Foreign Affairs Committee on Oct. 24th, 2018

[The Chair, Mr. Michael Levitt (York Centre, Lib.)]

Good afternoon, everyone. Welcome to meeting 111 of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development. We will be continuing with our Arctic sovereignty study today. We have two sets of esteemed witnesses testifying before us.

Our first witness is Jessica Shadian, who is chief executive officer and founder of Arctic 360 and a distinguished senior fellow at the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary International History at the University of Toronto.

We also have Whitney Lackenbauer, who is Canada research chair in the study of the Canadian north and professor at the School for the Study of Canada at Trent University.

Welcome. We will have each of you speak for around eight minutes, then we'll open it up to the floor, because I know my colleagues will have lots of questions for you.

Ms. Shadian, we will begin with you.

[Dr. Jessica M. Shadian, Chief Executive Officer and Founder, Arctic 360, and Distinguished Senior Fellow, Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary International History, As an Individual]

Hello, everyone.

Thank you for the invitation and the opportunity to talk to you about Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic.

We cannot have a conversation about Canadian Arctic sovereignty, both protecting it and strengthening it, without turning our attention to the critical need for infrastructure investment in the Canadian north. The magnitude of infrastructure required, however, necessitates a new vision and strategy for the north. Rather than having a conversation about whether or not Russian battleships and submarines are making their way to Canada's north, the dual political conversation about Canada's Arctic sovereignty should be on building a strategy that lays out a long-term Canadian vision not only of the north in itself but as part of a grander vision of the future role of Canada in global politics and economics, and what the north has to offer in that respect.

Dave McKay, the president and CEO of RBC, repeated an interesting comment in numerous speeches about what Canada needs to do to remain competitive in the global economy following the April 2017 U.S. tax legislation. When I relisten to his words, it shouted “north” in every sense, yet I think we can fairly assume that the Canadian north was not on his mind at that time. In those speeches he said, “We need roads, rail and pipelines to continue to harness our natural resources, which pay for much of what we take for granted and connect our country together.”

In that vein, I'm going to begin today with my conclusion. I believe that Canada needs not only a northern strategy for the next 12 years but a Canadian version of China's road and belt initiative, a strategy of how the north fits into Canada's vision for its role in the world in the future.

There is an enormous opportunity for Canada to strengthen its sovereignty in the vast economic and geopolitical potential that is not yet being realized. There is a narrative to build that would both improve many Canadians' understanding of and interest in the north and that can be used for export that would reaffirm to the global community that Canada is a northern nation and takes its north seriously. I will explain where I'm going with this argument through the examples of Russia and China.

I'm going to begin with Russia. In 2009 Russia released its Arctic strategy and that strategy makes a case that the Arctic is critical to the future of the Russian economy. In part it's due to the abundance of natural resources that exist there and, particularly, oil and gas.

To exploit those resources and profit from them Russia is turning the northern sea route into a new maritime corridor so it can get its resources to global markets, for global markets such as shipping to pass through the NSR between Europe and Asia and for foreign ships to access Russia's resources. In addition the NSR has become a means for generating additional revenue through user fees paid by those who pass through the route. The user fees are for icebreaker escorts, which are almost always needed, and thus a fee is almost always paid.

The process to turn its northern sea into a viable and regulated maritime route included a grand vision, the completion of several economic feasibility studies, followed by a strategy. Accompanying this, Russia has and continues to make massive investments in icebreakers and other military equipment, human resources, ports, roads and the list goes on.

A maritime corridor that includes ships and tankers travelling across Russia's entire northern coast through waters where scattered ice is the norm, carrying people and products such as LNG or oil, requires civil-military investment from icebreaker escort services and search and rescue equipment, including surveillance, to identify, prevent and/or combat threats, whether they be terror-related or environmental. Thinking about the NSR in this context one could well argue that much of the military buildup in the Russian Arctic is to protect Russia's sovereignty in its own region rather than to challenge Canada's sovereignty.

