Irwin Cotler

[Supply, April 3rd, 2003]

Madam Speaker, what I found particularly revealing in reviewing Ambassador Paul Cellucci's speech of last week was not so much his expression of “disappointment” and “upset” with Canada's decision not to join the war on Iraq, but his reference to Canada as “family”.

For a country like Canada that had felt ignored in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 when U.S. President George Bush did not appear to number Canada among U.S. friends, more oversight than advertence, the reference to Canada as family ought normally to have been encouraging in its characterization.

What Ambassador Cellucci's statement appears to reveal is a deep sense of psychological hurt on the part of the United States, and one grounded more in the harmful, if not hurtful, statements made by some Canadian MPs than in the actual decision or policy of the Canadian government.

For the essential truth is that we are family, that the ties that bind are many and meaningful on multiple levels, on levels of family itself, security, community, culture, environment, economy and the like.

It is no less true that despite the ties that bind, we may often differ domestically speaking, as the hon. member for Vancouver Quadra put it, in our attitudes to health care, gun control, capital punishment, social policy and the like, just as we have differed internationally on a variety of matters, including treaties respecting children's rights, landmines, climate change, the ICC and, now most recently, on the timing and conditions precedent for action to disarm Iraq.

Simply put, we differed, in my view, with our American counterparts not on principle, such as the imperative of disarming Iraq or the evil represented by Saddam Hussein or the imperative of bringing Saddam Hussein to justice, but we differed on the means to achieve this.

The difference, then, was one of judgment, on our belief that all remedies short of war had not been exhausted, that the requisite international support had not yet been assembled, that the case for war, which might have in any case ended up being inevitable, had not yet ripened. I use that term in its juridical as well as a factual sense.

And so we sought, through a bridging proposal, to identify clear disarmament benchmarks, to set a deadline of March 28 for compliance, and to include a provision for automaticity, an automatic trigger for the use of force if the disarmament benchmarks were not complied with by the deadline, a notion of automaticity which the U.S. acknowledged at the time was not present in UN Security Council resolution 1441.

The United States' judgment on timing, conditions and context, including imminence of threat, was different, but it is important we appreciate that there is a shared judgment on matters of principle as reflected in the motion before the House.

It is important again, as my colleague the hon. member for Vancouver Quadra put it, that we avoid simplistic notions of for and against, of all right or all wrong and once and for all, that we avoid these types of characterization on matters which do not lend themselves to oversimplified characterization and partake of a shifting context and set of conditions.

Accordingly, I would like to share some perspectives, if not principles, of partnership that may underpin our approach not only to the war in Iraq and beyond, but to our ongoing relationship with our neighbour.

First, we need to understand, to show understanding of, the impact of 9/11 on the American psyche and politics, for 9/11, and I sense this on each occasion on which I visit with colleagues in the United States, had a transformative impact in America. For America the world was changed. The post-9/11 configuration of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and rogue states not only dramatized for the United States the changed threat environment, but also transformed for it the United States national security doctrine that needed to result from it.

Second, we need to reassert, indeed reaffirm, our commitment to the struggle against terrorism, which is as much, in this sense of recommitment, of symbolic as well as substantive value and which speaks to the post-9/11 prism that underlies the American security doctrine.

I am not saying that we should take the same approach as the United States does to the struggle on terrorism. I know we have different appreciations, both domestically in our approach to an international criminal justice optic to that of the United States in its more national security oriented optic, and internationally it has an armed conflict model resulting from 9/11 that is not yet part of our doctrine.

What has to be appreciated is that the war against terrorism is an organizing idiom of American public policy, both domestic and international, and finds institutional expression in the initiation and organization of the department of homeland security, almost the most radical transformation of American governmental organization in years.

We need to appreciate, therefore, the American mindset, not that we have to agree with it, and give expression at the same time to what is indigenous to our own approach to the struggle against terrorism. I am referring to our juridical commitment to the struggle against terrorism which has characterized our approach, which includes as well the appreciation that what underlines everything here has to be the promotion and protection of human security, of the security of democracies and the protection of the most fundamental rights of inhabitants of that democracy: the right to life, liberty and security to a person.

Third, we need to engage with the United States and Britain in the reform of the United Nations, lest the UN become yet another casualty of the war on Iraq. This would include the rethinking of international law in a post-9/11 universe, in terms of the rethinking, for example, of the doctrine of self-defence; of hosting a conference on international humanitarian law; of addressing and redressing situations where the United Nations system becomes hijacked by rogue states; of the consideration of the formation of a democratic caucus; and more.

Fourth, we need to appreciate the importance of combating the financing of international terrorism, the soft underbelly of the terrorist threat environment, which makes possible the recruitment, training, harbouring and launching of acts of terror.

