Evidence of meeting #12 for Canada-China Relations in the 43rd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was kong.

A video is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Clerk of the Committee  Ms. Christine Holke
Evan S. Medeiros  Penner Family Chair in Asian Studies, Georgetown University
Alvin Y.H. Cheung  Non-Resident Affiliated Scholar, US-Asia Law Institute, New York University School of Law
Lynette H. Ong  Professor of Political Science and Global Affairs, University of Toronto
Stéphane Chatigny  Lawyer, As an Individual
Sharon Hom  Executive Director, Human Rights in China
Malte Philipp Kaeding  Assistant Professor in International Politics, University of Surrey

12:20 p.m.

Conservative

Leona Alleslev Conservative Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill, ON

Are you suggesting an integrated, whole-of-government approach, not only with a point person but with co-ordination among all of the departments, so that we understand all the fronts that information is coming in from and all the pressures from all corners?

12:20 p.m.

Non-Resident Affiliated Scholar, US-Asia Law Institute, New York University School of Law

Alvin Y.H. Cheung

That would be a fair characterization, yes.

12:20 p.m.

Conservative

Leona Alleslev Conservative Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill, ON

Thank you very much.

12:20 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Geoff Regan

We will move to Ms. Zann for five minutes, please.

12:20 p.m.

Liberal

Lenore Zann Liberal Cumberland—Colchester, NS

Thank you very much.

While we're speaking with Mr. Cheung, I would like to ask him a couple of questions about his views on some of these issues.

Back in April of this year, Mr. Cheung, you wrote on the website Just Security that, “On first observation, the decay of Hong Kong's autonomy has been abrupt.” In your view, however, recent events you said were long in the making. You identified three factors that have contributed to the erosion of Hong Kong's autonomy:

...the Beijing and Hong Kong governments’ abuse of “advocating independence” as a political and legal cudgel; the growing role of the Liaison Office; and the political capture of a previously professionalized civil service apparatus.

What events, developments and decisions would you say have led to the erosion of Hong Kong's autonomy since 1997? What were the warning signs that perhaps the world has missed? How did the international community including Canada respond, and how do we deal with this issue now? It's a bit of a long question.

12:20 p.m.

Non-Resident Affiliated Scholar, US-Asia Law Institute, New York University School of Law

Alvin Y.H. Cheung

It's a complex set of questions with an equally complex set of answers. To make a long story short, key events since 1997 would include the abuse of the power to interpret the basic law that was vested in the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. Since 1997 on only one occasion has that power been exercised at the request of a Hong Kong court. That should have been cause for alarm back in 1999 when the first interpretation was issued. It should have been cause for much more alarm in 2016 when it was used to pre-empt the decision of a Hong Kong court regarding the disqualification of legislatures. Yet not very much has been said on the occasion of each interpretation and that has, in part, led us to where we are now.

Other events would include, of course, the 2003 demonstrations, but also the Beijing government's subsequent reactions. I referred in that Just Security article to something that was written in the party journal Study Times by a liaison official in 2008 referring to a “second governance team”. That warning was not taken seriously at the time. As it turns out, having not been called out on it, the liaison office has taken whatever opportunities it had to broaden its role. In that sense, I would say there have been numerous warning signs, some of which I refer to there.

The responses from the international community on the whole have not been terribly helpful. I don't think that any particular country has covered itself in glory. The U.K. in particular, as the other signatory to the joint declaration, has done what the last governor, Governor Patten, referred to as the equivalent of writing reports that said “rien” when the Bastille was stormed.

So what do we do now? I think it is incumbent upon the international community to say enough is enough. Any healthy relationship involves the setting of clear boundaries and I think the time to do that with the PRC is long overdue.

12:25 p.m.

Liberal

Lenore Zann Liberal Cumberland—Colchester, NS

Thank you.

When did you see China, rather than just being a Communist regime, becoming somewhat of a capitalist regime as well? It seems to be a mix now. It is using both to compete in the world, but now also to control the people. When did you see all of that starting to change?

12:25 p.m.

