Bill C-59 (Historical)

National Security Act, 2017

An Act respecting national security matters

Part 1 enacts the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, which establishes the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and sets out its composition, mandate and powers. It repeals the provisions of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act establishing the Security Intelligence Review Committee and amends that Act and other Acts in order to transfer certain powers, duties and functions to the new Agency. It also makes related and consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 1.‍1 enacts the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act to authorize the issuance of directions respecting the disclosure of and request for information that would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity and the use of information that is likely to have been obtained as the result of mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity.
Part 2 enacts the Intelligence Commissioner Act, which provides that the duties and functions of the Intelligence Commissioner are to review the conclusions on the basis of which certain authorizations are issued or amended, and determinations are made, under the Communications Security Establishment Act and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and to approve those authorizations, amendments and determinations if those conclusions are reasonable. This Part also abolishes the position of the Commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment, provides for that Commissioner to become the Intelligence Commissioner, transfers the employees of the former Commissioner to the office of the new Commissioner and makes related and consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 3 enacts the Communications Security Establishment Act, which establishes the Communications Security Establishment and, among other things, sets out the Establishment’s mandate as well as the regime for authorizing its activities. It also amends the National Defence Act and makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 4 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to
(a) add a preamble to that Act and provide a mechanism to enhance the accountability of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service;
(b) add new limits on the exercise of the Service’s power to reduce threats to the security of Canada including, in particular, by setting out a list of measures that may be authorized by the Federal Court;
(c) provide a justification, subject to certain limitations, for the commission of acts or omissions that would otherwise constitute offences;
(d) exempt employees of the Service and persons acting under their direction from liability for offences related to acts committed for the sole purpose of establishing or maintaining a covert identity;
(e) create a regime for the Service to collect, retain, query and exploit datasets in the course of performing its duties and functions;
(f) make amendments to the warrant regime that are related to datasets; and
(g) implement measures for the management of datasets.
Part 5 amends the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act to, among other things,
(a) emphasize that the Act addresses only the disclosure of information and not its collection or use;
(b) clarify the definition of “activity that undermines the security of Canada”;
(c) clarify that advocacy, protest, dissent and artistic expression are not activities that undermine the security of Canada unless they are carried on in conjunction with an activity that undermines the security of Canada;
(d) provide that a disclosure of information is authorized only if the disclosure will contribute to the carrying out by the recipient institution of its national security responsibilities and will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary;
(e) require that information disclosed be accompanied by information about the accuracy of the disclosed information and the reliability of the manner in which it was obtained; and
(f) require that records be prepared and kept in respect of every disclosure of information and that every year a copy of every record prepared in the preceding year be provided to the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency.
Part 6 amends the Secure Air Travel Act to authorize the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to collect from air carriers and operators of aviation reservation systems, for the purpose of identifying listed persons, information about any individuals who are on board or expected to be on board an aircraft for any flight prescribed by regulation, and to exempt an air carrier from providing that information, or from the application of any provision of the regulations, in certain circumstances. It amends the Act to authorize that Minister to collect personal information from individuals for the purpose of issuing a unique identifier to them to assist with pre-flight verification of their identity. It also reverses the rule in relation to a deemed decision on an application for administrative recourse. Finally, it amends the Act to provide for certain other measures related to the collection, disclosure and destruction of information.
Part 7 amends the Criminal Code to, among other things,
(a) make certain procedural modifications to the terrorist listing regime under section 83.‍05, such as providing for a staggered ministerial review of listed entities and granting the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness the authority to amend the names, including aliases, of listed entities;
(b) change the offence of advocating or promoting terrorism offences in general, in section 83.‍21, to one of counselling the commission of a terrorism offence, and make corresponding changes to the definition of terrorist propaganda;
(c) raise one of the thresholds for imposing a recognizance with conditions under section 83.‍3, and amend when that section is to be reviewed and, unless extended by Parliament, to cease to have effect;
(d) repeal sections 83.‍28 and 83.‍29 relating to an investigative hearing into a terrorism offence and repeal subsections 83.‍31(1) and (1.‍1), which require annual reports on such hearings;
(e) require the Attorney General of Canada to publish a report each year setting out the number of terrorism recognizances entered into under section 810.‍011 in the previous year; and
(f) authorize a court, in proceedings for recognizances under any of sections 83 and 810 to 810.‍2, to make orders for the protection of witnesses.
Part 8 amends the Youth Criminal Justice Act to, among other things, ensure that the protections that are afforded to young persons apply in respect of proceedings in relation to recognizance orders, including those related to terrorism, and give employees of a department or agency of the Government of Canada access to youth records, for the purpose of administering the Canadian Passport Order.
Part 9 requires that a comprehensive review of the provisions and operation of this enactment take place during the fourth year after section 168 of this enactment comes into force. If that section 168 and section 34 of Bill C-22, introduced in the 1st session of the 42nd Parliament and entitled the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, come into force within one year of each other, the reviews required by those sections are to take place at the same time and are to be undertaken by the same committee or committees.

