Thank you very much for the invitation.
I thought it might be helpful to pull together the testimonies heard to date. The conclusion I have reached is that there are two seemingly contradictory schools of thought on Arctic sovereignty, yet they are arguing for the same ends. For decades we have heard many arguments that Canada's Arctic sovereignty is in peril—or that it is not. What is fascinating, however, is that both schools are urging action to the same common ends.
The common theme is as follows. Successive governments fail to provide enough resources and/or policy guidance to either re-establish presumably lost Arctic sovereignty or maintain the status quo of just enough sovereignty. Both camps have raised valid concerns, but the solutions are lost because of the opaqueness, misunderstanding and misuse of the term “sovereignty”.
Southern Canadians use sovereignty as a shorthand replacement to suggest they have a general fear or concern about something but can't always articulate exactly what, or how to ameliorate the situation. What is more, successive Canadian governments have used sovereignty as a catch-all response to demonstrate concern about Canadian interests without needing to be very specific about what is being done or addressed. The term “exercising” sovereignty suggests all-or-nothing solutions, when what's been recommended are resources and nuanced responses that are not in the abstract or in theory. Furthermore, the term confuses and confounds allies and Arctic states, as Canada is the outlier in referencing sovereignty threats rather than threats to the homeland or capability gaps or surveillance challenges.
Here are four issues that both schools agree need to have continued support, now and in the future.
The first is all-domain awareness in the air, sea, land, space and cyber domains. Operation Limpid is part of that puzzle, as is the common maritime operating picture provided by the MSOCs. We have NORAD's two warning missions and the information provided by government departments and allies, yet a vital source of domain awareness, the north warning system, is coming to the end of its serviceable life. Resources are not earmarked for its replacement or reimagining. At the same time, we've heard that the RADARSAT constellations launch is now delayed.
Of course, all of these missions are under enormous resource and personnel pressures. What keeps me up at night is that I am not sure, for example, we'll be able to attract, train and retain personnel in all of Canada's safety, security and defence-related fields. This is not specific to the Arctic. Even the very successful ranger program and now the new Coast Guard Auxiliary program are in competition to attract the same individuals.
The second issue is the continuous governance challenges in the Arctic, such as the lack of services for the peoples of the Arctic—and for remote communities in Canada in general, for that matter. Housing prices are still too high, and the supply is too low. Nutrition North is not achieving the ends it seeks, which is to ensure that affordable, nutritious food is available. Businesses operate, but note that the growing bureaucratic red tape is making it difficult. Canada will not be able to attract or retain entrepreneurs if we can't guarantee the basic services. If projects like the retrofitting of an existing deepwater port take over a decade to materialize, this sends the wrong message.
It is perhaps not surprising, then, that Canada's Arctic is the only one of the eight Arctic states that has a stagnant Arctic GDP, as reported in the last “Arctic Human Development Report”. At the same time, we do know of some successes—for example, the new Arctic region announced today by the ITK, Fisheries and Oceans, and the Canadian Coast Guard. These are all steps in the right direction.
Third, every witness has been asked about Russia and China. These are questions that should be posed not only in the context of Canada's Arctic but in general. These potential near-peer competitors, coupled with the U.S., which seems determined to break or ignore international norms, rules and organizations that have allowed it and Canada to thrive to date, are not helped by discussions about sovereignty. Rather, we need analysis regarding intentions and capabilities.
NORAD and the Canadian Armed Forces have articulated their concerns about the capabilities that Russia possesses. They can reach Canada and the U.S. from Russian territory. China too has been investing in weapons that could threaten Canada, not the Arctic specifically.
Where discussions become very muddy is with respect to intentions because of the sovereignty debate. It is clear that the Arctic has proven to be a zone of co-operation, and it is thanks to the Arctic Council, numerous international laws and rules, not to mention Canadian laws, such as the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, or tools such as NORDREG, and of course Russia's and China's adherence to those rules to date.
Canada's attention needs to be on encouraging and fostering this co-operation and these accomplishments, like the High Arctic commercial fishing moratorium, which was just signed.
Finally, with respect to the Northwest Passage, it seems to me that all of the witnesses, and even the world, agree that it is Canadian. The arguments are about the rules that Canada can or should adopt to facilitate responsible shipping, protect wildlife and promote Canada's economy, regardless of its status.
Both sovereignty schools have argued for similar solutions and these ends. Canada needs to operationalize the Arctic maritime corridors initiative, which then prioritizes the location for navigational aids, future mapping efforts and sets the path for bathymetric surveys.
By continuing to fixate on sovereignty with references to the Arctic, there are some very serious problems that are obfuscated, and discussions we are not having with regard to Canada's national interests that transcend the Arctic, i.e., Canada's economic future, its defence and the future of a rapidly deteriorating liberal world order.
Thank you.