Moving over to China, in 2013 China announced its new belt and road initiative, a long-term strategy for constructing a global infrastructure system where essentially all roads lead to Beijing. Sherri Goodman from the Council on Foreign Relations stated it well when she said that China is a like a spider and its road and belt Initiative is its web. Likewise China's strategy is not based on election cycles but on centuries.

Recognizing the geopolitical changes that climate change is already creating in the north, including enabling greater access to mineral and other natural resources, is compounded by interest in Arctic research to better understand the long-term impacts of climate change. In January of 2018, China released its Arctic strategy. The strategy included its polar silk road, which became China's vision to bring the Arctic into its road and belt initiative based on what it expects the Arctic will look like in the next 20, 30, 50 years and so on.

At the moment China's main focus is on the NSR, and it moved quickly to fill the investment gap when the Russian sanctions took effect. Russia has since made some significant investments into the Russian LNG as well as infrastructure investments. That is not to say that the Chinese are not interested in the Canadian and broader North American Arctic. Investments or active efforts to invest in resources and infrastructure have already taken place and many others are in the process of negotiation.

Though the Northwest Passage is not close to becoming a reliable alternative maritime route, it is reasonable to argue that it is nevertheless becoming increasingly navigable and navigated. There's also a growing consensus that at one point in the near distant future it will be possible to go over the pole.

China's polar silk road policy is based on the assumption that major maritime changes are coming to the Arctic and those changes have strategic value for its larger belt and road initiative. The Chinese are essentially preparing now for an open Arctic Ocean. They are also investing today in the resources and scientific knowledge that they need and want.

In the North American Arctic and Iceland, active investments range from ports and research stations in Iceland to rare earth minerals in Greenland, to a gas pipeline in Alaska, and several mining investments in Canada.

The social ills from the lack of northern infrastructure in the Canadian north are well documented, as are the implications of the infrastructure gap on the economic viability of mineral and other natural resource projects there, further undermining northern communities' abilities to benefit from the development of those resources. Likewise, the reality is that if the federal government wanted to build all of the infrastructure needed for the north, it just could not afford to do so. Subsequently, communities are competing to attract the good graces of the federal government's limited resources to fund individual projects.

Currently, much of Bay Street has no idea about the potential value of the Canadian north. If someone asks a question, I can bring more up about that. Most on Bay Street do not think there is a rationale to invest in northern infrastructure. This is partly due to ongoing negative stereotypes about the north, as well as the lack of incentives to make it attractive or that would provide adequate rates of return. They argue that northern infrastructure is a social development and not an economic opportunity and thus it's the responsibility of the federal government.

Consequentially, the northern territories, indigenous development corporations, etc., look to China for capital investment. What does that mean for Canadian sovereignty? It means nothing, perhaps. It's like Norway. Its institutions and economy are strong enough to stand on their own in the sense that Norway has the necessary bargaining power. Is that the case in Canada's north? That's something I'm not in a position to say, but I will just say that the Chinese see the critical value of the Canadian and North American Arctic. I think all Canadians should as well.

I have a good example of this with the Chinese version of Google Loon, if someone wants to ask me.

Can an opportunity be created when, according to the Financial Times, the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board plans to invest double the assets it allocates to the emerging economy of China over the next seven years? At the current moment there is not a single Canadian pension plan fund that invests even a small proportion of its money in northern Canada. Could some of its investment dollars go north instead of the north asking the Chinese for capital investment?

For Bay Street to be interested in the north, however, it first needs to know and understand the north. That includes seeing the region's human value and its economic potential. Essentially, Canada needs its own polar silk road strategy, which would result in decisions for funding infrastructure projects based on an overarching rationale, rather than made in isolation, precisely what is required to attract private capital.

Bay Street and global finance agrees that China is an emerging economy, but we need to do more to advance the recognition of the North American Arctic as also an emerging economy. That narrative really needs to start somewhere.

