Geoff Regan

[Use of Unanimous Consent—Speaker's Statement, May 27th, 2019]

I would now like to make a statement regarding the use of unanimous consent in the House in light of recent use of this procedure.

Members are aware and appreciate the fact that, while most decisions of the House are made following the usual process of debate and the putting of a question on a motion, the unanimous consent process offers a viable means for the House to expedite its decision-making. In fact, it is an accepted and effective procedural tool adopted by the House for the benefit of members.

Part of its usefulness, and dare I say success, stems from its simplicity. There are just two steps: First, a member must obtain the consent of members to move the motion, and then, if consent is granted, the member can move the motion to allow a decision by the House.

Inherent in this is the assumption, even expectation, that the wording of the motion will be read in extenso, in its fullness, so that members know exactly what they are being asked to decide. Not only did this become our common practice, but it is even prescribed by our rules when used in the context of Standing Order 56.1.

That said, it also confers on the Chair a certain discretion to determine to what extent a motion needs to be read, particularly when they are unusually lengthy or when multiple motions are presented one after another. On February 6, 2004, Speaker Milliken had cause to state at page 245 of Debates:

I want to say right off that if every member had the right to stand up and ask for consent to move motions and then stood here and read motions all day, no business would be conducted in the House. In my view members do not have such a right. They are asking for consent and if consent is not going to be given, then we cannot have interminable requests for unanimous consent.

The Chair then must seek to safeguard the House against unilateral attempts to repurpose or redefine our procedures. As the Deputy Speaker reminded members as recently as May 17, at page 28029 of Debates:

It is known to be common practice of the House to use the unanimous consent motion approach when there is known agreement among parties for the acceptance of these motions. Nonetheless, I would ask members to refrain from using those opportunities for debate. It is not what they are for.

In other words, requests for unanimous consent are not to be used as a method to thwart the rules of the House or as a dilatory tactic. Therefore, to uphold the integrity of the process, the Chair will continue to invoke its authority, particularly when it becomes clear that the motions are deliberately too lengthy, when they are continuously attempted in a repetitive way or when they stray into the realm of debate.

As Speaker, I am confident that members still expect the process of unanimous consent to be used for its rightful purpose and in the manner in which it was intended, including ensuring that the necessary consultations take place prior to these requests being raised in the House so that the motions can be read in their entirety, as is expected. Although as of late there has been a departure from this, the Chair is committed to working in collaboration with members to restore and preserve this important procedural process.

I thank all hon. members for their attention.

[Committees of the House, May 16th, 2019]

The report of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security was presented a few moments ago. Given the point of order raised on May 9, 2019, by the hon. member for Lakeland regarding Motion No. 167, which was a motion of instruction to that committee, I would like to make a statement.

As members will recall, in raising her point of order, the member for Lakeland explained that, on May 30, 2018, the House adopted Motion No. 167, which was an order to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security to study the matter of rural crime and to report its findings to the House no later than six months following the adoption of the said motion. The committee did not respect this reporting obligation. More than five months after the deadline, which was November 30, 2018, the member brought to the attention of the Chair the failure of the committee to comply with that order.

In response, the chair of the committee, the member for Scarborough—Guildwood, provided explanations for the committee's delay.

Despite missing the fixed deadline to report to the House, as Speaker, I am satisfied that the committee did finally report on Motion No. 167.

While the Chair understands well the dynamics of committees and the different, sometimes conflicting, viewpoints that may arise in their deliberations, this does not excuse a committee from its obligation to respect orders of the House that pertain to its work, such as Motion No. 167. The fact that committees are masters of their proceedings does not allow them to ignore this obligation. Should difficulties arise in carrying out an order of the House, as may happen, it remains incumbent on the committee to ask for an extension to a deadline it cannot meet by means of a report to the House so that it may then decide whether or not to grant it.

With the report of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security having now been presented to the House, I consider the matter closed.

I thank all hon. members for their attention.

[Privilege, May 6th, 2019]

I am now ready to rule on the question of privilege raised on March 22 and April 4, by the hon. member for Durham concerning solicitor-client privilege in the context of parliamentary privilege.