Department of National Defence—Main Estimates, 2019-20

[Bob Bratina, Liberal, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

Mr. Chair, I am thankful for the opportunity to speak today.

I am pleased to spend the time allotted to me discussing the Communications Security Establishment, also known as CSE, and the important work it does in cyber-defence and cyber-protection, as well as the cyber-work performed by the Canadian Armed Forces.

CSE is one of Canada's critical security and intelligence organizations within the national defence portfolio. It is Canada's national signals intelligence agency and serves the national interest by providing foreign intelligence to inform government decision-making. CSE also has the mandate to provide technical and operational assistance to federal law enforcement and security agencies in performing their lawful duties.

However, I am here today to focus on the second part of CSE's current mandate: cyber-defence and cyber-protection.

CSE has more than 70 years of history providing advice and guidance, including more than a decade of operational experience in defending cyber-systems of importance to the Government of Canada.

We know that good cybersecurity is critical to Canada's competitiveness, economic stability and long-term prosperity. That is why we launched the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, as promised in budget 2018. This new centre will provide Canadian citizens and businesses with a trusted place for cybersecurity advice.

Through the newly established Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, we are provided with sophisticated technical expertise to help identify, prepare for and respond to the most severe cyber-threats and attacks against computer networks and systems and the important information they contain. It also provides advice and guidance so Canadians can better protect themselves.

In the short time since its launch last fall, the cyber centre has improved operational coordination, providing better cyber-protection and more efficient responses in cases of cyber-attacks. This has improved Canada's cybersecurity overall. It has also made strides in increasing public and industry awareness and engagement on all matters of cybersecurity.

Canadians can rest assured that their government is prepared to meet the cybersecurity challenges of today and tomorrow. Reliable, secure cyber-systems are vital to Canadians' daily lives. That is why, in our last two budgets, we have taken action to strengthen Canada's cybersecurity.

In budget 2018, we committed $507.7 million over five years, starting in 2018-19, and $108.8 million per year ongoing to support Canada's first comprehensive national cyber security strategy, which includes establishing the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security.

Budget 2019 builds on these investments, proposing $144.9 million over five years, starting in 2019-20, to help better protect Canada's critical cyber-systems. For the cyber centre, this funding will support its advice and guidance to critical infrastructure owners and operators on how to better prevent and address cyber-attacks, no matter where they might originate.

Since October 1, CSE and the cyber centre have published key public reports to inform Canadians about the threats we face, including the first-ever unclassified “National Cyber Threat Assessment 2018” and the “2019 Update on Cyber Threats to Canada's Democratic Process”.

In today's dynamic security environment, CSE's efforts to educate, protect and defend Canada and Canadians against cyber-threats are more critical than ever.

Protecting Canadians includes protecting our democratic processes from threats of foreign interference. This is why the Government of Canada has created a security and intelligence threats to elections task force, in which CSE plays an integral role. This task force also includes the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Global Affairs Canada.

The security and intelligence threats to elections task force works to counter covert, clandestine or criminal activities from influencing or interfering with the electoral process in Canada. It aims to prepare the government to assess and respond to threats to our elections.

However, CSE's work is not limited to the security and intelligence threats to elections task force. It is also working closely with Elections Canada to protect its infrastructure.

CSE, through the cyber centre, has offered cybersecurity advice and guidance to all 16 recognized federal political parties. It has also published companion resource documents for both Canadians and political campaigns on its website.

Pending the passage of Bill C-59, which is currently being studied in the other chamber, CSE would be able to provide more targeted advice, guidance and services to designated critical infrastructure owners upon their request. If passed, Bill C-59 would give CSE the mandate to conduct online operations to disrupt foreign threat attacks against Canadian systems. The same sophisticated cyber capabilities that CSE would employ could also be leveraged by the Canadian Armed Forces in support of military operations.

Cyberspace is becoming ever-more contested, and our adversaries are becoming more sophisticated. At the same time, our reliance on cyber is increasing. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces recognize the importance of staying ahead of our adversaries in this environment. Cyber considerations must be built into everything the defence team does. Our government is ensuring that the women and men of the Canadian Armed Forces have the tools and equipment they need to accomplish their important missions at home and abroad.

That is why “Strong, Secure, Engaged” includes several important initiatives to strengthen Canada's cyber capabilities, notably the new cyber mission assurance program and the creation of a new cyber operator trade within the Canadian Armed Forces.