Rather than battleships and missiles to fend off the Russians or Chinese, the largest threat to Canada's north is a real overarching lack of vision to bring about investment to build critical infrastructure. The infrastructure gap profoundly undermines northerners' own security, their quality of life, and the ability to protect and strengthen our own sovereignty.

I think we also need to reflect on Russia's northern sea route system, in light of creating a North American Arctic seaway, which I think was discussed a little bit in a previous meeting. I hope to discuss this more in the question and answer.

To summarize, Bay Street and global capital will not invest in the region without a grand rationale and a strategic plan. China is an exception because they took the initiative on their own to make their own strategic plan for the Arctic. If Bay Street capital is preferred to Chinese capital investing and owning the infrastructure of the Canadian north, or at least if it is preferred that Canada sets the terms of engagement for that investment, or if Canada wants to talk about its Arctic security with Russia, or to others about Russia, I think we really need a Canadian “belt and road and polar silk” vision.

This would detail Canada's strategic role in the Arctic and in the world through the 21st century, and moreover, we need to put that vision into motion.

I look forward to answer your questions.

Thank you.

[The Chair]

Thank you very much, Ms. Shadian.

We'll go straight to Professor Lackenbauer, please.

[Professor Whitney Lackenbauer, Canada Research Chair in the Study of the Canadian North and Professor, School for the Study of Canada, Trent University, As an Individual]

Thanks.

Good afternoon. It is my pleasure to appear before the committee on this important theme.

Canada's Arctic sovereignty is a subject rooted in many misperceptions, and it's less sensational a subject than it's often made out to be. You heard last June from Alan Kessel, the legal adviser at Global Affairs, that “increased vessel traffic, if conducted properly and in accordance with Canadian law and policy, actually serves to reinforce Canada's Arctic sovereignty.”

That is correct, as is his assertion that no one disputes Canada's sovereignty over our Arctic lands, with the minor exception of Hans Island. The northern maritime disputes with the U.S. in the Beaufort Sea and with Denmark in the Lincoln Sea are well managed and will be resolved in accordance with international law when there is a perceived imperative to do so. In neither case do I anticipate an immediate need to solve these boundary issues. They really come down to an issue of political will to compromise with neighbours with whom we have a long history of co-operation.

If we went back a decade, I would spend most of my time countering what I saw as misplaced narratives about an alleged race for resources and threats of naval or commercial ships driving through the Northwest Passage and destroying Canada's legal position that these are our waters. Despite all the hoopla back then, this has not occurred, nor do I see activities of this sort posing a great threat to Canada's Arctic sovereignty today or in the foreseeable future.

You've heard from far greater experts than me, such as Mr. Kessel and Professor Lalonde, that Canada considers all the waters of our Arctic archipelago, including the various waterways commonly known as the Northwest Passage, to be internal waters by virtue of historic title. We have built up a strong legal position since the Second World War, and I do not feel that it is in particular peril today.

However, I'm sure you're less interested in blanket statements such as these than in my thoughts on the three main topics your committee is studying at present: Russian militarization of their Arctic, China's growing Arctic ambitions, and Canada's extended continental shelf claims. All are interrelated, but I'll take each one in turn.

First, in regard to Russia, although the end of the Cold War seemed to portend a new era of deep co-operation between Canada and Russia, lingering wariness about geopolitical motives and a mutual lack of knowledge about the other's slice of the circumpolar world are conspiring to pit our countries as Arctic adversaries. Furthermore, Russian aggression in the Ukraine and Syria, and strategic bomber flights to the limits of North American airspace, suggest a return of great power competition globally. These activities warrant careful monitoring and analysis in concert with the United States and other NATO partners. Although meeting near-peer competitor threats may require new or renewed capabilities in the Canadian Arctic, such as modernizing the north warning system, I would highlight that these threats are not borne of Arctic-specific sovereignty issues or disputes.

