House of Commons photo

Crucial Fact

  • His favourite word was aboriginal.

Last in Parliament October 2015, as Conservative MP for Vancouver Island North (B.C.)

Lost his last election, in 2015, with 28% of the vote.

Statements in the House

Electoral Boundaries Readjustmentact, 1995 June 20th, 1995

Mr. Speaker, I have been sitting here listening to this debate for some time. I was interested in the comments offered up by the

hon. member for Glengarry-Prescott-Russell and by the hon. member for Kingston and the Islands. Back in British Columbia we call some of the comments which were made symptoms of the Ottawa disease: no substance but a lot of cheap political gamesmanship, and this from veterans in the House who could pursue much more productive avenues.

The bill we are discussing tonight was not produced by all parties, as those members well know. We co-operated, which is our norm and we filed a dissenting report. We heard in typical style that this bill will be adopted. One of the problems with this House is that the results are a foregone conclusion when we see the stubbornness with which these bills are approached.

This is the fourth time I have spoken in public on Bill C-18, the forerunner to this bill, on Bill C-69 today and indeed on another occasion to the electoral boundaries commission in British Columbia. This dates back to February 9, 1994, March 21, 1994, May 26, 1994 and again today.

I must say that when members of the public ask me what is transpiring in terms of the whole electoral boundaries situation, there is a natural tendency to try to not talk about it because everything has become so complex, unravelled and intertwined. There is a great deal of uncertainty among everyone as to where we are going on these boundaries and when the changes, if there are going to be changes, will actually take place.

It is important to dredge up the history behind all of this and why we stand here tonight in this circumstance. We have to explain a little bit of that history to understand what is going on here.

One thing was of concern to me last year and is still very much at the forefront of my thoughts. The whole initiative to kill the electoral boundary redistribution process started in Ontario. It had got up a head of steam so that Bill C-18 was being drafted before British Columbians had even received their original electoral boundaries report to know where their proposed boundaries were.

This is typical of how many regions of the country feel left out and manipulated by what goes on in Ontario or in central Canada. It is worth repeating that there is no necessity in this issue. It was not an issue in the campaign. It was not an issue after the campaign. It is not in the Liberal red book, the dead book.

This bill continues to do one thing and one thing only. It responds to the desires of politicians to draw lines on a map. The Ontario MPs are trying to kill the boundary redistribution process. As I said before, they were trying to do that before the B.C. report was even out. This process has been in effect every decade since 1867 during the time of Confederation. It has been tied to the census. There was no public outcry. The outcry does not exist.

Cn Commercialization Act June 20th, 1995

Madam Speaker, I am happy to talk on third reading of the CN privatization bill.

Railway politics in Canada take a prominent place in our history. I know from growing up in this country and working on the railways part time I have a great sense of history. The member for Kenora-Rainy River is another part time railroader. The ra ilways are very important historically to the country.

I am reminded of the railway on Vancouver Island, E&N Railway, very important in the development of the west coast. There is an ongoing contractual commitment in this country to keep that railway going despite some pressures the other way. Those contractual commitments date back to prior to the turn of the century.

In terms of our contemporary history, we are seeing great changes, the stability of our railways, or the instability in the beginning. It is a whole new ball game now. Why is it a whole new ball game now? Government operations and crown corporations can no longer function in the way they functioned for the last several decades.

This is unavoidable because of our fiscal situation and I am reminded of this every day. Two-thirds of government revenues are derived from personal federal income taxes. One-third of federal revenues are to service our national debt. It does not take much of a mathematician to figure out 50 per cent of people's personal federal income tax is going to service our debt.

This situation despite the last budget is getting worse because part of our revenue dedicated to servicing debt is increasing over the next couple of years. We are treading water and sinking slowly. This message is slowly being accumulated by the population at large. It is being expressed in a lot of different programs of government and it is being expressed in how we unavoidably must deal with our crown corporations.

The transport committee, the task force appointed by the minister in September of 1994 which put its finding forth in January of 1995, identified a number of things which I think were largely known to most.

