Bill C-51 (Historical)

An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Department of Justice Act and to make consequential amendments to another Act

This enactment amends the Criminal Code to amend, remove or repeal passages and provisions that have been ruled unconstitutional or that raise risks with regard to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as well as passages and provisions that are obsolete, redundant or that no longer have a place in criminal law. It also modifies certain provisions of the Code relating to sexual assault in order to clarify their application and to provide a procedure applicable to the admissibility and use of a complainant’s record when in the possession of the accused.
This enactment also amends the Department of Justice Act to require that the Minister of Justice cause to be tabled, for every government Bill introduced in either House of Parliament, a statement of the Bill’s potential effects on the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Finally, it makes consequential amendments to the Criminal Records Act.

Justice

[David Anderson, Conservative, Cypress Hills—Grasslands, SK]

Mr. Speaker, Conservatives in Canada believe that the number one priority of any government should be the safety of Canadians. The criminal justice system must strengthen these provisions, not weaken them.

In 2017, the Liberal government introduced Bill C-51. Ostensibly, it was intended to eliminate unnecessary and unconstitutional clauses in the Criminal Code, but buried in it were a number of additional Criminal Code provisions the Liberals decided to remove, including long-standing protections for clergy and places of worship. There was no logical reason why these were included, particularly at a time when incidents of religious intolerance are increasing. The government only backed down and removed these proposals after Canadians spoke up and said this was completely unacceptable.

However, they are back. Bill C-75 would reduce penalties for a whole range of serious crimes, including membership in a terrorist organization and political corruption, but it also would reduce sentences for obstruction and violence toward clergy.

Why is it that the Liberal government always puts terrorists and criminals ahead of victims?

Report stage

[Linda Duncan, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I attended many a rally concerning opposition to Bill C-51. Those constituents and people across my city are not any more convinced that they are not still concerned. The only time I received more concerns was over the fact that the government refuses to deal with the arms trade.

It is my understanding that the government is still refusing to absolutely prohibit the use of information attained through torture, not just prohibit the country from using torture to get information but in any way prohibit its use. The reason I raise this is that both Liberal and Conservative governments have been involved in rendition and in colluding to get that information.

If there is one thing we hear a lot of Canadians speak out about, it is that they are opposed to providing reparations when the government violates international law. We have Maher Arar, Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad El Maati, and Muayyed Nureddin. Is the government not concerned that the amount we have to pay out in reparations is simply going to mount if we do not finally and absolutely prohibit, in any circumstance, the use of information gained through torture?

Motions in Amendment

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

moved:

Mlotion No. 1

That Bill C-59 be amended by deleting the short title.

Motion No. 2

That Bill C-59, in Clause 49.1, be amended:

(a) by replacing lines 13 to 15 on page 43 with the following:

“3 (1) The Governor in Council must issue written directions to all deputy heads prohibiting”

(b) by deleting line 25 on page 43 to line 2 on page 44.

Mr. Speaker, it is unfortunate that the third motion, which pertained to one of my amendments, was not selected by the Chair, but I will still come back to the important points about it in a few moments. Just because it was not selected does not mean we cannot talk about it.

We are near the end of what has been a very long road with this government on an issue that dates back to even before the Liberals took office. Obviously, we must recognize that Bill C-59 is the result of the Liberals' approach. On one hand, during the last Parliament they supported Stephen Harper's draconian bill, Bill C-51, and on the other, they claimed that there were a lot of problems with the bill. The Liberals told people not to worry, however, because when they took office they would fix all of those problems. That was problematic for obvious reasons. If the bill was so flawed, posed so many problems with regard to national security matters, and violated Canadians' rights and freedoms, the Liberals should not have voted to pass it, and yet that is exactly what was happening with Bill C-51.

Let us fast forward a little. After the Liberals were elected, they waited two years to introduce the legislation. They said that they had to hold public consultations. I will come back to that.

Meanwhile, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, used the power to disrupt threats bestowed upon it by Bill C-51. CSIS confirmed that in committee.

While we waited those two years for the government to consult, even though the election promise had been to consult on a specific piece of legislation, this was open consultation, or so it would seem. However the problem was, and many experts decried this, the fact that the government's green paper seemed to indicate, through some of the notions that were put forward, that some of these aspects were already a foregone conclusion. There was a definite bent more toward the side of intelligence gathering and law enforcement, and certainly a lack of substantive points being made in favour of the other side of that, which was protecting Canadians' rights and privacy.

