Evidence of meeting #111 for Foreign Affairs and International Development in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was infrastructure.
A recording is available from Parliament.
4:40 p.m.
Mr. Michael Levitt (York Centre, Lib.)
Thank you very much.
We are now going to go straight to Professor Perry.
4:40 p.m.
David Perry Vice-president, Senior Analyst and Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, As an Individual
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair and members of the committee, for the invitation to speak to you today as part of your study on Canadian sovereignty in our Arctic.
For my opening remarks, knowing that I would be testifying alongside Dr. Charron, whose views on sovereignty I almost consistently agree with, I decided to focus on the aspect of your study addressing Russian militarization of their northern territories and the implications of that for Canada.
These hearings are happening at an important time, because the strategic environment in and around Canada's Arctic is becoming increasingly complicated. Advances in military modernization by Russia are presenting increasing levels of threat to Canada and our allies in and through the Arctic. These factors require Canada to treat the defence of Canada against conventional military threats more seriously than it has in the past and to enhance our ability to defend Canada and North America in the Canadian Arctic.
Canada's policy regarding the Arctic is strangely inconsistent however. With our NATO allies, we are strongly committed to the defence of Europe and the deterrence of Russia, including in the Arctic. In fact, at present we are currently sending roughly 2,000 troops, four ships and 11 aircraft to participate in NATO's exercise Trident Juncture in Norway. Part of the objective of that exercise is to “ensure that NATO forces are trained, able to operate together, and ready to respond to any threat from any direction.”
Yet, as previous testimony from Canadian officials as part of this committee's study has indicated, Canada's official position is that the Canadian Arctic is a zone for peace and co-operation. That is certainly a desirable outcome. To increase the chances of actually realizing that, I think Canada should strengthen its ability to understand what is happening in our Arctic and bolster our defences there in an effort to better deter Russia.
In doing so, we would be taking the same prudent approach in the Canadian Arctic that we employ in Europe and the North Atlantic with NATO of increasing our defensive posture and deterring Russian aggression. As our chief of defence staff, General Vance, has stated that it is difficult to conceive of a strategic threat to Europe that would not also manifest itself in North America. At present, the most likely source of such threats would be the Russian north. For this reason it is time for Canada to treat the entire Arctic as an integrated strategic region and to adopt a more consistent defence approach.
I say this because over the last several years, the Russian military has significantly upgraded its air and naval forces and continues to do so. Much of this activity, including that related to Russian strategic forces, has been concentrated in the Russian north. The Russians have demonstrated the effectiveness of this new equipment as well as a willingness to use it to advance their own interests.
In Syria specifically, they've employed a sophisticated class of conventional air- and sea-launched cruise missiles that have greatly increased range, are difficult to observe and are capable of precision targeting. Three aspects of this are particularly troubling. First, these weapons come in both nuclear and conventional variants, therefore complicating efforts to assess the nature of Russian activity and providing them additional options for escalation in a crisis, which could increase the chances of miscalculation. Second, these missiles can be carried by Russian long-range patrol aircraft as well as their newest and most capable submarines. Patrols of both these aircraft and submarines have increased in the last several years, with the latter now reaching levels not seen since the Cold War. Third, because of the increased distances at which these new missiles can successfully hit targets and their low observability characteristics, the current arrangements for defending North America will have to be upgraded to counter them effectively.
Given the basing arrangements for many of these Russian assets, the Canadian Arctic will be heavily implicated in any future arrangements to successfully defend North America against these threats.
The increased Russian military activity in the Arctic requires that Canada enhance our understanding of what is happening in all of our air and maritime approaches and especially those in the Canadian Arctic. To that end, progress should be made to further upgrade and extend the life of existing platforms that conduct intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and to acquire new means of doing so to improve our ability to maintain awareness of any activity in our own territory. This should include upgrading the Canadian component of the north warning system with something better suited to both current and future threat environments.
In addition, the government should move quickly to replace our fighter aircraft with a fleet of highly capable fighters that are fully interoperable with the United States Air Force, with whom Canada defends North America often over the Canadian Arctic and its approaches.
Further, the government needs to invest in anti-submarine warfare capabilities to be able to detect and deter Russian submarine activity. Canada's submarines, our most capable anti-submarine warfare assets, are approaching the end of their current lifespan. The modernization and life extension of that fleet should be expedited and a project to acquire new submarines that could patrol all three of Canada's ocean approaches should be launched as soon as possible.
