Canada-China Relations Committee on March 9th, 2020

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you very much. Sorry to be so brief.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you very much, Ms. McPherson.

Now we go to the five-minute round, beginning with Ms. Alleslev.

[Leona Alleslev, Conservative, Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill, ON]

Thanks very much to all of you for your thought leadership on one of the most challenging conversations of our time.

Ms. Glaser, I know you testified at a committee in the U.S. on the “made in China 2025” policy. One thing you talked about was the increasing integration of military and civilian commercial economies, essentially. You highlighted that they were doing this with a view toward controlling entire supply chains and obtaining significant market share in targeted industries. I wonder if you could give us a little more information on that, and perhaps advise Canada on what we might be able to do to protect ourselves or to address this increasing challenge.

[Bonnie Glaser]

The made in China 2025 plan is just one of many industrial policies that Xi Jinping has put forward. I think what surprised many people was that this particular plan was very public and very detailed. It laid out 10 areas of key cutting-edge technologies that China, Xi Jinping says, must be dominant in. We're looking at things like electric cars, for example, semiconductors, and certain areas of transportation.

It remains to be seen, of course, whether China achieves this goal, but if they were to actually achieve a dominant position in most, if not all, of these areas, it really would pose a threat, I think, to many countries that have leadership and of course multinational corporations that have really significant market share. I think the Germans in particular are very worried, as are the Americans.

[Leona Alleslev, Conservative, Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill, ON]

Would you say that that threat was not only an economic one but also a security one?

[Bonnie Glaser]

Absolutely. Of course it begins with an economic threat, but it is a security threat, and you mentioned the close relationship between the civilian and military sectors in China. This is called civil-military fusion by Xi Jinping. The idea is to make it very easy for innovation in the civilian sector to be shifted over into military spheres and to be applied to military capabilities so that China can gain a rapid advantage over its potential adversaries, the United States being first and foremost.

[Leona Alleslev, Conservative, Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you very much.

I would direct my next question to Ms. Sun, if you wouldn't mind. You made a very important point in your opening remarks, talking about, essentially, the rise of great powers and the shifting economic, political and even military balance in the world as a result. Where does that leave middle powers like Canada, and a number of others?

You suggest that we need to have increased co-operation of middle powers. Could you give us some ideas on how we might achieve that, particularly in light of the erosion of some of our international institutions that were essentially put in place to have a balance with middle powers. How do we now achieve that co-operation, and what action can Canada take to further that?

[Yun Sun]

Thank you, madam, for your question.

In the era of great power competitions, the erosion of the current international organizations and effective mechanisms is almost inevitable, because you will see both China and the United States reaching out to erode these systems to get their own way. Particularly in the case of China, this is the case.

I think, for middle powers like Canada, to keep the plurality of the regions is extremely important. It's not just a mechanism to prevent China from achieving the hegemonic status it desires; it's also to provide regional checks and balances, and the managing mechanism that will bind these great powers with superpower ambition through the norms and rules developed by regional countries.

I agree with you. I think the international systems these days are being eroded, but it doesn't prevent the emergence of other regional forums, regional organizations or regional mechanisms—minilaterals, if you like, or trilaterals—among like-minded countries and countries with similar power status, to develop their common position.

[Leona Alleslev, Conservative, Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you, Ms. Alleslev.

Ms. Zann, you have five minutes.

[Lenore Zann, Liberal, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

Thank you very much.

My question is for Ms. Sun.

Hello. I hope you're doing well today.

We've just celebrated International Women's Day, so my thoughts are turned to the issue of women's rights. On the eve of International Women's Day in 2015, Chinese authorities jailed five feminist activists for planning to hand out stickers on subways and buses against sexual harassment. News of the arrest of the “feminist five”, as they became known, spread swiftly, sparking global protests and diplomatic outrage. Luckily, the government released the women after 37 days.

Then, on International Women's Day two years ago, Weibo and WeChat both banned the most influential feminist social media account, called Feminist Voices, because it “posted sensitive and illegal information”. Thousands of students signed #MeToo petitions demanding action against sexual harassment, but many of these petitions were deleted by censors soon after being posted on social media.

The shrinking public space for discussing women's rights in China is very concerning for me. I find it particularly ironic given the importance of gender equality during the communist revolution in the early Mao era, following the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, since the early communists enshrined the equality of women and men in the constitution of the People's Republic, and the government introduced ambitious initiatives to put women to work in building the new communist nation by the 1970s. They in fact boasted that the biggest female workforce in the entire world was in China.

Could you please give us an update on women's rights in China and what Canada and other countries can do to support the feminist movement in China?

[Yun Sun]

Thank you, madam, for your question.

To begin with, there is a cultural element to it because in China, if you look at the top leadership on the Politburo standing committee, there is no female leader at that level. That is just a fact. The Chinese political scientists have attributed this to the Chinese traditional culture, which has been dominated by males.

In terms of looking at women's rights in China, I would say that under Xi Jinping, the political tightening of spaces in almost all areas—not only women but also ethnic minorities, religious groups and democratic political dissidents in China—is intensifying. Women are just one of those areas. If this violation of human rights in China is systematic and widespread, I think the solutions that we need to look at should not focus only on women.

[Lenore Zann, Liberal, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

Thank you.

