Carole Freeman

[National Aboriginal Day, June 21st, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, June 21 marks the summer solstice, the longest day of the year, and more importantly, National Aboriginal Day.

I am pleased to remind the House that the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples recommended a National Aboriginal Day in 1995. In 1996, June 21 was declared the first National Aboriginal Day.

For the past 10 years, we have been celebrating the important contributions made by first nations peoples. For decades, even centuries, we have benefited from their assistance in our everyday lives. June 21 offers an opportunity to acknowledge the exceptional contributions made by the first nations, Inuit and Métis to Quebec and Canadian society.

Aboriginal nations have a place of honour in our history and the Bloc Québécois would like to emphasize the importance of their contribution to our society.

Enjoy the festivities, my dear friends.

[Claude Saint-Jean, June 14th, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, we are saddened to learn of the death of Claude Saint-Jean, the founder of the Canadian Association for Friedreich's Ataxia, now known as the Canadian Association for Familial Ataxias.

In 1972, Mr. Saint-Jean learned that he suffered from this progressive genetic disorder. He created the Fondation Claude-Saint-Jean, which collected millions of dollars to fund scientific research and thus discover that there were different forms of ataxia.

Together, science and the tenacity of Claude Saint-Jean led to the discovery that ataxia is a symptom, and not a specific disease; it is characterized by impaired coordination among the parts of the human body. This physical condition progresses inexorably and cannot be arrested.

Claude Saint-Jean put a face on Friedreich's ataxia. He exhibited uncommon courage and phenomenal perseverance in his efforts to relieve the suffering of people with ataxia.

Claude Saint-Jean is gone, but his work will continue. The Bloc Québécois offers its deepest condolences to his family and friends.

[Criminal Code, June 5th, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, today I am pleased and honoured to speak on behalf of my Bloc Québécois colleagues as we begin the debate on the second reading of Bill C-10 to substantially amend the Criminal Code. On behalf of the government, the Minister of Justice is asking the House to adopt this bill, which was introduced on May 4, that will make the law tougher by imposing minimum prison sentences for offences involving firearms.

According to the bill introduced by the minister, the Criminal Code will be amended to set out minimum prison sentences of five, seven or even ten years—depending on whether it is a repeat crime—for eight serious offences involving the use of a firearm. The prison sentence will be determined according to several factors, including whether the firearm in question is a restricted or prohibited weapon, or whether there is a link between the offence and a criminal organization. The bill also sets out minimum prison sentences of one to five years depending on whether it is a repeat offence linked to other gun crimes.

Finally the obsessive hard-line approach of the Conservatives, founded on their dominant law-and-order ideology, shall once again be manifested in the creation of two new offences: breaking and entering with intent to steal a firearm, and robbery to steal a firearm.

My colleagues and I have given the wording of the bill a very attentive reading and thorough analysis, and too many concerns came up which prevented us from simply taking a positive view of its principle, at this stage of its passage.

We are fundamentally opposed to the very approach of the Conservative government which, true to itself, is cultivating an obsession with security and proposing excessively populist solutions, guided by purely electoral ambitions and scornful of the possible solutions, and above all of concrete results. Not only are the solutions put forward by the Conservatives based on mistaken premises, but worse still, they are harmful, ineffective and will contribute nothing to the real improvement of citizen safety.

The wave of violence in the city of Toronto last year, together with the excessive media coverage it was given, was probably a major contributor to reinforcing the idea that the streets of our communities have become more dangerous than before. Repetitive media coverage of a tragedy and the attention that citizens develop to these horrifying images can probably distort the reality of a situation. That is precisely what the Conservatives are skilfully cultivating to create a veritable psychosis in the population.

In other words, the Conservatives are utilizing tragedies reported in the evening news to wage an insidious campaign of fear mongering and thereby promote their simplistic solutions, which, they hope, will find a select place in the collective unconscious under the false pretext of a resolute initiative to stamp our crime and violence.

The method is as old as the world, but the recent experience of the Bush administration south of the border demonstrates the limits of populist propaganda. Similarly, the Conservatives’ premise that the most effective way to battle crime and wipe out violent behaviour is to adopt tougher enforcement measures is singularly mistaken, and flies in the face of the most basic logic.

It is not the fear of serving a long and difficult prison sentence that will dissuade an individual from committing a crime, even a violent crime. This is purely and simply because the individual whose plan led him to commit such a serious offence as an armed crime, simply does not have the same state of mind or heightened awareness of the true seriousness of the act he is preparing to commit as would an honest citizen. Criminologists and other experts on individual criminal behaviour define this psychological state of mind as an unbalanced perception of invulnerability. The criminal mind is convinced of the fact that it is not running any risk of being caught.

