Transport Committee on April 1st, 2014

[The Chair, Conservative, Larry Miller]

Thank you, Mr. McGuinty.

We'll now move to Mr. Watson.

[David McGuinty, Liberal, Ottawa South, ON]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, Larry Miller]

Sorry, I didn't mean to cut the interpreters off. My apologies.

Go ahead, Mr. Watson.

[Jeff Watson, Conservative, Essex, ON]

I appreciate that. I'm actually writing down what the interpreters were just saying because that latter point was an important one about—if I understood correctly—victims being compensated apart from the question of shared liability between the carrier and a third party. That was the point made at the end.

Let me thank, of course, our witnesses for appearing here today. We appreciate your contributions. Obviously we are undertaking at the minister's request an important study into how we make improvements both to safety management systems and the regime around the transportation of dangerous goods as well.

On issues of liability, I know we're looking more at what we're doing to improve liability regimes for the marine sector, for example, with a major panel report that has already come due. Their recommendations are under consideration and review, if you will, in an expedited fashion by the government and our officials. I suspect we'll be hearing more about the crude oil regime in particular. There's an additional element where we're looking at our preparedness for hazardous materials by the marine mode of transport as well, so these are very timely.

Your contributions, Mr. Gardner, on the issue of liability are important to this committee.

I have a question, Mr. Gardner, about the Canadian Transportation Agency's consultation, the railway third party liability insurance coverage regulations. Have you contributed or made a submission to that particular effort by the CTA?

[Daniel Gardner]

I learned last week that there were consultations. On top of teaching, I travel all over the world. For example, at the beginning of the month I went to France to speak about railway accidents. Next May I will be in Spain speaking about the Saint-Jacques-de-Compostelle tragedy. I only learned more or less yesterday that there had been an invitation to contribute and that the deadline was March 21.

I'm late and it is simply because I was not told. There's some news that apparently does not make it all the way to the rural areas in Quebec.

[Jeff Watson, Conservative, Essex, ON]

It's not a question of blame or anything, Mr. Gardner. We appreciate that. I just wanted to know whether you were aware of it or had a chance to do that. Your submission here obviously is important. It's on the public record, and it's important for consideration as well.

If you wish, as well, to table for the benefit of this committee any type of written submission, that would be appreciated. If you want to formalize some of your thoughts or put together a more comprehensive submission to the committee, we'd welcome that for sure.

That could also be distributed, I presume, as well.

[Daniel Gardner]

Yes.

[Jeff Watson, Conservative, Essex, ON]

I could take a copy of that to the minister, relative to the other process.

Mr. Jeanes, you've been before our committee before. I've been on this committee since 2007. We value that you and your organization continue to stay actively engaged and active with respect to appearing before this committee.

I don't want to sound like I'm picayune, if you will, on this, but I do want some clarity on a particular point. That relates to positive train control. Ms. Tadros was here earlier, and I think what I heard in her response was that the TSB's recommendation was not specific to positive train control, but to fail-safe mechanisms for braking. That implies there are other ways of achieving fail-safe than positive train control.

I'm hearing the NDP continue to raise this, that it was a recommendation for PTC, and I think I've heard the same, Mr. Jeanes. For clarity's sake, there are other mechanisms to achieve fail-safe other than PTC. Is that correct?

[David Jeanes]

The problem is that PTC, depending on where you are in the world, is really a generic term and has different meanings. There are very specific implementations of different kinds of positive train control.

The Japanese bullet trains, shinkansen, have had complete automated train control in the cab, not dependent on signals beside the railway lines, since 1964, when those trains started running. As I mentioned, even American steam railways back in the 1920s, the Pennsylvania Railroad, for example, had mechanisms for positive train control, as did the Great Western Railway and other railways in the United Kingdom.

The technology has many forms and has evolved in many ways. You have situations like the one in Santiago de Compostela, Spain, where there was an older system interfacing to a more modern system, and the interface itself between the two systems was part of the cause of that accident.

The situation in Canada is that we only have the visual indications and the two engineers in the cab as the way of checking that. In the case of Burlington, that didn't work. There was a third qualified engineer in the cab. Although in training, he was a qualified and experienced engineer. That still did not prevent the misinterpretation of the signals there.

When I say positive train control, I mean a system that provides the second line of defence so that if there is a mistake made, or if a signal malfunctions, as it did at Saint-Charles-de-Bellechasse when the VIA Rail train derailed when the signal was partly obscured, there will be a second line of defence. That is the recommendation of the TSB.

[Jeff Watson, Conservative, Essex, ON]

Okay. I appreciate that. I only draw the distinction because Ms. Tadros drew the distinction herself, Mr. Jeanes.

If there are varying models, which one are you recommending that Transport Canada implement here? Is it what they're doing in the United States? Is it a different model? For greater clarity, when you're talking about positive train control and making the recommendation, what model are you asking us to consider?

[David Jeanes]

Because we have a fully integrated rail network between Canada and the United States, because both Canadian railways operate extensive track in the U.S., and because they're equipping their locomotives to meet the American standards, I think we have to observe that integration.

What's done in Europe is useful. The German technology I mentioned, Indusi, is used on Ottawa's O-Train, the only federal railway that uses it. It's also used on light-rail systems in Calgary and Edmonton, for instance, to provide safety.

But we can't go and buy a European system off the shelf, because it would not work across the interface between Canada and the U.S.

[The Chair, Conservative, Larry Miller]

Thank you very much.

We'll now move to Mr. Toet, for seven minutes.