Russian military activities in its Arctic do not in any obvious way relate to environmental change or maritime corridors, or military threats in or to our Canadian Arctic. Commentators often make a false correlation by conflating Arctic issues, those threats emerging in and from the region itself, with global, grand strategic issues that may have an Arctic nexus but are appropriately dealt with at a global rather than narrowly regional level. In my view, this must be reflected in official Canadian policy, or the policy itself may create the very misperceptions that build mistrust and create conflict.

In short, Canada and Russia will find themselves on different sides in an era of renewed great power rivalry, but I do not think that this general state of competition portends Arctic conflict. Instead, there is still room for substantive co-operation and collaboration in the circumpolar world in areas of common interest, which I am happy to discuss, based on respect for each Arctic state's sovereignty and sovereign rights, as long as circumpolar co-operation is not held political hostage to broader geostrategic rivalries.

Although some media and academic commentators point to China as an emerging military competitor or sovereignty threat in the Arctic, I have argued in a recently co-authored book that this is based on speculation and I don't think it has any basis in verifiable evidence. Accordingly, I would suggest to you that alleged Chinese threats to Canadian Arctic sovereignty are a red herring that should not deflect attention or resources from more important issues.

Now, lest I be accused of being naive about China's Arctic interests, I'd like to qualify that statement by explaining that there are security and safety issues that arise from the activities of China and other non-Arctic states in our Arctic. These could include espionage, resource development or shipping activities that harm the environment, and even the loss of Canadian economic sovereignty. I would argue, however, that these are not “Arctic sovereignty” issues as we typically discuss them, and are best considered in the broader context of Canada's relationship with China as an emerging global actor.

Finally, I'll offer a series of suggestions that I'd be happy to elaborate upon during the question and answer period.

While references to Arctic sovereignty and security have been conspicuously absent from official Government of Canada statements on the Arctic since November 2015, public opinion polls conducted over the last decade have demonstrated that these concepts resonate with Canadian audiences. Accordingly, it's important for official Canadian statements to refer to sovereignty and security, but to be very clear about how these concepts are being used.

Accordingly, I recommend that the Government of Canada adopt a legal definition of sovereignty in its public messaging to avoid confusion, particularly when it comes to international audiences. A state-based definition used with international audiences should then be complemented by messaging explaining how Canada exercises its sovereignty in partnership with its indigenous peoples as rights holders within our country who also have particular rights internationally.

Second, Arctic coastal states hold, under international law, specific interests and responsibilities in the Arctic Ocean region. In exercising these rights, Canada should undertake full consultations with its domestic stakeholders—provinces, territories, indigenous governments and organizations—prior to international meetings and negotiations. This does not change the legal reality that the delineation of the outer limits of the Arctic continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles is a process that is conducted by states.

Given the UNCLOS article 76 process, Canada's ongoing research to delineate the limits of its continental shelf is aimed at fulfilling its obligations as a coastal state. The rights to a continental shelf are already ours as a party to UNCLOS and have nothing to do with historic rights, occupation or usage. Presuming that the science supports our case, our continental shelf will overlap that claimed by our Arctic Ocean neighbours. Efforts to foster dialogue with all our coastal state neighbours, including Russia, should be encouraged, as the eventual resolution of this critical issue for Canada will necessarily involve negotiations between all the concerned parties. This is not a cause for alarm but a process that can serve the national interests of all the Arctic coastal states.

Finally, we cannot solve the Northwest Passage issue with the United States bilaterally. This is a pipe dream. Instead, I urge you to recall an important point made by Professor Lalonde last week that the difference of opinion on the legal status of transit rights through Canada's Arctic waters is an international one, not a bilateral one. Countries like China are playing their cards close to their chests, as she explained to you. There is no simple solution to this long-standing issue, and anyone offering one, I would argue, is ignorant of history and of evolving international political realities.