I am pleased that we did ratify the international convention on the suppression of the financing of terrorism and that we enacted domestic legislation for the purposes of implementing that international commitment. We have to keep a watching brief so that we are sure that we put the best application, such as in Fintrac and otherwise, which has been excellent in its performance and application in this struggle.

Fifth, we need to take the lead, and we are well positioned by our commitment to international justice to do so, to establish an international criminal tribunal for Iraq, the same way we did with respect to an international criminal tribunal for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, so that we can bring Saddam Hussein and his co-conspirators to justice. Indeed, it is a tragedy that we did not do so in the early 1990s at the same time as we established the international criminal tribunal for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

Just as the international criminal tribunal for former Yugoslavia led in its juridical expression, I believe, to the delegitimatization of Milosevic, to regime change, so might we have achieved a regime change in Iraq by juridical means. At the same time, I believe we would have been able to pre-empt, if I can use that term, to prevent the continuing criminality of Saddam Hussein.

The very fact that in the aftermath of the Iraqi genocidal Anfal campaign in 1988 and in the aftermath of the genocidal campaign against the Marsh Arabs in the south of Iraq at the end of the first gulf war, we still could not bring ourselves to set up an international criminal tribunal for Iraq which allowed Saddam Hussein to interpret from our inaction, if not indifference, that he could continue with his Nuremberg criminality.

The fact that some states, such as Russia and France, continued to trade and invest in Iraq while this Nuremberg criminality was going on, was a mockery of international law and a mockery of international morality.

Six, we need to participate in the provision of emergency humanitarian relief. I am pleased that we have allocated $100 million for that purpose.

Seven, we need to assume our rightful responsibility in the post-war reconstruction of Iraq, the rehabilitation of its citizenry and the re-establishment of the rule of law that is our best guarantee for the promotion and protection of the human security of the Iraqi people.

Eight, we need not equivocate or appear ambiguous about the prior and continuing anti-terror and military presence we have in the Persian Gulf as we have also in Afghanistan. We need not apologize for our role in the AWACS system, in our military exchange agreements or for our ships in the gulf area. To withdraw that now would be to take sides, and on the wrong side. To refuse to acknowledge this presence is to appear diffident or indifferent to the presence and fate of those sent there at our direction.

Nine, we need to emphasize the importance of border security, not just in trade terms but in security terms. This is, after all, not just a matter of economics but of human security.

Ten, we need to eschew and reject any notions of moral equivalences between the U.S. and Iraq and eschew any indifference about the outcome of this war, which we trust will conclude with a minimum of civilian harm, the averting of humanitarian catastrophe, the prevention of regional instability and the protection against hate and incitement. The objective in this war is the disarmament of the Saddam Hussein regime, not the armament of the constituencies of hate and terror.

Eleven, we should intensify parliamentary track II diplomacy, not abandon foreign policy to the executive level. We should enhance our parliamentary contacts with the U.S. and use our good offices in the multilateral parliamentary arena for post-war diplomacy.

Finally, we should internalize the Hippocratic oath of “Do no harm” in our discourse with our neighbours. We should guard against harmful and hurtful language, and neither indulge nor acquiesce in any such gratuitous expression. This is not to say that we will not disagree with our neighbours, and this is not to say that we should refrain from any critique of any policy of our neighbours with which we disagree and where we consider it warranted, but it must be done on the merits and not ad hominem.

[Multiculturalism, April 2nd, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, Canadians are concerned about reports that schoolyard bullying, discrimination and intolerance are on the increase nationwide. Could the Secretary of State for Multiculturalism and the Status of Women tell us what her department is doing to prevent and address such discrimination and intolerance?

[Multiculturalism, March 20th, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, Friday, March 21, is a special day around the world. In 1966 it was declared by the United Nations as the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.

Would the Secretary of State for Multiculturalism and the Status of Women tell the House what her department is doing to raise the awareness of Canadians about racism?

[Democracy and Human Rights, March 20th, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, while we are understandably occupied with the war in Iraq we might miss an inspiring and indeed historical development that has taken place in the Middle East.

I am referring to the judgment just handed down by Egypt's highest court, the Cour de Cassation, acquitting Professor Saad Eddin Ibrahim, the leading democracy activist in Egypt if not all of the Arab world, of a series of trumped up charges which were utterly devoid of any legal authority or evidence. Indeed, the whole prosecution was an attempt to quarantine Dr. Ibrahim and intimidate the fledgling Egyptian democracy movement.

As one who had the privilege of acting as Professor Ibrahim's international legal counsel, I regard this judgment as a landmark event. In the words of Professor Ibrahim upon hearing the judgment, “I am grateful and hope that no other intellectual will go to prison because of his opinions. It is a victory for democracy and human rights”.

I would like to express my appreciation to the foreign affairs minister, the secretary of state for the Middle East and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade for their support and assistance in this case.

[Purim, March 19th, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, the Jewish people all over the world just concluded the celebration of the Purim Holiday, whose centrepiece is care for family, neighbours, friends and the less fortunate, a concern symbolized by the delivery of food baskets on this holiday.

