Bill C-233

An Act to amend the Export and Import Permits Act

This enactment amends the Export and Import Permits Act to more fully align it with the Arms Trade Treaty and to remove exemptions for specific countries by, among other things,
(a) clarifying that parts, components and technology necessary for the assembly or use of arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war are included in the meaning of those terms;
(b) preventing exemptions from the Export Control List for arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war based on their country of destination;
(c) preventing the issuance of general export permits for arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war;
(d) preventing the issuance of general brokering permits for arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war;
(e) enhancing the considerations that the Minister must take into account in issuing a permit to export or broker arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war;
(f) providing that the Minister must require end-use certificates from the government of a country to which arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war are being exported if doing so would sufficiently mitigate a substantial risk of war crimes or violations of international humanitarian law or international human rights law; and
(g) requiring the Minister to prepare and table in Parliament an annual report on the export of arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war and Canada’s compliance with the Arms Trade Treaty.

Export and Import Permits Act

[Jenny Kwan, NDP, Vancouver East, BC]

moved that Bill C-233, An Act to amend the Export and Import Permits Act, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my colleague, the member for Rosemont—La Petite-Patrie, for seconding this important bill.

It is with both a heavy heart and a deep sense of purpose that I rise in the House today to speak to Bill C-233, an act to amend the Export and Import Permits Act, or what many civil society organizations have been calling the no more loopholes act, legislation that seeks to finally bring Canada's arms export regime into full compliance with the Arms Trade Treaty.

The bill is about something far larger than policy or procedure. It is about whether we, as a nation, will choose to be builders of peace or merchants of war. It is about whether Canadian-made weapons, the products of our factories, our labour and our infrastructure, will continue to fuel the killing of innocent civilians abroad.

We cannot claim to be one thing on the world stage, a supporter of human rights, while turning a wilfully blind eye to what we are doing by maintaining this giant loophole. Canadians expect and deserve better.

Let me emphasize first and foremost that the legislation is not partisan. It should never be partisan. Every member of the House, regardless of political stripe, must ask themselves whether we want Canadian-made arms to be used to commit war crimes. Do we want our export laws to continue to contain loopholes so large that bombs and munitions slip through them? Do we want Canada's name to be associated with genocide and human suffering? The bill is our opportunity to say no, clearly, unequivocally and finally.

Canada acceded to the Arms Trade Treaty in 2019. The government did so with great fanfare, promising to uphold the highest standards of transparency, accountability and peace. Bill C-47 passed to amend the Export and Import Permits Act, establishing a new framework for arms brokering and export controls.

At the time, Canadians were told that our government was committed to ensuring that our weapons would never contribute to human rights abuses, that we were joining the world in saying never again to atrocities fuelled by the global arms trade. What we were not told, and what Canadians are now only beginning to understand, is that the 2019 amendments left open a gaping loophole, a loophole that has since become a giant and open back door for weapons, components and explosives to flow freely from Canada to the United States and then onward to some of the most brutal conflicts in the world.

The U.S. loophole is indeed the heart of the problem. Canada never adopted article 4, which required Canada to treat weapons, parts and components with the same scrutiny as full weapons systems. Canada also left out article 6, which clearly prohibits arms transfers where there is a serious risk that they will be used in genocide or war crimes. By omitting these articles, it means that, under section 7 of the Export and Import Permits Act, the lion's share of exports to the United States are exempt from the permit reporting and human rights risk assessment requirements that apply to every other country.

That means that Canadian-made weapons, explosives and parts can cross into the United States completely unmonitored, with no transparency and no public record. Once they arrive in the U.S., those components are often integrated into larger weapons systems, F-35 fighter jets, Apache helicopters and heavy munitions, and then exported to countries such as Israel, Saudi Arabia and Sudan, where they have been used to devastate civilian populations.

In fact, in 2009, under the Harper administration, General Dynamics Land Systems, a Canadian company, provided 724 light armoured vehicles to Saudi Arabia. These light armoured vehicles were seen being used in Saudi Arabia's operations in Yemen for years, where hundreds of thousands of Yemenis were killed.

In 2014, under another contract, Canada supplied a newer make of armoured vehicles to Saudi Arabia. In 2015, that continued under the Trudeau administration. This is not speculation; this is not hyperbole. This is fact, documented in commercial export data, defence contracts and investigative journalism.

A recent report by Arms Embargo Now uncovered that hundreds of shipments of Canadian military goods are directly contributing to atrocities abroad. Between April 2004 and August 2025 alone, 34 shipments of Canadian-made aircraft components went to Lockheed Martin in the United States. Later, those same components were transferred to the Israeli Ministry of Defense and Israeli weapons manufacturers. Another 360 shipments of Canadian aircraft parts went to the F-35 assembly facility in Fort Worth, Texas. These are the same F-35s that have been dropping bombs on Gaza. Meanwhile, 150 shipments of explosives from Quebec went to U.S. ammunition plants, producing 2,000 pounds of bombs and artillery shells exported to Israel.

This is not indirect complicity. This is active participation in a deadly supply chain. Let us be clear about what that means. When Canadian-made components end up in weapons that kill civilians in Gaza, when our explosives are part of the bombs that are dropped on hospitals and apartment buildings, Canadians bear responsibility. When weapons bearing the logo of a Canadian arms manufacturer have been documented in the hands of paramilitary groups in Sudan, groups accused of massacring civilians and committing ethnic cleansing, Canada is complicit.

The United Nations and human rights observers have warned repeatedly that the flow of arms, including those traced back to Canada, has fuelled one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. We cannot continue to hide behind bureaucratic language or the convenient fiction that what leaves Canada for the United States stays in the U.S. It does not, and we all know it.

The government has tried to reassure Canadians. The former foreign affairs minister said that no Canadian “arms or parts of arms” were sent to Gaza. Her successor, the current foreign affairs minister, said that Canada would “not allow Canadian-made weapons to fuel this conflict in any way”. Those words ring hollow when confronted with the evidence.

The government has done nothing to close the U.S. loophole, nothing to stop the use of Canadian-made weapons or components in the bombardment of Gaza, nothing to ensure compliance with the Arms Trade Treaty. By exempting U.S.-bound exports from oversight, Canada is violating not just the spirit but the letter of the Arms Trade Treaty. Article 5 of the treaty requires all state parties to regulate arms transfers in a consistent, objective and non-discriminatory manner. Article 6 prohibits transfers that would contribute to genocide, crimes against humanity or serious violations of the Geneva Conventions. Article 7 requires each state to assess the risk of exported weapons being used to commit such acts.

When the government issued general export permit no. 47 in 2019, allowing the full export of full-system conventional arms to the U.S. without permits or risk assessments, it undermined the very treaty we acceded to. That was why we need to pass Bill C-233, to end such blanket exemptions, so that Canada can finally live up to the promises we made to the world and to ourselves.

Bill C-233, the “no more loopholes act”, will close the U.S. export loophole requiring permits and human rights assessments for all military goods, regardless of destination; end the issuance of general export of brokering permits that bypass case-by-case review; ensure full transparency and public reporting of all military exports, including those to the U.S.; and reinforce Canada's compliance with the Arms Trade Treaty and restore integrity to our export regime.

A few weeks ago, I received a leaked document of the Liberals' talking points to counter my private member's bill. The Liberals say that Bill C-233 is misguided. They say this bill would decimate Canada's defence industry, that it would create unnecessary delays and potentially block Canada-made materials and equipment from getting to our allies in Europe like Ukraine, and that it would weaken Canada's role in NATO. Let me address each one of these points head-on.

First, living up to Canada's commitments to the Arms Trade Treaty is not misguided. It demonstrates the integrity and trustworthiness of a nation.

Second, the bill would not decimate the defence industry. It would simply require that all exports, including those going to the United States, meet the same human rights and risk assessment standards that we already apply to every other destination. If a country is already compliant with the Arms Trade Treaty, it has nothing to worry about. Canada's defence system will not be put in jeopardy, as Canada is reliant on imports of military goods going to Canada, not exports.

Third, this bill would not disrupt NATO or delay aid to Ukraine. Not only is there no evidence that it would delay or potentially block Canada's military aid to Ukraine, but the vast majority of the aid to Ukraine is sent either directly to Ukraine or to European allies. This bill seeks to standardize the regulatory process for arms exports going to the U.S. In addition, transfers of military aid, including for Ukraine, are handled by the Department of National Defence, not the export permitting process overseen by Global Affairs.

Fourth, harmonizing export controls with our European allies strengthens, not weakens, NATO. Of the 32 NATO members, 30 are state parties to the Arms Trade Treaty. The two states that are signatories to the Arms Trade Treaty but have not acceded to the treaty, are Turkey and the U.S. Passing Bill C-233 would, in fact, bring Canada into alignment with the vast majority of our allies, not out of step with them.

