Foreign Affairs Committee on Dec. 3rd, 2018

[The Chair, Mr. Michael Levitt (York Centre, Lib.)]

I call the meeting to order.

Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to the 118th meeting of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

As we begin, I'd like to acknowledge the presence in the room of former minister of justice Irwin Cotler, and also of the Peruvian ambassador to Canada, Ambassador Roberto Rodriguez Arnillas.

As we begin today's hearing, I want to explain that we are undertaking a meeting on the continuously deteriorating situation in Venezuela and its terrible regional and hemispheric impacts. As a result of the political and economic crisis in Venezuela, an estimated three million Venezuelan migrants and refugees have fled in search of safety and opportunity.

The statistics out of Venezuela are heartbreaking. Its economy has lost over 40% of its GDP and it is in its fifth year of recession. Poverty affects 87% of Venezuelans, 90% of whom don't have enough money to buy food. More than half of Venezuelans have lost an average of 24 pounds.

This has created the largest refugee crisis in the history of the Americas. It has been a long time coming and it does not appear that the Venezuelan regime under Nicolás Maduro has any intention of solving this situation in the near future.

To speak to us about this crisis we have two panels of witnesses joining us today. For our first hour, we're joined by Mr. Alejandro Guidi, senior adviser for the Americas for the International Organization for Migration. From the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, we have Mr. Jean-Nicolas Beuze, representative in Canada, and Mr. José Samaniego, regional coordinator for the Venezuela situation.

For our second hour, we have the privilege of hosting Secretary General Luis Almagro of the Organization of American States, from whom this committee has previously heard in December 2016.

Also with us, of course, is the Honourable Irwin Cotler, former minister of justice and member of the OAS panel of independent international experts on the possible commission of crimes against humanity in Venezuela.

With that introduction, I'll invite our first panel to begin their opening statements, after which we can move straight into questions from members.

Mr. Beuze, I will ask you and each of our panellists to take eight minutes to make your remarks, and then we'll open it up to the panel. Mr. Beuze, would you like to begin, please?

[Jean-Nicolas Beuze, Representative in Canada, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and honourable members. I am very happy to be back in front of the committee today.

I will hand over the floor directly to my colleague, José Samaniego, who will be able to discuss in more detail the response of UNHCR.

Perhaps we will propose that the IOM representative speak first, but I am not sure whether that person is online.

[The Chair]

I don't believe he is online at this time, so we are making a little bit of a switch on the go here.

I'll leave it to you gentlemen to begin.

[José Samaniego, Regional Coordinator, Regional Coordination for the Venezuela Situation, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees]

Excellent. Thank you very much.

I would start by mentioning some figures and trends on the overall situation and the impact of the Venezuelan situation in the region. In the last statistics, we account for more than three million migrants and refugees outside the country. Eight out of 10 persons are in neighbouring South American countries, Caribbean and southern Central American countries, but there are also important movements towards the U.S., Canada, Spain and the European Union.

We also have to notice a very rapid deterioration of the situation, with more than two million persons arriving in the last few years. In addition to that, we have also to consider other population movements. There are circular migration movements from Colombia to Venezuela, with people going back and forth, sometimes looking only for food and medicines. There are also important groups of Latin American citizens who have been obliged to go back to their country. We are talking about some 400,000 Colombian returnees, but there are also people from other nationalities coming back to their hometown.

Here is an important piece of information. Why are these people leaving? I believe the outflow of Venezuelans is a response to a serious political, social and economic background, but we have also to observe that there are important international protection considerations. Criminality rates are very high. There are also imputed political opinions, such as the loss of employment for those who are not in favour of the regime, and also discrimination in the redistribution of food and other basic items.

Finally, as the UN Human Rights Council has mentioned in the last human rights resolution of September 2018, there are also serious human rights violations in the context of political, economic, social and humanitarian crises.

On the response, I believe that the key word for the region has been “solidarity”. In fact, all the countries, at least in South America, have kept the doors open, and close to one million persons have received different forms of legal stay. In addition to that, we have over 360,000 asylum claims filed in the region. We have also to remember that asylum seekers, refugees and migrants have freedom of movement, access to social rights and work permits, and access to most public services. It is not only the solidarity of the governments; we have also to mention the solidarity of the whole society.