I would like to express my appreciation to B'nai Brith, the Chabad community and the Ottawa Jewish community for hosting yesterday's Purim celebration on Parliament Hill and presenting food baskets to representatives of each of the parties. Purim is also an omnipresent reminder of anti-semitism as the oldest and most enduring racial hatred, and of the standing threat in its wake to the survival and security of the Jewish people. It is also a reminder, in the universalist sense, of the victory of the oppressed over the oppressor, of the importance of the steadfast commitment to principle, of the courage to confront evil, to resist and to prevail.

[Situation in Iraq, March 17th, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, there is an old and not unfamiliar adage which says, “When the guns roar, the muses are silent”. While the countdown to war has begun and while the legal muses may be unable to prevent it, international law does provide an appropriate framework: first, for appreciating the general principles of international law respecting the use of force; second, for assessing the validity of the recourse to the use of force by the United States, the United Kingdom or any coalition of the willing; third, for invoking or applying the legal norms that govern the exercise of the use of force; and finally, for providing a normative guideline of the conduct of foreign policy, be it that of the United States, the United Kingdom or Canada.

Accordingly, with this in mind, I will share some basic principles that underpin such a juridical analysis. One preambular comment: the United States' resort to force or the resort to force of the coalition of the willing might well seem on the face of it an arguably justifiable use of military force, for, simply put, Saddam Hussein has directed and presided over one of the most tyrannical and brutal regimes in modern history.

Indeed, for more than 25 years Saddam Hussein has sought to acquire chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and has, in several documented cases, not only succeeded but has in fact used them. He gassed 60,000 of his own people in 1986 in Halabja in a modern genocide. He launched two catastrophic wars, sacrificing nearly a million Iraqis and killing or wounding more than a million Iranians. He has violated the United Nations resolutions, some 16 resolutions over 12 years, resolutions that found him to be in material breach of his disarmament obligations, including the most recent one of four months ago, a resolution that gave him a final opportunity to fully and immediately disarm or face serious consequences.

Most important and most disturbingly, he is the only head of state to have committed the most horrific of all international crimes, crimes against the peace, sometimes referred to as the mother of all crimes, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. But while Saddam Hussein is clearly a war criminal and has committed the most serious of international Nuremberg-type crimes, this does not necessarily authorize the use of force against him, unless such recourse to the use of force is consonant with international law.

Admittedly, it has been said that international law is something that the powerful need not heed and that the righteous need not obey. It may well be that President Bush believes that the convergence of power and right on his side is such that it authorizes the use of force, but there is an normative and juridical framework applicable both to the powerful and the righteous, which I shall now seek to share with colleagues in the House.

The first and foundational principle, which is set forth in article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations charter, is the prohibition on the use of force save for two exceptions: first, the exercise of the right of self-defence in response to an armed attack as mandated under article 51 of the charter; and second, the right of the Security Council, acting under chapter 7 of its authority, to determine a situation to be one of a breach of international peace and security and to authorize military action to address that breach to counter aggression and the like.

President Bush has argued, first, that he has a right of pre-emptive self-defence, that is to say, that in a post-9/11 universe the United States nor any other power is not required to await an armed attack which, with the convergence of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction and rogue states, can convert that into a suicide pact.

However, even allowing for a flexible interpretation of the right of self-defence in a post-9/11 universe, even allowing for a broader interpretation of that right, nonetheless there must at least be credible evidence of the imminence of such an attack. There must be credible evidence of a clear and present danger of such an attack. No such evidence exists at the present time.

Second, the president has argued, and has argued again this evening, that Iraq is in material breach of UN Security Council resolution 1441 and that serious consequences thereby ensue, including authorizing the use of force. This brings me to the second principle, that is to say, UN Security Council resolution 1441 as a basic juridical framework for appreciating the legalities here.

It is somewhat ironic that President Bush, who helped craft the UN Security Council resolution, which was very much a creature of the United States and the United Kingdom, should seek to invoke that UN Security Council resolution as a legal basis for the recourse to the use of force, because that resolution states clearly that it is only the UN Security Council, not the United States, not the United Kingdom, not the combination of them or others, that can determine whether, first, there has been a material breach, second, that serious consequences flow from that material breach of Iraq's disarmament obligations and, third, that it authorizes the use of force. No such determinations have yet been made by the UN Security Council. Simply put, the UN Security Council resolution 1441 is not a self-executing act that can be invoked by any state acting on its own.

That brings me to the third principle, the principle known as the exhaustion of remedies short of war. Indeed, the United Nations charter on customary international law requires states to seek peaceful resolutions to their disputes. Article 33 of the charter states:

The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

It may well be, and the United States and the United Kingdom may well argue, and have argued, that they have exhausted all other means, but even in the case of a clear act of aggression or threat to the peace and even in the case of the presumed exhaustion of other means, it is only the UN Security Council which is required, under the charter article 41, to first employ measures not involving the use of armed force, and only when such measures would “be inadequate or have proven to be inadequate”, as article 42 states, can the Security Council authorize the use of force.