Too often the Liberals, in the committee in particular, like to put the word “balance” forward. As we heard from representatives of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, when they presented at committee, balance implies that something is being taken away from one side or the other to achieve said balance. For us, the question of rights and liberties, and certainly the protection of Canadians' privacy, is not something that can almost be a victim of that type of compromise required to achieve said balance.

The other aspect that was not included in the public consultations, but that eventually became a central topic in our committee study, is the Communications Security Establishment, or CSE.

CSE, as members will know, is under the purview of the Minister of National Defence and its mandate is given to it by the National Defence Act. However, despite promises to no longer come forward with omnibus legislation, the Liberals have taken something that is the purview of the Minister of National Defence, something that the national defence committee has the institutional memory to study, all due respect to me and my colleagues on the public safety committee, and put it into this legislation.

That ended up taking up inordinate amounts, and rightly so, of time at the committee. These new powers being given to CSC and the huge change being made to CSC's mandate took up a lot of space and led to the most questions, not just from members but also from some of the experts who were there. Quite frankly, as far as we are concerned, many of those questions still remain without answers.

For example, there is the issue of CSE's cyber defence capabilities, as well as its offensive and active capabilities. The experts asked many questions on that subject. I introduced an amendment in committee to eliminate these powers, but it was not intended to compromise the safety of Canadians or our cybersecurity. We still kept CSE's defensive powers and capabilities in place. However, we had the right to ask questions, as I did with the senior CSE officials, though I did not get satisfactory answers, especially about what all this means for our country's military future.

CSE is governed by the National Defence Act, but it is a civilian agency, not a military one. However, Bill C-59, and now the federal budget and the legislation that the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness says will be tabled this fall, is opening the door to capability sharing between CSE and Canadian Forces to improve our cyber capabilities in a military context or even in war zones.

I posed questions to the chief of the CSC and other officials who were present throughout different stages of the study. I said that there was some debate in the context of international law as to what sovereignty meant in this digital age. An act of war is when one infringes on someone's sovereignty, but is a server part of one's sovereignty? What is the role that data is playing in this? Certainly, colleagues who work on the trade file had similar concerns that they raised.

I asked these questions in the context of information-sharing capabilities with Canadian forces. All I was able to get as an answer was that this stuff was already being done and it was better that it be codified in the law with all the protections, oversight, and review. Pardon me for being glib, but that all comes with that. However, it is not enough. If a foreign state actor, as the bill describes, engages in some kind of activity, we are talking about the Minister of National Defence having the capability to interfere with intellectual property and to be engaged in an active way.

In this era, when the federal budget is talking about more and more capability sharing between police and intelligence services, which let us not forget is what CSC is, ultimately, as it is not any kind of offensive entity but rather deals with foreign intelligence, and then to involve the Canadian Armed Forces, we are going down a slippery slope. This is not an issue I raise. It was one that witnesses raised time and again throughout this study.

Part of the reason why I tabled amendments, which were unfortunately voted down by the Liberals at committee, was to remove these elements, not because we disagreed, although they certainly are concerning, but because they required proper study. They should not have been part of omnibus legislation. They had nothing to do with the previous Bill C-51. Nor were they part of the public consultations that both the minister did and the committee did.

That is important. I know the answer I will get is that all the issues relate to national security. That is not enough. We need to be able to examine these issues more thoroughly, and that is certainly not the feeling we got.

Lets continue to look at part three of the bill that has to do with CSE. One of my amendments was unfortunately deemed inadmissible by the Chair, because it was too similar to another amendment I had proposed and that my colleague, the leader of the Green Party, had also proposed. The motion was almost word for word what the experts had suggested. It had to do with publicly available information. We will come back to this concept.

The concept, as it currently exists, is important because it gives CSIS and CSE the power to collect publicly available information. With respect to CSE, we were told over and over again that its mandate does not concern Canadians, since the legislation explicitly prohibits it from targeting Canadians. We must be careful, though, and we have to read part three of the bill, subclause 23 and 24, and the next few subclauses.

Subclause 23 indicates that, despite the ban on targeting Canadians, the centre can collect publicly available information for study and research purposes. In short, it lists a number of things to advance its mandate. Even collecting information inadvertently is allowed. This is very problematic.