As the nature of technological threats is evolving, using Canada's cyber talent is essential to face future challenges. We are determined to maintain a modern and agile force capable of responding to the technological challenges of today and tomorrow.

With the cyber mission assurance program, National Defence is considering cyber defence on all new equipment and technologies. That means identifying and addressing cyber-associated risks to military networks and equipment before buying. Cybersecurity is top of mind when the defence team assesses its current capabilities, fleets and infrastructure. It is deliberate and attentive in safeguarding computer networks, platforms and weapons systems, and networked equipment in key infrastructure.

I want to stress that cyber mission assurance takes place at every level, from the largest procurement projects outlined in SSE to the logistics officer overseas procuring goods for deployed personnel, to individual defence team members sitting at their computers. This is a coherent and enduring program that manages cyber-threats to ensure that the Canadian Armed Forces is always in control of its actions. All of this helps to ensure that cyber-related disruptions do not interrupt military operations or the important business of security and defence.

As I mentioned, creating the cyber operator trade within the military was another important initiative in the defence policy. That includes new cyber operator roles within the reserve force that support the newly created cyber force, a specialized team of both military and civilian personnel.

This, combined with the changes that Bill C-59 proposes, would allow CSE to support cyber operations in Canadian Armed Forces missions when required and to deploy cybersecurity tools to defend Canada's critical infrastructure upon request.

CSE is proud to play a critical role in protecting Canada and Canadians from cyber-threats. Our top priorities are to protect, defend and educate in order to secure our networks from adversaries. As the reliance of Canada and Canadians on connected technology increases, so will the need for CSE and the Canadian Armed Forces and their cyber mandate.

Those are my remarks. I will use the remainder of my time, if I may, to put some questions to the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence.

[Julie Dabrusin, Liberal, Toronto—Danforth, ON]

Over the past few exchanges, we've heard a little bit about Bill C-59 and the other forms of oversight or review that might be put in place. In respect of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, NSIRA, how would you see the complementarity between the review agency and yourself?

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Right, thank you.

I have another question on National Defence and the recommendation to amend Bill C-59 as well as on the definition of the mandate that would be given to the new committee.

Is your committee concerned about the resources that this new sister committee would have to do this monitoring? The resources are already rather limited. If the mandate is expanded, are you concerned about whether the new committee will be able to carry it out each year? I would like it to be and I agree with the recommendation, but the question is whether it will be able to do so adequately given current or planned resources.

[David McGuinty]

Our role is to submit reports to the government, and we have done that. All we can do is hope that the government will take them seriously

The national security and intelligence review agency, NSIRA, once it's created under Bill C-59, will have the power to review the Department of National Defence but will not be obligated to do so on an annual basis like it will for CSIS and CSE. The committee was unanimous in calling for NSIRA to have that annual responsibility built into Bill C-59 so that the extensive activities of the Department of National Defence in intelligence were reviewed on an ongoing basis.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Your notes mention Bill C-59. You make recommendations involving the Department of National Defence, DND. I know that the bill is being studied in the Senate at the moment, but I no longer recall which stage it has reached. Do you think that amendments will be proposed by the Senate or the government? Have you heard anything about that?

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Minister Goodale appeared before this committee during the hearings on Bill C-59, I believe. At that time, he told us that he could not answer certain questions because it was a matter of national security. After that, in the House of Commons, Minister Goodale said the opposite. Daniel Jean also testified before our committee that it was not a matter of national security.

In your opinion, is it a matter of national security?

[David McGuinty, Chair, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Good afternoon, colleagues. Thank you for your invitation to appear before your committee. I am joined by Rennie Marcoux, executive director of the Secretariat of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, or NSICOP.

It's a privilege to be here with you today to discuss the 2018 annual report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.

The committee's first annual report is the result of the work, the dedication and the commitment from my colleagues on the committee. It is intended to contribute to an informed debate among Canadians on the difficult challenges of providing security and intelligence organizations with the exceptional powers necessary to identify and counter threats to the nation while at the same time ensuring that their activities continue to respect and preserve our democratic rights.

NSICOP has the mandate to review the overall framework for national security and intelligence in Canada, including legislation, regulations, policy, administration and finances.

It may also examine any activity that is carried out by a department that relates to national security or intelligence.

Finally, it may review any matter relating to national security or intelligence that a minister refers to the committee.

Members of the committee are all cleared to a top secret level, swear an oath and are permanently bound to secrecy. Members also agree that the nature of the committee, multi-party, drawn from the House of Commons and the Senate, with a broad range of experience, bring a unique perspective to these important issues.

