Foreign Affairs Committee on Nov. 19th, 2018

[The Chair, Liberal, Michael Levitt]

Thank you very much, Ms. Gagnon.

We will now move straight to Ms. Stigant, please.

[Susan Stigant, Director, Africa Program, United States Institute of Peace, As an Individual]

Thank you.

Good evening. It's a pleasure to be here before the committee. Thank you for continuing to bring focus to the situation in South Sudan, Somalia and the DRC.

My name is Susan Stigant and I am currently the director for Africa programs at the United States Institute of Peace.

For those of you who don't know USIP, USIP is an independent, non-partisan institute that was established by the U.S. Congress over 30 years ago with a mission to prevent, manage and resolve violent conflict globally. Given that it's an independent, non-partisan institute, the views that I express here are my own and do not represent those of USIP.

In preparation for today's meeting I've had the opportunity to read the transcripts and the briefs from the other witnesses, and I think they have very clearly documented the fragility in the three countries that are under study. They have underlined the depth of the humanitarian crisis and truly some of the worst things that humans do to other humans around the world.

They have highlighted the critical role of both Canadian and national civil society in designing and delivering development assistance. They have underscored the need for political solutions to conflicts, and they have identified clear opportunities for Canadian engagement around Canadian policy objectives.

Rather than talking about the specific dynamics in each country I thought I would draw out three themes that I think resonate across the three countries.

The first, for me, is that it's helpful to look beyond the horizon, both forwards and backwards. So often we are focused on the emergency and the urgent matter at hand—and we should be. These are serious human rights and humanitarian situations. But it gives us little time to reflect on where we have come from and where we are going.

For example, in the DRC the focus today is on getting the elections done by December 23, or maybe with a slight delay. This is an awesome task, with 100,000 polling stations, new voting machines, logistics, very little logistics capacity, the opposition efforts to come together falling apart and civil society struggling. The priority has been very much to hold the elections and to ensure that President Kabila does not run again.

The history of elections in the DRC tells us that the international community needs to be prepared for post-election disputes. We know that it's very likely the opposition will reject the results. We know it's very likely that there will be an outcry over disenfranchisement because of violence and armed group action. We know that there will likely be confusion and chaos around tabulation and transmission and counting.

Consistently in DRC we've seen that this has led to people going to the streets to protest and often to heavy-handed response by the government.

Ultimately then we will have a new government that inherits all of the challenges of the past and ends up, in fact, further behind in trying to establish the healthy state-society relationship that we know is needed.

Today what's needed are preparations to know what happens in the immediate post-election period, and then what next. This means sustained engagement and inclusion with civil society as well as with political parties. These transitions that take place very quickly are often the culmination of a very long period of development that we don't always see because we're so focused on what's immediately ahead of us.

Similarly in South Sudan there has been considerable focus on making the revitalized peace agreement work. The narrative that I continually hear is that this is all that we have and it's the best chance for the South Sudanese.

I spent six years living and working in South Sudan during what people call the “good days” after the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement. I will tell you that South Sudanese people hoped for much more than what they're experiencing today.

It's a challenging balance to strike. You clearly hear the hope and determination of the South Sudanese to make the most of the space. The door is open, wedge your foot in, hold it and get as much as you can out of it. But we also see an agreement that does not fundamentally change the underlying logic that puts together a power-sharing arrangement that has failed not once, but twice, and really, the odds seem to be stacked against it.

The guarantors are an unlikely pair of countries—Uganda and Sudan—that have never agreed on very much in the last while, but now have come together towards this. This isn't to say that the international community shouldn't do its best to take advantage of where things are and to make the most of the situation, but it also means that there needs to be a clear plan B.

For example, the end of the peace agreement is premised on an electoral transition in a three-year period. I would recall that this civil war started because of the political competition leading into the anticipated 2015 elections. What is our strategy to get things changed so that the game is played differently and that the result will be different this time?

I also find that there is less attention to some of the dynamics of the political economy of the conflict. The conflict isn't the parallel to the economy. The conflict is the economy. It's important that we understand how assistance and other engagements play into those dynamics.

On the economic front, there has also been little conversation about the massive infusion of funding that will be needed to stabilize the economy. In a workshop that we did recently, we asked people to calculate on the back of a napkin what it would cost to stabilize, and the numbers were around $400 million for the first year. This is just to back the pounds that are currently in circulation. There's a disturbing article in The Washington Post today that says an associate professor at the University of Juba would have to save for more than two months to be able to buy a chicken to feed his family. This is how far inflation has gone in the country.