Some have bizarrely claimed that more transparency would compromise our sovereignty. Transparency is not a threat to sovereignty; it is its foundation. A sovereign nation should be able to stand before the world and say with confidence that its weapons are not being used to kill innocent civilians. This is not weakness; this is actually strength.

While I acknowledge that Canada's defence industry contributes to our economy, that economic benefit cannot come at the expense of human lives. Our message to the defence industry is clear: If exports are compliant with international law, business can continue; if exports risk enabling war crimes, then they must stop. We cannot and must not build prosperity on the backs of human suffering.

This is ultimately a test of our integrity, particularly at a time when there will be unprecedented defence spending with a commitment of $81.8 billion in budget 2025, far exceeding the 2% NATO commitment the Prime Minister made during the campaign. We cannot continue to call for peace while profiting from war crimes, and we cannot condemn atrocities abroad while quietly enabling them through our exports.

Canada once led the world in peacekeeping. We once stood proudly as a voice of conscience on the global stage. However, today, our moral standing is being eroded, not by what we say but by what we permit. As we debate this bill, the bombs are still falling on Gaza. Families are still being buried beneath rubble. Children are dying in hospitals that are running out of fuel and medicine. Somewhere in the chain of destruction, there are Canadian-made parts, like propellants and circuitry, that help make these weapons possible. That must end.

History will judge us not by how we defended industries or alliances, but by whether we defended humanity. Bill C-233 is about closing the loopholes, yes, but it is also about opening our eyes. It is about aligning our laws with our values, our words, our deeds, our actions and our conscience, with no more exceptions, no more excuses and no more Canadian complicity in war crimes.

To my colleagues in this House, if we truly believe in human rights, in the rule of law and in peace, then we must support this bill. When the crime is the killing of innocent civilians, there can be no loopholes, no silence, no culture of impunity, no looking away, no wilful ignorance and no moral blindness.

Canadians will be watching how each member votes, and it will be recorded in Hansard forever. They want Canada to be a force for peace. It is time for us to live up to that promise.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for contributing to the debate by raising these points. I am going to talk about this later, because I will be giving a speech on the topic, so I will not delve into it too deeply right now.

However, let us consider a hypothetical scenario, because I want to make sure I understand all the details. Daesh, in Iraq and Syria, has often stored arms or ammunition in hospitals, schools and mosques on the assumption that the Global Coalition Against Daesh would not dare attack such places. I want to make sure I understand correctly.

If the coalition were to attack such locations, which are in fact places where terrorists store arms, would export permits necessarily be suspended?

Could Canada continue to export to such countries?

[Jenny Kwan, NDP, Vancouver East, BC]

Mr. Speaker, with Canada's current commitment, the export of arms and weaponry to every other country has to go through a permitting process. That has to be measured against risk assessments and the standards outlined in the Arms Trade Treaty, except for the United States. The vast majority of the weaponry that goes to the United States does not require a permitting process. This is what we are talking about. We need to close the loophole to ensure that weaponry, parts and components that go through to the United States are measured against the Arms Trade Treaty, and that the standard applied to every other country applies to U.S. exports as well. In that way, we can be—

[The Assistant Deputy Speaker, John Nater]

We have to allow time for other questions.

Questions and comments, the hon. member for Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I am disappointed with this private member's bill. Essentially, what the member is trying to do is chase the defence industry right out of Canada and into the hands of Donald Trump.

Right now, the defence industry employs thousands of people right across this country. She talked about Saudi Arabia and the LAVs that are being built in London, Ontario, a riding that used to be held by an NDP member, Lindsay Mathyssen. Of course, she is no longer here because of the NDP's lack of support for the labour sector. As we know, creating these thousands of jobs and having these companies here actually support Canada's sovereign capabilities to build weapons for ourselves. Those industries are not sustainable with just Canadian orders.

Why is she chasing jobs out of Canada and into the arms of Donald Trump?

[Jenny Kwan, NDP, Vancouver East, BC]

Mr. Speaker, the Canadian government continues to argue that Canada is not violating the Arms Trade Treaty. If that is the case, manufacturers here in Canada have nothing to worry about. All I am saying is that we need to make sure when we export to the United States that exports meet Arms Trade Treaty requirements so that we do not contribute our weaponry, parts and components to atrocities and to committing genocide and crimes against humanity. I do not think Canadians want blood on their hands, and that is what the bill would mean. If companies do not violate the act, there is nothing they need to worry about. It would not impact them at all.

[Alexandre Boulerice, NDP, Rosemont—La Petite-Patrie, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I congratulate my colleague from Vancouver East on this extremely important initiative.

Canada is also a signatory to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Because of the American loophole, which allows weapons to be sold to the United States and then end up in Israel, Canada could be complicit in genocide—

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I rise on a point of order.

I apologize for interrupting the hon. member. Some people seem to think they are in their living rooms right now, and it is very unpleasant.

[The Assistant Deputy Speaker, John Nater]

Of course.

I will ask the hon. member for Rosemont—La Petite-Patrie to start over and ask his question again.

[Alexandre Boulerice, NDP, Rosemont—La Petite-Patrie, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I congratulate my colleague from Vancouver East on this important bill.

Canada is also a signatory to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. With the American loophole, which allows Canadian weapons to flow through the United States and then to be sold to the Netanyahu regime, does my colleague not think that Canada and the Liberal government could find themselves in a situation where they could be accused of being complicit in genocide?

[Jenny Kwan, NDP, Vancouver East, BC]

Mr. Speaker, that is exactly the point. We want Canadians to feel proud, and we want the Canadian government to take action so we can proudly stand on the international stage and say that Canada is not complicit, because as it stands right now, we are. Our arms, our components and our weaponry are ending up in some of the most brutal conflicts in this world, which are killing civilians using Canadian-made arms. That is wrong and has to stop.

I urge all members of the House to support Bill C-233.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs]

Mr. Speaker, I want to begin by commending the member for Vancouver East for her ongoing and very steadfast commitment to strengthening oversight and to bringing peace in our world. She has attempted to do that in the bill, and I believe that all members of the House agree that Canada must maintain a strong export control system to prevent the misuse of weapons anywhere and everywhere.

Right now, global security matters more than ever, and Canada must act with clarity and resolve. The decisions we make today in the House will shape not only our sovereignty but also the safety of Canadians and of our allies around the world. Accountability does matter, but Bill C-233 as it is drafted, while perhaps well-intentioned, would risk undermining Canada's security, international security, our defence industry and our international partnerships at a critical moment.

Indeed, since the Second World War, Canada has strengthened our export controls for arms to the point where we are privileged to have one of the world's strongest, strictest and soundest regimes. For generations, countries have looked to Canada as a leader, as a peacekeeper and as one of the world's most steadfast promoters of the responsible use and sale of military equipment. Canada's voice matters.

Canadians are wanted and needed to promote peace, to make peace and to keep peace. That is why a Liberal government under then foreign minister Lester Pearson ensured that Canada was there to found the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces. It was a Liberal government that made sure Canada was a founding member of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies.

That is why the Liberal government ensured that Canada was one of the founding members of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies.

It was a Liberal government under then foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy that shepherded the Ottawa convention to ratification, banning the practice and use of landmines. A Liberal government then ratified the Arms Trade Treaty in 2019.

Canada's efforts do not go unnoticed. When looking to refine their export control systems, other countries have looked to our own as one of the strongest and most effective examples. I know it has been many years, but I would remind the member for Vancouver East of the debate while she was an MP in 2018, respecting Bill C-47 during the 42nd Parliament. Canada had a strong debate about that and put in standards that not only meet the Arms Trade Treaty requirements but exceed them.

We apply exemptions more narrowly than any other ATT signatory does. We control a wider range of items than the ATT requires. Not only do we place controls on conventional arms; we also control dual-use goods and nuclear, chemical, biological and missile technologies. We impose a stricter criterion for denials than those specified under the ATT, such as where there is a risk of contributing to gender-based violence, terrorism or organized crime, and we enforce those rules. We enforce controls on Canadians involved in the transfers of military goods, even if the goods never enter Canada. We have tabled annual reports to Parliament on the export of ATT items ever since the 1990s, long before the ATT's ratification.

In deciding whether to issue or not issue an export permit, the current law dictates that it be taken into consideration whether the proposed export would contribute to peace and security, or undermine it, and whether it could be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law. We are very serious when we take these matters into consideration, and we are vigilant on the enforcement of the law; those who breach it are held accountable.