From that perspective, the spectre or threat of a long prison term does not apply to the individual. It thus becomes totally illusory as a dissuasive factor.

This state of affairs applies equally to the likelihood of recidivism by an offender sentenced for a major crime. As I was saying, the state of mind and the predisposition to commit another violent crime is often seen by the individual as an unexplained failure of an act that went awry. So, bad luck and the unconscious assurance that next time he will not be caught. But there is more. The court's obligation to impose minimum sentences, especially in the case of offences involving firearms, implies as well a limitation of the means of preventing crime and the prospects for the rehabilitation of the individuals. This is because the judges hearing the case of an individual found guilty of crimes subject to the provisions of the bill before us will inevitably and needlessly have their hands tied by the requirement in the legislation to sentence the person to prison.

If we assume that judges are the individuals most familiar with the details and circumstances of a crime that was committed, since they must analyze the case and render a decision, their ability to determine the most appropriate sentence would thus be limited, in light of all of the facts that will have been submitted.

There is an old common law principle justice must not only be done, but also seen to be done. Thus, convicting someone to several years of prison will certainly please a certain portion of society and give them a false sense of security, but this will do nothing to resolve the causes of that individual's behaviour.

For a long time now, the Bloc Québécois has made it clear that we strongly advocate fighting crime using an approach based on the rehabilitation of offenders. The Bloc believes that the most efficient means of truly limiting the scourge of violence is by first attacking its origins. The Bloc Québécois supports a model of justice whose cornerstone rests on a individualized process that takes into account the unique nature of each case. The model proposes lasting, truly deterrent solutions that are based on rehabilitation.

Despite the Conservative Party's firm language, the government's approach is doomed to failure and will do nothing to address the situation. At best, we will imprison people who will brood about their frustrations for years and very likely form a desire for revenge against the system that punished them instead of helping them rehabilitate themselves.

Of course, there will always be certain people for whom the value system that guides society will never be anything more than another constraint to break free of. But individuals who are deemed to be beyond redemption are not released and remain incarcerated.

By increasing minimum sentences according to the number of previous convictions, the government is admitting that its proposal is ineffective. The minister is calling for even stricter sentences for repeat offenders because he understands that their initial prison term, without guidance, will serve no purpose and that the sentence, as strict as it may be, will not have the desired deterrent effect. Then there is the highly predictable impact that serving a long and difficult sentence in a penitentiary—a nightmarish prospect that offers no comfort—will have on someone convicted of a first offence.

Penitentiaries are often described as veritable crime schools. There is a good chance, then, that during a mandatory five-year minimum sentence, an individual who may not have been headed for a life of crime will have access to all the tools he needs to complete his criminal education, so to speak.

In conclusion, I would suggest that the government, and particularly the Departments of Justice and Public Safety, work to restore public confidence in the parole process if they really want to make sweeping reforms to the justice system.

[Divorce Act, June 5th, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to take part in the debate at second reading of Bill C-252, sponsored by the member for Lethbridge, amending the Divorce Act.

My colleague's bill, tabled on May 4 in the House, is intended to amend the existing act in order to enable a spouse who is terminally ill or in critical condition to have special access to a child of the marriage. We conclude that parents, who do not have “regular” access to a child can claim the state of their health to have the decision of a court amended in order to become reconciled with that child in what are likely to be their final moments. The bill provides that such access is to be consistent with the best interests of the child, of course.

This is the crux of the matter. Currently, subsection 16(8) of the Divorce Act sets out very clearly the basic criterion to guide the judge in deciding the terms of custody of the child. Thus, it provides that in making an order, the court shall take into consideration only the best interests of the child of the marriage as determined by reference to the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the child.

The best interest of the child is the fundamental notion guiding all measures set out in the Divorce Act. In this regard, members will recall the unsuccessful attempt by the former Minister of Justice, Martin Cauchon, to have Bill C-22 adopted in the 37th Parliament. At the time, the minister was working on an ambitious project involving reform of the legal framework for divorce. He had in fact based his approach on a strategy closely linked to the interests of the child, but had introduced at the same time the notion of parental responsibility, in opposition to the use of “custody” and “access”, which gave a negative win-lose quality to the terms of rulings.

Since the reform never came to fruition and the bill died on the order paper when the House was prorogued in the second session of the 37th Parliament, nearly three years ago, the matter remains largely unresolved.