In his intervention, the member alleged that the Prime Minister used solicitor-client privilege in an inappropriate way by allowing only a partial waiver to the former attorney general, the member for Vancouver Granville, in respect to the SNC-Lavalin affair and the Shawcross doctrine. Stating that there has been confirmation that parliamentary privilege is absolute and supersedes solicitor-client privilege, he contended that without a full waiver of solicitor-client privilege, his ability to fulfill both his individual and collective functions has been impeded.

Rather than asking the Chair to find a prima facie case of privilege, the member asked the Chair to reaffirm that parliamentary privilege, being absolute, supersedes solicitor-client privilege. He also wanted me to take the extraordinary step of inviting the former attorney general to speak in the House, assuring her that she would not be subject to the constraints of solicitor-client privilege.

As the member himself acknowledged, this is not a question of privilege, but as the member raised other issues, I will address the points raised.

Any member participating in the deliberations of the House and its committees is protected by the privilege of free speech; the same is true for witnesses appearing before committees. Whether this accepted principle was somehow diminished or even overturned by solicitor-client privilege, it must be recognized that the former attorney general decided to respect that convention. The Chair is not in a position to either question or pass judgment on this.

The Chair is also limited in its authority to invite members to speak on particular issues. It is not for me as Speaker to invite the former attorney general to speak, as the member for Durham suggested. This would take us far from our rules and practices—too far, I would suggest.

I thank all hon. members for their attention.

[Privilege, May 2nd, 2019]

I am now prepared to rule on the question of privilege raised on April 10, 2019, by the hon. member for Chilliwack—Hope concerning allegedly misleading statements by the Minister of National Revenue.

When raising his question of privilege, the member for Chilliwack—Hope explained that the Minister of National Revenue had told the House more than once that the Canada Revenue Agency had hired 1,300 new auditors since 2016 but that certain Quebec newspapers reported this to be inaccurate, stating that the true figure was just 192. The member went on to explain how the minister's statements breached privileges since they were knowingly and deliberately misleading and made with the intent to deceive the House, in his view.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Government House Leader countered that the minister’s statements, inside and outside the House, were in fact accurate and consistent. The parliamentary secretary cited the auditors hired from 2016 through 2018 to justify the minister’s claim that 1,300 auditors were hired by the Canada Revenue Agency. From his perspective, the parliamentary secretary claimed that this was a dispute as to the facts rather than a legitimate question of privilege.

By now, members are only too aware that, in most instances, when members are accused of misleading the House, the Chair has ruled that it is a dispute as to the facts. Given the gravity of such a charge, the Chair must be able to establish with certainty that the statements made were undoubtedly false, misleading and intended to misinform the House.

Members must recognize that what may appear to be misleading and false is often a matter of perception subject to context and interpretation, factors that are inherent to debate. On this, Speaker Milliken stated on December 6, 2004, at page 2319 of Debates:

Disagreements about facts and how the facts should be interpreted form the basis of debate in this place.

Consequently, absent any compelling evidence to the contrary, I do not find that a prima facie question of privilege has been established in this case.

I thank all hon. members for their attention.

[Privilege, April 30th, 2019]

I am now prepared to rule on the question of privilege raised on April 8, 2019, by the hon. member for Victoria concerning a leak involving the appointment process for the Supreme Court.

When raising his question of privilege, the member for Victoria asserted that his reputation as a member has been damaged as a result of speculation around the source of a leak of personal information of a prospective member of the Supreme Court. In particular, he felt that both he and the member for Niagara Falls are now under a cloud of suspicion, having been involved in the process initiated by the government of recommendations for Supreme Court nominees. Consequently, he argued that this suspicion, until resolved, has resulted in a direct impact on his privileges. He also contended that the leak has shown a distinct contempt of Parliament.

As referred to at page 22 of the third edition of House of Commons Procedure and Practice, the practice of an ad hoc committee of parliamentarians to review nominees for the Supreme Court is not new. Successive governments have used this mechanism to help them fulfill their duties. While composed of some parliamentarians, it is not a parliamentary committee but more of an advisory body to the government as part of the exercise of its prerogative power of appointment.

The issue raised then is one that concerns government and the way it reaches its decisions, an area over which the Chair has no authority. My predecessor reminded members of this on May 12, 2014, at page 5520 of the Debates, when he stated:

...it is not within the Speaker's authority to adjudicate on government policies or processes...the distinction between governmental procedures and House procedures remains and must be acknowledged.