Suggesting that Canada is not compliant with the ATT is not only misleading; Canadians also both need and deserve to hear the truth about it. We have a comprehensive legal framework, a legislative framework, that we in Parliament have contributed to and that now the Government of Canada enforces.

Thus, we can see that Bill C-233, while based on good intentions about keeping people safe, is actually based on false premises. Canada has one of the strongest military export control systems in the world, and considerations for human rights are at its very core.

Instead of strengthening Canada's ability to promote responsible use and sale of military goods, this well-intentioned but misguided piece of legislation has wide-reaching implications, and it would have unintended consequences. We are working to fulfill our NATO commitments. We want to bolster security and defence industries. We want to diversify trading partners, and this bill would put us out of step with our allies in licensing efficiency, transparency and the use of appropriate discretion.

We are a NATO country. We need to be part of NATO, and the security of NATO is something that Canadians depend on. That does mean, for us in the House today, that we need to keep our NATO obligations and build upon them. This legislation would undermine that.

The changes proposed in the bill would severely hinder our defence industry by creating further instability. It would weaken Canada's role in NATO by creating unnecessary delays and potentially blocking Canadian-made materials and equipment from getting to our allies to keep our world safe, allies like Ukraine, and it would jeopardize the capabilities of our Canadian Armed Forces by constraining the way they get the supply of critical equipment and impeding their operations in vital regions like the Arctic.

Under Canada's existing export control framework, Canada allows certain military items to be exported without permits, provided they are destined for specific countries. This flexibility is embedded in the systems of our closest allies, such as the U.K., the EU and Australia. We also have deep and symbolic relationships with other partners, such as the United States, and it is a party for which the ATT also provides certain exemptions. Canada already applies this discretion more narrowly than any of the other nations granting permit-free access to only one country.

Let me be perfectly clear. Any exemption that we provide the U.S. is not a loophole. It reflects a unique geopolitical relationship rooted in our shared security commitments, continental defence and decades of military integration. This legislation would undermine these efforts and make both of our countries less secure with greater threats to our sovereignty and our stability.

The bill's stringent permitting requirements would not only strain our relations with the United States and our co-operation, but also disrupt relationships around the world. Mandatory delays in approvals would place Canadian suppliers at competitive disadvantages in Europe and Oceania, while restrictive end-user requirements could hinder Canada's ability to support partners like Ukraine in a critical time.

Let me get to the heart of this. We are in a consequential moment for global security. We have had an election. Canadians have declared that our sovereignty and our security are paramount. We are serious. We call upon all parties in the House to take that consideration seriously to ensure that Canada can defend itself and can work with our NATO allies to defend ourselves in the world.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

Mr. Speaker, Bill C‑233, an act to amend the Export and Import Permits Act, was introduced by the member for Vancouver East. I would like to thank the hon. member for introducing this bill, as it allows us to highlight the role of the Export and Import Permits Act.

The bill would amend the Export and Import Permits Act, which governs Canada's defence and military exports, by removing exemptions for specific countries. Currently under the Export and Import Permits Act, the United States is exempt from its provisions, due to a ministerial order. This exemption allows the United States to re-export Canadian military exports without the Government of Canada's approval. The United States is the only country under the act that is currently granted this exemption.

The effect of the bill would be to bring the United States under the provisions of the Export and Import Permits Act by removing the power of the minister to grant exemptions such as the one that has been granted to the United States. This would result in an effective ban on Canadian defence exports to the United States if those exports were to be re-exported to another country on which Canada has implemented a defence export ban.

The bill would change the current legal framework by clarifying that parts, components and technology necessary for the assembly or use of arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war are included in the meaning of those terms. It would also change the legal framework by preventing exemptions to the export control list for arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war based on their country of destination.

The bill would change the legal framework by preventing the issuance of general export permits and general brokering permits for arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war; by expanding the list of considerations that the minister must take into account in issuing a permit to export or broker arms, implements, ammunition or munitions of war; and by providing that the minister must require end-use certificates from the government of a country to which these arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war are being exported if doing so would sufficiently mitigate a substantial risk of war crimes or violations of international humanitarian law or international human rights law.

Finally, the bill would change the current legal framework by requiring the minister to prepare and table in Parliament an annual report on the export of arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war and Canada's compliance with the Arms Trade Treaty.

The defence industrial sector in Canada in 2022 contributed $14.3 billion to our GDP, which is roughly 0.5% of Canada's GDP. This sector is expected to grow substantially as a result of the government's commitment to massively increase Canada's military spending. Half of the production of Canada's defence industrial sector is exported, much of it to the United States, and herein lies the problem with the bill.

This bill could create some conflict between Canada and the United States. For example, the United States could view the passage of this bill as a significant threat to its defence and security. I would like to highlight one such example.

The United States military describes the F-35 fighter jet as an indispensable tool and a cornerstone of their fighter fleet, both for homeland defence and for warfare. Some of the F-35 parts are manufactured in the United States, but other parts of the F-35 are manufactured in Canada, with the final assembly of the F-35 in the United States in Fort Worth, Texas.

I would like to enumerate some of the F-35 parts that are manufactured in Canada, which my colleague across the way has highlighted. The horizontal tail assemblies for the F-35 are manufactured in Winnipeg, Manitoba. The weapons bay door inserts are manufactured in Lunenburg, Nova Scotia. The engine sensors are manufactured in this city, the city of Ottawa in Ontario, and the outboard wing assemblies are manufactured in Delta, British Columbia.

One of the consequences of the bill is that it could result in a ban on F-35 parts manufactured in Canada being exported to the United States. It is not difficult to see how the United States would view this ban as a direct threat to their defence and security if Lockheed Martin's plant in Fort Worth, Texas, cannot complete the assembly of F-35 jets because of an inability of the company to import the necessary component parts from their plants in Canada.

Another consequence of the bill that I fear is a possible deintegration of the integrated North American defence industrial sector. Canada could see the exodus of thousands of good jobs from this country as defence industrial companies exit Canada to ensure access to the U.S. market. These are companies like L3 Harris Wescam in Hamilton, Ontario, which employs over 1,300 workers; Magellan Aerospace in Mississauga, Ontario, which employs over 600 workers; Honeywell, also in Mississauga, Ontario, which employs over 3,500 workers; General Dynamics Mission Systems—Canada in Ottawa, which employs over 1,000 workers; and Lockheed Martin Canada, which employs over 1,400 workers across multiple locations in Canada, such as Ottawa, Montreal, Calgary and Victoria.

For all these reasons, I do not support this bill.

I would again like to thank the member for Vancouver East for bringing the bill forward to allow this debate in the House to take place. However, again, for the reasons outlined, I do not support the bill.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

Mr. Speaker, tonight we are debating Bill C‑233, an act to amend the Export and Import Permits Act, introduced by the member for Vancouver East.

I will begin by outlining the main points. Bill C‑233 amends the Export and Import Permits Act to remove certain exemptions for the export of arms, ammunition and military or dual-use equipment.

The objectives of the bill are as follows:

(a) clarifying that parts, components and technology necessary for the assembly or use of arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war are included in the meaning of those terms; (b) preventing exemptions from the Export Control List for arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war based on their country of destination; (c) preventing the issuance of general export permits for arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war; (d) preventing the issuance of general brokering permits for arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war; (e) enhancing the considerations that the Minister must take into account in issuing a permit to export or broker arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war; (f) providing that the Minister must require end-use certificates from the government of a country to which arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war are being exported if doing so would sufficiently mitigate a substantial risk of war crimes or violations of international humanitarian law or international human rights law; and (g) requiring the Minister to prepare and table in Parliament an annual report on the export of arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war and Canada’s compliance with the Arms Trade Treaty.

Obviously, the example that comes to mind today is the brutal Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I know that there are other examples, but this is the one we are going to use to illustrate certain points during our discussion. Let us not forget that the NDP, which is introducing this bill, and the Bloc Québécois were among the first to demand an end to arms sales to Israel. We still support that. Neither the NDP nor the Bloc Québécois has been shy about denouncing the crimes being committed by the Netanyahu administration in Palestine, whether in the past, present or possibly in the future.

The idea underlying the bill we are discussing is this: Even if everyone agrees on the need to stop selling weapons to a country that would misuse them, whether in Gaza or elsewhere, nothing currently stops a country from selling arms to a third country. A country could buy weapons from Canada and then resell them to another country officially boycotted by Canada. The example closest to home would be if the United States were to buy weapons from Canada and then ship them to Israel, making it appear as though Canada had sent weapons to Israel itself.

I want to start by saying that we support the intentions of Bill C‑233. I also want to commend the member for Vancouver East on her constant efforts to promote world peace. This bill is a testament to her commitment to that. The bill is full of good intentions, but the Bloc Québécois has a number of concerns about some of its aspects.