My second theme is about calibrating regional and transregional dynamics. So often we tend to look at policies and approaches focused on a single country. In the DRC, however, we know that the relationship with Uganda, Rwanda and the other Great Lakes countries is critical, and that the role of South Africa in advancing a political solution will be absolutely critical going forward.

Somalia is particularly interesting in this regard. We've always looked at Somalia and understood its strategic positioning because of maritime security and piracy. There's been less attention to what flows across the Red Sea region. Many times we think of the Red Sea as the border between Africa on the one hand, and the gulf and the Middle East on the other, but increasingly we see that transregional security, economic and political dynamics are impacting peace and security in the Horn of Africa.

For example, over the last year, the division in the gulf between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates on one side and Qatar on the other, is beginning, it seems, to be reflected in engagement in the Horn of Africa. The federal government of Somalia took a formal position that they would remain neutral in this division in the gulf. However, there was a perception that the Prime Minister received funding from Qatar, and that maybe Qatar was being favoured. Shortly thereafter, negotiations started between the United Arab Emirates and some of the federal member states in Somalia to build ports, a strategic economic and security interest for the UAE in the war in Yemen. This further undermined the delicate balance that is trying to be built between the federal government in Mogadishu and the federal member states outside.

This is a classic multilateral problem that requires a multilateral solution, but at this point there aren't any forums that are fit for purpose. The European Union Council has called for a new Red Sea forum. The African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development are thinking about how to take this forward, but a way forward still very much needs to be identified.

My third theme is the opportunity to link the domestic to the international. I know that many of you in this room have significant populations that come from South Sudan, Somalia or the DRC. We know that conflict and violence are no longer spatially contained. Because of technology and the movement of people, if there is conflict in a country in Africa, it very much affects the populations. We also understand the reverse is possible, where the tensions and dangerous speech that are taking place in the social media space can, in fact, impact the violence in the country.

There are important opportunities to engage diaspora populations and understand that the deep divisions we see in a community are also reflected in the communities in Canada. I would commend to you a recent initiative by the Australian government to try to facilitate dialogue among the South Sudanese diaspora.

In thinking forward, in how Canada could prioritize engagement, I would first encourage a widening of the aperture. So often we are focused on countries, but a regional strategy is really needed. The European Union and the United Nations have envoys who cover the Horn of Africa and look at a broader regional perspective. This allows calibration of priorities across different countries. It allows a single ambassador to travel around and get access to heads of state. This is more than any one, even amazing, ambassador could take on himself or herself. I know that Canada has a past experience of having a special envoy, with Senator Jaffer to Sudan, and then South Sudan, between 2002 and 2006, and that there is the ongoing experience with Bob Rae in Myanmar.

My second recommendation is around Canada's catalytic capacity. I'm struck by the degree of cohesion, and the emergence of a narrative around women's participation and around the Vancouver principles on peacekeeping. I've been struck by the success story I've seen of Canada's engagement in South Sudan. I witnessed that Canada brought together a working group focused on child soldiers and helped to provoke a very important conversation that was not taking place to the degree that it needed to. I witnessed that Canada saw a priority to engage women in the peace process and reached out and worked together with UN women to do that.

But as important as those specific activities are, I was struck at the public diplomacy initiatives that took place where the embassy took visits to the development assistance projects around the country and made them highly visible. Primarily they were around maternal and child health initiatives, so that in communities people were seeing women not just as victims but as survivors.

It also made the point that South Sudan isn't just Juba. It's also about the people who are living outside. It made a clear point that the international community was watching and seeing what was happening outside the capital.

My third recommendation is around Canadian experience and expertise. Canada has unique experiences in managing conflict, diversity and promoting pluralism. This type of approach would be resonant as Somalia continues to figure out their federal system and how to put that into practice. South Sudan is contemplating whether they will keep 32 states or shift to 10 states, but ultimately, this is a question about the relationships between the centre and the state governments.

The role of the Parliament in a federal system is an incredibly difficult and important question, where Canada can play a role.

I will end on something that I think is perhaps the most important, so I saved it for last: a recognition that in these three countries, the population is incredibly young. Africa is going to be the youngest continent. In some countries, more than 70% of the population are youth. In our engagement, we need to think about how we work with that next generation. How do we buffer them from the challenges and the systemic corruption and conflict issues that have plagued the countries, and how can we start to forge relationships with them at an early stage?