We tried to do a few things to fix that. The first was to change the definition of “publicly available information”. That is because when I asked representatives of the CSC if the information that Cambridge Analytica legally but immorally stole from Canadians and others throughout the world through Facebook would be part of publicly available information under the definition provided in this legislation, I got a one-word answer, which is rare in these parts. It was “yes”.

What does my amendment propose to do? The Liberals said not to worry, that they would deal with it. They put in the words “a reasonable expectation of privacy”. That is good. That was part of my amendment as well, as was it part of the amendment brought by the member for Saanich—Gulf Islands. However, there is a whole slew of information missing from that. Allow me to read it to the House, since unfortunately it was deemed inadmissible and voted down by Liberals at committee.

It states that it would also include, along with information where Canadians have a reasonable expectation of privacy, “information that is published or broadcast only to a selected audience or information that is subscribed to or purchased illegally”, in other words, the prohibition on information purchased illegally. That is the problem with these amendments sometimes when one is reading them without the rest of the text that follows. Why is that important? It is important because despite the assurances that we got, there are a lot of questions about this. These are questions and concerns that some of the foremost experts in the field all have as well.

I also proposed an amendment for a catch-and-release principle, for information acquired incidentally on Canadians by the CSC. If it truly does not need the information captured incidentally, I understand it. That happens sometimes when one is going to study the information infrastructure in Canada. Therefore, we had a reasonable compromise, which was that if it happens, the centre has a responsibility to get rid of it. That was another amendment that was voted down by the Liberals on the committee.

I could speak at length about the CSE aspects, but I have only 20 minutes for my speech. It just goes to show how complex and worrisome the new concepts are and how we are far from having enough time to address them today. I would even say that we had very little time in committee as well. I have been in Parliament for seven years, and for the first time since becoming an MP, even though I can be quite verbose, my mic was constantly cut off and not through any fault of the chair, but because we simply did not have enough time to get into the details. I am not blaming the committee chair, who does excellent work on this study. Unfortunately, we did not have enough time for this conversation.

I want to come back to something more specific that affects more than just CSIS. I am talking about one of my amendments that were deemed admissible. Amendments that go beyond the scope of a bill can be proposed when that bill is referred to committee before second reading, as this one was, and the Liberals took advantage of that.

The Liberals used that opportunity to essentially present a new bill into the legislation dealing with the question of information obtained under use of torture, which bafflingly the Conservatives voted against. However, we do not have time to get into that today.

I voted in favour of it, for two reasons, but it does not go far enough, and we are going to get to that. The first reason is because the fact that it was even on the table was an acknowledgement that the status quo is not good enough, that the ministerial directives right now are not good enough, and that having these concepts more explicitly enshrined in law is always a good thing. Even though some of these symbolic statements in legislation sometimes seem to be only that, symbolic, they guide the decisions made and the advice given when these agencies seek legal opinions and so forth. On that front, it is a good thing. The other reason I supported it was because it is better than nothing. However, the language that remains is that the Governor in Council “may” issue directives to deputy heads. At the end of the day, we remain in the same situation we were in before. These were all recorded votes, so Canadians can check them.

Let me say for the record that I offered more explicit amendments to nearly every section of the bill that dealt with one of these agencies, putting in an explicit prohibition on using information that may have been obtained under the use of torture. Every single Liberal and Conservative on the committee voted against them. That is absolutely shameful.

Here is the motion that is before us today: that “The Governor in Council must issue written directions to all deputy heads..”. At the very least, even though we are still dealing with ministerial directives, that obliges the government of the day to issue the directions, even though we already know that the directives themselves have loopholes. Even if the current directives, I will acknowledge, are stronger than the ones in the previous government, there are still holes in them, and those holes need to be addressed.

It is sad to see that my amendments, which would have at least done something to prohibit the use of that type of information, were defeated through the committee process.

Speaking of my amendments, I want to mention one thing I forgot at the beginning of my speech, since I think the Canadians watching us will find it interesting. The government said that it was open to suggestions from the opposition. I suggested 120 amendments, and just four of them were accepted by the Liberals Three were accepted on the condition that I use the Liberals' wording, and the other was accepted because it was just a preamble. Not a single one of the Conservatives' 25 or 29 amendments was accepted. Not a single one of the Green Party's 55 amendments was accepted either.

The Liberals proposed amendments. Anyone can look at them, they are public. The Liberals put forward one amendment and decided to withdraw the others because they had an inferior one to replace them. I therefore proposed the Liberals' amendments myself, and they voted against their own amendments. That speaks volumes about the process.