Our first concern is that it is doubtful whether it will actually work, because the defence industries of the United States and Canada are extremely integrated. That is already quite a headache. Bill C‑233 amends the Export and Import Permits Act to add restrictions. It eliminates the exemptions that were provided for under the act.

In addition, the bill would require U.S. importers to produce a certificate stating that the weapons or ammunition would not be used to commit any crimes. The intention is entirely commendable, but the addition of such constraints and the lack of predictability in the government's decision mean that American companies will simply seek out other suppliers to reduce the risk that their imports will be blocked by the Canadian government. In short, to use the example given, the Americans would stop buying weapons from Canada but could continue to get them elsewhere and sell them to be used in Gaza anyway. We have no control over the choices the Americans make, and it is unrealistic to think that we have any kind of leverage over them.

Another problem with the bill is that the threshold for refusing an export is unclear. For example, the bill states that an export permit should be denied if there is a risk that a weapon could be used against civilians or civilian buildings. In that case, all exports to the United States would have to be halted, since there is always a risk—through negligence, through error or sometimes deliberately out of necessity, unfortunately—that civilians or buildings will be hit by a U.S. strike. Take the example of soldiers who disobey their rules of engagement and commit war crimes. The threshold set out in the bill is too vague, too arbitrary.

Here is what the bill says:

...where there is a substantial risk that they would be used to commit or facilitate genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians protected as such or other war crimes as defined by international agreements to which Canada is a party;

While the threshold of “genocide” for denying an export permit is clear, the threshold of “attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians protected as such” is vague.

Let me give an example. In Iraq and Syria, Daesh terrorists frequently used mosques, schools or hospitals to store weapons and ammunition. Their reasoning was simple. If the global coalition avoided strikes on such locations, the weapons and ammunition would be safe. Conversely, if the coalition were to strike those places, other international bodies would condemn the attacks, undermining public support for military intervention in coalition countries. However, if I understand the spirit of Bill C-233 correctly, striking locations like schools and hospitals would immediately force Canada to halt its exports to coalition countries.

The Bloc Québécois thinks it would be better to leave this up to the government's discretion. Not only would it improve predictability, but it would allow for the possibility of putting pressure on other countries. For example, rather than following rigid rules, we would be able to threaten to halt exports to a country during negotiations and compel it to comply more strictly with international law. That discretion could give us a bargaining tool.

In short, the Bloc Québécois has serious reservations about Bill C‑233, but we believe it is important to listen carefully to the two-hour debate on the issue. We will listen to all the arguments from all sides on this bill and then make a final decision on whether we should refer the bill to committee.

[Mona Fortier, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs]

Mr. Speaker, I want to begin by thanking the member for Vancouver East for introducing Bill C‑233, an act to amend the Export and Import Permits Act, as part of Private Members' Business.

I have heard many comments about this bill from people in my riding of Ottawa—Vanier—Gloucester. It is clear that Canadians are deeply concerned about our country's role in global security and the responsible export of military equipment. The debate surrounding this bill touches on core Canadian values: our commitment to democracy, human rights, responsible trade and our contribution to making the world a safer place. These are not abstract ideals, but the very foundations of our foreign policy.

No one here disagrees with this bill in principle. Canada must maintain strong export controls to prevent the misuse of weapons. However, Bill C-233 rests upon a false premise.

Canada has one of the world's strongest export control regimes in the world and has updated it over the years accordingly. That is why Canada joined the Arms Trade Treaty in 2019 and updated our laws to ensure full compliance through Bill C-47, a bill that many members, including the member for Vancouver East, should remember well.

Canada's export control system aims to limit the illicit arms trade by preventing weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists, criminals or groups that foment conflict, and to reduce human suffering around the world. Oversight is essential, but it must be balanced and practical. While Bill C‑233 means well, its overly broad scope would create obstacles for Canadian businesses, slow trade and limit Canada's ability to respond effectively to global challenges.

When we debated Bill C‑47, we discussed many of the measures in the bill before us today that concern exemptions. What was true then remains true today in terms of the need to include these measures in our system. In short, the proposals in Bill C‑233 would disrupt a balance that we are able to achieve through existing legislation, regulations and policies.

Let me explain further. The world is changing. Conflicts are evolving and new threats are emerging. Canada must stay agile and ready to respond.

Canada's export control regime was built to keep pace with this changing world. Our risk-managed framework provides the tools needed to act swiftly, doing so, for example, by adding items to the export control list to prevent sensitive technologies from being misused.

Decisions on export permits are taken carefully after a rigorous process that involves a range of experts from across government. This includes evaluating permit applications against the criteria drawn from the Arms Trade Treaty and embedded in Canadian law through the Export and Import Permits Act.

Our system is flexible, but that flexibility does not mean that we are cutting corners. We have a carefully designed risk management framework that balances our national security, international obligations and defence partnerships with the commercial ties that support economic growth in Canada. Our process is designed to take into account intelligence, diplomatic information and human rights considerations. We work closely with Canada's missions abroad, our allies and partners, to make informed decisions that reflect the realities on the ground.

As parliamentarians and Canadians are aware, Canada has suspended or revoked permits when credible evidence of misuse has emerged. Any violations of the Export and Import Permits Act are taken extremely seriously. Those who are found to have breached the law face consequences, including fines, seizures and criminal prosecutions. That is how we help to protect lives and uphold our values. We will always work to do so.

Bill C-233 would hinder our ability to continue with this risk-based approach in three significant ways.

First, Bill C-233 seeks to create a statutory definition of arms that could potentially include items that are not weapons at all, such as navigation systems, software and even basic mechanical parts. The bill's proposed definition could have Canada needlessly regulating thousands of products, from nuts and bolts to steel and aluminum. This would put Canada out of step with allies, whose focus is rightly on high-risk technologies and high-risk destinations. Further, this would overwhelm our export control system, require staggering increases in government resources, slow legitimate trade and hurt Canada's reputation and Canadian businesses, especially small and medium-sized manufacturers, which rely on predictable rules.

Second, this bill seeks to prescribe how export applications are assessed by adding new mandatory requirements for governments to certify the end use of items purchased by private companies in their countries. Not only does this go well beyond what is required by the Arms Trade Treaty, but it would be virtually impossible to implement. Most countries simply do not issue official end-use certificates to private entities. Canada would have neither the authority nor the influence to enforce this provision, and imposing it would only block legitimate exports, including potentially those destined for our allies in Ukraine.

What is more, Canada already conducts thorough end-use and destination risk assessments. End use is verified using a variety of reliable methods. These may include end-use certificates issued by a government when it imports items itself, or other assurances provided by reputable private parties for private exports.

Canada assesses destination countries based on factors such as the strength of their export control systems and the risk of diversion, consistent with how our allies operate. The proposed addition to our assessment criteria would not make the world a safer place. Rather, it would hurt Canadian businesses and their customers, including the Canadian Armed Forces and our NATO allies at a time when we need them most, and undermine Canada's role as a trusted partner.

Third, Bill C-233 would impose costs and burdens on ordinary Canadians. Like many of our allies, Canada uses expedited licensing in specific circumstances for lower-risk military and dual-use items to countries with similarly robust approaches to export controls. This is a standard international practice that enables defence trade to move quickly and securely without compromising oversight and the agility it requires in a rapidly divided world, at a time when we are trying to increase our defence capacity, not decrease it.

This bill would disrupt the balance we have worked so hard to achieve. It proposes restrictions that would increase costs for both the government and Canadian businesses, without improving the quality of decisions. This bill would end the current system that allows most military goods and technology to be exported to the United States without the need for individual permits, which would harm an important trade and defence relationship.

In fact, this bill goes beyond what it claims to do in this area. It would cancel all existing export permits, including long-standing general export and brokering permits. This means that Canadian companies, many of which have already undergone rigorous review, would be forced to start from scratch and re-apply for permits, affecting hard-working Canadian companies that already have very limited resources.

As a result, I wish to inform the House that we are unable to support this bill as it stands, but I think it is important to thank the member for Vancouver East for bringing it before the House.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Mr. Speaker, it is unfortunate that I will not have more time to discuss Bill C-233, the amendments being proposed by the NDP to the Export and Import Permits Act.

The intent is laudable in wanting to make sure that Canadian-made weapons and components are not being used in weapons by our adversaries, like terrorist organizations. Iran was using components in the Shahed drones that were bombing Israel, and they have been sold to Russia and are being used against the great people of Ukraine. We want to make sure that that does not happen and that we hold companies to account when they have sold components and weapons to other suppliers and they have ended up in the hands of our adversaries.