However, there are also very important constraints and an increased pressure on the governments, first due to the economic shock. Just in Colombia, they estimate that the reception and attention of Venezuela represents 0.5% of their annual GDP. Basic services are completely strained, mainly in border areas. On the other hand, we have also some trends, some incidents of xenophobia and discrimination. There were even violent protests in some countries.

On the government side, some countries have introduced some restrictions—visas, passport requirements, the high cost of documents, but also in the case of the Caribbean, deportations. On the other hand, we have also to remember that fewer than 7,000 Venezuelans have been recognized as refugees.

On the protection concerns and vulnerabilities, we have observed the following main vulnerabilities of the population. The first is access to the territory and to effective protection. There are many Venezuelans still in an irregular situation. It is estimated to be about 40% to 50%, depending on the countries.

There are also many cases of GBV—gender-based violence—and trafficking at the borders of Colombia, forced recruitment, situations of unaccompanied children ,and of course very high vulnerabilities in terms of health, education and livelihoods, and in particular cases of labour exploitation.

I will now focus on the response, because I believe that in this year of the global compact, the region is giving a model, an example, of how we have to coordinate the respond to this kind of crisis. In the response, we have of course governments involved, but also the UN system, other international organizations, and in the last months, a greater engagement of the development banks.

On the governments, each government has established a national response plan. As we said, they have created, established or reinforced legal stay arrangements, and they are promoting or facilitating effective access of Venezuelans to health services, education and the labour market.

At the regional level, governments have promoted a regional process. It is called the Quito process, and it has two dimensions. First, in September, they presented the declaration, and the main message is to keep doors open. As well, last November they adopted an action plan. In this action plan, you have a proposal to harmonize legal stay arrangements, promote regularization and facilitate the social and economic rights of Venezuelan refugees and migrants.

An example in the case of education is their recognition of titles and of certificates. There is also a commitment to international co-operation, and there is also a request to maintain an open and constructive dialogue with Venezuela for some specific issues affecting the Venezuelan population, such as documentation and health.

These government processes are very much due to the creation, the establishment, of a special mechanism created by IOM and UNHCR by the High Commissioner under the Director General at the request of the Secretary-General. In fact, two months ago a regional platform was established and a joint special representative for IOM and UNHCR was appointed. We are talking about Mr. Eduardo Stein, who is trying to articulate with a different government and to assure a consistent and coherent message and a consistent response to this crisis.

At the operational level, we have, under the overall coordination of IOM and UNHCR, more than 100 partners at national and regional levels coordinating and working together. The main objective is to have a coherent and coordinated regional operational response to identify gaps and to complement the response of the states.

This regional platform will present tomorrow a proposal, a refugee and migrant response plan, to increase the immediate response from the international community. This response is maybe one of the most ambitious plans presented by the humanitarian community. It involves 75 partners—not only the UN, but also international and regional organizations and civil society in 16 countries. The target population is over two million refugees and migrants from Venezuela as well as host communities. The budget amounts to over $730 million. The main priorities are, of course, humanitarian support, but also access to health care and education, the promotion of social and economic inclusion, and the prevention of and response to GBV.

The last point is also how the dynamics of the government go together with support and complementarity from the international community.

We have also seen how the development actors are engaging in this response. Indeed, there are proposals from some banks—the World Bank in particular, but also the Inter-American Development Bank—to promote a regional financial platform.

The World Bank is already supporting the states with technical assistance for the assessment of the fiscal impact of the crisis and in the development of a medium- and long-term response. They are also foreseeing the activation of the Global Concessional Financial Facility, which, as you know, has been activated in other regions, such as the Middle East.

The Inter-American Development Bank is also submitting for approval the creation of a $100,000,000 fund for displacement and migration crises, including the crisis in Venezuela.

To conclude, there are three priorities that we see for the time being in the region.

The first priority is to maintain doors open, ensuring the legal stay of migrants and refugees and the protection of Venezuelans in neighbouring countries.

The second priority is to scale up the immediate response to the crisis, not only with humanitarian support to help migrants and refugees but also to benefit the main communities affected by the arrival of this population.

Third, we require further, stronger, more robust support from the international community for states to promote and facilitate the local integration of refugees and migrants. We believe it is a matter of stability for the whole region to have solidarity and responsibility sharing.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair]

Thank you.