In order to conduct our work, we are entitled to have access to any information that is related to our mandate, but there are some exceptions, namely, cabinet confidences, the identity of confidential sources or protected witnesses, and ongoing law enforcement investigations that may lead to prosecutions.

The year 2018 was a year of learning for the committee. We spent many hours and meetings building our understanding of our mandate and of the organizations responsible for protecting Canada and Canadians. The committee was briefed by officials from across the security and intelligence community and visited all seven of the main departments and agencies. Numerous meetings were also held with the national security and intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister. NSICOP also decided to conduct a review of certain security allegations surrounding the Prime Minister's trip to India in February 2018.

Over the course of the calendar year, the committee met 54 times, with an average of four hours per meeting. Annex E of the report outlines the committee's extensive outreach and engagement activities with government officials, academics and civil liberties groups.

The annual report is a result of extensive oral and written briefings, more than 8,000 pages of printed materials, dozens of meetings between NSICOP analysts and government officials, in-depth research and analysis, and thoughtful and detailed deliberations among committee members.

The report is also unanimous. In total, the report makes 11 findings and seven recommendations to the government. The committee has been scrupulously careful to take a non-partisan approach to these issues. We hope that our findings and recommendations will strengthen the accountability and effectiveness of Canada's security and intelligence community.

The report before you contains five chapters, including the two substantive reviews conducted by the committee.

The first chapter explains the origins of NSICOP, its mandate and how it approaches its work, including what factors the committee takes into consideration when deciding what to review.

The second chapter provides an overview of the security and intelligence organizations in Canada, of the threats to Canada's security and how these organizations work together to keep Canada and Canadian safe and to promote Canadian interests.

Those two chapters are followed by the committee's two substantive reviews for 2018.

In chapter 3, the committee reviewed the way the government determines its intelligence priorities. Why is this important? There are three reasons.

First, this process is the fundamental means of providing direction to Canada's intelligence collectors and assessors, ensuring they focus on the government's, and the country's, highest priorities.

Second, this process is essential to ensure accountability in the intelligence community. What the intelligence community does is highly classified. This process gives the government regular insight into intelligence operations from a government-wide lens.

Third, this process helps the government to manage risk. When the government approves the intelligence priorities, it is accepting the risks of focusing on some targets and also the risk of not focusing on others.

The committee found that the process, from identifying priorities to translating them into practical guidance, to informing ministers and seeking their approval, does have a solid foundation. That said, any process can be improved.

In particular, the committee recommends that the Prime Minister's national security and intelligence advisor should take a stronger leadership role in the process in order to make sure that cabinet has the best information to make important decisions on where Canada should focus its intelligence activities and its resources.

Moving on, chapter 4 reviews the intelligence activities of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. The government's defence policy, “Strong, Secure, Engaged”, states that DND/CAF is “the only entity within the Government of Canada that employs the full spectrum of intelligence collection capabilities while providing multi-source analysis.”

We recognize that defence intelligence activities are critical to the safety of troops and the success of Canadian military activities, including those abroad, and they are expected to grow. When the government decides to deploy the Canadian Armed Forces, DND/CAF also has implicit authority to conduct defence intelligence activities. In both cases, the source of authority is what is known as the Crown prerogative. This is very different from how other intelligence organizations, notably CSE and CSIS, operate. Each of those organizations has clear statutory authority to conduct intelligence activities, and they are subject to regular, independent and external review.

This was a significant and complex review for the committee, with four findings and three recommendations.

Our first recommendation focuses on areas where DND/CAF could make changes to strengthen its existing internal governance structure over its intelligence activities and to strengthen the accountability of the minister.

The other two recommendations would require the government to amend or to consider enacting legislation. The committee has set out the reasons why it formed the view that regular independent review of DND/CAF intelligence activities will strengthen accountability over its operations.

We believe there is an opportunity for the government, with Bill C-59 still before the Senate, to put in place requirements for annual reporting on DND/CAF's national security or intelligence activities, as would be required for CSIS and CSE.

Second, the committee also believes that its review substantiates the need for the government to give very serious consideration to providing explicit legislative authority for the conduct of defence intelligence activities. Defence intelligence is critical to the operations of the Canadian Armed Forces and, like all intelligence activities, involves inherent risks.

DND/CAF officials expressed concerns to the committee about maintaining operational flexibility for the conduct of defence intelligence activities in support of military operations. The committee, therefore, thought it was important to present both the risks and the benefits of placing defence intelligence on a clear statutory footing.

Our recommendations are a reflection of the committee's analysis of these important issues.

We would be pleased to take your questions.

Thank you.

Criminal Records Act

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Speaker, and yes, I would ask my hon. colleague to be patient. I will get to my point forthwith.