Finally, Russian developments require Canada to improve its ability to operate across the entire breadth of our Arctic. While Canada has a number of military assets that it can deploy to our north, they are almost exclusively based in southern Canada.
The transit time to the Arctic is lengthy, and the infrastructure in our north is limited. Advances in Russian military technology mean that Canada needs to improve its ability to quickly move forces into the Arctic and project them further north than we have previously. This all requires significant improvements in Canada's logistical footprint in the Canadian north.
Canada's “Strong, Secure, Engaged” defence policy has made a number of commitments that would directly address many of these issues, once those initiatives are actually implemented. To date, though, aside from the recent launch of the first Arctic and offshore patrol ship, it is difficult to find evidence of progress in actually implementing these initiatives.
To respond to Russian militarization of their northern territories, Canada should expedite the implementation of the Arctic initiatives in “Strong, Secure, Engaged”, and adopt a consistent approach to defending against and deterring Russia in the entire Arctic region, including the portion that is Canadian.
Thank you.
4:50 p.m.
Mr. Michael Levitt (York Centre, Lib.)
Thank you very much.
Let's move straight to questions.
We're going to begin where we left off, with MP Alleslev.
4:50 p.m.
Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill, CPC
Thank you very much, to both of you, for a very compelling and informative presentation.
There are many who have argued at this committee that Russia and China are not military threats in our Arctic. They do not justify concern in any way on our part, and therefore, we don't need to change our behaviour.
I'm wondering if you could comment and provide your perspective. If that's the case, has it changed recently, and have we changed?
4:50 p.m.
Vice-president, Senior Analyst and Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, As an Individual
I'll go first if that's okay, Dr. Charron.
I would disagree with that assessment. I would agree with the assessment by officials at NORAD that both Russia and China do present threats to Canada. I would also add—
4:50 p.m.
Vice-president, Senior Analyst and Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, As an Individual
More generally, but particularly through the Arctic, because like it or not, our Arctic is between at least portions of those countries and over flight paths to the rest of Canada and the United States.
Even if we don't think there's a direct threat to Canada, I think that most senior American officials believe there is one to their country, and our Arctic is unfortunately in between.
4:50 p.m.
Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill, CPC
Do perhaps American perceptions and Canadian perceptions differ in this area?
4:50 p.m.
Vice-president, Senior Analyst and Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, As an Individual
They would seem to differ, because the only Canadian officials, to my recollection, who would adopt the same characterization that I have are those working for the NORAD command in Colorado Springs.
4:50 p.m.
Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill, CPC
Ms. Charron, could you give us your thoughts?
4:50 p.m.
Director and Associate Professor, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
I too look to NORAD for an indication of the level of threats for Russia and China, and it's not specific to the Arctic. I think one of the problems is that Canada treats the Arctic as being separate and apart from the rest of Canada, but it's fundamental to what Canada is.
What we're seeing, though, is that both countries, and especially Russia, have the capability to hit us. They don't need to come even close to our Arctic. It used to be the case that they had to come deep into Canadian territory before they could launch anything that might hit either southern Canada or the continental U.S. Now, that's no longer the case. They can launch missiles from deep in Russian territory.
That's why the Canadian government has done a few things, such as realign, or align the Canadian air defence identification zones. NORAD is undergoing a study called EVONAD, the “Evolution of North American Defence”. What we need to do in all cases, whether it's Russia, China, or whether it's any threat to North America, is to look up and out to try to stop the threat as far away from North America as possible.
Again, these are not discussions that are particular to the Arctic. In most cases, the Arctic is simply the avenue of an attack; it's not the destination of the attack. However, we cannot separate the Arctic from the rest of Canada.
4:50 p.m.
Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill, CPC
Outstanding.
Would you say that their capabilities—the enemy capabilities—have increased, while at the same time, perhaps our capabilities to address those increased capabilities have not kept pace?
4:50 p.m.
Director and Associate Professor, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
If that's directed at me, I think the general suggestion is yes, we're seeing that China and Russia have invested heavily in all sorts of weapons, and not the conventional sort. We're looking at what they can do in terms of cyber-meddling and cyber-offensive action. Both are investing heavily in what we call hypersonic weapons, which then allow for missiles to skip along the atmosphere and come at us at Mach 5 or 6.