I will end on a personal note of thanks. I started my career with the international youth internship program that then-DFAIT ran, where I worked with the parliamentary centre in South Africa. I think that youth engagement very much applies to Canada as well as to our partners in Africa.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Michael Levitt]

Thank you very much to you both for your highly instructive comments. We will open it up.

MP McCauley, you're kicking it off.

[Kelly McCauley, Conservative, Edmonton West, AB]

Welcome. Thank you for the information. It's quite overwhelming. I don't even know where to start. You have to bear with me. I'm going to bounce around with different questions and areas.

How much is north Sudan playing into the problems in South Sudan?

That's to either one of you.

[Susan Stigant]

Sudan hosted the last round of the peace talks and is very much seen by the region as having delivered the peace agreement together with Uganda. We've heard incredible reports that the peace process did not happen in a fully voluntary way. There are reports of intimidation and coercion, particularly of the opposition, which is concerning. Any agreement that's signed under duress we know is less likely to hold.

As part of the normalization of relationships between the U.S. and Sudan, which led to some lifting of sanctions earlier this year, Sudan committed not to interfere, which was defined as not arming opposition groups. The tracking seems to suggest they have been good to their word on that.

Sudan's primary interest is to get the oil flowing again. A lot of money is owed to the Government of Sudan, and the economic situation there is as bad, perhaps even worse, than in South Sudan.

[Kelly McCauley, Conservative, Edmonton West, AB]

You mentioned the child soldiers. In our briefing document, 99% of the child soldiers kidnapped in Somalia are men. We have a well-based focus on maternal health, young women and young girls. Do we risk perhaps not focusing on the young men as well in how we're approaching things?

It's not to criticize what we're doing with our focus on women. That's very valuable. But are we missing out helping the men, perhaps?

[Susan Stigant]

I mentioned a situation of “yes, and”. We increasingly talk about our work not just as women's peace and security, but as gender and peace building, and knowing that we have to understand the relationships between girls and boys and men and women to create that space.

I think it's an important consideration.

[Georgette Gagnon]

Yes, and in some of the work that we're doing, we have what's called a spotlight on youth in a lot of our monitoring. We document how children under 18 are affected by conflict, economically and in every other way, with real attention to the way, as my colleague said, girls and boys experience conflict differentially. Girls are still disproportionately negatively affected, which I think is why we often talk about it more.

That's not to say that boys don't need all kinds of support too, especially in education. You know, there's forced recruitment. Many kids are still forcibly recruited.

[Kelly McCauley, Conservative, Edmonton West, AB]

There's obviously an overwhelming amount of need in the three countries, and we have resources that we're spending there. They're finite. Should we be continuing our path as we're doing, or should we pull back to focus on certain areas? We've talked about the election and about building a civil society, building a structure to deliver services, policing, democracy. Should we focus on one thing and let our allies focus on others?

Are we going down the right path of not a shotgun spread but of apportioning finite resources in so many different areas?

[Susan Stigant]

I think wherever there's an ability to coordinate with international partners, this is the ideal situation, and there have been some useful experiments and pilots that have been based on a compact and a partnership that's made with the host country. It's very much negotiated, agreed upon and driven by the country.

In my mind, we're all facing resource challenges, every country around the world. I think what's more important is the predictability and the sustainability, rather than trying to do it all. I think what we see, particularly in democracy and governance programs and peace building programs is that a lot of money goes in just before the election, and then in the three years in between, there's very little, and it's very difficult to maintain momentum. There's a lot that can be done with a relatively small amount of money, and I think that's the same in other sectors.

[Kelly McCauley, Conservative, Edmonton West, AB]

Why do we go down that path where we support up to the election and then just seem to walk away? Is that just because that's what gets the headlines or that's the sexy part, or are we just ignorant on how to properly help?

[Susan Stigant]

My view is that this is very much driven by.... The things that come into the headlines get people's attention. We say in rhetoric that an election is not an event but a process, but that's not necessarily reflected in how the planning takes place, and as you noted, when things seem to be going well.... A great example is in Kenya. Kenya has had some very difficult elections over the last few years, but as soon as things seem to be on the right track, the money gets shifted somewhere else where the situation seems much worse. I think it's a lesson in the importance of sticking, and sticking with partners.

[Kelly McCauley, Conservative, Edmonton West, AB]

Madam Gagnon.