However, we know by what is being proposed in Bill C-233 that we would have an added layer of bureaucracy that would slow down the sale of parts, weapons, platforms and technology to our allies and partners. One thing that is going to happen with this bill is it would require that no country gets an exemption. Therefore, none of our NATO allies, none of our Five Eyes partners and none of our friends in the Middle East or Ukraine would be able to go to our suppliers and Canadian businesses to buy the parts and weapons systems they need to defend their sovereign territory. We want to make sure that does not interfere with the overall operations of our defence industry and our relationships with our allies.

I have to stress that, when we look at this, we have to remember, as Canadians, that our sovereignty is also threatened by this. Part of our sovereign capacity and capability is having a strong defence industry. When we have a defence industry that exports over $7 billion of the $9.6 billion it produces on an annual basis, and 63% of that goes to the United States, we have to protect that to ensure that those industries survive.

I will carry on this conversation the next time we rise on Bill C-233.

[The Assistant Deputy Speaker, John Nater]

I thank the hon. member. He will have about seven and a half minutes coming back to him the next time the House considers this matter.

The time provided for the consideration of Private Members' Business has now expired, and the order is dropped to the bottom of the order of precedence on the Order Paper.

The House resumed from November 19, 2025, consideration of the motion that Bill C-233, An Act to amend the Export and Import Permits Act, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I want to begin by acknowledging the sincere intention of my NDP colleague, the member for Vancouver East. Above all, bill C-233 is based on a completely valid concern, that of ensuring that Canadian exports do not contribute to human rights violations or armed conflicts. I think that everyone here in the House can agree on this fundamental objective of defending human rights and upholding international law.

That said, recognizing that legislation is well-intentioned does not necessarily mean that the proposed measures are the right ones. As I said, it is completely valid to ensure that the weapons, ammunition and military equipment produced in Canada, including dual-use equipment, are not used against civilians. The Bloc Québécois is concerned about the situation in Gaza, which is why we proposed several realistic measures that could help to improve it, including repeatedly calling for a complete moratorium on arms exports to Israel.

The Bloc Québécois has always been critical of arms export to countries that violate human rights, such as, for example, Saudi Arabia. We also strongly oppose the export of light armoured vehicles to that country, which is known for its systematic human rights violations. While the Bloc Québécois has never hesitated to denounce Benjamin Netanyahu's deadly policies, the question is whether Bill C‑233 would have a real impact on the situation in Palestine or elsewhere in the world. The Bloc Québécois believes that it is preferable for the government to have some discretion, which promotes predictability and allows for pressure to be applied on rogue countries.

The Bloc Québécois recognizes the importance of better regulating military exports to avoid any complicity in human rights violations. However, we believe that the current wording of the bill is too rigid and too broad to achieve its objectives. As a result, we unfortunately cannot support it. Bill C‑233 primarily seeks to address a sobering international situation, but in our view, it adds overly restrictive conditions and limitations.

Although well-intentioned, Bill C‑233 raises a number of concerns. We are obviously aware that the situation with the United States is unique because of the agreement under which Canada is considered a domestic supplier. Indeed, under American law, since 1956, Canadian manufacturers have been considered domestic suppliers, allowing them to integrate the Pentagon's supply chain and to participate in research and development projects in America's defence apparatus.

In reality, it seems this bill would have two possible outcomes: Either the United States will stop procuring from Canada or it will simply not comply. Indeed, the United States could simply circumvent the restrictions in this bill. The idea that the United States would start asking for Canada's approval to ship small arms and light weapons is wishful thinking.

Since the tariff crisis began, it has become quite clear to us that we have little, if any, control over the decisions that are made by the United States. If Canada and Quebec stop supplying the United States, it will change suppliers, and Israel will still receive arms and munitions from the United States. Passing this bill would not even achieve its intended goal, and chances are that its greatest impact would be to weaken a number of our industries, which are already suffering from American tariffs, and I think everyone in this House wants to avoid that. As I said earlier, the intent of the bill is certainly more than respectable, but we feel that, in its present form, it would only yield mixed results. I believe that we should rather keep working at improving existing mechanisms in partnership with our allies and with all the relevant stakeholders.

The measure proposed under Bill C‑233 is also unenforceable because it stipulates that Canada should prevent arms and munitions exports if there is any risk of misuse. Let us face it: There is no such thing as zero risk. It is also a difficult term to define.

Indeed, while genocide is obviously enough to justify the denial of an export licence, the threshold of attacks directed against “civilian objects...protected as such” is rather vague. Moreover, I have serious doubts about Canada's ability to quickly obtain the information needed to make a decision without relying on in-depth investigations by recognized organizations that often have much better knowledge of the situation in the various war zones.

Thus, in our view, it would be best to leave government some discretion rather than opting for an approach that seems difficult to apply, like the one proposed under Bill C‑233. That does not mean, however, that we should abandon our commitment to a responsible approach that respects international human rights and is based on a balanced legislative framework. I would like to reiterate that we appreciate the intent of the bill. Unfortunately, however, we believe that passing this bill would miss the mark regarding military exports.

It should also be noted that Canada has one of the strictest arms export control systems in the world, particularly since its accession to the Arms Trade Treaty. That framework already imposes on the government a duty to assess the risks associated with military exports, including the possibility that the equipment may be used to commit serious violations of international humanitarian law. I acknowledge that it is far from perfect, but in our attempt to close certain perceived loopholes, I fear that we may complicate a system that is already governed by rigorous control mechanisms.

I believe we have a collective responsibility to find the right balance between coercion, protecting human rights and honouring international commitments. For these reasons, while we sincerely commend the dedication of the member for Vancouver East, we cannot support Bill C‑233 in its current form. That is why we will not support it as written by the New Democratic Party at this time. Again, this does not mean that we do not commend the member for Vancouver East's objective.

[Salma Zahid, Liberal, Scarborough Centre—Don Valley East, ON]

Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of Bill C-233, the no more loopholes act. Introduced by my colleague the hon. member for Vancouver East, the bill seeks to amend the Export and Import Permits Act to close dangerous loopholes in Canada's arms export regime, loopholes that leave us complicit in human rights abuses abroad.

At its core, the bill is about consistency, accountability and conscience. It is about ensuring that Canada lives up to its international obligations and that our industries act responsibly within the global defence trade. The bill is not anti-industry, and it is not anti Canada's defence sector, but it is anti complicity in violence against civilians. It is pro human rights, pro social justice and pro principled global leadership.

Let us be clear that Canada already has strong export controls intended to prevent military exports from contributing to human rights abuses or violations of international humanitarian law. Under the Export and Import Permits Act, exporters are generally required to obtain a permit after a risk assessment. If a substantial risk exists that an export could contribute to human rights violations, the export must be refused, but there is a loophole and a large one, which is that Canada's current system exempts most exports destined for the United States from meaningful permit requirements.

Because of this, hundreds of Canadian-made military components, ammunition, aircraft parts and explosive materials cross the border with no individual risk assessment, no transparency and no public reporting. Once in the U.S., these Canadian components can be, and have been, incorporated into weapons systems used in conflicts where civilians have been killed or injured. Independent reports have traced Canadian-origin components into U.S. facilities and then onward to militaries engaged in hostilities with documented civilian harm, notably in the Middle East. The so-called U.S. loophole thus enables a pipeline by which Canadian arms can travel into contexts that we as Canadians would never knowingly support.

This is not political theatre; it is a documented reality. Canada is a signatory to the Arms Trade Treaty, which prohibits exports of conventional arms if there is a substantial risk that they will be used to commit serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law, yet our regulatory framework, with its blanket exemption for U.S.-bound shipments, is out of step not only with Canada's international obligations but also with global standards. We have legal obligations under international law, not just of intent, but of due diligence, risk assessment, end-use monitoring and transparency. Without these safeguards, the very values we espouse, such as human dignity, the protection of civilians and international justice, are hollow.

Let us be honest. We should not profit from war, repression or attacks on civilians anywhere in the world. Whether the suffering is in Gaza, Yemen or elsewhere, it matters. Human rights are not situational, and they should least of all be overridden by an arbitrary geographic exemption. Opponents of Bill C-233 have claimed that closing the loopholes would decimate Canada's defence industry or jeopardize our economic relationships. I reject that framing. Bill C-233 would not impede production, innovation or legitimate defence trade. It would simply ensure that Canadian goods destined for the United States receive the same due diligence of permit requirements, risk assessments and reporting as goods going to other destinations.

Industry thrives on predictability, trust and a reputation of integrity. Strengthening our export controls and aligning them with international partners would enhance confidence in Canadian products. Many of our allies already apply similar controls to U.S.-bound exports. Canada's current practices are the outer, not the global, norm. Jobs are not at risk here. What is at stake is our moral authority and Canada's global brand as a principled exporter. There is room in this Parliament to simultaneously support both Canadian industry and human rights, and this bill strikes that balance.