I have just three minutes left, and I have only spoken about one part of the bill. I just spent 20 minutes giving a speech on the flaws of a single part of a bill that has 10 parts. That tells you everything you need to know about the flaws in this bill, not to mention the fact that CSIS retains its power to disrupt and to detain without any right to counsel, as was the case with the former Bill C-51.

Without mentioning that apart from changing the word “sharing” to “disclosure”, even though the word “disclosure” was there, what was qualified by groups like the B.C. Liberties Association, among others, as a cosmetic change at best to the information sharing regime remains in place. It was one of the biggest criticisms we had, and a reason for voting against Bill C-51 in the previous Parliament.

We will get to that through a future point of order, but hopefully we can vote on different elements of the bill. There are two parts that are good, review and oversight. Despite the fact that we tried to make changes to the review body to make it more accountable to Parliament and less to the executive, it was rejected. With the real-time oversight of the intelligence commissioner, we tried to make that a full-time position. I was not able to propose those changes, as they would require royal prerogative, which I, as an opposition member, do not have. Perhaps I can enter a final plea, although at report stage it is probably too late for that.

It is all too clear that, on the one hand, the Liberals did not want the Conservatives to criticize them for standing up for the rights and freedoms of Canadians and, on the other hand, they wanted to try to protect their progressive image in light of our legitimate criticisms that they have failed in their duty to protect the rights and freedoms of Canadians. Despite all the time we were able to dedicate to the study, despite the public consultations, questions from experts, criticisms from members, and a grandiose announcement that the Liberals were going to do things differently in committee, still, all of our amendments were rejected. The same system will remain in place and not enough improvements are being made in terms of what the Conservatives proposed.

In conclusion, it is true that we are entering a brave new world. We certainly know that in this digital age. I acknowledge that the threats are evolving and we need to address them. There is no doubt about that. However, one thing is for sure: right now, the ability of these agencies to act is outpacing the protections that Canadians have for their rights and freedoms, and their privacy.

That, for me and my party, is completely unacceptable, because at the end of the day, if we truly want to defeat these threats and what they stand for, if we truly want to stand on the other side of that terror and on the right side of history, it means standing up for Canadians' rights and freedoms. This bill just would not do that, and we will continue to oppose it. It is absolutely unfortunate, because we heard that better is always possible, but it does not seem to be with this legislation.

Citizenship and Immigration

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I would love to debate the other bill. However, at the same time, the member for Calgary Nose Hill has moved a motion, and that is her right. If the member thinks she does not have the right to do that, then we have a serious problem here.

The Liberals waited until we were close to the election to table bills for election reform. They waited two years to table their Bill C-51 reforms. At the end of the day, they control the agenda of the House. If they want to whine and complain about it and not contribute, that is their problem.

[Linda Duncan, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Mr. Speaker, my colleague always shows how things should be done in the House by just simply standing and providing very cogent presentations on very complex matters. I give him a thousand accolades for that.

I am little troubled about what our colleague across the way has suggested, that instead of talking about this matter of ensuring services are delivered to support constituents, it would be more important to talk about a policy reform. In my constituency office, time after time people tell me that they would like me to reform the policy on immigration, employment insurance, and the way assistance is provided to constituents. They are also concerned about what was Bill C-51, and hopefully it will be improved, although we will not hold our breath.

Could the member speak to that again? We need to remember that we have two roles as elected members, and certainly working on providing better services to our constituents is an equally important one.

Criminal Code

[Dave Van Kesteren, Conservative, Chatham-Kent—Leamington, ON]

Madam Speaker, I recall a time, not too long ago, when we were doing some battle with the Liberals on Bill C-51. I would just remind the House what that was in regard to. There was an attempt by the Liberals to take away the protection of places of worship. There was a long list of staggering and frightening changes that the Liberal government was proposing to make.

I am wondering whether the Liberal government has used this legislation as a back door to once again make that attack on places of worship.

[Rob Nicholson, Conservative, Niagara Falls, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I am presenting, I am sure, one of the largest petitions you perhaps have seen in this House. It is related to the government's attempt to repeal section 176 of the Criminal Code in Bill C-51. That is the section that protects members of the clergy and religious services. When the government decided that it was going to remove that completely from the Criminal Code, it caused a considerable amount of discomfort and outrage across this country.