The proposal put forward by the hon. member for Lethbridge, which would add a new criterion to be considered, would result in exceptional consequences for previous rulings. I fully understand and appreciate the noble intent that prompted my colleague to develop his bill and I commend him on that. It goes without saying that the sincere and profound wish of a seriously ill parent living out their final days is to spend the last moments of their battle surrounded by their children or one of their children. It is perfectly natural to want that.

We should question and think hard about why, since this involves a departure from the original court order, this specific access to the child being now requested was previously restricted or prohibited by the judge. This is precisely where the concept of the best interests of the child becomes important and is what makes this debate so interesting.

If everyone agrees that the best interests of the child are the priority, then does the seriousness of a parent's medical condition, from a human point of view, justify access to and visitation of a child because the parent is dying? As I was saying earlier, the court provided a well considered justification to limit such contact, which, as natural as it may be, is not necessarily desirable.

This leads to me question the subordination of the best interests of the child to the humanitarian aspect of the situation. One would have to know what it was like to be ill and dying to understand the extraordinary comfort to be derived from the mere presence, no speech even being necessary, of a close family member at one's bedside.

To ease the suffering of body and mind, a parent could request the presence of a child to whom they previously did not have access by court order. The new reality proposed in the bill intrinsically implies adding a criterion to guide the judge when it comes time to hand down a ruling.

My question has to do with the subordination of the best interests of the child to those of the parent. I have given it some thought and I have come up with two diametrically opposed observations.

If the only purpose of the member for Lethbridge's bill is to allow a possible exception to a court decision by explicitly subordinating the parent's extreme medical condition to the interest of the child, then the bill respects the spirit of the current law, thereby making it ill-advised. If the child's interest comes first under any circumstances, the parent's medical condition would not justify making an exception to the court's decision in favour of the parent.

Take, for example, a parent who was denied access to a child because of some kind of physical abuse. What does it matter that that parent has only a few days to live and wishes to express remorse or ask forgiveness? If it had been decided that it was not in the child's best interest to visit the parent, the access restrictions would be maintained. In this case, amending the act would be pointless because the child's interest takes precedence.

If, however, my colleague's intention is to create a broader or more flexible definition of the concept of the child's best interest—which would inevitably result in reducing the extent and especially the precedence of the child's best interest in favour of the parent who has been denied access or who has limited access—that would make the bill completely unacceptable. This is a basic principle that should not be questioned, not even in the case of a parent's imminent death.

That said, I do not believe this is my colleague's intention, and I think that he has brought before the House a very interesting issue that requires serious consideration.

So as to contribute to this debate, I would like to draw the attention of the House to a historical position of the Quebec government staunchly defended by the Bloc Québécois that dates back to when Daniel Johnson senior was in power. This position calls for exclusive jurisdiction for the provinces in the area of divorce. Given that the provinces have jurisdiction for the solemnization of marriage, it is only logical that the dissolution thereof also fall to the same authority. This is merely common sense.

I should point out that it is not stipulated anywhere in the Civil Code of Quebec that a parent's critical state of health must be taken into account when establishing his or her visiting rights. Furthermore, our interpretation is based on article 3142 of the Civil Code of Quebec, which stipulates that “A Québec authority has jurisdiction to rule on the custody of a child provided he is domiciled in Québec”. Articles 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which refer to the child's interests, compel the court to seek the child's opinion.

It would therefore be pointless to amend the Divorce Act, as I indicated earlier.

However, in the interest of openness for the remainder of the debate and in order to further explore the issue raised by our colleague from Lethbridge, the Bloc Québécois will support the bill at this stage of the legislative process. By referring the bill to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, we will give the hon. member an opportunity to thoroughly explain the objective of his proposal.

Before I close, I would like to reiterate the Bloc Québécois' position that the Divorce Act should be repealed, and that Quebec and the provinces should have the power to legislate divorce. This would correct one of the aberrations of the Canadian Constitution.

In the meantime, since divorce remains under federal jurisdiction, we will earnestly take part in any reform initiative that would ensure greater protection of the child's interests.

[Criminal Code, May 31st, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, I would first like to thank my colleague, the hon. member for Saint-Bruno—Saint-Hubert for her comments.

I would also like to congratulate my colleague for her courage in defending the officers of the Correctional Service of Canada. As she pointed out, these people are in a very difficult situation. As she said, as of June 1, they will have been without a contract for four years. We must commend her for all of her efforts to defend the Correctional Service officers.

I must also mention that the Conservative Party is constantly presenting us with right-wing bills that depart further and further from the fundamental values of Quebec and from our preferred approach to rehabilitation. In that regard, I must thank the hon. member for Saint-Bruno—Saint-Hubert for her comments. I agree with her that the Conservative Party and all of its right-wing measures are currently leading us nowhere.