I might state parenthetically that I regret that the Canadian bridging proposal, which set forth disarmament benchmarks or tests for Iraq to comply with as part of its disarmament obligations and provided timelines for testing the implementation of those disarmament obligations, was not adopted. We are in fact only 10 days away from the expiry of those timeframes; to think that we may have to witness a recourse to the use of force in 48 hours when we could have waited another week and arguably had a UN Security Council resolution that in fact determined that Iraq was indeed in breach of its disarmament obligations as set forth in those benchmarks or tests. And there would have been a timeframe within which that needed to be fulfilled.

That brings me now to principle number four and that is a refined multilateralism approach, or the invocation of the Kosovo precedent and principle. I am referring here to the invocation of the argument that the coalition of the willing resorting to or invoking the Kosovo precedent and principle can go to war. In the same way that a UN Security Council resolution did not exist then but there was a coalition at the time, so can a coalition now engage in the recourse to force without such a resolution.

However, this ignores the fact that at that time a significant majority was secured for a UN Security Council resolution that resulted in a veto by Russia and therefore did not pass.

Today, we have a situation where even a second resolution could not have been put to a vote because a majority vote simply was not there. At the same time the objective then was humanitarian intervention, and even arguing that President Bush has now, in fact, expanded the objective for the use of force from the breach of disarmament obligations under UN Security Council resolution 1441 to that of humanitarian intervention or regime change, it is still clear that even for humanitarian intervention a UN Security Council resolution would be required. Yet such a UN Security Council resolution for that purpose has not even been sought, let alone sanctioned, and regime change is not otherwise permissible under international law.

That leads me to the fifth principle, which is the principle of unintended consequences. If there is one given with respect to the use of force, it is that war is unpredictable. If precedent be a guide, and if the witness testimony before our Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade be instructive in this regard, then the use of force may well trigger a humanitarian catastrophe, as the witness testimony before our committee cited.

Which segues into a sixth principle, what I would call the right action principle, having regard to all the circumstances and the prospective adverse fallouts from the use of force. Is this the right action to be taken at this time?

The prospective use of force may well result in a series of adverse fallouts, including not only untold large numbers of civilian dead and wounded--and women and children are the likely first victims of such a use of force--but also the destabilization of the region so that it may not achieve the goal of democracy, peace and security that is sought, but in fact it may unravel both with respect to Iraq and beyond.

Regarding the destruction of the Iraqi infrastructure, the undertaking by the United States and others to rebuild Iraq does not in any way assuage us. The inflaming of the Arab and Muslim world by an attack will be perceived as being an attack on Islam and on Arabs. Even though with respect to humanitarian intervention in Kosovo it was for the sake of saving Muslims at the time, nonetheless the perception at this point, in the absence of any perceived legitimate framework, may be very different. The provoking of more terror would not contribute to the struggle against terror but, in fact, to the encouragement of it through the disruption of the global economy in such a way that we would be faced with untold misery rather than the securing of a freer and stable world.

It may well be that none of these adverse actions that I have just cited may occur. I am only saying that in making a determination to go to war, one has to factor into that decision the principle of the law of unintended consequences and therefore the right action to be deployed in that regard.

That leads me to principle seven and the distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello . In other words, international law is relevant not only in assessing the legality of the recourse to the use of force, but also the validity in the exercise of force. However, paradoxical as the nomenclature may seem, we have laws of war, laws governing the use of force in armed conflict, that perhaps are better known as international humanitarian law principles.

These international humanitarian law principles are very clear in what is permissible and impermissible. The use of weapons in any armed conflict must be proportional to the threat, must be necessary for effective self-defence, must not be directed at civilians or civilian objects, must respect the principle of civilian immunity, must be able to discriminate between civilian and military targets, must not cause unnecessary or aggravated suffering to combatants, must not affect states not party to the conflict, must not cause severe, widespread or long term damage to the environment, and must endeavour to avoid civilian infrastructure which is already operating at minimal efficiency.

This is, generally speaking, the framework with respect to the international humanitarian norms applicable to the exercise of the use of force, which leads me now to the eighth principle.

That is the principle of accountability for breaches of international humanitarian law. Clearly, Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi leadership are responsible under international criminal law as well as humanitarian law for their Nuremberg crimes, crimes against peace, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

Clearly, one does not anticipate, nor should one impute, that the coalition of the willing forces will in any way engage in any crimes similar to that. However, the principles I enunciated with respect to the norms of international humanitarian law, the most important among them being respect for the principle of civilian immunity, are sacrosanct. We now have a regime of international criminal law and an international criminal court which is in force that can hold even members of the coalition of the willing accountable, believing as they do and even imputing to them the good faith that they are acting out of right intent. Nonetheless, they too could be held accountable for said breaches of international humanitarian law.