The priorities of Canadians are not the priorities of this Liberal Prime Minister and his government, and this could not be more clear than when two former cabinet ministers were removed from their party. They were banished last week, and there was a breakdown in trust. Sadly, the fault lies clearly with the Prime Minister and his cronies, while the penalties continue to be placed on the members who were removed.

The Prime Minister has offered one falsehood after another trying to it explain away. Quite bluntly, it has been painfully obvious to the rest of the country that he put politics ahead of the best interests of Canadians.

The Liberals have tabled their bill for taxpayer-funded records suspensions. There it is; I am back on the issue. How does this align with the needs of Canadians? In general, how does it fit with public safety? The many issues facing our country in protecting our communities and ensuring a strong, fair justice system go well beyond the Prime Minister trying to interfere with the independence of the former attorney general or the director of public prosecutions.

We know where Canada is struggling with public safety. According to Statistics Canada information, Canada has a gang problem in our cities. We have a justice problem, with backlogged courts and court appointments for judges. We have a rural crime problem. We have a sentencing and recidivism problem, with revolving doors in the justice and jail system. We have evidence-lab challenges and RCMP police-resourcing challenges. Stats Canada has shown that gang-related shootings are primarily responsible for recent increases in violent crime in this country, and to date, the only Liberal response has been unfulfilled promises.

Instead of action, the Liberals' legislative changes, like Bill C-71, for example, went after licensed firearms owners instead of criminals. As the Department of Public Safety noted in its own consultation document, the vast majority of licensed firearms owners are not involved in crime. In fact, statistics provided to the public safety committee suggest that it is under 1%. The Liberals' legislative response to gang violence and illegal weapons has been to crack down on less than 1% of the problem and to ignore the 99%.

What would help? I know a number of items that could help improve public safety and reduce violent crime. First is spending the money the government promised for policing and to go after organized crime. Second is to put more resources into public prosecutions, courts and evidence labs. These have all been shown to be under-resourced, especially with the recent court decision to limit trial length. Third is to stop softening sentences for violent criminals, as proposed in Bill C-75. Serious crime needs serious punishment for reform to work, and all these ideas have evidence to show that they are needed and would have an impact.

What will not have an impact is a taxpayer-funded pot pardon. No one would be safer because of this policy. A very small number of Canadians would benefit from it. The truth, from my experience, is that most individuals likely to seek record suspensions may have a number of other convictions as well. While they may receive a single free record suspension, their other charges may not be so free. Possession might be only one of the many charges on a person's record.

Where would Bill C-93 leave this House and Canada on the constant effort to combat crime in an ever-changing and evolving world? After three and a half years of Liberal mismanagement, we have a strained legal system that sees more and more criminals going free, rather than facing charges, or pleading to significantly less-serious charges.

Prisoners will now have access to needles whenever and wherever they want in prisons. As our correctional officers have told us and have pointed out more than once, even in Europe, which the Liberals claim to be copying, the needles are never in the general population; they are in the hands of medical staff. Rather than dealing with the cause of crime, most often addiction, the Liberal plan is to continue the addiction.

Under the current Liberal government, we have seen a horrific record of protecting communities from returning ISIS fighters. When we asked the committee how many outstanding monitoring warrants were placed on the 60 ISIS terrorists who have returned, the number was zero.

While I have no doubt that teams at CSIS and the RCMP are working to keep tabs on these individuals, and are doing a great job, limited by the legislation from the government, the red tape and oversight rules proposed under Bill C-59 would no doubt make it harder to watch known radical extremists who have participated in horrific, hate-based crimes. To me and many Canadians, a desire to join ISIS is itself an admission that someone supports violence.

The Prime Minister is happy to talk about being opposed to radicals and extremists, but none of his actions suggest that he is serious about combatting the sources of radicalization or the threat of domestic terrorism. Words matter, but actions have impacts.

We have seen a radical and damaging string of policies that have increased drugs in our communities and have not helped make anyone safer. Whether it was the poorly thought-out and rushed legislation on marijuana, which ignored reasonable requests from police and medical professionals, or the unnecessary risk of drug-impaired driving, to my knowledge, we still do not have a reliable roadside mechanism to test for drug impairment or to increase supervised injection sites.

Nothing so explains the potential harm of the Liberal approach to crime as the issue of rural crime, which we are dealing with in rural Canada. My riding has a small city and an expansive rural region. Across Alberta, Saskatchewan and other parts of our country, we have heard from Canadians about the rampant, escalating crime in rural communities committed, for the most part, by urban criminals victimizing rural Canadians where police response is minimal, delayed, or in some cases, nonexistent.

Canadians have told us heartbreaking stories of violent encounters, financial hardship and trauma from repeated thefts and victimization. Canadians have spoken of fear, alienation and abandonment. That is not Canada. That is not my Canada, but it has become an unfortunate reality in the Prime Minister's Canada.

