Cold War. I think there are cases of losses of life. The first air crash in Resolute a number of years ago is a key example. We were fortunate to have forces on the ground as part of Operation Nanook.
Is that a portending of things to come? Perhaps, but again these are not reactions to ideas of a buildup in alleged arms race capabilities in the Arctic; these are civilian responses. I think the bottom line comes down to situational awareness and maritime domain awareness in the context of Arctic waters to make sure that we're not only able to share information across departments and agencies within the federal family, recognizing that these issues sort of blur the lines between security and safety and sometimes defence, but also figure out if there are mechanisms to share information with our allies, whether they be Greenland, Denmark, or the United States. It's a difficult environment in which to gather some forms of intelligence or information. In my mind, the more we can work together to get a picture of what's happening, the better off we're going to be in terms of preparing to meet those exigencies.
4:15 p.m.
Conservative
John Williamson Conservative New Brunswick Southwest, NB
I'm trying to summarize. We need to do a lot of things well; RCMP, pre-positioning of emergency responses, equipment throughout the north, a coast guard presence, updating radar installation, and a role for the navy. Comment on that and then answer one question: what is your view of NORAD in terms of addressing a naval component?
4:15 p.m.
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, As an Individual
We need to have NORAD take seriously its commitment to the naval side that was made back in 2006. The issue is how do we do it? How do we have the sensors? The challenge we face with NORAD now is that—given the ongoing American economic crisis that they face combined with their political inability to move forward—we are going to have to pay a lot more than the traditional 10% or so that we have paid on to NORAD. The issue for Canada when it comes to the Arctic and maritime is that we need to do it, but we need to be aware that it's going to cost us a lot more than it's ever cost before.
4:15 p.m.
Professor, Department of History, St. Jerome's University, As an Individual
I agree with Rob wholeheartedly on this and I think the briefs you received from Dr. Charron and Dr. Fergusson earlier were right on the mark. NORAD is the way to build in that maritime watch component. It is a very resilient, long-standing partnership that works very well. This is a critical aspect of where we should be investing our resources with our premier partner and ally.
4:15 p.m.
Conservative
December 9th, 2014 / 4:15 p.m.
Liberal
John McKay Liberal Scarborough—Guildwood, ON
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I thank you both for your thoughtful and provocative presentations. I found them quite interesting.
I was looking at the Library of Parliament's statement that defence expenditure is going to rise by approximately 33% next year, and 33% of nothing is still nothing. The ruble is in free fall. The Russian economy is in free fall. It's getting some stiff resistance in Ukraine. It has a full front on the Baltic and the Russians historically are very fond of sabre rattling. No one has ever been able to initiate any conflict in the Arctic.
I'm wondering if the precariousness of the Russian economy makes some of this discussion a bit moot. It doesn't mean it is not important and it doesn't mean you shouldn't prepare, but in some respects it pushes it out further than crisis du jour.
Either one—
4:20 p.m.
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, As an Individual
I'll start with that one.
My immediate response to you is the Finns would have a different perspective about the Russians never attacking in the north. The winter war is a bit different, but the challenge we are facing is that regardless of where the Russian economy is today...and there is a lot of suspicion that the Saudis are unloading as a punishment, or as a means of supporting American foreign policy, against the Russians. There is a lot of thought in the open literature on that. This may be part of the overall—
4:20 p.m.
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, As an Individual
Given how important oil is to Russia, if you can oversupply at this point in time this sends a very subtle message to the Russians that we may not be bringing formal sanctions against them, but if they continue with their aggressive actions in the Ukraine, they can expect to see oil prices collapse. Do I have hard evidence to back that up? Absolutely not, but that is some consideration and—
4:20 p.m.
Liberal
4:20 p.m.
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, As an Individual
I think we're collateral damage in that context; look at the pipelines. The issue is that the Russians are being put into a situation that regardless of the free flow of where it goes they need to respond. They need in their view to respond to NATO moving closer to their borders. I dare say that Sweden and Finland are making a lot of noise that they are seriously considering to do that.