While the United States has not ratified the international criminal court, the United Kingdom has, and therefore armed forces from the United Kingdom could, should they engage in any breaches of international humanitarian law, find themselves liable first of all before the British court if not before the international criminal court. Even U.S. nationals could find themselves liable under principles of universal jurisdiction before other jurisdictions.

I make this statement because as a basic principle of notice before any armed conflict with the kind of weaponry that may be engaged, this principle of accountability for breaches of international humanitarian law must be given.

Clearly, I make no equivalence between that which has already been committed--the international Nuremberg crimes that have already been committed by Saddam Hussein and his regime--and prospective breaches of international humanitarian law that could be committed by the allied forces. Nonetheless, under the principle, such notice must be given.

Finally, we come to what I would call the principle of retroactive validity. That principle is perhaps the most compelling one that may operate in favour of President Bush and the coalition of the willing. The principle of retroactive validity is such that if the resort to the use of force is exercised, if a war is launched and even if there is some dubious question about the legalities of the recourse of the use of force, if the United States, the United Kingdom and the coalition of the willing do uncover weapons of mass destruction, do uncover evidence that Iraq was deceiving the inspection regime and the international community, and are greeted with a responsive greeting by the Iraqi people, who see them as liberators and the like, it may well be that at that point one might perhaps consider that the initial legalities or the question of legalities of the recourse to the use of force will have been overtaken by the realities of what I would call the principle of retroactive validity.

In conclusion, the juridical framework organized around principles of international law may yet be for us the best looking glass to appreciate what in the days ahead may become a recourse to an extensive use of military force, during which we will have to assess what is the validity of this recourse to the use of force, what is the validity of the exercise of the use of force, what is the accountability that is involved, and what are our respective obligations post the use of force.

[The Budget, March 17th, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, I intend to address the whole situation in Iraq later on this evening in the debate, but I will say that I believe the humanitarian situation, if a war is launched, really will partake, and I perhaps can put it best, in the principle of unintended consequences. Those unintended consequences, in particular, will be of a humanitarian character and I suspect that in particular they will affect the most vulnerable in Iraqi society, namely women and children who are already living in a very fragile infrastructure and the like.

I believe it will behoove Canada, as it will other members of the international community, to address humanitarian concerns. When we talk about humanitarian intervention, and if we want to put the best construction upon it, that humanitarian intervention should really be one where we seek to prevent this from happening. If we cannot prevent it from happening then we should seek to alleviate the humanitarian concerns once the intervention takes place, and then we should seek to participate in the human reconstruction of a society thereafter.

[The Budget, March 17th, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, a budget is not just a financial statement or a statement on the financial health of a nation, rather, at its core, it is a statement about the health of a nation as a whole. It is not just an accounting exercise, but a reflection and representation of the values and vision that inspire and underpin it, of the sense of who we are and what we aspire to be as a nation and as a people.

Accordingly, as the member for Mount Royal I am delighted that this budget gives expression to the values and voices, the humanistic vision of my diverse riding. In particular, it addresses those core values that have permeated every encounter that I have had in the constituency and upon which I initially presented my candidacy for elected office.

First, the need for a universal, accessible, comprehensive, publicly funded, sustainable and renewable health care system. Second, the understanding that education is not only inextricably bound up with the imperatives of a knowledge-based economy, but is the defining signature of a society. Third, that the protection of the environment is not only intertwined with the economy, but with the health of society as a whole. Fourth, that affordable housing is itself a crucial co-determinant of one's well-being. Fifth, as I have mentioned elsewhere, the question: Is it good for children? is not only the litmus test of a commitment to human rights, but a litmus test also of the normativity of the core values of a budget. Finally, that gender sensibility should be mainstreamed in the budget as it should be mainstreamed in all public policy, that women's rights are human rights as I have stated elsewhere, and human rights mean nothing if they do not also include respect for the rights of women.

I will address two priority concerns in this budget, health care and education, which reflect priority concerns in my riding as they do in my province as a whole.

During the course of a take note debate on June 11, 2002, in this Chamber, I identified eight strategic priorities for health care in my province and riding of Mount Royal. What I propose to do now is look at how each of these eight strategic priorities find expression in the budget.

The first and most compelling need, as I expressed then and restate now, is for an increased supply of doctors, nurses and other health care professionals to meet current and emerging demands. Increased health care funding of $9.5 billion in cash transfers to the provinces and territories over the next five years could be used in part to hire these additional health care professionals, and $16 billion over five years to the health care reform fund would assist staffing concerns, as would $3.5 billion in the Canada health and social transfer to relieve existing pressures. There is still a concern expressed in the critiques of the Canadian Health Coalition, the Health Action Lobby, the Canadian Medical Association and the Canadian Healthcare Association that the funding is insufficient to address the human resources deficit in health care. This could adversely affect timely access to health care.

