Mr. Speaker, the defence minister ended with a flight of oratory which, in my opinion, hardly befits this morning's debate. This is the third time that this House holds a debate on the participation of Canadian troops in Bosnia, under the aegis of the UN.
As you know, in February 1994, the defence minister said that he had a duty to provide as much information as possible to MPs and to Canadians on Canada's participation in peacekeeping missions, and to truly inform people of all the related implications.
As in the two previous debates, the Bloc cannot oppose Canada's participation in peacekeeping missions. As the defence minister emphatically pointed out, Quebecers and Canadians who are members of Canadian armed forces have frequently been honoured for their role in peacekeeping missions. I think everyone agrees here that they do their job to the best of their knowledge, and that they do their utmost to ensure the success of these missions.
However, there are certain expectations. The defence minister said earlier that it is important, in this debate, that the public's opinion, as well as that of the military, be heard through members of this House. It seems clear to me that, during such a debate,
certain rules should be clarified. Throughout my presentation, I will refer to comments made by the minister.
On November 23, the Prime Minister said, after meeting with Mr. Boutros-Ghali, that Canada had a duty to participate in the peacekeeping effort, following the Dayton agreement, adding that such participation, including the number of troops to be sent, would have to be determined. This morning, I expected the defence minister to provide more details on what the government and his department have planned.
I was briefed by National Defence officials, whom I want to thank, and was told that there were a number of scenarios which cost anywhere from $2 million to some $70 or $75 million, and which require the participation of 50 to 3,000 troops in the international NATO-led implementation force. This morning, I thought the minister would suggest a specific scenario which, in his opinion, reflects what the public is prepared to support as regards such missions, and what our forces can do.
The minister said that we must fulfil certain commitments made to NATO. Indeed, whenever NATO participates in missions, its members must provide 1,000 troops. Is that a minimum or a maximum? Do we send 1,000 combat troops, or can we send military personnel for various tasks? The minister should have been a little more specific since, in a debate such as this one, he not only informs members of this House, but also the public at large.
I did not hear anything in his speech to indicate the direction we might take. Later on in the debate, I will suggest a few avenues to the minister which may be of help to him.
A little later on in his speech, the Minister of National Defence quite justifiably listed all of Canada's military contributions from the onset of the conflict during the summer of 1991, throughout 1992, the opening of the Sarajevo airport, Canadian forces' participation with NATO aircraft, all of the Hercules transport flights, participation in the Adriatric embargo, and so on.
Justifiably, because Canada has indeed made an extraordinary contribution to this conflict, and has always been equal to the task in traditional peacekeeping missions, that is surveillance of humanitarian convoys, population assistance, food shipments, food convoys, communications, etc. For anything connected to traditional peacekeeping, as the minister has said, Canadian expertise is recognized throughout the world. There is no problem in this regard; our military does an outstanding job and everybody acknowledges it, including the people of Canada and Quebec.
However, I see this type of mission as a radical turnaround. We will now be there under chapter VII of the UN Charter rather than chapter VI; this allows far more latitude for interventions, military or otherwise. According to U.S. Secretary of Defence William Perry, when the NATO contingent is in place in Bosnia, if we run into any difficulties in implementing certain provisions of the Dayton peace accord, we will just implement them through force, and if attacked we will respond in kind.
Now this has absolutely no connection with the peacekeeping missions in which Canada has been involved in the past. This is a totally new ball game. The Bloc Quebecois and the people of Quebec and of Canada have concerns about the change in the nature of our mission.
In the same vein, I would like to add that perhaps the comparisons were unwise. Unfortunately, the minister has looked at the attractive aspects of peacekeeping missions. He has listed the Canadian army's and Canada's accomplishments with respect to certain peacekeeping missions, focussing on results that are sometimes not readily measured. There are, however, some things that have to be looked at when playing under different rules. When the minister referred just now to Canadian participation in the discussions on the rules of engagement under chapter VII, I would have liked to hear him clarify exactly what those rules of engagement are, if Canada does commit under NATO auspices to taking part in this new peacekeeping mission to implement the Dayton accord.
Referring to the logistics of "peacekeeping missions", or the linguistic interpretation of the term "peacekeeping mission" , it struck me that the mission now being organized under NATO is being termed-please pardon my use of the English term-a peace enforcement mission.
Going back in time a bit, I have the unfortunate recollection that the Americans' mission to Somalia was also labelled "peace enforcement". We cannot ignore the fact that this additional connotation of "peace enforcement" on top of the traditional "peacekeeping mission" bears some similarity to what happened in Somalia. Far be it from me to go back over the unfortunate events involving the Canadians, the Belgians and even the Americans, but as soon as things started to heat up, the U.S. pulled out and left Canada, Belgium and other countries holding the bag, which led to major problems, unfortunately.
I think it is important, and this is also the position of the Bloc Quebecois, to make the change in mandate very clear. The last time NATO organized a mission under the auspices of the UN dates back to the war in Cyprus.