On November 22, 2016, I reiterated this fundamental distinction when I stated at page 7084 of the Debates:

...when members request redress with respect to rules external to the House, as Speaker I can neither interpret nor enforce them. It has long been the case that the Speaker's role is limited to ensuring that the body of rules and practices that the House has adopted are respected and upheld.

As such, it is not for the Speaker to investigate or pass judgment on rules, events or actions external to the House, including the leak of information in question. Moreover, as the hon. member acknowledged, this incident is being investigated by the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, a parliamentary agent who reports to this House.

That being said, damaging a member’s reputation is a serious matter if it can be proven that their ability to perform their parliamentary functions has been impeded. House of Commons Procedure and Practice, third edition, states at page 112:

The unjust damaging of a Member’s good name might be seen as constituting an obstruction if the Member is prevented from performing his or her parliamentary functions.

It is incumbent upon members to demonstrate to the Chair exactly how they were hindered in the performance of their parliamentary duties. The hon. member has contended that the cloud of suspicion has damaged his reputation as well as that of the hon. member for Niagara Falls, but he has not explained in what way it has actually obstructed him.

Finally, the member for Victoria claimed that the leak constituted a contempt of Parliament. Although members of Parliament were part of the government's advisory group, it is hard to see how a leak from any non-parliamentary body can be a contempt of Parliament. Again, the member has not provided enough information for me to understand how a contempt against Parliament has been committed.

As the member for Victoria has not clearly demonstrated to the Chair how he has been impeded in fulfilling his parliamentary functions, I cannot find that this constitutes a prima facie question of privilege or of contempt of the House.

As an aside, I do not suppose it will help if I indicate my own very high regard of the hon. members for Victoria and Niagara Falls.

I thank all hon. members for their attention.

[Points of Order, April 29th, 2019]

I am now prepared to rule on the point of order raised on April 10 by the hon. member for Vancouver East concerning the applicability of Standing Order 69.1 to Bill C-97, an act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 19, 2019 and other measures.

I would like to thank the member for Vancouver East for raising this matter, as well as the Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons for his comments.

The member for Vancouver East asked that the Chair use the authority granted under Standing Order 69.1 to divide the question on the motions for second and, if necessary, third reading of Bill C-97, as she argued the bill contained measures not announced in the budget of March 19, 2019.

She argued that the measures in subdivisions B, D, E, F, G, J, K and L of division 9 of part 4 amending a number of different acts did not appear to have been announced in the budget. The member also argued that divisions 15 and 16 of part 4, creating the college of immigration and citizenship consultants act and amending the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, should be separated out of Bill C-97, as these two measures would significantly transform the Canadian immigration system.

The parliamentary secretary to the government House leader, in his intervention, sought to reassure the House that these measures were indeed arising out of the budget. He pointed out that many of the amendments arise out of a commitment made at page 326 of budget 2019 where it is written, and I quote:

The Government proposes to introduce legislation to begin its work on an annual modernization bill consisting of legislative amendments to various statutes to help eliminate outdated federal regulations and better keep existing regulations up to date.

He also mentioned that subdivision D in division 9 of part 4 was explicitly referenced at page 119, which states:

To facilitate internal trade, the Government intends to remove the federal requirement that alcohol moving from one province to another be sold or consigned to a provincial liquor authority. Provinces and territories would continue to be able to regulate the sale and distribution of alcohol within their boundaries.

Finally, the parliamentary secretary stated that divisions 15 and 16 of part 4, which relate to the creation of the college of immigration and citizenship consultants act and make changes to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, were dealt with at pages 184, 185 and 326 of the budget.

Standing Order 69.1 empowers the Speaker to divide the question on the motion for second and third reading of a bill in circumstances where the bill contains a number of unrelated provisions. It could certainly be argued that this is precisely the case with Bill C-97. However, the matter before us today concerns section (2) of that standing order, which makes an exception for budget implementation bills. That section reads as follows:

69.1(2) The present Standing Order shall not apply if the bill has as its main purpose the implementation of a budget and contains only provisions that were announced in the budget presentation or in the documents tabled during the budget presentation.