With Bill C-93, the government is proposing a no-fee, no-waiting-period record suspension without any enquiries or reviews of personal history or conduct. The reason we have a Parole Board, both the administration and the regional organization, appointed to conduct hearings is to exercise discretion in the review of individual cases. Parole hearings can uncover vital information about convictions, such as a plea deal with lesser charges despite the person having been involved in serious and violent crimes.

While there are likely to be a very limited number of cases like this, such cases may be separated from simple possession issues. Moreover, some plea deals may have been arranged with lesser charges but with specific instructions, such as an agreement to have no record suspension, as appropriate to the person's personal history.

This means that these pardons would be granted as a matter of process, and the board would take up no inquiry of the person and would have little or no opportunity to exercise discretion. This means that even in cases where it was patently obvious that the person continued a criminal lifestyle but did not have a conviction entered against him or her, a pardon would be granted.

The police in this country have raised some concerns about Bill C-93. They suggest that our officers need to feel confident that individuals who are a threat to public safety and the public order are going to be popping up on CPIC, even if they have been convicted of simple possession.

Here is a scenario as an example. There are many individuals who have been charged with more than one serious criminal drug offence, but once they have gone to court and worked out a plea deal for simple possession for a multitude of possession charges, these charges are then reduced for multiple reasons, such as to ease a court backlog, to save witnesses from testifying or to secure testimony for the conviction of a bigger criminal player, etc. The plea to a simple possession charge would be used by the Crown with the understanding, as I said previously, that the conviction would still be a permanent part of that individual's record, ensuring that any future investigation of a similar nature could be appropriately linked and applied to that person's own personal history.

This does not serve the best interests of officer safety or community safety. It does not promote the rehabilitation of those entrenched in the criminal element, the ones who threaten to be repeat offenders.

I appreciate the fact that we cannot hold unproven facts against individuals. That would be unfair. However, we cannot ignore the circumstances that would lead to the arrest, charging and conviction of individuals using the available laws and the discretion of the day, which is key. The Crown and the courts would not have accepted the lesser pleas knowing the proposal today. This itself would affect the administration of justice.

There are two very different scenarios at play here: one person who is stopped and charged for carrying a dime bag of marijuana versus a person who is caught up in a drug ring and pleads to a simple possession charge. They are two very different people, but the proposed changes would treat them the same way. One is not a danger to police or the community, and the other continues to pose a risk. That is what should be screened. There should not just be blanket pardons.

While the Liberals are happy to talk about there being discretion in our justice system, they have removed the discretion of the public service at the Parole Board as well as the discretion of the Parole Board itself. It is important to keep in context the arrest charges and plea deals, especially since many plea deals would never have considered the possibility of a future government legalizing drugs and imposing record suspensions without any review or context.

The House should consider that no individuals would benefit from this act who would be excluded otherwise, and I can see no way to make that happen without an appropriate review.

I hope that members of the committee are not prevented from making minor and common-sense amendments to the legislation that would ensure public safety. Already we have seen too many pieces of legislation from the Liberals that ignore common sense and public safety in favour of policy and division.

To be clear, I know, and I believe members know, that these are not the public safety priorities of Canadians. This bill would not help victims recover from the trauma of violent crime. It would not prevent criminals from victimizing rural Canadians. It would not stop gang violence or deter youth from joining gangs. It would not address illegal firearms in our country. It would not address the many concerns and challenges faced by prosecutors and police across the country.

I see Bill C-93 as a continuation of the Liberals' plan: more minor gestures without the requisite actions to combat addiction, crime and poverty to improve public safety. It is a plan that would provide a benefit to a select and small group of Canadians at taxpayers' expense, a plan that would double down on legalizing marijuana while ignoring real, serious and important threats to Canada's public safety. These are not the priorities of Canadians. This bill does not address the issues, and from what I have heard from police and prosecutors across the country, it does not address their concerns.

I can only assume that Liberal MPs will once again be called on to vote in blind faith with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Public Safety, because today more and more Canadians are seeing clearly that the priorities of the Liberals are not the priorities of Canadians.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

So, my question becomes this: If we look at Bill C-59, for example, where you're giving CSE defensive and offensive capabilities—and part of that is proactively shutting down malware that might be...or an IP, or things like that—is there concern about escalation and where the line is drawn?