CN and CP are both facing very strong competition from other industries and from the U.S., particularly on the north-south routes, north-south markets. The railways are losing market share to trucking. Deregulation of the U.S. railways is obviously impacting a great deal on the Canadian railways. The eastern routes are losing money and the western routes are declining in profitability.

This same task force also identified that all major North American railways were privately owned with the exception of CN. One wonders why Canada would have such a different contemporary situation. This bill is quite predictable. The privatization was to occur. All the market pressures were there and governments around the world are privatizing crown corporations.

The task force also identified that as a crown corporation CN had been subject to many politically motivated moves and that much of this results from the president and the board basically being patronage appointments. There is a message in all of this for other crown corporations of government.

The standard provisions of any privatization bill are essentially the same no matter what crown corporation is being privatized. What is different are the bells and whistles which deal with investor attractiveness, some of the social ramifications, how it deals with existing employees, how it deals with the public interest and those kinds of things. Essentially that is what most of the debate in the House and in committee has been about. The amendments proposed by the Bloc and by the Reform Party have largely been about the bells and whistles of the bill.

In terms of investor attractiveness, the bells and whistles are a very strong signal of what kind of regulatory environment the new owner is to face when they try to run the railroad. The signals we are sending out with this bill are all wrong. Most of the amendments deal with the signals we are sending to potential purchasers of the railway.

One amendment is the requirement that CN's headquarters remains in Montreal. We have heard several times in the debate that this requirement is absurd because the marketplace can make that decision better than anyone else.

That it exists in Montreal today may have some social and employment ramifications which is why a sunset clause is not a bad idea. We have seen in the history of Canada that different jurisdictions over time have different natural advantages. There are population shifts and differences in trading patterns and all kinds of rationale for which private investors would want to retain the option to move their office to a different location.

Before I get into further amendments I will talk about the way the bill was handled in the House. The bill went to committee after first reading, which was a new process. Normally a bill goes through first reading when the legislation is tabled and through second reading debate and then the bill goes to committee.

Conceptually there are some very nice things about sending legislation to committee after first reading when in a non-partisan way people can get all their points in before the legislation becomes set in any way and then a better bill can come before the House. The concern with respect to this bill was that if the environment was not there after first reading when it went to committee, to take all the best of everything people had to say about the bill to make it the best legislation possible we have really missed the opportunity of second reading debate. We want to have a very close look at the process before we commit

ourselves to a continuation of it whereby we essentially eliminate debate at second reading.

The next point I would like to speak to is about restricting the percentage of shares that any one individual, corporation or association may own. This has a very negative impact on bringing in the kind of investor that would like to purchase a major portion of the new company and bring in a management style that would revitalize the whole company.

The chair of the transport committee, the member for Kenora-Rainy River, said that this had been looked at. The 15 per cent restriction was quite plausible because CP had never had more than 11 per cent single ownership. Surely our view of the world extends beyond the gaze of Canadian Pacific. We have to look at this on a global scale. We have to look at it from a totally different perspective. Government once again is talking about privatization yet government still wants to retain control. There is an irony about this and it is inappropriate.

One investor said that the 15 per cent restriction circumscribes the deal. It certainly does. It dampens investor confidence. It freezes out many investors who would otherwise look at this. It sends out all the wrong signals.

With respect to CN's debt, this is repetitive but CN currently owes about $2.5 billion. It has been established by experts that CN will never sell this debt level. It must be reduced to a level which would allow access to a BBB credit rating. The general concurrence is that amount would be about $1.5 billion.

CN currently has $300 million to $400 million on hand through recent company sales such as CN Exploration, and excess capital reserves. The market value of CN's non-rail estate assets are $400 million to $600 million. In a perfect world this alone would be sufficient to attain a BBB credit rating.

Clause 12 of the proposed legislation gives the minister the power to reduce CN's debt to any amount he chooses. This is a major problem. This is something the other place should look at very closely if we cannot change anyone's mind in this place because there are two major risks in this.