The question for the Speaker then is whether the measures identified by the member for Vancouver East correspond to provisions announced in budget 2019.

Let me first deal with the measures in subdivisions B, E, F, G, K and L of division 9 of part 4 of Bill C-97. I am willing to accept the arguments from the parliamentary secretary that the amendments to the Electricity and Gas Inspection Act, the Precious Metals Marking Act, the Textile Labelling Act, the Weights and Measures Act, the Quarantine Act and the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act are all part of the effort to modernize existing regulatory powers and obligations. I believe it is appropriate that those measures be included in the general vote at second reading and, if necessary, at third reading.

The measures in subdivision J of division 9 of part 4, contained in clauses 217 to 219 of Bill C-97, concern amendments to the Pest Control Products Act. They deal with changes to the special review process that a minister may initiate relating to the registration of pest control products. I understand from the parliamentary secretary's comments that these modifications also fall under the heading “Bringing Innovation to Regulations” at page 326. Pages 116 to 120 of the budget provide more detail on this initiative. While less explicitly linked to specific regulations, in my view, the amendments to the Pest Control Products Act in Bill C-97 are aimed at reducing the regulatory burden associated with re-evaluation and special review of a product. The act empowers the Governor in Council to make regulations respecting the registration process, as well as a number of subjects related to the registration process, including the evaluation of the health or environmental risks or the value of pest control products. As such, I am prepared to accept this argument and will allow it to be included in the general vote.

The measures in subdivision D of division 9 of part 4, contained in clauses 185 to 189 of Bill C-97, concern the amendments to the Importation of Intoxicating Liquors Act. As indicated in the summary of the bill, these amendments are to limit the application of the act to intoxicating liquors imported into Canada. It is mentioned at page 119 of the budget that the government intends to remove federal barriers to the interprovincial trade of alcohol.

When reading clauses 185 to 189 of Bill C-97, I understand that the Importation of Intoxicating Liquors Act must be amended for it to apply only to the importation of alcohol into Canada and not to interprovincial trade. I therefore believe it is also appropriate that those measures be included in the general vote at second reading and, if necessary, at third reading.

Divisions 15 and 16 of part 4 deal with the creation of the college of immigration and citizenship consultants act and make changes to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. These measures are contained in clauses 291 to 310 of the bill. Each of these initiatives are explained at pages 184, 185 and 326 of the budget, under the headings of “Enhancing the Integrity of Canada’s Borders and Asylum System” and “Protecting People from Unscrupulous Immigration Consultants”. The provisions identified by the member for Vancouver East concerning these topics were therefore clearly announced in the budget.

The member for Vancouver East argued that the creation of the college of immigration and citizenship consultants act and the changes to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act should have been introduced as separate pieces of legislation. I do not believe that the Standing Orders allow the Chair, in the context of a budget implementation bill, to determine whether the significance of the proposed measures necessitates separate bills. If the measures are contained in the budget documents, the exemption of Standing Order 69.1(2) applies. As I mentioned in my ruling of November 1, 2018, which can be found at page 23380 of the Debates:

…I believe the purpose of the Standing Order is to allow such a division in relation to those matters which are unrelated to the budget, accepting that the purpose of the remainder of the bill is to implement the budget.

As all of the measures contained in the bill appear to arise out of commitments made in budget 2019, I believe the criteria referenced in Standing Order 69.1(2) have been met and the question will not be divided. Accordingly, there will only be one vote at second reading for this bill.

I thank all hon. members for their attention.

I wish to inform the House that because of the ministerial statements, government orders will be extended by 22 minutes.

[Privilege, April 11th, 2019]

I am now prepared to rule on the question of privilege raised on April 9, 2019, by the hon. member for Markham—Stouffville concerning an alleged violation of section 49.8 of the Parliament of Canada Act.

In raising this matter, the member for Markham—Stouffville argued that caucus expulsions or readmissions require proper due process. According to her, members of the Liberal caucus were prevented from voting on the rules for this decision pursuant to section 49.8 of the Parliament of Canada Act. She stated explicitly that, in this case, the matter of privilege is very much about knowing which rules apply for expulsion or readmission; it is not about a possible caucus expulsion, as was the issue addressed in my ruling on April 8, 2019. In her view, although the Chair has no role in the interpretation of statutes, it does not relieve the Speaker of the responsibility to ensure that all members are aware of their rights in this House.