I have a petition signed by over 8,000 people. They are petitioning the government to leave that section alone so that religious services and members who officiate at religious services have specific protections. I am proud to present this. The petition has been duly certified by the clerk of petitions.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

As this was already in Bill C-51, we intended to withdraw this amendment from Bill C-59. However, there may be some confusion about it.

Could the officials tell us what the situation is?

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you, Chair.

This will be brief. This is another consequential amendment to what I presented in the first meeting that seeks to fully repeal what was SCISA, now SCIDA, the information sharing regime brought in by former Bill C-51.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

I agree with Ms. May entirely and I would simply add that it's even more dangerous, to my mind, in this context, because information sharing is at the heart of one of the most problematic elements of former Bill C-51, now being modified through Bill C-59.

I think the wording that both Ms. May and I are proposing here is far more appropriate and, as she so eloquently pointed out, is what is proposed by many experts who clearly have expertise in the field.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

I appreciate the view of the officials, but with all due respect to Mr. Fragiskatos, Professor Roach and the Canadian Bar Association aren't pikers, and this isn't, as we like to say, their first rodeo. Professor Roach is one of the country's leading experts in security law, and the same departments and the same Justice officials in the previous government gave us completely dangerous broad definitions such as “terrorism...in general” in part 3 of Bill C-51, which made no sense, but they defended them just as vigorously to a committee then.

With all due respect to our officials here, there is no justification for having a different definition. It doesn't add confusion to the law to be consistent. It adds confusion to the law to use a novel definition that's found only in the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I propose—and the clerk can check if I've got this right—to deal with amendments PV-10, PV-11, PV-12, PV-13, PV-14, PV-15, PV-22 et PV-25.

I think those are all the amendments in this regard.

These amendments all speak to the same point, and I think those are all the ones that remain extant after the slaughter of Mr. Dubé's amendments. Sorry. It's a ritualized slaughter. We appreciate the effort.

I think those are the ones I could speak to all at once and, with the chair's permission, speak to the fundamental point these amendments are trying to achieve. I hope, because of the unusual nature of this process before second reading, that some of my words might reach ministers' offices as well, and that members of the committee might consider whether it isn't wise to actually have a fundamental rethink of the structure of our security intelligence legislation.

This is an important moment, as we all know. This is the most fundamental review we have had in years. It's really good legislation insofar as it sets up the national security intelligence and review agency. Having NSIRA is a big change, but in my view, Mr. Chair, it doesn't take away from the fundamental mistake that was made in Bill C-51.

Forgive me, but having been through the hearings at Bill C-51, I know there were witnesses this committee didn't hear talking about the risks of CSIS having kinetic powers at all. That's what I want to speak to. I will be brief.

This legislation reduces the wrongs that could be done by CSIS agents having these new powers to disrupt plots, but it doesn't deal with something quite fundamental that we grappled with in committee on Bill C-51. It was certainly raised by witnesses and experts like Craig Forcese and John Major, former Supreme Court justice, and also in the Senate. Actually one of the most important witnesses on Bill C-51 was heard on the Senate side. His name's Joe Fogarty. He was the U.K. security liaison with Canada. He was an MI5 agent from the U.K. What he pointed to was the big risk of the RCMP and CSIS not talking to each other, and when you then give CSIS powers to actually disrupt plots, you have an accident waiting to happen, basically.

In his evidence, he referred the committee only to those things that are publicly known, but he assured the committee that, from his work as a U.K. security liaison in the Five Eyes system with Canada, there were more examples of which he could not speak. He directed us to the 2009 case of R. vs. Ahmad where, on the evidence, CSIS discovered the location of a suspected terrorist training camp within Canada and decided not to tell the RCMP.

There's another example, which was in the Canadian Press, to which Joe Fogarty also referred. In the case of Jeffrey Delisle, which we all know—the navy officer who sold secrets—apparently CSIS knew of the spying operations of Delisle for a very long time and decided not to tell the RCMP. Delisle was arrested when the RCMP was tipped off by the FBI.

There's a fundamental problem here, which John Major at the time referred to in this committee and its predecessor in the 41st Parliament. It's human nature not to want to share information, so what have we done now? I think we've compounded the problem because CSIS now has the powers to take action, but we haven't dealt with the fundamentals that it still may not want to tell the RCMP.