Let me bring this principle closer to home. Recently, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement awarded a contract to a Canadian firm to buy 20 armoured tactical vehicles built to withstand bullets and blast effects, and there was no robust Canadian oversight of their end use.

This is more than an abstract trade detail. ICE is not a combat military force. It is a law enforcement agency with a documented history of enforcement practices that harm civilians, including migrants and vulnerable communities. These armoured vehicle have been deployed in ways that raise serious human rights questions, yet under our current framework, these sales can proceed with minimum transparency or human rights scrutiny.

This example illustrates the broader point that Canadian products should not be exported in ways that contribute to violence, repression or human rights abuses, whether abroad or within communities in North America. We are a country that has historically championed refugee protections, human dignity and equitable justice. That legacy is undermined when our goods are put to harm in contexts that we ourselves would reject.

I want to underscore an important point about context. The political, economic and security environment in which Canada's arms export regime was first structured has shifted dramatically. As the Prime Minister has noted, “The old relationship we had with the U.S. based on deepening integration of our economies and tight security and military co-operation is over.”

In other words, the assumption that we can treat U.S.-bound military exports differently from all other reflects a bygone era, an era that predates the protectionist trade actions and broader geopolitical shifts under the current U.S. administration. This raises a vital question: Is the America of today the same America that justified this exemption? If it is not, then surely Canada should not anchor its export control policy on absolute premises.

Closing this loophole would strengthen Canadian sovereignty and align our foreign policy instruments with contemporary realities. Bill C-233 would help ensure that Canadian exports, including those that could find their way into law enforcement operations abroad, are subject to meaningful human rights, due diligence and end-use monitoring.

Another core strength of this bill is its commitment to transparency. Right now, data on U.S.-bound military exports are not publicly reported and are tracked only when permits are required, leaving large swaths of the Canadian arms trade opaque. There is no public record of end-users or risk assessments for most of the U.S.-bound exports.

Bill C-233 would require elimination of country-based exemptions and ensure meaningful risk assessments on all exports, end-use certificates to prevent diversion to human rights abuses and increased parliamentary reporting on Canada's compliance with the Arms Trade Treaty. These are not radical reforms; they are responsible governance. They are reforms that would enhance public trust and ensure that Parliament has oversight over how Canadian goods are used around the world.

In supporting this bill, we are affirming that Canada will not consign its moral compass to convenient legal loopholes. We are saying that human rights matter more than trade loopholes, that social justice matters more than export exemptions and that Canadian industry can and should flourish without being implicated in violence against innocent civilians.

We are also strengthening Canada's credibility on the global stage, particularly among other nations that have already implemented similar safeguards and view human rights compliance as integral to defence trade. This is not about isolationism. It is about principled engagement. It is about making sure that when Canada says never again, we mean it, not just in rhetoric, but in law.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Madam Speaker, today we are considering a bill that would amend the Export and Import Permits Act, which governs Canada's defence exports. If passed, this bill would see the removal of allowing exemptions for specific countries.

The bill would change the current legal framework by:

(a) clarifying that parts, components and technology necessary for the assembly or use of arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war are included in the meaning of those terms;

(b) preventing exemptions from the Export Control List for arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war based on their country of destination;

(c) preventing the issuance of general export permits for arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war;

(d) preventing the issuance of general brokering permits for arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war;

(e) enhancing the considerations that the Minister must take into account in issuing a permit to export or broker arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war;

(f) providing that the Minister must require end-use certificates from the government of a country to which arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war are being exported if doing so would sufficiently mitigate a substantial risk of war crimes or violations of international humanitarian law or international human rights law; and

(g) requiring the Minister to prepare and table in Parliament an annual report on the export of arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war and Canada’s compliance with the Arms Trade Treaty.

I wish we lived in a world where there was no war, where there was no need for military or the weapons to arm them. I grew up in a nation at war. It was a bloody 15-year battle from which the country of my birth has not fully recovered, even with the passage of decades.

We now live in a world at war. Bombs are falling in Iran and Ukraine. Conflicts are going on in Yemen, Sudan and Gaza. There are other smaller conflicts around the globe, ones that rarely get noticed. If there were no weapons, maybe those conflicts would not happen, or maybe people would still kill each other with sticks and stones. If those were not available, they could use their bare hands.

Since the Suez crisis in 1950, Canadians have thought of ourselves as peacekeepers. We see ourselves as standing between those in conflict, keeping warring armies apart. We hope that our presence will allow time for a cessation of hostilities. Our desire is to create a buffer zone that can lead to talking instead of fighting. With this in mind, with that image of Canada as a peacekeeper, we do not see ourselves as manufacturers or importers of weaponry. The truth, though, is that we have a thriving defence industry.

The defence industrial sector in Canada was worth about $14.3 billion in 2022, roughly one half of 1% of the GDP. As members can imagine, a lot of that involves supplying the United States with Canadian technology and expertise.

We live in an ever-changing world where, sadly, hostilities seem to be on the increase. It would be foolish to not examine how we can better defend ourselves from outside threats.

Defence is a primary responsibility of national government. We need to support our defence industry, which provides the means to keep all Canadians safe. Canada's defence industry is tightly integrated with the U.S. defence industrial sector. That makes sense. Our militaries have been working together for years. Our soldiers have fought and died together in the First World War, the Second World War, Korea and Afghanistan. Our troops have served together in countless UN and NATO missions. We are partners in NORAD and numerous training exercises.

With the government's commitment to increase defence spending, significant growth is expected. It is only to be expected that with that growth, our relationship with the United States will continue to be important. That is something important to consider. What would be the ramifications of the passage of this bill on the Canadian industry, Canadian jobs and our country's relationships with our closest ally, the United States?

It is popular in some segments of society to maintain that the relationship between the United States and Canada is at some point irreparably broken. Some people are willing to cast aside more than two centuries of friendship and partnership because they do not like what they hear coming from Washington. I would suggest that this is short-sighted. Canada and the United States have far more binding us together as peoples and as nations than things that divide us. Our common, undefended border is a tribute to the closeness we have.

At the present time, the United States is the only country subject to exemptions under the Export and Import Permits Act. The bill would bring the U.S. under the provisions of that act by removing the current exemption. This would result in a ban on Canadian defence exports to the U.S. if those exports are re-exported to another country on which Canada has implemented a defence export ban. In essence, the bill is an attempt to impose Canadian foreign policy on our closest ally, with those working for our defence industry paying the price.

Certainly, if Bill C-233 becomes law, it would create problems in the Canada-U.S. relationship. How could the U.S. not see this as a significant threat to its defence and security sector? Why would we want to put Canadian jobs in jeopardy? Why would we want to tell the Americans that we are a less than trustworthy defence partner?

While the Liberal government may be vacillating on the number of new F-35 fighter jets it will ultimately purchase, we are committed to purchasing some, spending millions of dollars. The decision to select the F-35 comes with benefits for Canadian industry and Canadian workers, as some of the components of the plane are being manufactured here. What do we tell the workers in Winnipeg making horizontal tail assemblies, who could lose their jobs if the bill passes, or workers making weapons bay door inserts in Lunenburg? The F-35’s engine sensors are made in Ottawa, while outboard wing assembly is being done in Delta. Will those jobs remain in those communities if Canada shows itself to be an unreliable partner?

It seems to me that the bill is not about arms exports so much as it is about bringing an end to an enduring partnership that has benefited Canada. To do that does not make sense to me. It is important that the House send a clear message that this piece of legislation is not acceptable. I encourage all hon. members to vote no.

[Karim Bardeesy, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Industry]

Madam Speaker, Canadians have not seen this level of global chaos and instability since the Second World War, with a level of death and suffering due to the conflicts in the Middle East, Ukraine and Sudan that is staggering and horrifying. Right now, civilians in a dozen countries in the Middle East are facing daily air attacks from drones and missiles. Every member of the House has a duty to join with their colleagues to encourage the protection of civilians in these conflicts.

In that spirit, I want to salute the member for Vancouver East for her concern not only in these conflicts but more generally for those who fight for justice and protecting the most vulnerable.

When I read the bill, Hansard from the fall debate on the bill, correspondence from my constituents on this matter, and the outside research and advocacy on it, both for and against, I hear a real concern about the proliferation of weapons of war, especially those that are used against civilians. I share the concern, especially when those weapons are used by leaders from countries to which we are closely allied.

While there are few good ideas in the bill, it is so broad in scope that it would fundamentally damage a regime that is already functioning at a high level to honour Canadian values, a regime that we strengthened when we signed the Arms Trade Treaty and passed further legislation to go further than the treaty.