[Lawrence Toet, Conservative, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

Mr. Jeanes, I also wanted to touch on the positive train control aspect of things. There does seem to be a little bit of misunderstanding on exactly what is happening in the United States today on this particular issue also.

Are you aware that currently in the United States there is a bill that has been introduced to extend the full implementation of positive train control?

[David Jeanes]

Yes.

This is an administrative issue because railways have indicated back to the government that they cannot meet the original deadline of 2015, which was mandated by congressional legislation. It's still an open question as to when. What is not an open question is whether it is going to happen. It is happening, and the railways are investing heavily. The only question is by when will it be converted. Obviously, that's still a matter for discussion. But in Canada there is not yet any program.

[Lawrence Toet, Conservative, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

However, in the U.S. one of the challenges they're facing with their 2015 deadline is the technology is not really there yet 100%. They're still working through that process.

Also, they estimate, from the Federal Railroad Administration, that PTC would prevent perhaps 2% of collisions and derailments and it's going to cost over $10 billion to do the implementation. That money is also being diverted from other safety measures. There is a belief out there also that these would actually create more effect than the 2%, but because of the railways investing so heavily into PTC right now, there is a challenge there as to directing their funds in the right direction.

This is not to say there's an issue with PTC and that it's not something that should be looked at seriously, but I think it is important that we recognize these factors in this going forward and that there is a reality that this legislative requirement has put a real burden on the railways. Some of their other safety measures that they may be able to implement they haven't been able to implement because of the money that they're actually directing so strongly into this particular piece of legislation.

I think it's just good and important that we're recognizing those types of things.

The other thing I wanted to ask you about is in regard to safety management systems. You touched on it briefly in your introductory remarks that you were supportive of safety management systems. I'm glad to hear that. I just wanted you to comment on your perception of the addition of SMS to the safety regime for Canadian rail, and the effect that has had. Maybe you could comment on your perception of the effect that has had on the safety regime in Canada.

[David Jeanes]

I think the important thing is that it has established that the railways have to have their own safety culture; they have to have responsibility for safety at the highest management levels. It isn't something that is just responding to problems identified by government investigators, but it is part of the operating culture. It is something that requires continuous investment by the railways. I mentioned already that the railways have to invest in their own infrastructure because governments, unlike other modes, don't pay for railway infrastructure in general, with the exception of course of infrastructure improvements for VIA Rail, which is a crown corporation and therefore depends on government investment for its infrastructure improvements.

Generally what we have seen, and it has certainly been evidenced by the presentations that I've heard at the number of events I've attended.... I mentioned the Canadian Transportation Research Forum meeting earlier this year, where we had a number of presentations from the mainline railways, the short-line railways, and the supply industry. It was the same thing with the International System Safety Society meeting, which I attended and presented at last year, and the TRAQ conference.

The railways are all extremely conscious of the importance of safety. I think it is the introduction of SMS that has brought this elevated consciousness. The question is one really related to the resources of the smaller companies and can companies like MMA, Montreal, Maine & Atlantic, with respect to Lac-Mégantic, afford to properly implement the safety regime that is required. We don't know yet because we haven't had the final report from the TSB to what extent the safety management culture within MMA may or may not have been deficient. We're waiting to hear that.

[Lawrence Toet, Conservative, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

I would submit that they cannot afford not to.

[David Jeanes]

With tragic consequences if they don't.

[Lawrence Toet, Conservative, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

Yes.

Going further, when you answered the question, you talked about SMS being so critical and important at the management level. Last week I had a tour of one of the major rail facilities with the president of the company, and also the president of the union. Actually, what I saw at that particular time was a real pervasiveness right across the structure into the safety management system. The workers also have been very much involved in it and its being important.

Can you comment on how important it is? It's important for management to have this buy-in and to be involved, but could you comment on how important it is from a worker's aspect, because the culture, if it doesn't get down to the people at the ground level, doesn't really adequately suffice, right?

[David Jeanes]

No. The railway employee who is in that high rail truck that is actually running out on routine inspections on the rail line is just as important as the chief safety officer of the corporation in making that happen. If there is any reluctance, for example, to do whistle-blowing on safety problems at the working level, then it will not actually be possible for the chief safety officer to do his job and perform his role.

That openness and the fact that everyone in the corporation understands that safety is part of the corporate culture and not just a management and reporting issue, is essential. I think SMS is understood to require that culture to be created.

[The Chair, Conservative, Larry Miller]

You have 40 seconds.

[Lawrence Toet, Conservative, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

I have a quick question on that. As we go forward looking at safety management systems, if you could give us one recommendation as to one of the most important components of safety management systems which we should be looking at as a committee, what would you say that is, in a very brief response?

[David Jeanes]

Well, the effectiveness has to be monitored. We've already had some concerns expressed by the Auditor General, and if there any concerns about the implementation of safety management systems that come out of any of the TSB reports that we're awaiting, then those should be promptly responded to.

[The Chair, Conservative, Larry Miller]

Thank you very much.

Ms. Boutin-Sweet, you have three minutes.

[Marjolaine Boutin-Sweet, NDP, Hochelaga, QC]

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Given that I only have a little time, both my questions will be for Mr. Gardner.

You have referred several times to compensation, civil law, and so on, but I personally would like to hear you speak about the human aspect. You said that we need to put people first and I really appreciate that.

In a article in La Presse canadienne in August you wrote about our moral obligation. My first question is this. What do you mean by that?

You did not mince words in speaking about the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, the TSB, and Transport Canada. You stated that they had failed and that they had been lax in the case of the Lac Mégantic tragedy. My second question is, what should they have done, what do they not do, and what should they do?