Non-Resident Affiliated Scholar, US-Asia Law Institute, New York University School of Law

Alvin Y.H. Cheung

The PRC's transition to state capitalism has been happening for a very long time now. I would argue that the PRC has not been communist, in the strict sense of the term, for a very long time. As such, I am skeptical of the claim that it has an ideology beyond ethnonationalism. To that extent, I really don't think it should be construed as an ideological fight.

12:25 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Geoff Regan

Thank you.

We'll now go to Mr. Williamson for five minutes.

12:25 p.m.

Conservative

John Williamson Conservative New Brunswick Southwest, NB

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much to our witnesses. You've presented a number of excellent points today, and some good recommendations.

Professor Ong, I'm curious to get to some more of your thinking. You seem to be at least partially hopeful that there is an ability to reverse the takeover we're now seeing in Hong Kong. You said that it will take time, but you seem to hold out that hope. Could you address that briefly?

If that's the case, should we view Hong Kong not so much by going back to the Cold War but as a Poland, going forward, with that resilience we all know is alive in Hong Kong in the people? Could you comment on your reasons for hope?

12:25 p.m.

Professor of Political Science and Global Affairs, University of Toronto

Lynette H. Ong

My reason for hope is that we want to preserve Hong Kong the way it is for as long as possible, because the rest of mainland China looks very different. The rest of mainland China operates within the great firewall. We speak of repression in Hong Kong; it is nothing like the style and extent of the repression in mainland China. As long as Hong Kong stays different—and I mean as liberal as it is now—I think it will offer a beacon of hope as well as an example to the rest of mainland China.

In fact, when Sun Yat-sen first proposed the idea of the republic, he came up with the idea when he was in Hong Kong because he saw that the ways in which Hong Kong operated were very different from the rest of mainland China.

I also think that we should take a longer-term view of history. No regime will last forever. The more repressive it is, the more long-lasting it will—

12:30 p.m.

Conservative

John Williamson Conservative New Brunswick Southwest, NB

Yes, I think that's a good point.

I'm going to turn now to Professor Medeiros.

I take your point that what we're seeing in Hong Kong is not a prelude to war and that we have to be careful. Not only does Canada have about 300,000 citizens in the territory, but there are millions of like-minded friends in Hong Kong, literally millions. I think the talk of a cold war is overstated because of, as Mr. Cheung just said, the ethnonationalism we see on display in China.

I'd like your thoughts. Should we think of what we're seeing in Asia now as more akin to what we saw with respect to Imperial Japan: a nationalist population and government, an expansionary state and a military regime that does not have civilian oversight? If that's the case, should the attention now not turn completely to Taiwan? Taiwan is the nation island. China wants it, and it has long made this clear. Do we not need to stick together on this, particularly with the Taiwan Defence Act in the United States? If this is not managed properly, unlike Hong Kong, this could lead to a real clash in the South China Sea.

Could I get your comments on that? You have just over a minute to respond.

12:30 p.m.

Penner Family Chair in Asian Studies, Georgetown University

Evan S. Medeiros

Okay. I'll give you my lightning response.

First and foremost, yes, we need to stick together on this question of how to address the China challenge in east Asia, especially when it comes to Taiwan.

I think there are some useful and interesting analogies between China today and the Japanese military and militarization, but keep in mind that the PLA, the Chinese military, is a party-run army, so there's actually quite a bit more civilian control over it per se, and I think Xi Jinping, through his anti-corruption campaign, has been able to re-establish a lot of authority. The Chinese economy is a lot more globally integrated than Japan's was. Nonetheless, the nationalist component of it and the fact that the military is more capable give me a lot of concern. That's why thinking about a China strategy as a series of coalitions of the willing to address specific issues with like-minded partners is perhaps the best way to approach different and unique challenges going forward.

12:30 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Geoff Regan

Thank you very much.

We will go to Ms. Yip for five minutes, please.

12:30 p.m.

Liberal

Jean Yip Liberal Scarborough—Agincourt, ON

This question is directed to Professor Ong.

We have heard from you that the Hong Kong stock market is the best way to raise capital. Also, four out of 10 companies are planning to leave their headquarters and go elsewhere.

How dependent is China on Hong Kong as a financial hub?

12:30 p.m.

Professor of Political Science and Global Affairs, University of Toronto

Lynette H. Ong

They are quite dependent, but they are not without options.

