Thank you, Madam Gélinas, and good afternoon, everybody.
I'm going to be speaking in conjunction with a slide deck that has nine slides on it. Four of them will give a bit of history about the audits we conducted in 1999 and 2002. For the last five slides we've chosen five topic areas that fell out of our audit work. We've identified these five areas as ones we would certainly look at if we were going to audit this topic area again, and we've identified a number of questions that we would be posing in the context of those kinds of audits.
Let me recap, very quickly, the 1999 work we did. As Madame Gélinas said, this work was reported in two chapters. Those two chapters split the topics of toxic substances into assessment activities in chapter 3 and risk management activities in chapter 4.
For the purposes of this audit, we scoped the topic of toxic substances quite broadly. This was not just toxic substances as defined under CEPA. We looked at both a range of industrial chemicals that, one way or another, were called toxic in different federal programs, policies, and legislation, and we looked at pesticides. I'm not going to be speaking to any of our pesticides findings today. We did look at aspects of CEPA, and in 1999, that was the 1988 CEPA. The new act had not been passed yet, and that did change for our follow-up. We looked at six different federal departments and made, in total, 27 recommendations.
Chapter 3, again, dealt with the assessment of toxic substances. The title of our work was “Understanding the Risks From Toxic Substances: Cracks in the Foundation of the Federal House”. We chose that title because a major conclusion of the audit was that there was a sizeable and growing gap between the demands placed on departments to assess substances and the supply of information, the supply of science. In other words, while departments were increasingly being asked to assess substances, at the same time there had been cutbacks in scientific research and monitoring, so the departments were very much faced with a resource problem. The audits themselves identified a number of examples of that resource gap leading to problems in decision-making.
The second major finding from that work was that environmental monitoring in particular--that is, ambient monitoring, the monitoring of toxic substances in the environment--was not in good shape. We identified significant shortfalls in monitoring, problems with the coordination of research, and a small item that may still be relevant for you: in 1999, there were no defined procedures on how departments could incorporate new information into past assessments. That was an item we flagged in the 1999 work as well.
Chapter 4 dealt with risk management. I'm sorry if I'm going fast, but we want to just hit the highlights.
The net conclusion in this chapter was that the government was not taking adequate action to deal with toxic substances. Vis-à-vis CEPA substances and the priority substance lists 1 and 2, the audit found real problems of slow, slow progress; after ten years, some substances still did not have any risk management measures in place. Again, resource problems--gaps--came to the fore here. For example, although the departments had gone through the exercise of identifying recommendations to manage many of the declared toxics, no resources were identified for the implementation of those measures.
In 1999 the government was relying heavily on voluntary programs to manage toxic substances. We were neutral on the question of whether that was a good idea or a bad idea, and we're still neutral on that question, but we did take the position that if you're going to use voluntary instruments to manage toxic substances--substances that pose problems for health and the environment--then those voluntary instruments have to be robust and reliable and deliver the results they're intended to. We made a number of recommendations on how they can improve the use of voluntary instruments.
In chapter 4, on tracking releases, we identified that a great number of toxic substances, including CEPA toxics, had no tracking information, no release information. We simply didn't know the amount being released through the national pollutant release inventory.
In 2002 we undertook our follow-up work. That is reported in chapter 1 of the 2002 commissioner's report. I don't know whether you have copies of this chapter, but at the back you will see a table that indicates the follow-up status for each of the 27 recommendations in all six of the departments. If you flip through that matrix, you'll see an awful lot of empty circles, which is our code language for no action. There are far more empty circles than full ones in this case, so certainly from our standpoint, when we do follow-up again, we will start with some of those recommendations.
The progress was mixed. At that time the CEPA of 1999 had come into force, and the departments were very much on the job of trying to implement and get their heads around the requirements of the new CEPA. Maybe for that reason, many other departments became less engaged in the management of toxic substances, and I think that's why there are so many white circles in there, but many of the root causes we identified in the original work in 1999 persisted through 2002: issues around resources; issues around the gap between the knowledge that's required and the knowledge that's being provided; and, to an extent, issues around burdensome consultative and regulatory processes.
That's a quick summary of our work in 1999 and 2000. I'm going to spend the balance of my time briefly capping five thematic areas we would look at if we were going to work in this area again.