Part of this study.... The problem is that we're all lay people, or most of us anyway—I won't speak for all—when it comes to these things. My understanding of AI—because I've heard that, too—is that it's not what we think of it as being from popular culture. Does that mean that if, due to employing AI to use some of these capabilities that the law has conferred on different agencies, AI is continuing...? How much human involvement is there in the adjustments? If that line is so blurry as to what the rules of engagement are, is there concern that AI is learning how to shut something down, that the consequences can be graver than they were initially, but the system is sort of evolving on its own? I don't want to get lost. I don't know what the proper jargon is there, but....

[Dan Rogers]

Under the current mandate for CSE, our authorities are limited to intelligence collection. There are provisions in Bill C-59, which the Senate is currently considering. If that bill is passed, we may have more authorities in the future.

Report Stage

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to address Bill C-83. As we know, it is a bill that symbolizes the current government's approach to leadership in this country. It is an approach of ignoring the concerns of many, providing little in the way of moral leadership and transparency, and putting the safety of Canadians at risk for the benefit of political gain.

I have said many times in this place that it is and should be the top priority of the House to put the safety of Canadians first, ahead of any other issues or politics. With the bill, the House would fail to meet that expectation.

To paraphrase my NDP colleague from Beloeil—Chambly, I can think of no time when a bill has come before Parliament where there are no witnesses who support the legislation. That is exactly what happened with Bill C-83. The minister claimed the bill would end administrative segregation. The witnesses who refuted the bill included prisoner advocacy groups, civil liberties groups, former wardens, professors, correctional unions, the correctional investigator and a senator. The overriding sentiment was that the legislation lacked the detail and information needed to back up such a claim by the minister.

The minister claimed the bill responded to issues raised by the courts that segregation caused the death of two inmates. However, the facts are clear in these two unfortunate deaths that they were the result of operational and management failures in both circumstances.

The minister claimed safety and security of staff were the top priorities. However, correctional workers and former inmates testified that segregation is essential to managing violent and volatile inmates, and that the bill would create more risk to staff.

Civil liberties groups called the bill unconstitutional and said it would make things worse rather than better. They noted the bill lacked external oversight, a check against the authorities of Correctional Service Canada. The minister actually acknowledged this lack of oversight existed.

Senator Pate testified before the committee and indicated that Bill C-83 was a bad piece of legislation. The senator dismantled the minister's claims as to how the bill would end segregation. In a visit to a Nova Scotia Prison, Senator Pate noted that it had renamed the segregation unit, the “intensive intervention unit”. The minister will claim otherwise, of course. However, I will take the testimony of a senator and her eyewitness account over the minister's promise, especially given the minister's repeated track record of misleading Parliament and Canadians.

Perhaps the only accomplishment by the minister with respect to the bill is that he brought together the NDP, the Green Party and the Conservatives, who all oppose the legislation.

I would like to note the unexpected and very valuable contribution of written testimony from Mr. Glen Brown, someone who knows the system well. Mr. Brown is a highly experienced former warden and deputy warden, who now teaches criminal justice and criminology at Simon Fraser University and Langara College.

As someone once responsible for segregation units, he notes that the Ashley Smith and Edward Snowshoe cases were more about mismanagement of behavioural issues and neglect. These issues are not legislative problems. They are management, training and accountability issues. When in segregation, inmates should receive bolstered communication on current risks and mental health issues. They should have increased contact with officers and staff, and they should have an increased potential for services. All this should bring greater attention to an offender's rehabilitation plan.

Mr. Brown wrote:

The strength of a functioning administrative segregation process is that it should bolster all of those things: oversight is strengthened; case management should be more active; information sharing should be more robust; referral for clinical service should be prioritized and case management intervention to develop plans should be urgent.

After noting that science and research has shown that properly managed segregation units do not cause short- or long-term harm, Mr. Brown noted, “To respond to current circumstances with sweeping legislative reform is only to react ideologically, and to ignore science and evidence.”

On the minister's grand solution to segregation, which is to rename segregation units to “structured intervention units”, Mr. Brown noted that Bill C-83 described SIUs in such broad and vague language that the consequences of implementation were very uncertain, that the details were unknown and the details were the key. The current layout of many segregation units did not facilitate socialization and programming. The emphasis on programming suggested longer-term stays in SIUs, weeks or maybe months. SIUs would not be suitable for short-term management of volatile inmates, such as those under the influence. There was the inability to have specialized staff for particular subpopulations in a prison. Finally, he noted that given the current layout of many prisons, a wing may need to be deemed a structured intervention unit, meaning up to 96 inmates may be subject to 20 hours a day of confinement where before it would be only 16.

To be clear, someone who is an expert and has worked for years in prisons with segregation says that he cannot discern the minister's plan. Moreover, he says that prisons often lack the infrastructure, are inappropriate to what is needed and could have the opposite effect to what the minister claims.