Nevertheless, our legal position is not in jeopardy. We should operate from a position of confidence. Our Arctic foreign policy should reiterate, wherever possible, that Canada welcomes navigation in our waters in the Arctic as we do elsewhere, provided that ships respect Canadian regulations related to safety, security, protection of the environment and Inuit interests. This includes vessels from countries like China and Russia, whether research icebreakers or cruise ships, that comply with Canadian regulations. This approach also means having robust capabilities to maintain vigilance in ensuring that these vessels are not undertaking activities that are against Canadian laws or counter to our national interests.

Finally, we need to embrace the benefits of working with our allies and circumpolar partners to maintain a rules-based order in the Arctic. This does not require amplifying safety and security issues into so-called sovereignty threats that seldom warrant a long-term investment of resources, both material and intellectual. Instead, I would argue, we need to convince Canadians across the country that we already have Arctic sovereignty. We just need the national will to help northerners realize their dreams for the region as fellow Canadians.

Thank you.

[The Chair]

Thank you very much to you both.

We'll go straight to questions, and we'll begin with MP O'Toole, please.

[Erin O'Toole, Conservative, Durham, ON]

Thank you very much.

Thank you both for your presentations.

Dr. Shadian, I read your op-ed with Clint Davis in the Globe some months ago. I worked with Clint when I was on Bay Street and he was at CCAB.

You're probably the first person who has really talked in economic terms with respect to the Arctic. I'd love to expand upon that. On the vision statement you were looking to that no politician has articulated, I think Diefenbaker did with his “roads to resources”.

[Dr. Jessica M. Shadian]

We're still talking about it.

[Erin O'Toole, Conservative, Durham, ON]

Yes. In the modern sense, we have not.

Where do you see partnerships between levels of government and indigenous development corporations? Is there a vehicle the federal government should be providing to allow the prioritization of infrastructure to be Inuit-led?

[Dr. Jessica M. Shadian]

That's a great question. Thank you.

I would say it should be done by a combination of the federal government, indigenous development corporations and private capital.

Of late, I've been working with many Inuit first nation development corporations on trying to educate Bay Street about the north and to dispel the stereotypes. We're trying to take Bay Street up to the north and bring folks from the indigenous development corporations to the south to do internships. It has been a slow process, and I've received a wide range of comments, from really bad negative stereotypes to.... I've piqued a few persons' interest.

There is now the beginning of an interest coming from Bay Street, I would say. I feel as though I have to reel them in one at a time, and I feel very happy when I actually do it. It's amazing to see the light bulb go on. One of the pension plans actually came with me to the Arctic Circle conference in Reykjavik. You're just blown away. How is it that we don't know about all of this?

I would say, then, that it's a tripartite effort. It's the federal government, and it should come from the territories and indigenous development corporations themselves. We also need the help of private capital. This would provide a lot of avenues for us to understand how to bring indigenous equity into these public-private partnerships, and also show what kind of public-private partnerships are possible and thus what the federal government should be doing to provide incentives.

[Erin O'Toole, Conservative, Durham, ON]

Let me stop you there.

The Liberal government is doing this, just not in Canada. It has tasked Ambassador Blanchard to speak to pension funds and private capital about investing in the developing world under sustainable development goals, as part of its UN Security Council seat bid. The frustration I have is that we have an infrastructure gap—that's an understatement—for the north, and we have Inuit who are frustrated with the Prime Minister for treating their areas like a park and not even consulting on declaring vast stretches of the Arctic as out of bounds for resource development, and then pushing private sector money to go to developing countries overseas.

Do you think that same approach should be applied not through its UN bid, but perhaps partnering with first...?

[Dr. Jessica M. Shadian]

It should be both, possibly. The thing is that we're going against the grain. Normally there isn't an emerging market in the OECD, but when you look at Alaska, Canada and Greenland together, they are absolutely an emerging market, with many of the same characteristics of an emerging market anywhere else in the world, minus possibly a lot of the risk factors because they're stable economies.