The first one is not necessarily linked to CEPA; it's the theme of scientific research and monitoring. I think you well know, committee members, that good science underlies virtually all decisions in CEPA on both the assessment and the management fronts. If you don't have good science, you're probably not going to be making the kinds of decisions you need to. I think we would very much pursue this by going substance by substance and finding out to what extent there have been changes in monitoring, in research, and in the tracking of releases.
In particular, I think we would probably also want to find out what happened to the recommendations from an exercise called the Canadian Information System for the Environment. CISE is the acronym it goes by. Just about the time we were completing our work in 2002, the government was also leading a blue-ribbon panel to look at the state of science and research and monitoring. They made a series of recommendations to the government; from what we've been able to tell on the website, none of them has been implemented. We're not sure if they've been resourced, but we would certainly start by querying the government about the status of CISE.
In 2002 we also raised the issue of biomonitoring. I raised it in the sense that we noted it wasn't present. There have been some announcements recently, I understand, and I know this committee has discussed biomonitoring, but I think we would pursue that as well.
The next thematic area would be the precautionary principle. In 1999 we didn't do a whole lot of work in this area, but we did note at the time that of the 44 substances, I believe, on the original priority substance list 1, 13 were still inconclusive on the basis of insufficient information. In 1999 we raised the question of whether the precautionary principle would have a role in helping to make those kinds of decisions.
In 2002 we pursued that and ended up recommending to Environment Canada that they develop operational guidance on how to apply the precautionary principle in the act. They were under way in that exercise--they had started developing that guidance--but it wasn't complete at the conclusion of our audit. At the same time, the Privy Council Office was undertaking a government-wide examination of the precautionary principle; that, too, was inconclusive at the time of the conclusion of our audit. Therefore, I think we would pursue with both of those--PCO and Environment Canada--where that operational guidance has been left now. I think it's particularly important not just for the priority substances lists assessment, but especially now for the screening exercise that's about to be undertaken on the domestic substances list. I know you've had a good discussion on the precautionary principle in the past.
The next thematic area is with respect to the PSL1 and PSL2 substances. Frankly, there was slow, slow progress in 1999, and not a lot of progress by the time 2002 came into force. In 2002 the department--Environment Canada--had redesigned the processes it was going to use for managing PSL2 substances as compared to PSL1 substances, but that process had not been implemented. Were we to do some follow-up here, we would clearly be going after almost a substance-by-substance inventory of what measures have been recommended, what measures have been put in place, whether resources were attached with those measures, what reductions have been achieved in the environment, how they know that, and so on. I think we would get down to very much a substance-by-substance review.
We would also, I think, want to ask ourselves if pollution prevention is truly being achieved. When I say “truly”, I don't mean pollution control; I mean pollution prevention, prevention at source, before a pollutant is generated in the first place. That is a preamble to the act, and it was certainly a major feature of the policies that existed prior to the enactment of the new act. I think we really just want to know if this system is working and if the substances are being managed effectively.
The fourth thematic area would be on virtual elimination. Again, I know you've had some presentations on this topic. At the time of the 1999 audit, virtual elimination was a policy objective of the Government of Canada. The departments engaged in the toxics debate at the time were almost at war with each other over virtual elimination, what it meant, and in particular how to apply it to naturally occurring substances. That was very much stopping progress.
Since then, as of 2002, the act has been amended. There is now a formal process. I think that at the time of the 2002 audit, no substances had been added to the virtual elimination list. The departments were in the process of preparing quantification limits, detection limits; I'm not sure if that's changed at this stage, but we would clearly go after virtual elimination as a topic area in the audit to see whether it is in fact being achieved where it was supposed to be.
The last slide is on the topic of the domestic substances list. Again, I think this is now well known. The department is soon to conclude the categorization of the 23,000 substances; then that goes into a process of screening.
A minor question we would ask is whether the process, specifically the categorization, is on track according to CEPA, but I think our major preoccupation on the DSL would be around resources and trying to determine whether the departments really do have the capacity to both assess and ultimately manage any substances that fall out of that exercise. As I mentioned at the outset, resources were a problem in 1999 and again in 2002. I'm not aware that there's been a major infusion of resources into either department to cope with future demands, yet the future workload is growing through the domestic substances list.
I hope that wasn't too short, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. We wanted to touch some of the highlights very briefly; there's an awful lot of underlying detail, but I think I'll stop there.
We are available for questions.