Perhaps the only potential value in the legislation could come from an external review mechanism of segregation, because it could provide Canadians with greater confidence in offender management. The minister, however, told the committee that we did not have the authority to do this, an order the Liberal MPs on the committee followed, while the opposition members put forward mechanisms to provide such oversight, which were soundly rejected.

When we pushed the Liberals at committee to amend the worst parts of the legislation and pointed to the glaring issues raised by the many expert witnesses, we were told that Liberal MPs were voting with “faith in the minister”.

The role of committees is not to provide support and faith to a minister. It is to conduct detailed examinations on challenging issues, to hear from experts and impacted Canadians, to examine programs, spending and legislation to determine if it will meet the needs of Canadians or, at the very least, what the minister claims it will meet. On this, our committee has failed.

At the conclusion of committee debate on Bill C-83, my Conservative colleagues and I put our views on the record. We indicated that the committee failed in its role to review the legislation and ensure that it could make informed decisions. We also said that we believed the minister withheld information from committee that was clearly available to him at the time, namely the cost and how it would be used and implemented in the bill, which most witnesses said was essential to knowing if the bill would be useful. For the minister, it seemed more important that he withhold his plan from the committee. Half a billion dollars connected to a bill, where and how the money will be used is essential to know if the bill will work. We still do not have a plan necessarily for that money.

What was the response to the overwhelming criticism and skepticism of the bill? Government MPs stated that they were “making a leap of faith” and putting their trust in the minister. What was accomplished by the committee in reviewing this legislation? In my opinion, next to nothing. The Liberal members rejected amendments on how the money would be used. They rejected a requirement to publish the standards of the new SIUs. They rejected limits to reclassifying prisons. They rejected having the minister provide us with how he would implement this new plan.

On this legislation, the Liberals have turned their backs on Canadians. We are to trust the minister who has an extensive track record of misleading Canadians on things like the disastrous India trip, Bill C-59 and Bill C-71, failure to provide funding for police to tackle gangs, and I could go on.

We as a House can do better. We must do better. We can all rise to a higher level. Personally, I feel this committee failed its constituents, its communities and its country. Bill C-83 is yet another example of the many failures of the Liberal government.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

I have a minute left, Minister.

One of my colleagues, Ms. Dabrusin, asked about CBSA oversight. It feels like it's been three years now that Mr. Goodale has been telling us over and over that it's coming, so maybe we'll get a bill that we can adopt before the election.

Glibness aside, I do want to address this issue. I don't know if you could comment on this, or if this is for Minister Goodale. He did mention that the new review body created in Bill C-59 would look into issues relating to national security. However, many of the issues that have come forward, especially in the media, that such a body could look at—in particular, allegations of harassment in the workplace and things of that nature, or even some of the security issues that have been raised—could be looked at by a more specific mechanism that doesn't necessarily fall under....

There's some debate about whether everything the CBSA does, as a national security body, falls under that committee. Can you comment on that specifically? What's being done to address some of those issues in the workplace and some of those security screening issues, for example, that oversight and review could help us address?

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

The legislation is in the process of being drafted, and we intend to present it at the earliest opportunity. The functions of the CBSA that touch on national security are covered by Bill C-59, just as any other department or agency of the Government of Canada that deals with security or intelligence issues is covered by C-59.

However, where you're dealing with individual officer complaints or concerns about specific functions or situations, you will need a separate instrument. That's what we're drafting now, and we will present it as rapidly as we can. It's very much in progress.

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

In those two cases, the commissioner and SIRC have very extensive powers to know everything that those two agencies do, the CSE and CSIS. They have very well-established relationships where the agencies report to the review agencies. If the review agency wants any information, under the law they have complete access to all of that information. The problem is that they work in silos. SIRC can look at CSIS, and nothing else. The commissioner can look at CSE, and nothing else.

The new NSIRA, the national security and intelligence review agency created by Bill C-59, will be a comprehensive review agency with the legal authority to look at the security and intelligence operations of any agency or department of the Government of Canada.

Apart from the couple I've mentioned, there are at least 17 different departments and agencies of the Government of Canada that have some security or intelligence function—for example, CBSA, the Privy Council Office, the Department of National Defence, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Transport and so forth. NSIRA will be able to look at all of that, without limitation.

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

One thing that Bill C-59 does with respect to the threat reduction measures is to create a very clear procedural, as well as legal and constitutional, frame that will ensure more transparency and more accountability. Exactly how the powers can be used is laid out now more explicitly in legislation than ever before.

The one major criticism of the old Bill C-51 was that the way those powers were worded in the old law implied that you could somehow exercise those powers in violation of the charter. We have clarified in the law explicitly that it is not the case, and that indeed, if and when those powers are ever exercised, they must be exercised in a manner consistent with the charter, not in violation of the charter.