What Canada does in the international development realm is really important, but I also think that we should be thinking of our own north as a real opportunity.

[Erin O'Toole, Conservative, Durham, ON]

I've been talking about this for some time. Part of our sovereignty claim—and I've heard Professor Lackenbauer and previous witnesses say they don't even like us talking about this—and part of the Canadian insecurity is about our lack of presence in our north. That lack of presence doesn't exist for our partners in the north. Their northern stretch has 0.5% of our population and 40% of our land mass.

I've proposed a few times that the federal government, through National Defence, put in infrastructure and follow up with what former prime minister Harper did for Nanisivik. Many airports are worried about a lack of service because of a lack of runways. We should put in infrastructure dollars as part of an overall NATO 2% plan that also includes infrastructure in the Arctic, which has the by-product advantage of helping exert our presence in the north.

What are your thoughts on that approach?

[Dr. Jessica M. Shadian]

I would take more of an economic approach. The military stuff would come as a by-product of a rationale that would create an infrastructure system.

There are so many projects out there that everyone is trying to see funded in the north. Everyone wants their own project done, because there's not that much money. I think there needs to be a larger strategy. We need to think of ways to connect those projects together, and they need to be taken—

[Erin O'Toole, Conservative, Durham, ON]

If we took airports and ports off the territorial list, because the federal government would be responsible for those, that would shorten the list down to roadways and a number of economic development-focused projects.

[Dr. Jessica M. Shadian]

Also, it would be roads that would be leading to resource development projects, which would be leading to ports. A lot of these are connected activities.

I think that to put military just to put military is not really going to serve a purpose. There's no reason it couldn't look like northern Norway. Some of the Arctic countries are not worrying about presence in their own north. It's filled with vibrant economies, and there's no reason it couldn't be the same here. I would hesitate to put all of the focus on military. I think the focus should be on economic development, and then the military infrastructure would come with that, obviously. That would be my take on it.

[The Chair]

Thank you very much, Dr. Shadian.

We will now go to MP Saini, please.

[Raj Saini, Liberal, Kitchener Centre, ON]

Thank you very much to both of you for coming here.

Dr. Shadian, I'll start with you. I'll go back to the Fairbanks Declaration of 2017. Something important that came out of there was the funding model for their permanent participants. The endowment that was created provided some stability in terms of an annual funding model for them and also funding for projects that were specific to collaborative initiatives.

One thing that was not.... I go back to an article that I read. You talked about infrastructure specifically, saying that it will cost at least $1 trillion for infrastructure spending in the north. No country or entity, I don't think, can do it by itself. However, you have eight Arctic Council members. You have 39 observer states. You have six permanent participants who are there. Let's just focus on the observer states.

Right now, they are limited by a 50% spending rule when it comes to specific projects. If we are really going to tackle the infrastructure problem in the north, do you still believe that the observers should be limited by that 50% rule, or should there somehow be a more collaborative nature, irrespective of how much someone is spending, to make sure that the north is developed in the way that it should be?

[Dr. Jessica M. Shadian]

Actually, that's an interesting question, and it came up because Global Affairs Canada was at a panel that I participated in at the Arctic Circle, and it was talking a lot about this infrastructure piece.

Because the focus of Global Affairs Canada has largely been on the Arctic Council, it was posed to me what the Arctic Council could do to address some of these issues. I think this speaks a little bit, maybe, to what you're talking about. There has been discussion out there and interest from various entities in creating some sort of investment vehicle for the Arctic, whether it's some sort of investment fund or infrastructure bank. I kind of mentioned that maybe this would be something that would be an appropriate discussion topic for the Arctic Council because you would have all the heads of state of the Arctic countries. You'd also have the observers there to be part of this discussion.