The bill would limit and even damage Canada's ability to confront the many defence challenges facing us and our allies. It would limit Canadian sovereignty at a time of great conflict, while playing no meaningful difference on the conflicts that are of such justifiable concern to those who support the bill.

First I want to acknowledge one source of the bill: the horrifying war on civilians in Gaza perpetuated by the Israeli war cabinet. It is a war that was started by Hamas, killing and kidnapping almost 2,000 innocent Israeli civilians, who still need their own justice, but a war that has resulted in a disproportionate response by the current Israeli government and its military: a prolonged attack on a vulnerable and defenceless population, in which access to aid and food was itself weaponized.

Both Hamas and members of the Israeli war cabinet have been very clear that they do not just dehumanize the other side but that they also want to wipe it out. Some members of the Israeli war cabinet clearly intend to go further, with the widespread and illegal expansion of settlement activity in the West Bank. The question is how to slow or stop it and how to get justice. After all, these leaders have used not just weapons and bullets but also starvation, torture, arbitrary collective punishment, denying of aid and preventing civilians from leaving the war zone. The killing continues on occasion, even after the ceasefire agreement last year.

At least 75,000 people, most of them civilians, have met violent deaths in Gaza. On top of the deaths on and since October 20, 2023, an additional approximately 2,000 Israel Defense Forces soldiers have also been killed in action. The indictments of members of the Israeli war cabinet at the International Criminal Court on charges of criminal conduct in this war are richly deserved, and it is my hope that they and the surviving Hamas leaders will be held accountable for their actions. We need justice for the victims.

Canada cannot stop this war alone nor stop the killing alone. A well-intentioned vote for the bill may feel good. It may even feel right, but it would weaken our sovereignty without changing the facts on the ground in that war, and it would not prioritize what has the best chance of affecting the facts on the ground.

Our caucus and our government have been acting to affect the facts on the ground. When it became clear that Canadian-made lethal munitions were potentially finding their way into the armouries of the Israel Defense Forces for use in Gaza, our government took action to stop this with an arms embargo. No lethal weapons or ammunition exports to Israel have been permitted since January 2024. This is a sign that our regime, our current legislation and our participation in the Arms Trade Treaty are working.

We have been playing a key role in opening access to aid, including $300 million in humanitarian aid. We also know that a two-state solution with a reformed democratic Palestinian Authority guaranteeing the security of Israel is the only path out of this long, deadly struggle, and our government intends to push for this result at every chance.

I am under no illusions; this solution has been put at risk by both the Hamas terrorist attacks on October 7 and Israel's attack on Gaza civilians in reprisal, but, and more importantly, we recognized the State of Palestine last September, joining other leading democracies in that recognition. We can draw a direct line between that recognition and the ultimate ceasefire, a ceasefire that, while by no means perfect, has at least slowed the killing.

As we know, arms exports can sometimes evade restrictions, and there are tools available to the federal government in the current regime to help curb this. As I said to my community in July, if Canadian weapons are being used in this war despite our embargo, then our arms embargo needs to be strengthened in a targeted way. In particular, the provision in the bill under clause 6 that would require an end-use certificate in certain cases, as recommended by the minister of foreign affairs, could be a valuable addition to our regime. We can also do more to sanction, and to seek justice for the victims using the International Court of Justice process and ensuring that it does its work in a timely fashion, and considering extending sanctions to more people who are responsible for war crimes.

However, the bill is mainly about something else. It is about curbing arms exports to the United States. Canada already has robust arms export restrictions under the Export and Import Permits Act and the Arms Trade Treaty. The examples of loopholes that my colleague, the member for Vancouver East, mentioned in the previous debate were mostly before Canada's accession to the ATT and before Bill C-47 of the 42nd Parliament.

Indeed, our regime is stronger than the ATT, with its focus on weapons used against women and children, yet this war and other wars have killed many civilian women and children. Does that mean there is a loophole? It is a tragedy, yes, but it is not due to a loophole in Canadian law.

At its heart, the bill seeks to end legitimate trade and deny export permits with a single country, the United States. That would not be closing a loophole; that would be blowing up a critical defence and trade relationship with a NATO ally. If that were to happen, tens of thousands of Canadian jobs in the defence industry would be put at risk, our defence industry's access to North American supply chains to provide critical material to international allies would abruptly end and Canada would be frozen out of other trade partnerships in retaliation. Instead of working with our allies, we would be turning our back on them.

Every single one of these impacts would lead to a body blow to our sovereignty and our economy, further isolating us from our allies in North America and Europe at a time when, for the first time in living memory, Canada faces actual threats to its own territorial and economic sovereignty. In this moment, we need to build up Canadian sovereignty, not give it up.

Our allies in NATO and Europe are facing actual threats to their mere existence, especially in Ukraine. Ukraine's struggle for freedom from its Russian invaders is our struggle. In my riding of Taiaiako'n—Parkdale—High Park, we have a large and vibrant Ukrainian community whose friends and relatives back home have been living a nightmare since the 2022 invasion. Canadian firms work with those in other countries, including the United States, to fill production orders for items such as artillery rounds for the Ukrainian armed forces. The bill would disrupt such cross-border supply efforts that Ukraine relies on for its survival.

If Ukraine falls, it would lead to a catastrophic security crisis in eastern Europe, including the possibility of a wider war that could end up on Canada's doorstep in the Arctic and would bring grievous concern to millions of Canadians. The legislation would undermine these efforts and make both our countries less secure, with greater threats to our sovereignty and stability.

I want to stress that I am deeply concerned that weapons of war from Canada and around the world can and do end up in the hands of fighters who use them against civilians. It is a problem that can be solved only by adherence to the Arms Trade Treaty, legislation such as our current legislation, and further international co-operation and engagement.

The Prime Minister recently spoke eloquently at the World Economic Forum about how middle powers such as Canada need to stand together to hold the large powers accountable. Arms proliferation is one area where Canada's moral authority has already led to effective multilateral action to prevent lethal weapons from targeting civilians. In 1997, the Ottawa Treaty was implemented to prohibit the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines, which largely maimed and killed civilians over the 20th century. Over 160 states signed that treaty. The result has been astonishing, with over 48 million stockpiled land mines designed to kill humans having been destroyed.

We can, in this new order, work anew to stop impunity and to use the existing regime to curb the shipments of arms through enforcing the current legislation and working with our allies to establish new international rules to hold countries accountable for their actions. In doing this, we honour civilians, Canadian sovereignty and Canadian values.

[Tamara Kronis, Conservative, Nanaimo—Ladysmith, BC]

Madam Speaker, I rise today to speak to Bill C-233, an act to amend the Export and Import Permits Act. In presenting this bill, my hon. colleague from Vancouver East has argued that Canada must ensure that our domestic laws live up to our commitments under the Arms Trade Treaty, or ATT. She has raised serious concerns that are worthy of thoughtful consideration. Indeed, I believe all members of the House share the fundamental goals behind Bill C-233: making sure that Canada acts responsibly on the global stage, ensuring that our exports reflect Canadian values and aligning our policies with both international law and humanitarian principles. The question before us today, therefore, is not whether those goals are worthwhile, because they clearly are, but whether Bill C-233, as drafted, is the best way to achieve them.

I have followed the debate on this bill closely and want to thank colleagues from all parties for their contributions to the legislative record. Their remarks have been well researched, and their arguments have shaped my own position on the bill, which does not actually target any particular country or conflict but seeks to constrain Canadian policy and practice across the board. Because of that breadth, it is crucial for us to think carefully and practically about the impact that passing this bill would have on our sovereignty, our security and our global relationships, and we must be vigilant about avoiding unintended consequences, because the new world order the Prime Minister is fond of speaking of is a complex and dangerous place. Getting that balance right matters if Canada is going to realize its potential as a leading middle power, especially in the context of our geographic location, our obligations to NATO and our other allies, and our international commitments.

When determining whether Canada's export approach should change, as proposed by Bill C-233, we must first examine and evaluate the strength of Canada's existing export control regime. In my preparation and research for these remarks, I was pleased to learn that Canada already has one of the most stringent systems in the world for regulating the export of military goods and technology and that our standards not only meet those set out in the ATT but in many respects exceed them.

In his detailed speech explaining why the Liberal government will not be supporting this bill, the parliamentary secretary for foreign affairs explained that Canada's export control system already places human rights considerations at its very core and that Canada has gone above and beyond the requirements of the Arms Trade Treaty. Canada already applies exemptions more narrowly than any other ATT signatory. We control a wider range of items than the treaty requires, including dual-use goods and nuclear, chemical, biological and missile technologies. Canada imposes stricter denial criteria than those specified under the ATT, including risks of contributing to transnational violence, terrorism and organized crime. Canada also already has and enforces strict controls on Canadians involved in transfers of military goods abroad, even when those goods never actually enter Canada.