The situation is much improved because NSIRA can supervise what's going on. If it sees a problem, it can maybe intervene, but there still has never been a public policy rationale put forward by anyone, ever, for why CSIS needs the power to disrupt plots. CSIS was created, as Mr. Dubé referred to moments ago, in order to create a security and intelligence gathering, to give that information to the RCMP. That's the purpose. It was to separate it out, so that you wouldn't have the RCMP burning down barns and so on.

I don't see to this day why we want CSIS agents to have the capacity to disrupt plots within Canada.

The RCMP and CSIS need to work together and NSIRA needs to supervise them. All my amendments take out of our legislation the right of CSIS agents to have kinetic powers. Again, Bill C-59 improves on Bill C-51 in important ways, reducing and better balancing what CSIS agents are likely to do. I know we don't have anyone here from the RCMP on our witness roster but the RCMP job of disrupting plots will be complicated by the fact that CSIS doesn't share information with the RCMP. That's a pattern. That's our history. Things are improved in what CSIS agents can do. Thanks to Liberal amendment 16, we won't be worrying about torture, but there's still no public policy rationale for CSIS agents having these new powers to take kinetic action to disrupt plots.

I'm raising a different issue. The issue of whether we are undermining our own security intelligence operations by having different intelligence agencies tripping over each other, not talking to each other, when they're taking active steps to disrupt a plot. I'd rather have CSIS continue to do what it's always done since its creation, which is to collect the information and give it to the RCMP in a timely manner, which is what they haven't always done, so that the RCMP can arrest the Jeffrey Delisles of this world, not wait to be tipped off by the FBI or trip over CSIS agents who are trying to do the same thing.

Thank you.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

I appreciate that. My time is limited, so perhaps we can come back to that in a second. While the minister is here, though, I have a couple more questions.

We mentioned the mandate and the relationship with the Department of National Defence. That leads me to the question I asked the officials from Public Safety. We've spent a lot of time on this aspect of the bill. I think your presence here today is proof of the need to drill down on that aspect of it. This committee doesn't necessarily have the same kind of institutional memory that the committee of national defence would have. Can you explain why the decision was made to take a bill that essentially was moving on elements that were in the previous bill, Bill C-51 in the last Parliament, and essentially add this big block of stuff dealing with some significant changes to CSE as opposed to having it as stand-alone legislation?

[Daniel Therrien]

We aren't necessarily suggesting that the documents be destroyed within a short time frame. We are recommending a risk-based approach. A great deal of information is collected on a huge number of transactions, the vast majority of which relates to the financial transactions of law-abiding Canadians. That is the basis of the approach used to detect criminals or terrorists and is very similar to the procedure proposed in Bill C-51 and Bill C-59. It has merit, but the information has to be screened using numerous pieces of data to uncover threats and individuals who are security threats or criminals.

I am not calling the process into question, but it's helpful to keep some figures in mind. Over the past few years, the ratio of actionable disclosures to law enforcement or other organizations has been one for every 10,000 reports received. For every 10,000 reports received, only one disclosure is made to police, the Canada Revenue Agency, or security agencies. We found that a significant amount of information is collected but that people pose a security threat in a very small number of cases.

I'm not saying that the information should no longer be collected, but I am recommending that a risk-based approach be adopted, as the Canada Revenue Agency officials more or less suggested. A considerable amount of information can be gathered initially, but a risk-based approach—one that takes into account the usefulness of the information for forensic evidence purposes—can be applied. That could be one of the factors given consideration. However, a risk analysis should be conducted fairly early on to determine whether the information needs to be retained or not. It is possible that, for a variety of reasons, a certain number of reports would need to be retained for a long period of time. On the flip side, I think many other reports would need to be destroyed rather quickly, as proposed in Bill C-59.

Personally, I see similarities between the approach set out in Bill C-59, which proposes extensive data collection in order to identify the small number of people who pose a threat, and the collection of financial transaction information under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, in order to identify a small number of criminals who are laundering money or contributing to terrorist financing.

[Daniel Therrien, Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I’d like to thank the members of the committee for the opportunity to appear before you today as part of your statutory review of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, or PCMLTFA.

We, of course, support Canada's efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. However, the manner in which these efforts are undertaken must strike an appropriate balance between the need to combat such activities and respecting privacy rights of Canadians.

The most apparent privacy implication with this regime is that it casts a wide net capturing a great deal of information about law-abiding Canadians conducting financial transactions, with a view to uncovering threats to national security or incidents of money laundering.

In our previous parliamentary briefs on Bill C-51 and Bill C-59, we signalled concerns around information collection and sharing regimes in the context of national security.