I am pleased that three of my strategic priorities namely, improving primary care, allowing for access to the right care, by the right provider, when and where they need it; strengthening of home and community care to relieve pressure on the more than one in five Canadian families who currently care for a sick or elderly family member in the home; and coordinating efforts to manage rising costs for pharmaceutical products, currently the fastest growing cost component of the health care system--and particularly an acute concern in Quebec--have found explicit expression in the budget in the form of $16 billion for a five year health reform specifically targeted to these concerns of primary health care, home care and catastrophic drug costs.

I am equally pleased that my four remaining strategic priorities namely, supporting the development of common indicators and monitoring so that we can measure, report and improve health care system performance; harnessing the potential offered by recent advances in information, Internet and communication technologies to enhance access to and better integrate the delivery of health services and electronic patient records; investing in new and enhanced health equipment like MRIs and CAT scans to reduce the wait time associated with diagnostic and treatment services and improve the quality of life; and renewing performance standards and expanding the use of standards also found expression in the budget.

These four strategic priorities have also found specific expression in the budget in the creation of a new Canadian health care transfer by April 1, 2004 to enhance transparency and accountability and ensure predictable annual increases in health transfers; in the $1.5 billion specifically earmarked for a diagnostic and medical equipment fund; in the $600 million to continue development of secure electronic patient records; and, in $500 million for research hospitals to the Canada Foundation for Innovation.

Governments have also agreed to create a health council that will report regularly to Canadians on the quality of the health care system so that Canadians can see how reforms are in fact being implemented and how their health care dollars are being spent; in effect, the institutionalization of an accountability principle in the budgetary framework.

The ultimate purpose of the health care accord, which was entered into on February 4 and 5 and which finds budgetary expression in the 2003 budget, is to ensure that Canadians have access to a health care provider 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. This, in particular, will find expression in the increased ability and capacity for the CLSC, such as those in my constituency and elsewhere in Quebec, to have the human resource capacity and the other resources to deliver such services as timely access. Canadians need to have timely access to diagnostic procedures and treatment; have better access to quality home and community care services; and have access to the drugs they need without undue financial hardship.

If I am making specific and repetitive reference to the importance of access, it is because it is crucial to a health care system and to the qualitative character of that health care system that Canadians will not have to repeat their health history nor undergo the same test for every provider that they see; and that they will see their health care system as being what it aspires to be: efficient, responsive, adaptive and renewable to their changing needs and those of their families and communities now and in the future.

As well, the government will increase funding to address the specific health needs of aboriginal people. The health accord, which again finds expression in this budget, will, in addition to strengthening the equalization program and in light of improved federal fiscal circumstances which underpin the budget, the equalization ceiling will be permanently removed on a going forward basis.

I will now move to my second priority. Education is not only the motor that will drive our knowledge based economy but is an investment in our identities as peoples. I make that kind of reference because of the particular plural character of my constituency, one of the most multicultural constituencies in the country. In that sense, I am delighted in the singular budgetary investment in both access to post-secondary education and in excellence in university research, the whole with a view to establishing an educational system that is the best in the world.

I would like to make specific reference at this point to the budgetary investment and to the character of that investment in what will become a signature identification of who we are and what we can aspire to be as a people.

As we will recall, the government created the Millennium Scholarship Foundation to give young Canadians better access to post-secondary education. It established the Canada Foundation for Innovation to modernize the infrastructure of our universities. That has already awarded research grants to more than 2,400 projects, almost half of them in the health sciences, and it has created some 2,000 Canada research chairs to ensure that our universities can attract and retain the best faculties. I trust that these research chairs will also respond to the concerns that have been expressed about the need for a gender sensibility.

The budget also creates new ground. It creates new ground in the new investment specifically targeted which I think will make Canada a country that has the best educational system in the world and can compete on all levels with the best in the world.

Let me identify and enumerate, and for reasons of time I will do so telegraphically and enumeratively, the specific initiatives in this budget with respect to human investment and the investment in education.

First, the government will be increasing the budgets of the federal research granting councils by $125 million a year. Those federal research granting councils, and I speak here as a university professor, and the importance of that research will enhance in all levels of society the knowledge based economy as well.

Second, we will be institutionalizing a substantial federal contribution to the indirect costs of research, something that had been a concern of universities as they had expressed it to us and now is addressed in the budget.

Third, we will seek to help students better manage their debtloads by amending the Canada student loans program. At this point, protected persons in Canada, like convention refugees, can now be eligible for student loans.

Fourth, the budget will increase our investment in the Canadian Foundation for Innovation by $500 million, specifically for the infrastructure needs of Canada's research hospitals, and here it links up with the health care investor.