[Georgette Gagnon]

I don't have much to add to that. I'll just say that it's my experience, in the many countries where I've worked, that donors and member states, as we call them in the UN, do prioritize and take different bundles of work in different areas. So the Canadians will do this and the Swedes will do that, to avoid a lot of duplication and to make sure that projects are long term, not short term, although sometimes you need short-term projects for emergencies or crises.

Building institutions, the rule of law, the security sector reform, the DDR, is long-term, expensive work. Whether anybody likes it or not, that's what it is.

[The Chair, Liberal, Michael Levitt]

Thank you very much.

[Kelly McCauley, Conservative, Edmonton West, AB]

My time's up. Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Michael Levitt]

Now we're going to MP Vandenbeld, please.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

I'd like to thank both of you for what was very compelling testimony, with a lot of information there.

Ms. Stigant, you started your career with the youth international internship program of DFAIT, and so did I, in Bosnia with OSCE actually, where I believe, Ms. Gagnon, you've also worked. I believe you were the country director for NDI in South Sudan at the same time that I was the country director in DRC.

A lot of what you said resonates quite a bit, but what is also a little bit frustrating is that I was in those places in 2011 talking about exactly the same things, talking about the sustainability after the election, making sure we're investing in the institutions and governance structures, and women's participation, and it sounds as if we are here seven years later still talking about the same things.

My first question has to do with what Ms. Gagnon said about accountability. You mentioned multiple areas of accountability, including accountability for the UN mission leadership on protecting civilians. Could you elaborate on that? Then we can talk a bit more about other methods of accountability, but please elaborate in terms of the international community and particularly the UN.

[Georgette Gagnon]

You may know that over the last year and a half or so, the UN has looked at how UN peacekeeping troops and the troop-contributing countries can do better civilian protection. I'm not talking about SEA—if you know what SEA is. I'm talking about just protecting civilians.

There were a number of studies done, and I was part of two special investigations into attacks on the protection of civilian sites in South Sudan that the Secretary-General launched in 2016. Out of that came what is called the POC, or protection of civilians—accountability framework for mission leadership, meaning that all parts of the mission—the military, the political, the security—are responsible for taking certain types of steps and measures to be proactively and robustly protecting civilians. What these two investigations showed was that there were some failures and some issues with the way that civilians were not protected in those POC sites, as they are called.

There has been a lot of work done on it. The answers are clear; they are there. The UN has taken it very seriously and brought forward this framework, which all generals and political leaders have to sign up to and commit to, and then are held accountable for it.

Then there are other initiatives under way too within the UN.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Thank you.

Continuing with accountability, I would like to go to Ms. Stigant about accountability of the government.

We know that in multiple places, the armed groups are either tacitly, or even covertly, openly backed by pro-government forces.

How do we ensure that we have a better governance structure? Elections are one large part of that. However, as you noted, just changing the government alone doesn't change all of the dynamics and the pressures. How do we make sure that we have better accountability between government and civilians and the population, particularly women?

[Susan Stigant]

That is such a great question. It's probably a good dissertation topic.

I think on a very tactical level, if we think about South Sudan, the peace agreement established a ceasefire monitoring mechanism that is there and is working. It has some significant challenges in terms of the timeliness of its reports. That has not been getting faster; it has in fact been getting slower. This is less of a technical problem and more of a political problem, in terms of the regional governments and their willingness to make the reports available.

The second issue is that when those reports come, they tend to be very broad in nature: “All forces should desist from fighting.” That's as opposed to being very specific: “This number of forces should move this far from this location in a way that's verifiable.”

I think that mechanism could also be strengthened by adding in very specific monitoring around particular issues. There could be more monitoring around vulnerability of groups to recruitment, such as child soldiers. There could be more effective monitoring around gender-based violence. One mechanism is to work with what's there.

In terms of the overall transformation of that relationship, we know that's the key. We know that a healthy state-society relationship makes countries resilient to shocks, whether they're natural or conflict. We know this. We also know that a lot of governments are either unable or unwilling to make that change.

The countries we're talking about are in very difficult neighbourhoods, so the willingness of neighbouring leaders to push for a transformative change is not there.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Ms. Gagnon.

[Georgette Gagnon]

I don't have much more to add to that. I think that was a pretty complete answer.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

I would add that in terms of the transformative change, I think having more women in politics and in leadership can often be the thing that causes that.

The other thing I want to ask about is the targeting—

[The Chair, Liberal, Michael Levitt]

You have 30 seconds, so it's going to have to be a quick question.