Specifically, we have highlighted the need for rigorous legal standards around the collection and sharing of personal information, effective oversight, and minimization of risks to the privacy of law-abiding Canadians, in part through prudent retention and destruction practices.

As you are aware, subsection 72(2) of the PCMLTFA provides my office with a mandate to conduct biennial reviews of how FINTRAC protects information it receives or collects under this act. We can also conduct reviews under section 37 of the Privacy Act.

All of our audits have identified issues with FINTRAC receiving and retaining reports that do not meet legislative thresholds for reporting.

In 2014, the PCMLTFA was amended by Bill C-31 to add subsection 54(2), which requires that FINTRAC destroy information in its holdings that was not required to be reported.

Although FINTRAC has implemented measures to validate incoming reports, a significant improvement, we continue to identify information in FINTRAC databases that did not meet thresholds and should not have been retained.

Also, we have generally found FINTRAC to have a comprehensive approach to security, including controls to safeguard personal information. Our most recent audit did identify governance issues between FINTRAC and Shared Services Canada, which FINTRAC has committed to addressing.

Beyond these issues, which we are mandated to review under the PCMLTFA, our principal concern, based on our experience reviewing FINTRAC over the past 10 years, relates to the lack of proportionality of the regime. Disclosures to law enforcement and other investigative agencies made in a given fiscal year represent a very small number when compared with the information received during that same time frame. For every 10,000 reports received, one disclosure is made.

Information received is also retained for long periods. FINTRAC's retention of undisclosed reports increased from five to 10 years in 2007.

Even if one accepts that sharing financial transaction data related to law-abiding citizens may lead to the identification of threats of money laundering or terrorist financing activities, once that information is analyzed and leads to the conclusion that someone is not a threat, it should no longer be retained.

More broadly, we have noted a trend to broaden the regime over the years, and we note the Department of Finance Canada's vision of moving towards a holistic information collection scheme, which would create an environment supporting increased analytics and information sharing. We have already seen discussion about lowering existing thresholds for reporting, which could be done through regulations without parliamentary approval. In the consultation paper, the Department of Finance Canada also suggests increasing the number of reporting agencies and establishing a new model for engagement of the private sector.

While I appreciate that a holistic approach to the collection and sharing of information might be useful to identify threats, what is proposed, unless appropriate privacy safeguards are adopted, would further exacerbate our concerns with proportionality.

Instead, I would suggest that a risk-based approach be adopted in order to minimize the risk of over-collecting and retaining the financial and personal information of law-abiding citizens. Under such an approach, FINTRAC, based on a thorough risk-based analysis of its data, would develop criteria to limit collection, sharing, and retention to only situations likely to represent potential manifestations of terrorist financing or money laundering.

We realize this may be challenging, but as privacy experts, we at the OPC believe we can play a role in the assessment of these factors, which leads me to this: currently our review mandate, under the PCMLTFA and the Privacy Act, is limited to ensuring that these statutes and regulations, as enacted, including monetary thresholds for collection, are respected.

We think a more useful contribution would be to provide advice, after review, on amendments that could be made, to either the statutes or the regulations or the practices of FINTRAC, to ensure greater proportionality, including the assessment of risk factors that might govern information collection, sharing, and retention.

The government is recommending that the PCMLTFA be amended to provide that the reviews we currently undertake every two years under section 72 now occur every four years. We agree in part, but we would recommend a change of purpose for these reviews.

First, we would recommend that the purpose of our reviews under the act be modified to include advice or recommendations on proportionality, as just mentioned.

Second, they would begin at least one year before every anticipated five-year review that Parliament must undertake. The OPC would continue to conduct compliance reviews under section 37 of the Privacy Act, which would not need to be amended. As it relates to proportionality, the committee may wish to consider part 4 of Bill C-59, currently before Parliament, concerning CSIS datasets and their retention, which might be instructive.

Under that model, CSIS must clean data promptly—that is, within 90 days—and can retain Canadian datasets only if the Federal Court is satisfied that doing so is likely to assist in the performance of CSIS's mandate, including the detection of threats to the national security of Canada. In addition, with respect to any contemplated changes to reduce existing thresholds through regulations, which would also affect proportionality, I would reiterate my recommendation in the context of Privacy Act reform, that government institutions should be legally required to consult with my office on draft legislation and regulations with privacy implications before they are tabled.

My written statement now goes into questions of oversight. Do I have time?