The minister may choose to reduce the CN debt well below the amount at which the taxpayers can receive a return on the sale. This would raise the cost of shares making it appear more attractive but producing a lower yield for taxpayers. As well, excessive reduction in the debt of CN would put CP at a disadvantage which is all too familiar. This was done during the privatization of Air Canada. The intent of the Reform amendment was to limit the minister's power in reducing the debt of CN.

Clause 15 provides for a permanent requirement that CN retain the official languages policy and operates under both official languages. Once again, this is another signal of a regulatory atmosphere that is inappropriate when one is trying to attract investors.

The government does not have official languages control over the private sector. Privatization of CN removes the mandatory compliance of the Official Languages Act. The Reform amendment was to include a five year sunset clause on the mandatory retention of operating under both official languages. Unfortunately this was voted down.

Then we have the Canada clause. The bill does not provide any restrictions of foreign ownership, nor should it. However, the Reform amendment would have allowed a 90 day sale period open to Canadian individuals and corporations before opening it up to foreign markets. This provision would have allowed all Canadians first crack at investing in a Canadian institution. What could be more appropriate? This would have allowed a win-win situation but once again it was voted down.

The marine strategy report proposes that all national ports must become self-sustaining and that all loans must be obtained from the private sector without government backing. Reform agrees with that proposal.

The Sarnia tunnel is a viable access from Atlantic Canada to the American midwest. The Halifax Port Corporation believes that through upgrading the port facilities in Halifax it will secure the handling of the new high capacity deep draft freighters and thus the economic future of marine operations in Atlantic Canada. In order to secure the financing, it needs to ensure that CN connections will be there to connect the ports to the rest of Canada.

The Reform amendment would have included a clause ensuring rail service to the port of Halifax for a period of 10 years, thereby ensuring the development of the port facilities allowing them to compete with U.S. ports on the eastern seaboard and ensuring investor confidence once again. This amendment was not allowed. We call that the Atlantic clause.

The Reform Party supports the bill although the provisions laid out in it are too restrictive and involve too much government interference in what should be a much more complete move to the private sector.

Aboriginal Affairs June 19th, 1995

Mr. Speaker, I understand a lot of private property owners not involved in the archaeological dispute are suffering as a result of this dispute.

The minister has raised expectation levels in B.C. beyond what governments can deliver. A Penticton band spokesman is now saying that the B.C. treaty process is falling apart as he earlier predicted.

Other than to blame Reform, as the minister did Friday, what is the minister doing to reduce expectations and create a sensible and publicly acceptable set of negotiations in which the rule of law is rewarded and protests and blockades are not?

Aboriginal Affairs June 19th, 1995

Mr. Speaker, the minister of Indian affairs met with the B.C. aboriginal affairs minister this morning. The provincial minister is here to insist on greater federal participation in settling native disputes in B.C. A native spokesman has said since last week that Adams Lake residents will have their access blocked today at 5 p.m. unless the federal minister involves himself in the dispute. There is urgency.

How is it the federal department can promote and participate in all land claim and self-government negotiations in B.C., but when the public is held to ransom the minister asserts that he has no legal, moral or statutory obligation to get involved?

Indian Affairs June 16th, 1995

Mr. Speaker, press reports in B.C. are saying the predictable thing: British Columbians should expect a long, hot summer of blockades, quoting Shuswap band leader Ken Dennis.

Mr. Dennis says blockades will continue because they work-surprise, surprise. Now we have professional consultants, advisers and participants for roving native blockades.

Can the minister assure British Columbians he will commit to consistently involving himself in these disputes rather than passing the buck to the province?

Cn Commercialization Act June 15th, 1995

Mr. Speaker, I will not speak to Motions Nos. 8, 9 and 10. I am going to listen to the Bloc.

However I rise to support Motions Nos. 6, 7 and 11. Motion No. 6 deletes the possibility of government bailout of any CN debt. Current CN debt stands at $2.5 billion. Financial and industry experts agree that it will never reasonably sell with that debt level and must be reduced to an amount that would achieve an investment grade bond rating of BBB. A $1.5 billion debt would achieve this bond rating. The House should not give the minister the power to reduce CN's debt to any amount he chooses. This is risky and is not prudent.