Obviously China has a lot more money than some of the other Arctic states. It's a way for them to be a part, rather than thinking in terms of how much they could be spending in terms of direct participation in the Arctic Council—

[Raj Saini, Liberal, Kitchener Centre, ON]

I have a separate question for you, Professor Lackenbauer. I don't have that much time. That's why I want to make sure... These two questions are important to me.

The second question I have is specific to you, Professor Lackenbauer. When the Kiruna Declaration was signed in 2013, there were six observer countries that were added—China, India, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Singapore—which I find an interesting bunch of countries that are interested in the Arctic.

You wrote specifically on India. I'm not going to use India as a test case, but there are certain themes that came out of that article that you wrote that I wanted to explore a bit in terms of the geopolitical ramifications of allowing those six observer countries to join the other observer countries.

India had an Antarctic model, which it was using, but through whatever reasoning, it's not going to be applicable to the Arctic model. Something that came out of that paper, highlighted by India, was the global commons—the idea that this area would be able to be used by anybody, not just the Arctic coastal states.

Something else that came out of there, which was equally important, was the fact that now we have different definitions of what is going on there. You highlighted those definitions by saying either Arctic race, Arctic saga, polar lows or polar preserve.

Not using India necessarily as an example, but talking about the geopolitical strategy of the new great game and looking at all the people who are involved there—Italy, Japan, Republic of South Korea, Singapore, and 34 or 35 other observer countries—just so it could be better explained, which way are we headed geopolitically in the definition that you prescribe in your paper?

[Prof. Whitney Lackenbauer]

Thanks for the question. It's a wonderful one.

Looking at India is fascinating, in that it shows how some of the preconceived notions that have been developed by non-Arctic states in the context of other parts of the world, in the case of India, during the non-aligned movement era of the 1950s, looking at Antarctica and transposing that model onto the Arctic, which is a very poor analogue to Antarctica—the Arctic of course being primarily an ocean rather than a continent, and also much of it falling within the sovereign space of different coastal states, and of course having people—is pretty key. Watching Indian commentators become more sophisticated in their understandings of the Arctic over the last decade and refining their appraisals of what the Arctic future should look like, to my mind, gives hope that we are indeed heading towards a polar saga, as opposed to a polar race.

One of the other lines of reasoning coming out of some of the Indian commentaries was that in fact it was the responsibility of non-Arctic states such as India to save the developing Arctic world—those smug Arctic capitalist countries—from destroying the planet by exploiting resources in a highly vulnerable area. In fact, India was almost beginning to position itself as being, as it did back in the days of the non-aligned movement, the voice for the marginalized, to ensure that the planet was going to be sustainable.

I think that India's becoming an accredited observer—and according to the rules of the Kiruna Declaration it's a very circumscribed role, by no means in any way giving it a role comparable with that of the Arctic states, such as Canada—has actually encouraged an education process. It's great to have questions coming from outside the Arctic world.

At the same time, it's a great opportunity for countries such as Canada to play a leading role, as we espouse we are doing, in educating the world about this future and ensuring that it's one that can actually create conditions from which everybody can benefit.

[Raj Saini, Liberal, Kitchener Centre, ON]

The reason I mentioned India is that you said certain things in that article, especially about climate change and the warming of that area but also about the fact that India's annual rainfall depends on the monsoon season, which brings 80% of its rain. Even countries that don't have any coastal connection per se will still be affected by the actions that happen in the Arctic.

If we broaden it out further, outside the eight nations to the 39, would that not geopolitically reduce the risk of anything really serious happening, but also increase the participation of those countries to make sure that things are done moderately and governed well?

[The Chair]

I'll limit you to a yes or no kind of answer to that, because we're out of time.

[Prof. Whitney Lackenbauer]

Yes. It's helpful, especially in the realm of science, to have partnerships with experts from all around the world, including non-Arctic states, and certainly knowledge is in my mind conducive to peace and prosperity.

[Raj Saini, Liberal, Kitchener Centre, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair]

We will go to MP Blaikie, please.