There is a measure of transparency already in place, in the sense that the government has been tabling annual reports to Parliament on exports governed by the ATT since the 1990s, even before the treaty was ratified. As an issue this important should be, our approach to Canadian military exports has been serious and largely non-partisan. To verify these assertions, I reviewed some of the government's recent reports that are available to the public on the Global Affairs Canada website. Current law and practice require Global Affairs Canada to assess whether proposed exports would contribute to peace and security or undermine it and whether they could facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law. I was encouraged to see that export permits are not rubber-stamped. Applications have been denied, suspended or cancelled on occasion according to the established criteria.

However, our analysis of the bill and its potential should not stop there. Every system can be improved, so we must also consider the broader economic and strategic context in which Canada operates. Our defence sector is deeply integrated with those of our closest allies. A significant portion of Canadian defence exports consists not of finished systems but of components and specialized technologies that form part of multinational supply chains. This integrated industrial base supports thousands of highly skilled jobs across our country, enabling Canada to collaborate with partners that share our values in areas ranging from aerospace engineering to advanced manufacturing.

During the debate, both the parliamentary secretary, for the government, and the shadow minister for foreign affairs, along with numerous other speakers with expertise in defence and international relations, have warned that Bill C-233 could have significant unintended consequences for that co-operation at a critical moment for global security. They argued, and I agree from my own experience in international affairs, that the exemptions within the current regime are not loopholes but rather necessary pathways for co-operation grounded in shared security commitments, continental defence and decades of military integration.

My colleagues have warned that this legislation could disrupt defence co-operation, strain alliances and ultimately make Canada less secure. They have cautioned that the legislation has the potential to reshape an entire industrial sector and that those changes could place Canadian suppliers at a competitive disadvantage and hinder Canada's ability to support crucial international partners that are under threat at a critical time. These concerns are not mere hypotheticals in the current international landscape.

Canada's export policies operate within a broader framework of alliances, trade relationships and co-operative defence arrangements. Prudence requires that we approach changes to these relationships with care and a clear understanding of the downstream effects. We must consider how the bill could affect Canada's credibility as a reliable participant in joint industrial and security initiatives. Legislation always produces some consequences beyond its stated objectives. Even well-intentioned measures can have unintended side effects in sectors as interconnected and technologically complex as defence manufacturing.

During the debate, a member of the Bloc Québécois made an observation that captures the nuance required here. While acknowledging the motivations behind the bill, he argued that the goal of stronger oversight does not automatically mean that every proposed mechanism for achieving it will work. This is where Bill C-233 falls short. It attempts to address legitimate concerns, but it does so through sweeping legislative changes that could unintentionally disrupt economic stability, industrial co-operation and strategic partnerships.

Rather than rewriting the law in ways that could destabilize existing arrangements, we should take the more balanced path of improving transparency, enhancing reporting requirements and strengthening oversight within the current framework. GAC could expand the detail of annual export reports. We could improve parliamentary review of export decisions or invest in additional monitoring of supply chains, addressing concerns about accountability while avoiding unnecessary economic or diplomatic disruption through broad changes in law. We must weigh the moral aspirations behind the proposal against its practical consequences. We must ask not only whether a bill reflects our values but whether it would function effectively in the real world. In the case of Bill C-233, that balance has not been achieved. The mechanisms proposed raise significant concerns about economic stability, industrial co-operation and international partnerships.

Let us commit to continuing the conversation about how Canada can strengthen oversight, improve transparency and uphold the highest standards of responsibility in our export policies while preserving the partnerships, jobs and institutions that Canadians depend on.

[The Assistant Deputy Speaker (Alexandra Mendès), Alexandra Mendes]

I recognize the hon. member for Vancouver East for her right of reply.

[Jenny Kwan, NDP, Vancouver East, BC]

Madam Speaker, let me begin by addressing the central claim we have heard repeatedly, which is that Bill C-233 would somehow decimate Canada's defence industry and disrupt integrated supply chains. That assertion is simply incorrect.

Bill C-233 would not prohibit exports. It would not restrict production. It would not alter the list of controlled goods. It would standardize permit requirements for items already listed under group 2 of Canada's export control list by applying to U.S.-bound exports the same permit review that already applies to exports to every other destination. Canada already administers a global export permitting system. Extending permit review to U.S.-bound exports would not create a new regulatory regime. It would remove a destination-based exemption.

Regulatory oversight is not prohibition. Conflating the two is simply misleading. Other state parties to the Arms Trade Treaty manage highly integrated defence supply chains while still applying oversight mechanisms, including open and general licences where appropriate, and the United States is part of that regime. Administrative efficiency and legal compliance are not mutually exclusive.

We have also heard that this bill would weaken Canada's role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and delay support to Ukraine. Nearly all members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are state parties through the Arms Trade Treaty. Aligning Canada's export controls with our treaty obligations would strengthen our credibility within the alliance. Military assistance to Ukraine is transferred through Department of National Defence mechanisms, not through the commercial export permitting processes that Bill C-233 would address.

This legislation would concern commercial exports primarily to the United States. It would not impede direct government-to-government military aid. In fact, ensuring that Canadian-origin components are assessed before entering the U.S. supply chain reduces the risk of diversion to high-risk end-users. That objective is entirely consistent with NATO's collective security framework.

There is also the claim that Canada already exceeds the ATT requirements. Yes, Canada applies vigorous human rights criteria when issuing permits. That is not in dispute. The structural issue is that most conventional arms exports to the United States require no permit at all. That means no individual risk assessments and no comprehensive reporting.

Annual reports tabled since the 1990s do not capture the majority of U.S.-bound transfers because those exports are exempt from permits. A reporting framework cannot be considered complete when most of the exports fall outside of its scope. We are told that the U.S. exemption is not a loophole and that it reflects a long-standing bilateral defence relationship. That may be true, but its practical effect is that most conventional weapons exports to the United States proceed without permit, without assessment and without detailed transparency. This is, by definition, a regulatory gap.

Canada and the United States do not apply identical risk thresholds. The United States may authorize transfers to end-users that Canada would deny directly. Without a Canadian permit requirement, Canadian-origin components can enter the U.S. system and be transferred onward without Canada ever conducting its own risk assessment. We have seen this concern in reporting by CBC News, which documented that Canadian-origin military goods moved through the United States and onward to Israel during a period when the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that Canada was not exporting arms to Israel. This example underscores the oversight gap that Bill C-233 is designed to address.

Former Liberal cabinet ministers Allan Rock and Lloyd Axworthy recently argued in a Globe and Mail op-ed that Canada's credibility as a champion of the rules-based international order depends on aligning practice with principle. They reminded us that Canada played a leadership role in building global arms control norms, from the Ottawa Treaty to the Arms Trade Treaty. The exemption shields the majority of our transfers from scrutiny and undermines that legacy. They were clear: The issue is not whether we trust the United States but whether Canada exercises its own sovereignty and responsibility to assess the risk that Canadian-origin arms could contribute to serious violations of international humanitarian or human rights laws.

I urge all members to look at the facts and vote in support of Bill C-233.

[The Assistant Deputy Speaker (Alexandra Mendès), Alexandra Mendes]

The question is on the motion.

If a member participating in person wishes that the motion be carried or carried on division, or if a member of a recognized party participating in person wishes to request a recorded division, I would invite them to rise and indicate it to the Chair.

[Salma Zahid, Liberal, Scarborough Centre—Don Valley East, ON]

Madam Speaker, we request a recorded division.

[The Assistant Deputy Speaker (Alexandra Mendès), Alexandra Mendes]

Pursuant to Standing Order 93, the division stands deferred until Wednesday, March 11, at the expiry of the time provided for Oral Questions.

Sitting Suspended

[The Assistant Deputy Speaker (Alexandra Mendès), Alexandra Mendes]

The House will now suspend to the call of the Chair.

(The sitting of the House was suspended at 11:53 a.m.)

(The House resumed at 12 p.m.)

The House resumed from March 9 consideration of the motion that Bill C-233, An Act to amend the Export and Import Permits Act, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

Export and Import Permits Act

[The Speaker, Francis Scarpaleggia]

It being 3:14 p.m., the House will now proceed to the taking of the deferred recorded division on the motion at second reading stage of Bill C-233, under Private Members' Business.

Call in the members.

(The House divided on the motion, which was negatived on the following division:)

Vote #85

[The Speaker, Francis Scarpaleggia]

I declare the motion lost.

I wish to inform the House that because of the deferred recorded division, the time provided for Government Orders will be extended by 12 minutes.