Fifth, it will extend new research funding to Genome Canada and the ALMA astronomy project.

Sixth, and of particular importance, and this too responds to a need that has found expression and representations made to us over the past years and that now finds protection in the budget, the government will create the Canada graduate scholarships program. When this program is fully in place it will support 2,000 masters and 2,000 doctoral students every year and it will support them at levels that make graduate programs in Canadian universities competitive with the best in the world. This new program, for example, will increase the number of graduate scholarships offered by the federal government by more than 70%, to around 10,000 a year, and 60% of the new scholarships will be in the humanities and social sciences, again addressing a certain disparity and responding to a concern as expressed to us by graduate students across the country.

Seventh, there will be a $12 million endowment for the National Aboriginal Achievement Foundation to help expand its scholarships for aboriginal students.

Eighth, we will be contributing $100 million toward the creation of the Canadian learning institute which will help Canadians to make better decisions about the education of their children.

Finally, and of particular interest and concern to my own constituency which has an increasing number of new Canadians in its midst, Canada's distinct knowledge advantage and its distinct capacity to make a singular contribution in a knowledge based economy is built by expanding the skills of our labour force and by helping all Canadians who want to work, including new Canadians, to apply their talent and initiative to productive enterprise. Therefore we will be investing $41 million over the next two years to help new Canadians integrate into our economy, whether in the form of second language skills, in faster recognition of foreign credentials, or in pilot projects to attract skilled immigrants to smaller communities across the country. Our objective is clear: a new level of opportunity and potential to contribute for all Canadians, particular young Canadians.

I would hope that the particular priorities that I identified of health care and education, among the other, what might be called, social rights basket concerns, which reflect and represent not only the core values and vision of my constituency but I suspect the province as a whole, can make a dramatic contribution to the human welfare and the human condition in the country while making us competitive internationally in a human sense as well as in an economic sense.

[Falun Gong, February 28th, 2003]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to support the motion of the member for Lanark--Carleton and the individual cases and underlying cause that inspire it: the ongoing prosecution and persecution of the Falun Gong in China, in a word, the criminalization of innocence that finds expression in the intimidation, harassment, arrest, detention, coercive interrogation, torture, beatings and imprisonment of people for doing nothing other than espousing ancient Chinese values, which are also universal values, of truth, compassion and tolerance.

It is instructive and encouraging to note that since the member for Lanark--Carleton spoke to a similar motion on October 24, 2002, regarding the plight of thirteen Falun Gong practitioners with close family ties in Canada, which received unanimous support at the time and for which initiative he is to be singularly congratulated, five have been released, while a sixth, Yanying Wu, has been released but remains under house arrest.

As I mentioned, the news of their release is encouraging, and the improved treatment of other of these prisoners still in detention is also encouraging, and the whole is testimony to the role that the House has played and the role of our Canadian embassy and diplomats in that regard. As the member for Lanark--Carleton put it, we made it clear that we are going to be watching, that we are going to maintain a watching brief, that the prisoners are not alone in this regard and that we stand in solidarity with them.

But while this news is encouraging, as I have just described, and as the member for Lanark--Carleton went into the individual cases and humanized the appreciation and understanding of the cases and cause, the important point that must also be appreciated today and which is the import of my remarks is that while we are pleased and indeed encouraged at the release of people who are effectively prisoners of conscience, and we extend our appreciation to all involved in this effort, we have to realize that those released should never have been arrested to begin with.

We have to realize the following: that they should never have been imprisoned, held incommunicado and subjected to coercive interrogation and beatings while in detention; that they should never have been deprived of the companionship and shared life with their loved ones; that there remain eight Falun Gong practitioners with a Canadian connection still in detention, seven of them and one under house arrest, as I mentioned; that those who have been released should also not mask the fact that thousands upon thousands of Falun Gong practitioners, as has been mentioned in the House, have been detained and imprisoned for nothing other than espousing these values of truth, compassion and tolerance. We have to realize that in addition to their false imprisonment, their fundamental values of conscience and religion, of assembly and association and of expression and information, have been systematically violated, and that, indeed, over 100,000 people have been sent to labour camps without any legal process while over 1,000 Falun Gong practitioners have been detained in psychiatric institutions.

The Chinese authorities recently have passed new rules allowing courts to try followers for subversion, separatism and leaking state secrets if they spread any information about the Falun Gong, thereby further enlarging the dragnet of the criminalization of innocence. We are witnessing in effect a systematic and sustained assault on freedom of religion in general and the rights of Christians, Buddhists, Taoists, and Muslims in particular. For example, this has even included, by the Chinese authorities' own acknowledgement, the confiscation and destruction of houses of worship and religious books and material. This also has a Falun Gong connection, for the anti-cult legislation, developed to criminalize and eliminate the Falun Gong, has been used against 16 other religious organizations that refuse to tailor their beliefs and practices to the demands of Chinese authorities.