[Criminal Code, May 31st, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to join my colleagues in the debate on second reading of Bill C-9, which amends the conditional sentence provisions of the Criminal Code.

The Minister of Justice presented his bill in this House on May 4. Since this legislation was introduced, we have heard an impressive number of negative comments directed to the minister and the Conservative government. In fact, there is every indication that the government is going it alone, in what can only be described as a crusade whose true roots can be found in the Conservative Party’s populist approach.

The Conservative ideology is based on the law and order mindset that characterizes a particular fringe element of Canadian society, especially out west. The Conservative Party is pushing a tough and extremely harsh approach to crime and punishment, and along that way it has rejected the principles of rehabilitation of offenders and alternatives to imprisonment.

Let us be clear: the Bloc does not advocate emptying the prisons or using imprisonment only for dangerous criminals; far from it. But a balance must be struck between the harshness of the sentence imposed and the seriousness of the offence, the risk of recidivism and public safety. This is where the impact of enacting the Conservative bill would be felt the most.

To be as clear as possible, I would note that the objective of the current version of Bill C-9 is to amend section 742.1 of the Criminal Code to provide that conditional sentences may not be imposed for offences prosecuted by way of indictment for which the maximum term of imprisonment is ten years or more. At least, that is what the minister claims.

There are major flaws in this bill that nothing has been said about, and whose consequences go beyond sentencing alone. They will directly affect not only the justice system in its entirety, but also, and most importantly, the prison system as a whole.

At present, section 742.1 of the Criminal Code provides:

Where a person is convicted of an offence, except an offence that is punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment, and the court (a) imposes a sentence of imprisonment of less than two years, and (b) is satisfied that serving the sentence in the community would not endanger the safety of the community...the court may

In fact, however, that alternative to conventional imprisonment must comply with the purpose and principles set out in sections 718 to 718.2, including denouncing unlawful conduct and deterring the offender and other persons from committing offences. Consideration must be given to separating offenders from society, where necessary, keeping in mind the guiding principle of rehabilitating offenders and providing reparation for harm done to victims or to the community.

For example, expressions of remorse by offenders, or at least a genuine understanding of their responsibility, as expressed, for example, through recognition of the harm they have done to victims and to the community, are other factors that must also be taken into consideration in sentencing.

The court may then order that offenders serve their sentences in the community so that their behaviour may be supervised, provided that they comply with the strict conditions imposed.

The Conservative government wants to make the Criminal Code unnecessarily tough by eliminating the court’s option of imposing a conditional sentence of imprisonment. The consequences of that approach are enormous.

We need to realize that the bill sponsored by the justice minister will greatly increase the number of crimes for which judges can no longer impose a conditional sentence. It is ironic that in getting tough on criminals, they are tying the hands of judges who might have decided, in light of all the facts, that this would have been the most appropriate sentence.

With its populist approach for clearly electoral purposes, the Conservative government is taking a dangerous backward step of ten years in our legal system. Conditional sentences were adopted in 1996 as an alternative method of incarceration for adult offenders.

Now, as at that time, the Bloc Québécois believes that it is extremely important for judges to have as broad an array of choices as possible at their disposal in determining appropriate sentences. The Bloc also believes that this approach is most conducive to the successful rehabilitation of offenders while ensuring public safety and the appearance of justice.

Prior to 1996, people found guilty of a criminal offence and sentenced to terms of just a few days were required in all cases to serve their time in prison. The primary objective of conditional sentences was to reduce incarceration and give the courts an alternative.

Since the adoption of conditional sentencing, judges can condemn a person who poses no danger to public safety to serve a sentence that is less than two years in the community.

When imposing a prison sentence, judges must consider the offender’s degree of responsibility and the seriousness of the crime. Sentencing is therefore not a simple equation between a certain crime and a certain sentence. A multitude of factors have to be factored in, such as those I just mentioned.

The Bloc Québécois strongly advocates a justice system based on a personalized approach specific to each case in which conditional sentences are an essential option.

To do otherwise by eliminating the ability of judges to pass sentences that involve serving time in the community will impose a gigantic additional financial burden on Quebec and the provinces. If we consider the difficult financial situation that the provinces face and the astronomical cost of detaining offenders, it becomes self-evident that the money spent in this way would be much better used for the purposes of rehabilitation and prevention.