My point is that we want to keep the dependency of Chinese capital on Hong Kong going, because as long as they are dependent on Hong Kong, they won't impose harsher repression on Hong Kong of the kind we have seen elsewhere in China, such as in Xinjiang and Tibet.

Moving forward, what we are likely to see in Hong Kong's financial and business sector is a bit of a complication. We have the emergence of underwriting and prominence of Chinese companies in Hong Kong on the one hand and the withdrawal of western firms, particularly U.S. firms, on the other hand. Mind you, Chinese companies are there because they have ready access to U.S. dollars and all the convenience of Hong Kong. If we take that away by using sanctions or whatever punitive means to punish Hong Kong, we might in turn punish Chinese companies. I think that would in turn push the Chinese government to explore other options for doing business with the rest of the world, keeping Hong Kong out of the equation, and that would be bad for Hong Kong.

12:35 p.m.

Liberal

Jean Yip Liberal Scarborough—Agincourt, ON

How can Canada help the Canadian businesses there?

12:35 p.m.

Professor of Political Science and Global Affairs, University of Toronto

Lynette H. Ong

We should just keep doing business in Hong Kong the way it is. Of course, there are a lot more restrictions now than there were a couple of months ago, but I think business goes on as usual.

I think we should also keep doing business with China. It is only by maintaining the ties and engagement that we can keep the hope going.

12:35 p.m.

Liberal

Jean Yip Liberal Scarborough—Agincourt, ON

Is there any way that the international financial community could bring some further pressure to bear?

12:35 p.m.

Professor of Political Science and Global Affairs, University of Toronto

Lynette H. Ong

In the short run, businesses tend to be directed by where their interests and profits lie, but I believe that in the medium and long term, if governments guide businesses widely—that is, if we design suitable institutional designs—this would actually guide the incentives of businesses and help to steer the businesses away from authoritarian regimes. By imposing labour qualifications and imposing certain standards on businesses that they have to meet, we can slowly guide business from authoritarian regimes.

12:35 p.m.

Liberal

Jean Yip Liberal Scarborough—Agincourt, ON

That sounds hopeful.

My next question is directed to Professor Medeiros.

If you were asked to predict how U.S.-China relations might change under Trump's administration to possibly Joe Biden's come November, what would you say, and how will Canada benefit?

12:35 p.m.

Penner Family Chair in Asian Studies, Georgetown University

Evan S. Medeiros

It's hard to predict what the changes will be. I worked very closely with Vice-President Biden, including the very initial steps to build the relationship between Vice-President Xi Jinping and Vice-President Biden from the White House in 2011, so I saw how Vice-President Biden thinks about China. I would imagine that the first thing to change would be the tone, dropping the overtly confrontational cold war rhetoric and getting back to the business of strategic competition. I think that the frame of strategic competition would likely continue. It would probably be focused much more on improving America's own strength and its abilities to ensure America runs faster, but nonetheless strategic competition would continue to be the frame.

I think Vice-President Biden would also look to do a lot more with allies by reinvesting in and reconceptualizing alliances and working more multilaterally.

12:35 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Geoff Regan

Thank you very much, Ms. Yip.

Mr. Bergeron, you have the floor for two and a half minutes.

12:35 p.m.

Bloc

Stéphane Bergeron Bloc Montarville, QC

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I am going to make a quick comment. We heard the views of Mr. Medeiros and Ms. Ong on the possible impact of sanctions in reaction to the adoption of the national security law.

Because we will eventually be called upon to make proposals to the Canadian government, I would like Mr. Cheung's point of view on the utility of sanctions and what kind of sanctions should be introduced to have a marginally positive impact.

12:35 p.m.

Non-Resident Affiliated Scholar, US-Asia Law Institute, New York University School of Law

Alvin Y.H. Cheung

Thank you very much.

I think what we've seen so far with the U.S-imposed Magnitsky-style sanctions on designated Hong Kong and mainland officials is that they are having an effect, and that financial institutions, including PRC state-owned financial institutions, are scrambling to comply with them.

In the event that Canada were to consider imposing sanctions, ideally in conjunction with like-minded countries, Magnitsky-style targeted sanctions directed at people who have planned or instigated atrocities and human rights violations in Hong Kong would stand the best chance of not affecting the general Hong Kong population.