In response, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons informed the House that the chair of the national Liberal caucus had indeed sent the requisite letter to the Speaker, specifying that the provisions of the act regarding the expulsion and readmission of caucus members would not apply for the 42nd Parliament. This, in his view, makes this question of privilege moot and removes any confusion as to which rules apply. Furthermore, he argued that it is not the role of the Speaker to adjudicate such matters.

The issue at hand is quite simple: The Chair is being asked, as was the case with the recent ruling on a similar matter, to determine whether provisions included in the Parliament of Canada Act, as they relate to matters of caucus, have been violated. Section 49.8(1) of the act states:

At its first meeting following a general election, the caucus of every party that has a recognized membership of 12 or more persons in the House of Commons shall conduct a separate vote among the caucus members in respect of each of the following questions:

(a) whether sections 49.2 and 49.3 are to apply in respect of the caucus;

(b) whether section 49.4 is to apply in respect of the caucus;

(c) whether subsections 49.5(1) to (3) are to apply in respect of the caucus; and

(d) whether subsection 49.5(4) and section 49.6 are to apply in respect of the caucus.

These requirements, which came into force when the House adopted Bill C-586, Reform Act, 2014, in the 41st Parliament, establish processes for the expulsion and readmission of a caucus member, the election and removal of a caucus chair, leadership review and the election of an interim leader. It is the caucus of each recognized party, not the Speaker, which bears the responsibility for ensuring that these votes are held.

In fact, the only role of the Speaker is to be advised of the caucus decision. Section 49.8(5) of the act states:

49.8(5) As soon as feasible after the conduct of the votes, the chair of the caucus shall inform the Speaker of the House of Commons of the outcome of each vote.

The Speaker's role stops there. It does not, in any way, extend to interpreting the results of the votes, how the votes were taken or interpreting any other relevant provisions.

This is very much in keeping with the general restraint on Speakers when they are asked to interpret the law. Speaker Fraser stated this fundamental principle in a ruling on April 9, 1991, at page 19234 of the Debates.

...the Speaker has no role in interpreting matters of either a constitutional or legal nature.

This is in addition to another limit on its scope of authority, that is, parliamentary privilege and, thus, the authority of the Speaker is limited to the internal affairs of the House, its own proceedings. It does not extend to caucus matters. The member for Markham—Stouffville was right to state that the Speaker bears the responsibility for ensuring that all members are aware of their rights in this House. While caucuses may have some extraneous relationship to the membership of the House, it remains just that. There is nothing to suggest that its proceedings constitute or relate to a proceeding of the House.

This leaves caucuses alone with the authority to govern their internal operations. This is also made quite clear by the wording of section 49.7 of the Act which bars against judicial review, stating:

49.7 Any determination of a matter relating to the internal operations of a party by the caucus, a committee of the caucus or the caucus chair is final and not subject to judicial review.

With the full authority given to caucuses themselves in such unequivocal terms, it is clear that the Chair has no role in the interpretation or enforcement of this statute, even when members feel rudderless without what they feel would be clearly stated and understood rules.

For these reasons, the Chair is unable to conclude that the member for Markham—Stouffville has been obstructed in the fulfillment of her parliamentary functions. Accordingly, I cannot find that there is a prima facie question of privilege.

I thank all hon. members for their attention.

[Privilege, April 9th, 2019]

I am now ready to rule on the question of privilege raised on March 19, 2019, by the hon. member for Milton, concerning an alleged leak of proceedings at the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights.

I want to thank the hon. member as well as the Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons, and the members for Essex, St. Albert—Edmonton and Cariboo—Prince George for their comments.

In her intervention, the member for Milton alleged that earlier that day the text of a motion that was to be debated in camera by the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights was leaked to members of the media by Liberal staff. While the member acknowledged that it is normally committees themselves that must regulate such issues, in her opinion this disclosure of the work of the committee was egregious enough to constitute a breach of privilege that requires the Chair's intervention.

In response, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons insisted that no rules were breached in making public a motion not yet moved in committee since this act is not part of a committee’s proceedings.