You may think my analogies are a bit far fetched but the fact is that nothing in the Canadian military's experience in peacekeeping missions has prepared us for the kind of participation to which we
are committing ourselves or was ever approved or accepted by the people of Quebec and Canada.
I think it is important to say this and to be prepared to consider all eventualities. In any case, the Dayton agreement divides certain territories-Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia-and was signed by representatives from Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia.
One of the problems in Bosnia around Sarajevo is that the so-called chiefs of Pale, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, the military chief, did not sign this agreement. Only yesterday we saw on the news that Mr. Mladic, the military chief heads a group that is opposed to the Dayton agreement. These are people who for at least two years thumbed their noses at the UN's resolutions, brought their heavy weapons near the perimeter of Sarajevo and then withdrew them after a number of air strikes, playing cat and mouse with the UN. And now an agreement has been signed, these people are still there on the outskirts of Sarajevo. In fact, the self-styled Bosnian Serb Republic headed by Mr. Karadzic has so far been very inconsistent in its acceptance and has always been rather hard to pin down.
Another argument which casts some doubt on the security of the mission and I believe amplifies certain problems is the fact that the UN set up a war crimes tribunal. Recently, eleven judges from six different countries took part in the proceedings and convictedMr. Mladic and Mr. Karadzic of war crimes.
According to international opinion, to various experts in diplomacy or international law or crimes against humanity, peace will not have a chance until these people have been convicted.
As far as I know, those people who were at the root of the conflict in Bosnia never accepted the Dayton agreement and are already preparing to sabotage the process. I do not think it will be very pleasant or even easy to impose anything at all, because I do not see this as a peacekeeping mission but more as a mission to impose peace.
I think that in this House, parliamentarians have a duty to make it clear to the public and other parliamentarians that this means a change in what has built the extraordinary reputation of Canadian peacekeepers. It will be a different application.
Previously, a change of this kind unfortunately produced the kind of incidents we saw in Somalia, and I think it is too bad this had to happen.
My second point is the economic side. I think we all agree, and perhaps this is less true of members of the third party, that Canada has a duty to take part in these peacekeeping missions, to deal with the conflicts that arise in various countries throughout the world.
I think it is important to tell the House and the public what all this costs. The public realizes that when the government says: "We have soldiers, they need practice, we have equipment we use", all that costs money. However, in the past three years, in 1993, 1994 and 1995 which is now drawing to a close, we were $517 million over budget in Bosnia, which includes humanitarian aid and military spending as well.
This morning, the minister mentioned that costs might vary from $30 million to $50 million, depending on what the government decided. I found this hard to believe, because at the height of Canada's participation we had around 2,100 soldiers with the peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Croatia and we were over budget. In other words, it cost more than would normally have been expected, about $170 million per year more over a period of three years, which adds to up $517 million.
And now the government wants to either maintain or reduce Canada's participation, at a cost of say 30, 50 or 70 million, and if they send up to 3,000 soldiers, we are talking about $75 million. When at the height of Canada's participation, it cost us an additional $170 million for 2,100 soldiers, then how can it possibly cost $75 million for 3,000 soldiers? I find it hard to follow the calculations of the Minister of National Defence, and I think some clarification is in order. In fact, it should even be incumbent on the government to provide this clarification. It must be more precise.
When we decide to do these missions, guided by our suggestions or those of the Reform Party, and the government says that we will meet our commitment to NATO and provide, say 1,000 soldiers, it must give an exact calculation of the excess costs. I am not talking about costs pertaining to soldiers in the regular forces who are already getting their salary. Not those costs. But we must clearly stipulate the excess costs that can be expected. What is also needed is a clear indication of the duration of the mandate and the rules of engagement over which, as the minister said earlier, Canada would have the last say, but I would have appreciated some further indication from the minister.
As far as Canadian aid is concerned, I would like to refer to a statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs who said that Canadian aid might not necessarily be military. We have seen no indication of this option in the approach taken by the Minister of National Defence. The Minister of Foreign Affairs said that we could, for instance, take part in certain humanitarian missions through funding or by receiving immigrants. We know that since the beginning of this conflict in 1991, nearly 250,000 people have died in Bosnia and nearly 800,000 are trying to leave to get away from their wartime experiences and tragedies in their own families, with many killed or wounded. And there are also quite a few people who were maimed as a result of bombings, mines or sniper fire.
Bosnia greatly needs all kinds of help, but we in the Bloc wonder if our armed forces' ceaseless efforts are still needed. I can tell you that about two weeks ago at CFB Valcartier in my riding, the soldiers coming back from peacekeeping missions in Croatia looked a little tired. Some of them are on their fifth mission, others on their fourth or third, and I can tell you that a number of them have suffered from psychological problems, from family problems, from all kinds of problems.
Once again, we are being asked for a little more because, as the defence minister said earlier, Canada has been continuously involved since 1992. We must keep in mind that this is a European conflict and that the international community could never accuse Canada of not participating, sometimes beyond its capabilities in terms of human and financial resources, and of not doing more than its fair share.