You talk about the historical view of Russia—one of the historical realities is the moment the Russians feel entrenched it doesn't matter if their economy is in a free fall, as it was under the Stalin regime following the purges of 1937-38, they will respond when they think their core security issue—
4:20 p.m.
Liberal
John McKay Liberal Scarborough—Guildwood, ON
In this kind of context he who has the biggest bankroll wins because to project force costs a heck of a lot of money. It's not as if you can march forward millions, literally millions, of soldiers to be incompetently managed and to die. You need to have some sophisticated equipment backed up by some very deep pockets.
4:20 p.m.
Professor, Department of History, St. Jerome's University, As an Individual
Of course, Rob paints an interesting picture of Russians sort of bristling with these new investments, these new subs. When were the keels laid for those subs? It was in the late 1990s for some of them. It's taken a long time for them to realize a very modest fragment of a recapitalization program and their northern fleet is still a tiny shadow of its former self during the Cold War.
So all of this incredible growth as you're describing in terms of budgets is also mirrored in terms of their capital assets. The Russians are a shadow of their former self. In some ways I'm more concerned if Russians do nothing, because in the absence of feeling like they can defend themselves, they might take brash actions for fear that they're going to be vulnerable.
In essence, modest Russian defensive capabilities that stabilize the situation and give them the confidence that they have an effective deterrent is not antithetical to the presentation I'm making to say that the Arctic is on a trajectory and has been since the end of the Cold War towards greater peace. In fact, the Russians undertaking modest investments in defence, if that appeals to a domestic audience in Russia, can lead to the desired end state of a stable, secure Arctic and circumpolar world.
Frédéric Lasserre wrote a very interesting article with a colleague that appeared in the Journal of Military and Strategic Studies a few years ago where he belies the myth that Rob is suggesting to us of an Arctic arms race. He traces when a lot of the Russian announcements were made to show that a lot of their real capital investments were announced long before the Arctic racheted up in terms of its international profile. So, in essence, questioning this whole idea of an arms race is something I think is very much open for discussion or debate.
4:20 p.m.
Liberal
John McKay Liberal Scarborough—Guildwood, ON
To pursue the financial aspect a little further and deal with the notion that Russia has really got some financial challenges that are quite formidable, China on the other hand doesn't. China has real money and real capabilities.
I'd be interested in your response to the relationship between China and Russia in the Arctic. The secondary question is should we actually be far more worried about the Chinese in the Arctic than the Russians?
4:20 p.m.
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, As an Individual
That's an excellent question.
The relationship between the Chinese and the Russians is increasingly complicated. The Russians, under the current environment, see the Chinese as their major source of resources. They're trying to sell their resources to China and we're seeing that in a series of announcements that have been made.
On the other hand, I think the Russians have made it clear that they also are concerned about some of the Chinese positions vis-à-vis the Arctic. The Chinese haven't officially told us what they think in terms of the status of the northern sea route and the Northwest Passage. Are they internal or are they international waterways? I think the Russians think the Chinese will eventually go for freedom of the seas, but once again that's speculation.
This relationship is developing. The Russians are looking over their shoulders. They also see the growing dynamic situation in China and I think they see the Chinese as an opportunity right now to counterbalance the west. But they are cognitive that they remain a security challenge into the future and they have to balance that vis-à-vis the Arctic.
In terms of China as a security threat, there's a lot of speculation. It depends on how you want to interpret Chinese motivation. I will agree, and I know that Dr. Lackenbauer will say that to date the Chinese have been, if anything, very proper players within the rules that have been established, but they are starting to bring tremendous pressure in resources into this situation. Watch what happens in Greenland. There is a bill to allow foreign workers, up to about 10,000 Chinese workers, to come along to work in the mining sector in Greenland. Now what happens after this most recent election...I'm not quite sure what's going to happen in that context.
4:25 p.m.
Conservative