In a word, we would be remiss if we did not make mention of all this and sound the alarm about the dramatic increase in the persecution of the Falun Gong, including the increase in the rate of arrest and detention, the increase in deaths of Falun Gong in detention, the increase in the beatings and torture, according to eyewitness testimony and documentary evidence of Falun Gong detainees, the increase in the numbers sent to psychiatric institutions, and the use of atrocity propaganda to demonize them in the eyes of their fellow citizens.

Accordingly, I call upon the Chinese authorities: to release the seven Falun Gong practitioners with a Canadian and family connection from their imprisonment, and permit them to be reunited with their loved ones here in Canada; to repeal the illegal ban on the Falun Gong; to rescind any laws or regulations specifically criminalizing the Falun Gong as an “illegal association” and prohibiting thereby the exercise of the fundamental freedoms of their members as guaranteed under Chinese law; to cease and desist from any policy or practice of torture or other degrading punishment or treatment of prisoners in detention, something that Chinese authorities undertook as well with the ratification of the international covenant on civil and political rights, with respect to which we have made representations; and to release all Falun Gong members now detained in prison, forced labour camps or psychiatric detention.

Also, I want to express my appreciation to the parliamentary secretary for her comprehensive statement. I want to join in the support of the initiatives she described on behalf of the government respecting the promotion and protection of human rights and the rule of law in China.

In the matter of trade relations with China, again I want to join in the words of the parliamentary secretary and call upon the Canadian government to reaffirm certain basic principles for the Canadian relationship with China in the matter of trade and human rights, including: first, to reaffirm that human rights is an organizing principle of Canadian foreign policy and human security as the core of our Canadian foreign policy, such that it must find expression not only as a statement of principle, but as an expression of policy in our relations with China; second, that trade and human rights are not contradictory but complementary, as the parliamentary secretary mentioned in her statement, and that indeed trade can be used as an instrument for constructive engagement in matters of human rights, just as the protection for human rights protects the integrity of trade relations; and, third, trade missions should therefore be seen as trade and human rights missions, as trade cannot be a matter of “business as usual”. Human rights must be a priority on the agenda of our trade relations with China and, indeed, of the totality of our bilateral relationship with China.

[Supply, February 6th, 2003]

Madam Speaker, I will conclude quickly in that regard.

The evidence that we have now is not only, as Dr. Blix has disclosed, that Iraq has impeded access to skilled scientists on the Iraqi weapons program, but that it has intimidated them on penalty of death including their families should they provide any witness testimony or should they even try to leave the country for that purpose.

Fourth, Iraq has withheld the necessary documentation regarding its weapons programs, especially nuclear programs, which require an array of supporting data which need to be cross-checked against the material that has been declared.

Fifth, there needs to be a determination of nuclear capability data including the exposing of new technologies like those developed by North Korea and which can be used to mask, as we have learned, a nuclear program. In this connection allegations respecting importation of controversial shipments of aluminum tubes must also be addressed in this regard.

Sixth, Iraq must guarantee the safe deployment of a U-2 reconnaissance plane for aerial imagery and surveillance during inspections which it has not done.

Seventh, the inspections regime should also factor into their own inquiry the serious allegations made by Secretary of State Powell regarding Saddam Hussein's weapons capacity.

In conclusion, the military option may at some further point, if so determined by the UN Security Council respecting both the gravity of the material breaches and the compellability of serious consequences, become necessary. However it is not yet inevitable. The remedies have not yet been exhausted. The UN inspections regime has yet to be reported to the UN Security Council on February 14. The UN Security Council has yet to deliberate even upon such a report and determine whether there has been a material breach based on all witness testimony and documentary evidence available to that point.

Again, we appear to forget that it must be the UN Security Council which makes that finding of fact as to whether there has been a material breach, not all the compelling evidence which we now have in the form of witness testimony and in the form of documentary evidence which appears to make that prima facie case. That determination can only be made by the UN Security Council from a juridical point of view. Only the UN Security Council can determine what are the serious consequences to follow and only the Security Council can authorize military action.

In that sense, the motion before the House in some sense is jumping ahead of ourselves, though I can appreciate its merits. As President Bush himself said, and this may have been forgotten, “War should be a last resort”. That itself, by President Bush in that statement, was an acknowledgement of the foundational, juridical principle of the exhaustion of all remedies short of war.

We are in that process right now. We are seeking to exhaust all those remedies short of war. When the inspection regime reports back to the UN Security Council on February 14 another deliberative process must take place to for the purpose of whether there is a finding of a material breach, a determination of whether serious consequences should follow, and a determination of what those serious consequences may be which follow. It is not necessarily automatically military action.

Even then all the serious consequences of war must be factored into such a decision: the humanitarian, political, economic, juridical and regional consequences of resorting to war as well as consequences of perhaps not resorting to war.