They're putting a lot of effort into capabilities, but the other side of that, of course, is intention. We're still trying to understand the intentions. That's why I might differ a bit from Dr. Perry, in that I see opportunities when it comes to conversations on the Arctic about search and rescue, the Arctic fishing moratorium. This is an avenue of diplomacy where we can talk about shared interests and perhaps have side conversations that might give us a clear indication of exactly what the intentions are.
I know right now, concern for Russia is the GIUK gap. We have certainly dropped the ball on monitoring that. However, with regard to the Canadian Arctic as the specific target, I don't think that's the concern.
4:55 p.m.
Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill, CPC
Mr. Perry, could you give us some thoughts on intentions, and then an idea of where Canada's role with NATO should lie in this conversation?
4:55 p.m.
Vice-president, Senior Analyst and Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, As an Individual
Intentions can change a lot faster than capability. Certainly in the case of the Russian government, they now have the capability. They've demonstrated it in Syria, and if you draw straight-line distances from what they have demonstrated in that country, then we have room to be concerned. They've demonstrated an ability to do some of the things Dr. Charron was talking about at distances the current systems designed to defend North America aren't effectively positioned to defend us against.
There has been enough indication of other Russian malign intent—in Syria and in eastern Europe and Ukraine, as well as some of the attacks they've conducted in the United Kingdom—that would indicate they are a revisionist country that is looking to change the status quo. Even beyond that, though, if it's not yet clear they have intentions to do something towards Canada, the fact they're acting in what you could construe as an aggressive manner presents a significant possibility of miscalculation on their part, which could end up providing us with the same type of defensive challenge as it would if they were doing something with intent. Again, intentions can certainly change.
With respect to NATO, we're doing all the right things. The inconsistency for Canada is that we seem to draw a large imaginary line around the west coast of Greenland. West of that we treat the Arctic in a fundamentally different way than we do from Greenland east. From Greenland east, Canada is an active member of the NATO alliance, deterring and attempting to provide enhanced defensive measures against Russia in the North Atlantic at sea, and on the ground soon in Norway—right up to the Arctic Circle, I believe, from some of the discussions about Trident Juncture—as well as in the air. However, we seem to have a fundamentally different approach and characterization of the Arctic once you get west of Greenland.
4:55 p.m.
Vice-president, Senior Analyst and Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, As an Individual
I think it should, because I don't understand the logic of having that bifurcated approach.
4:55 p.m.
Mr. Michael Levitt (York Centre, Lib.)
Thank you.
With that, we will now go to MP Baylis, please.
4:55 p.m.
Frank Baylis Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.
We've heard a lot about the infrastructure gap. Both of you are clearly making the argument that we should be investing in military infrastructure, but I have a question here. Say there are limited resources, and we can invest a lot in the military or we can invest a lot in, like you mentioned, civilian housing, nutrition and all kinds of things like that. What would be the priority?
Given you want to do everything, and we're not doing anything but we want to do something, what would be the priority?
4:55 p.m.
Vice-president, Senior Analyst and Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, As an Individual
For me, taking a defence approach, it should be placed more on the defence infrastructure. There's been a lot of focus in recent years on some of that other socio-economic development. I would fundamentally agree there's a need for it, but I think there hasn't been enough attention on the more specific defence applications.
4:55 p.m.
Vice-president, Senior Analyst and Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, As an Individual
At the present time, yes.
4:55 p.m.
Director and Associate Professor, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
That's a tough one. I'm not so sure. That's the wicked problem that you have, as members of Parliament. You have all these competing needs and you need to prioritize them.
I like to look at Canada's national interest, though, as a guide. If we don't have the national interests protected, then we're talking about a very different Canada. Consistently, our national interests have been the economic success of Canada, the defence of Canada—and with that North America—and then preserving this liberal world order that we seem to be losing, in which case economic success can also be helped by an Arctic that can contribute more to our GDP. It's going to be a tough call, though.
October 24th, 2018 / 4:55 p.m.
Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.
In the movie business, if you show a gun in the first act, you have to use it in the third act. We buy all this weaponry. We could play a stunt like what happened with Russia in Turkey, where they kept quietly invading their airspace, and suddenly the president decided to shoot down a plane and all hell broke loose.
Would we, as Canadians, be ready for that eventuality? Let's say we bought that type of plane, and we had these encroachments occurring. Would we be ready to do that, or would we spend this money and not actually use it? What are your thoughts on that?