To begin, the Chair would like to confirm that, despite what has been reported in the media, it has not been clearly established when exactly this motion was shared with the media. To that end, it is my understanding that the chair of the committee has committed to investigating this issue.

Nonetheless, both the member for Milton and the parliamentary secretary were right to cite House of Commons Procedure and Practice, third edition, at pages 1089 and 1090, which states:

Divulging any part of the proceedings of an in camera committee meeting has been ruled by the Speaker to constitute a prima facie matter of privilege.

Of note, though, is that the sentence that follows, on page 1090, is equally instructive. It reads:

However, if a committee does not report a divulgation of in camera proceedings, a Speaker has ruled that there are no procedural grounds on which to intervene.

It seems to the Chair then that these two principles must be considered together, rather than separately. For to consider only one could very well lead to a misinterpretation of what the House has accepted as its principles and practices. In ruling on a question of privilege concerning an alleged breach of confidentiality of in camera committee proceedings, Speaker Milliken stated on February 25, 2003, at page 3986 of the Debates:

In the absence of a report from the committee on such an issue, it is virtually impossible for the Chair to make any judgment as to the prima facie occurrence of a breach of privilege with regard to such charges.

The message is simple and steadfast: Committees are the masters of their proceedings. The Speaker must not supersede their judgment unless and until the circumstances are serious or extreme enough to warrant an intervention by the Chair in the absence of a report from a committee.

This in no way diminishes the importance of confidentiality of in camera committee proceedings. In fact, it is this insistence on confidentiality that breathes life into and sustains the very nature and value of such proceedings. Members and staff alike who are privy to these confidential discussions must assuredly continue do their utmost to respect and protect this important obligation.

From the evidence presented and studied thoroughly, the Chair could not find any indication, nor reasonably conclude, that this was an exceptional situation requiring an intervention in the absence of a committee report. Accordingly, in my view as Speaker, there is no question of privilege.

I thank all hon. members for their attention.

[Points of Order, April 4th, 2019]

I am now prepared to rule on the point of order raised on March 19, 2019, by the honourable member for Wellington—Halton Hills, concerning the tabling of the budget 2019 documents by the Minister of Finance.

In raising the matter, the member for Wellington—Halton Hills explained the long-standing parliamentary convention that the budget is not made public before the Minister of Finance presents it to the House and usually not before North American equity markets close. As his point of order, he questioned whether the minister broke the convention on March 19 when he tabled the budget documents in the House before 4 p.m., making them public while an embargo was still in effect.

In response, the parliamentary secretary to the government House leader contended that the budget 2019 documents had been tabled in accordance with the rules.

With respect to a minister’s latitude to table documents, Standing Order 32(2) states:

A Minister of the Crown, or a Parliamentary Secretary acting on behalf of a Minister, may, in his or her place in the House, state that he or she proposes to lay upon the Table of the House, any report or other paper dealing with a matter coming within the administrative responsibilities of the government, and, thereupon, the same shall be deemed for all purposes to have been laid before the House.

Although the tabling of documents pursuant to this standing order most often takes place during routine proceedings, it is not limited to that time. This is confirmed by the House of Commons Procedure and Practice, third edition, at page 445:

Practices for tabling documents allow a Minister to table a document at any time in a sitting....

Neither a budget presentation nor a budget lock-up has a procedural effect or bearing on this rule.

As members will recall, the business scheduled for March 19 was somewhat unusual in that a deferred recorded division was scheduled to begin only minutes prior to the time the Minister of Finance was set to present his budget. As it happened, the minister tabled the budget documents before 4 p.m., at 3:52 p.m. In doing this the minister seemed to acknowledge that he was not following the convention, but he expressed his confidence that “members will be judicious with their privileges before 4 p.m.”

In conclusion, while there was a departure from usual practice with respect to the tabling of the budget documents, there is no point of order.

I thank all hon. members for their attention.

[Privilege, April 4th, 2019]

I am now ready to rule on the question of privilege raised during the sitting of March 20, 2019, by the hon. member for New Westminster—Burnaby, concerning the validity of the vote on Motion No. 126 under the opposed votes of the interim estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 2020.

In considering this question of privilege, I have noted the point of view of the House Leader of the Official Opposition and the members for Chilliwack—Hope and Calgary Rocky Ridge. I also thank other members who spoke on this matter.