I also wanted to ask you about China's role in the developing world and its approach to conflict mediation in that context. In an article that you published in 2019, you said this:

When viewing the domestic conflicts of a sovereign nation, China sees development and stability as two mutually reinforcing concepts. Instead of focusing on the fair and just distribution of political and economic rights, China prioritises making the economic pie larger so that everyone gets a bigger share.

What is China's general approach to conflict and governance issues in the developing world? How does that approach compare to the role played by the U.S. and its allies such as Canada and the United Nations?

[Yun Sun]

From the Chinese perspective, when they look at conflict mediation, they pretty much follow the Chinese experience. In China, they believe they have achieved a mutually complementary relationship between economic development and political stability. This has happened under the conditions of a strong authoritarian government ruling the whole country.

When China tries to mediate conflicts in foreign countries, the first condition has always been that China's national interests must be involved. In countries where China does not really have an interest, you rarely see China playing an active role in terms of conflict mediation. In these countries, China tries to preach this Chinese model of stabilization through economic development. This is the case we have seen in Myanmar; this is the case we are seeing in Afghanistan, and this is something that China has been preaching to the North Korean government for a very long time.

What is the difference between the Chinese approach and the western countries' approach? Well, the western approach focuses more on the origin of the conflict. There needs to be a democratic system to ensure and protect rights, to ensure that minorities are protected. The Chinese approach in this sense is much less substantive, because the Chinese prioritize ceasefires rather than a political solution. We see China try to mediate for ceasefires in conflict situations, but they rarely offer the substantive and intellectual framework to lead to an eventual and sustainable peace.

[Lenore Zann, Liberal, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you, Ms. Zann.

Mr. Genuis, you have five minutes.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses. This has been a really rich discussion over both the last two panels.

I want to make two comments and then ask a couple of questions that will be directed to Mr. Shambaugh.

First of all, those watching will know that the original agenda for this committee included former Ambassador McCallum, and I want to say from my perspective that it is very important that we do hear from him at some point. I think his perspective will be absolutely vital.

Second, I wanted to respond to a comment I didn't have a chance to respond to earlier. Mr. Fragiskatos was kind of implying that there was a parallel between return of fugitives as a one-off and the negotiation of an extradition treaty. I think it's important that we very much distinguish between those two things. An extradition treaty would go much further than has been contemplated before, and it would give the right of Canadian nationals, for example, to be extradited to China, with all of the concerns that raises.

Having just put those comments on the record—

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Point of order, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Mr. Fragiskatos.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

As we've heard at this committee, the Canadian government has no interest in proceeding with an extradition—

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

That's not a point of order. You're better than that. That's—

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Just to clarify for the record—

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Order, order. Thank you very much.

Mr. Genuis.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

That is a shameful abuse of procedure, and you know it. I didn't interrupt you when you were directly responding to my comments, so we expect better from you.

I want to ask Mr. Shambaugh two questions. First of all, we have the buzzword “engagement”, which has been around this committee a lot. You talked about the trap of the so-called engagement paradigm. It's interesting, because all of us would agree that there needs to be engagement with this topic, in terms of having those dialogues and opportunities for conversation. At the same time, we should reject the idea that engagement entails thinking that having a good, collegial, friendly relationship is an end in and of itself. Engaging in a way that shows firmness and consistency and seeks to advance our values and interests is the objective.

Can you talk a bit about what may be good engagement and bad engagement, given the importance of just that word?

Regarding the second question, you wrote an essay for The Wall Street Journal in 2015, in which you imagined the unfolding of.... I don't mean “imagined” in a pejorative way. You said, “The endgame of Chinese communist rule has now begun.... Its demise is likely to be protracted, messy and violent.”

I'm wondering if you still think, five years later, that we're in the endgame of communist rule in China. All of us here, presumably, would like to see freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law spread around the world, spread to China. Do you think political change in China is possible in the near or medium term? What policy approaches can we use here in Canada to promote the development of a free, multi-party democratic society, and in a way that minimizes any kind of conflagration in the process of transition?

You have two minutes left. Take the whole time however you like.

[David Shambaugh]

Two minutes, or two hours...?

On your first question, about engagement, I'd recommend the committee read, if it hasn't already, Paul Evans's excellent book entitled Engaging China. It is a history of Canadian relations with China since the Trudeau period and throughout this whole engagement paradigm. Second, read Ambassador David Mulroney, whom I hope you will hear from at the committee. His book Middle Power, Middle Kingdom is an excellent study. He also goes through these issues.

Engagement, in my view, is not an end in itself. It is a means to advancing a national and common international interest. I was also interested in this annex that Global Affairs Canada provided to the committee. There's a very nice organization chart of the probably two dozen or more bilateral dialogues that Canada has with China. When I looked at that chart, it made me think, “Well, they just see engagement as an end in itself.” Simply having those boxes on that chart is what those diplomats in Global Affairs Canada set out to do, and to have the dialogue is sufficient.

I would submit that it is not sufficient. You have to achieve things with dialogues. The United States, by the way, had 94, I think. Bonnie has written about this. We had 94 ongoing dialogues with China when the Trump administration took over. They're now down to fewer than 10. The Trump administration has just cancelled a number of them. Are we any worse off for it? I don't think so. It's a terrible waste of money, resources, time, airplane fuel, etc., unless you're getting real results.

Engagement, if it's institutional engagement, bilaterally, is a means toward an end in whichever issue or area you're talking about. That's just my brief answer to that.