First, it allows the minister to reduce the debtload well below the amount for which taxpayers can get a return upon sale. This could cause higher share prices which would appear to be a better deal but return a lower yield for taxpayers. I am quite certain this is not the intent of the minister, but this is no excuse for putting it into the legislation or allowing that kind of free board.

Second, excessive reduction of CN's debt would put CP Rail at a disadvantage similar to the disadvantage when Air Canada was privatized. It is not a simple matter of balancing the debt of two companies. CN has purchased many deluxe assets without normal private sector concerns for debt financing. The most recent example is the expensive buyout package for employees to help reduce CN's workforce. If CN is allowed this strategic advantage without any economic costs, it would have a tremendous and unfair market advantage.

Motion No. 7 would limit the government's ability to reduce CN debt to only the amount necessary to achieve BBB bond rating status after first reducing it by utilizing company funds available and from the disposal of real estate assets; in other words utilize cash and start selling off some of the assets. If members agree to this reasonable motion we will not need Motion No. 6 which deletes all authority for government bailout.

I also support Motion No. 11 which would provide for the continued existence of the CN pension plan to be administered by the CN pension board under current government rules. This is prudent and fair.

All too often employees with little control over the situation end up on the short end of the stick just because of a change in ownership. In many respects this is the most important and considered motion of all to pass through the House. If we all dig deeply in our collective memories we can think of living examples of people who have been treated unfairly by the system.

At this time I should like to move an amendment to Motion No. 7. The amendment is to one small section of Motion No. 7 which I believe was in error. We want the motion to read that it should apply to all CN debt, not just the debt owed to the Government of Canada. Therefore I move:

That Motion No. 7 be amended by deleting the words "owed to Her Majesty in right of Canada".

Cn Commercialization Act June 15th, 1995

Mr. Speaker, I rise to speak to Motions Nos. 1 to 4 in Group No. 1 on Bill C-89.

Motion No. 1 calls for the deletion of the head office clause which stipulates that CN's headquarters must reside permanently in Montreal and calls for the deletion of the 15 per cent ownership restriction.

In today's marketplace the stipulation of the permanent location of a head office is absurd and makes a mockery of a bill of serious intent. This whole question of permanence reminds me of a story of a fellow who applied for a job with a previous employer. When he was offered the job he asked whether it would be temporary or permanent. The response was in that company there were no permanent jobs. This stipulation would not occur in a free market and no private sector companies face these same restrictions. This is purely for political reasons and should be expunged from the bill.

As well, restricting the percentage of shares any one individual, corporation or association may own is not sound. Where is the incentive for new investors to bring in a new management style to revitalize this dinosaur? To which latest investor advice fad is the government listening?

This clause also restricts the best price CN could fetch in the marketplace. As one investor put it, the 15 per cent restriction circumscribes the deal. This restriction dampens investor confidence and freezes out the type of investor who looks for troubled, debt ridden companies that can be restructured and made profitable, generating dividends and capital gains. I support Motion No. 1.

Under Motions Nos. 2 and 3 of Group No. 1, I support the introduction of a sunset clause of a five year time limit on the headquarters and ownership restrictions should Motion No. 1 not carry.

Motion No. 4 calls for parliamentary approval on each offer made by the private sector for CN assets. This is redundant. If Bill C-89 passes Parliament has already given its approval for the sale of CN. I will not support Motion No. 4.

If the government cannot attract a good offer it will have to answer for that later.

Questions On The Order Paper June 15th, 1995

What was the amount of GST credit paid to eligible on reserve status Indians for the fiscal years 1991-92, 1992-93 and 1993-94?

Questions On The Order Paper June 15th, 1995

With regard to Indians making purchases off reserve at designated remote stores, ( a ) what was the amount of GST exemption for eligible Indians for the fiscal years 1991-92, 1992-93 and 1993-94, and ( b ) what are the designated remote stores off reserve by province?

Questions On The Order Paper June 15th, 1995

With regard to Indians making purchases on reserve or having purchases delivered to the reserve, what was the amount of GST exemption for eligible Indians for the fiscal years 1991-92, 1992-93 and 1993-94?