We in the Bloc are not calling for a definitive pullout. Not at all. What I insist on, however, is that the government should think very seriously about all the implications and disclose them without any restrictions to Canadians and to Parliament.
I would like to get back to the statement made last week by the defence minister, that Canada would send troops unless the Americans got involved. Last night, I heard some Americans arguing that Congress had not yet concluded an agreement to send 20,000 to 25,000 American troops. As far as I and my Bloc colleagues know and understand, if the American effort is not approved by Congress, I seriously wonder how the famous Dayton agreement can be fulfilled.
It is a little akin to debating whether Canada should participate without clearly defining what kind of support we will provide. Should we send a fighter squadron, as suggested by the hon. member for Saanich-Gulf Islands, an engineering battalion to repair roads, or a communications platoon? None of these options was suggested by the minister. I think it would have been an excellent opportunity to tell the people: "Yes, Canada participates in peacekeeping missions in line with its means and human resources".
As I pointed out earlier, I think that our soldiers are exhausted from all their missions, even if the white paper and the special standing committee's report call for increasing the number of land forces members. This has not been done yet. Recruitment is under way, but these people are not ready to participate. I think we should go in a different direction or limit ourselves to the 1,000 troops required under the terms of our agreement with NATO, and perhaps participate as observers or communications people, for example.
Before we make this decision, however, I have trouble understanding how the Prime Minister could tell Mr. Boutros-Ghali beforehand that we would send troops, that there was no problem.
Then we will figure out how much that will cost and what kind of assistance will be provided. And how long will we stay there? Well Mr. Boutros-Ghali indicated that commitments could be for six months, twelve months or three years, depending on how long the conflict lasts. That is another question mark for the public as well as for the military personnel involved and members of Parliament. How long will the Canadian contribution in Bosnia be for? If the government decides on a twelve month commitment, as requested by NATO members, but the conflict has not been resolved after twelve months, will we do as usual? Two days before renewing the agreement, we will hold a short debate and say: "Let us extend for another six months or twelve months. We will figure out how much all this costs after".
I am far from being certain that this is what the public expects. I think it is high time that the government, and DND in particular, should be more specific. We Bloc members agree with a Canadian and Quebec contribution to peace missions intended to protect values and traditions, but these contributions must be defined. In addition, our troops need a mandate clearly stating what they are expected to do and for how long, and the public should know how much it costs to uphold the principles and values Canadians believe in.
To conclude, regarding the geopolitical context and the Dayton agreement that was signed, we should be reminded of what Justice Deschênes, from the international court dealing with war crimes, whom I quoted, said; let us not forget that Mladic and Karadzic were declared war criminals. I do not think that Canada did anything about it or very little.
Are we going to pacify the region forcibly and then negotiate with these criminals? That is assuming that all the Bosnian families who were the victims of the atrocities inflicted by these individuals will just forgive them and forget all that happened. That a bit much to ask.
I can recall a member of the Croatian army who was also found guilty of war crimes and who was recently promoted in the army.
Again, I doubt that the population, on either the Serb or the Bosnian side, could put up with that. Consequently, peace will continue to be threatened. The international community and NATO should ensure that the sentences given out in these cases are carried out. Otherwise, several observers, and I agree with them, feel that peace will remain precarious as long as justice does not prevail.
In conclusion, before making a decision, the government should clearly explain all the political, financial and human implications relating to the rules of engagement mentioned, but not specified, by the minister. I think the time has come to discuss these rules openly before a decision is made.
Therefore, the Bloc recommends that the government set a specific duration for such missions. If, as a NATO member, we are asked to stay for 12 months, then we commit ourselves for 12 months and, in doing so, we avoid problems such as the recent hostage-taking incidents in Visoko, Tuzla and Gorazde. As some will remember, this was the Cobra mission. Since that mission is now completed, we are somewhat ahead in terms of training some troops that will be sent to Bosnia. I think that if we decide to go there, we should, and the minister talked about facilitating the withdrawal of peacekeepers, provide for the withdrawal of these troops at the end of their stay.
We should at least plan the withdrawal of our troops, so that it is not improvised, as was the case last spring or during the winter, with the hostages.
Finally, I would suggest, on behalf of the Bloc Quebecois, that Canadian troops be more specialized in what I call the traditional type of involvement in peacekeeping missions, which include activities such as monitoring, as well as communications and humanitarian operations. If we decide to participate in such missions, we should concentrate on such activities, given, as I mentioned, our limited human resources. We should also avoid breaking the Canadian tradition of excellent and extraordinary participation in peacekeeping missions. I do hope that Canada will never become an expert in peace enforcement missions.
Finally, it is always very satisfying to actively protect the values and principles that Quebecers and Canadians hold dear. But let us not forget that we must help our own population, and co-operate with it, if we hope to continue to help populations in distress abroad.