There are at present 15,000 individuals serving a conditional sentence. Those are 15,000 convicted criminals serving their sentence in society because they are considered very low risk, both to re-offend but also and above all for society itself. In other words, these individuals do not have to live, if I can put it that way, in a prison, and so the resulting financial burden is that much less.

In the opinion of Department of Justice officials one third of the 15,000 criminals on a conditional sentence will no longer be eligible for it if the government carries through with Bill C-9.

Imagine for a moment the need to incarcerate 5,000 persons all at once, all over Canada, for variable terms, certainly, but all the same at a time when the prison system is filled to capacity. I dare not even think of the colossal sum that this insane bill of the Conservatives is going to cost.

To satisfy a specific electoral clientele and firm up the support of the militant right-wing rank and file, the Conservative Party is prepared to embark on a legislative and social cul-de-sac, a veritable ideological dead end. The Conservatives’ logic is baseless, and even contrary to their general vision of law and justice.

They argue for a toughening of the penal system on the one hand, and on the other they limit the powers of judges to formulate and determine the sentences to be imposed on offenders.

Conditional sentencing is a very attractive alternative for the courts, in that judges can impose a harsh sentence on someone, for example by ordering strict conditions to limit mobility and activities, without filling and overfilling prisons which are already overflowing. And I have not even raised here the issue of deterrence for the bulk of offenders, out of simple fear of possibly ending up in prison amidst a clientele that is rather intimidating, for lack of a better term.

With regard to the conditions that accompany conditional sentences of imprisonment, it is helpful to note that they vary from one person to the next, but are defined according to a mandatory legislative classification, and are discretionary since they are determined by the court. For example, when an offender breaches one of his conditions, he has to appear before the judge again, and if the judge is convinced that the offender has breached a condition with no reasonable excuse, he or she will issue an order for the rest of the sentence to be served behind bars.

Mandatory conditions are those which a judge does not need to record in the conditional sentence order, as they apply in all cases without exception. The other conditions are called “discretionary” since the judge has discretion to include them in the conditional sentence order and to amend them according to the particular situation.

These mandatory conditions include keeping the peace and being of good behaviour, going to court when required, and reporting to a criminal justice system supervisor regularly. The court must also ensure that the offender stays in a specified area by requiring the person to get written permission to travel outside this area. The offender must also tell the criminal justice system supervisor before moving or when changing jobs.

With respect to discretionary conditions, there are, in theory, an infinite number of them because a judge can apply any condition he or she deems reasonable.

However, house arrest and curfews have practically become a given. Courts have ruled that a person receiving a conditional sentence must, in principle, be under house arrest for the duration of the sentence. The judge may allow some exceptions to allow the individual to go to work or to school.

This last element seems to me to be quite sensible, and I am surprised that members of the Conservative Party do not consider it to be more important. It seems that their basic objective is to fill up the prisons with all kinds of criminals, to just put them away regardless of the seriousness of their crimes or even their risk to reoffend.

In closing, I urge my colleagues to reject Bill C-9, which would not only cost a fortune in correctional infrastructure, but would bring take our penal justice system one big step backward.

[Justice, May 11th, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, does the minister realize that by denying judges the option of issuing conditional sentences to be served in the community Quebec and the provinces will assume an additional burden by having to imprison more people, when the same money could better be used for rehabilitation and prevention?

[Justice, May 11th, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, the Minister of Justice recently presented two bills indicating this government's penchant for a punitive approach. The bill on conditional sentences aims to send more people to prison, while crime is dropping markedly throughout Canada, especially in Quebec.

Does the Minister of Justice realize that his bill on conditional sentences is aimed at sentences of two years less a day and that he will send some 5,000 more people to prison annually?

[The Budget, May 9th, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his question and his comments.

The only way for us to meet all of those expectations is to achieve Quebec's sovereignty. Quebec must have full control in all areas, economic, cultural and the rest. That is really the only way to do it. That is our vision of things. That is the only way for us, the people of Quebec, to move forward.

[The Budget, May 9th, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my distinguished colleague for his question and comments.

The Bloc Québécois decided to support the budget because it felt it was a transition budget, as I mentioned in my presentation.

That means that we are not giving the Conservative party a blank cheque and that we are not supporting absolutely everything it proposes. Several recommendations regarding this budget are points raised by the Bloc Québécois. We will see whether or not the Conservative Party, as it has stated, will resolve the fiscal imbalance—a very important issue—within a year.

The Bloc Québécois is not giving the Conservative Party a blank cheque. Quite the opposite, as I stated in my speech. If some of the provisions did not meet with our expectations, we would not hesitate to oppose them. If necessary, the Bloc Québécois may go so far as to topple the government.