In his intervention, the member for New Westminster—Burnaby correctly points out that a point of order was raised with respect to the inability of members to hear the question that was put to the House. After listening to the point of order, the Chair began reading the question anew and the House proceeded with the vote on Motion No. 126.

The issue identified by the member for New Westminster—Burnaby was that many members were allegedly still entering the chamber when the Chair was reading the motion the first time. The member contended that the voting by some members who had arrived after the Chair had begun reading the question breached the rules and practices of the House. As consequence, there was some doubt about the integrity of the vote.

On April 1, 2019, the House Leader of the Official Opposition agreed, arguing that, as many members had entered the House after the question had been put the first time, without admitting as much, this amounted to interference in our proceedings and a contempt of the House.

The right to vote in a recorded decision is one of the most significant rights members have in this House. As recently as February 21, 2019, I was called upon to rule on a similar matter, where I reaffirmed this, at page 25018 of Debates, stating:

The right of all members to vote is fundamental. This cannot be overstated. It is through voting that members participate in making the decisions of this House. As Speaker, I am entrusted with protecting this right that belongs to all members.

To perform their parliamentary functions, such as voting, members must trust that they can carry out these functions without interference and in the manner prescribed by our rules and practices. Relevant to the matter at hand is Standing Order 16(1), which states:

When the Speaker is putting a question, no Member shall enter, walk out of or across the House, or make any noise or disturbance.

House of Commons Procedure and Practice, third edition, at page 588, also tells us that:

Members must be in the Chamber to hear the motion read and be in their assigned seats during the division in order for their votes to be recorded. Any Member entering the Chamber while the question is being put or after it has been put cannot have his or her vote counted. Members must remain seated until the result is announced by the Clerk.

As the Chair has said on many occasions, to be allowed to vote, members must be in the chamber so that they hear the question. The Chair said as much when the vote on Motion No. 126 took place. The logic of this is inescapable. Simply put, members are expected to make an informed decision.

Recorded votes usually proceed in an orderly fashion with the Chair finishing the reading of the question without interruption once started, followed by the other steps of the voting process. However, there are situations when the Chair must adjust slightly the application of this in response to unforeseen circumstances. Interrupted by a point of order on the vote in question during the sitting of March 20, the Chair did just that after it was made aware that there had been audio difficulties. Given the importance of members hearing the question, the reading of the question was restarted and read in its entirety for the members present. With respect to the circumstances surrounding the vote on Motion No. 126, the Chair rendered a ruling that applied to that particular division.

The votes held during the sitting of March 20 were somewhat exceptional. They can justly be described as a marathon of votes. Voting continuously and successively on over 250 motions for more than 30 hours, the movement of members in and out of the House was naturally and understandably more frequent. As Speaker, I can assure the House that this did not alter the expected applicability of and respect for the rules and practices of voting.

However, it is the uncertainty of the right of some of the members who voted on Motion No. 126 that is the crux of this matter. At the suggestion of some members, I reviewed the relevant video footage. Unfortunately, it was not possible to determine from this if or when exactly each member entered or exited the Chamber and I have been informed that no other relevant video footage exists that would further the Chair’s understanding of this situation.

The member for New Westminster—Burnaby, for his part, is turning to the Chair to confirm who of the members did not hear the question, whatever the circumstances of the moment during a vote, this is not a power conferred upon the Chair. This is a reality that all members can most assuredly appreciate.

The responsibility for determining who can or cannot vote rests solely with each and every member. Bosc and Gagnon indicates at page 588:

…if a Member's presence is disputed and the Member in question asserts that he or she was present when the motion was read, convention prescribes that the House accept the Member's word.

It falls on each member individually to know, and to make known, if their vote should be counted or not. The Chair cannot be expected to police the House or to know at all times exactly who was present or not when a motion put to the House is read. Rather, the Chair must rely on all members to ensure that, when they stand and vote in this House, they have heard the question on which they are pronouncing themselves. In fact, the member for New Westminster—Burnaby noted that, for Motion No. 126, some members abstained, while others voted or withdrew their votes which should not have counted.

As for the recorded division on Motion No. 126, the results of the vote stand and, as Speaker, I cannot conclude that this matter constitutes a prima facie case of privilege.

I thank all hon. members for their attention.