Mr. Guidi, our next witness, is getting set up. There's a bit of a delay here.

Mr. Guidi, are you able to begin now for about eight minutes? I know you just sat down.

[Alejandro Guidi, Senior Adviser for the Americas, International Organization for Migration]

For sure. I'm set up.

[The Chair]

Great. Please go ahead.

[Alejandro Guidi]

Good evening—good afternoon, I believe, for Ottawa. Thank you, excellencies, for inviting us to this important meeting.

I would like to start by saying that the number of Venezuelans out of the country has significantly increased in the last years. Globally, the number of Venezuelans went from 700,000 in 2015 to more than three million in 2018. Of these three million, an estimated 2.4 million have arrived in the Latin American countries.

According to official statistics, the breakdown of Venezuelans living in Latin American countries is the following. More than one million Venezuelans stay in Colombia, more than 500,000 are in Peru, and more than 200,000 are in Ecuador. Argentina and Chile received more than 100,000 each, with 85,000 staying currently in Brazil. Other countries in South America, Central America and the Carribean have received important numbers of Venezuelan migrants and refugees.

So far, Latin American countries have largely maintained a commendable open-door policy. Close to one million Venezuelans have benefited from regular stay arrangements in Latin America. With the support of IOM and UNHCR, governments are working on the regularization of these migrants and refugees.

We praise the receptor governments for their open policies and we encourage them to continue receiving Venezuelans.

The diversity of routes used by Venezuelans shows a dynamic and changing mobility. Apart from the air route, the land and maritime routes have recently become more significant. The short distances between Carribean islands such as Aruba, Curaçao, and Trinidad and Tobago facilitate the maritime mobility.

The Venezuelan nationals are extremely vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. Latest trends reveal a worrying increase in the vulnerability of refugees and migrants from Venezuela, affecting children and women on the move. The recent flows are increasingly more vulnerable than the previous ones.

Most of the people who are leaving the country have a double vulnerability. On the one hand, they experience vulnerabilities related to the conditions that are faced in Venezuela—health problems, etc. On the other hand, they suffer new vulnerabilities associated with the risks and challenges that they face during their journey.

The largest group of Venezuelans—known as caminantes, as we say in Spanish, or walkers in English—walk for 15 to 20 days, crossing two or three countries from Venezuela through Ecuador and Peru to Chile and even Argentina, travelling by narrow, risky roads, changing from 320 metres to 3,000 metres of altitude, and suffering drastic changes in weather conditions from tropical to stormy and cold weather, among other factors.

They are also vulnerable to trafficking, particularly in work exploitation but also through forced prostitution. To earn more money, many of the travellers engage in begging. The caminantes groups include pregnant women, single women with children, teenagers, aging people and handicapped persons, among other vulnerable people.

Just to give you an example of the harsh conditions they face during the journey, the ones that travel between Cucuta, on the border of Colombia with Venezuela, to Rumichaca, which is on the southern border of Colombia with Ecuador, need to walk more than 1,400 kilometres. This is just the beginning of the travel for many of them.

One of the most important difficulties that the Venezuelans face during this journey is the lack of proper documentation. The Venezuelan government is not issuing new passports. Therefore, the Venezuelans must travel with ID that doesn't meet security standards. In the case of children below nine years old, they only have birth certificates.

As we used to say in IOM, migration is the determinant of health, and this situation is not an exception. This situation of a massive exodus of Venezuelans is having a clear impact on the health of the refugees and migrants.

In this regard, diseases that were considered eradicated have reappeared and are affecting not only the Venezuelans but also nationals of the receptor countries. Many cases of measles have been reported, as well as several cases of malaria, dengue and tuberculosis, among other diseases.

Venezuelans who suffer from diabetes or HIV cannot receive assistance in their country, so they need to leave Venezuela or die. Maternal mortality and gender-based violence are also affecting Venezuelans who are leaving the country. Women, children, persons living with HIV, aging people and the indigenous population require special assistance. The LGBTI communities affected by the displacement also face discrimination and difficulties accessing health services.

Also, there was a drastic loss of doctors and other health professionals, which has reduced assistance to zero in some health facilities in Venezuela. In Colombia, the National Institute of Health reported a 272% increase in important events in public health for nationals from Venezuela. Seventeen percent of the reported events are for indigenous people.

We would like to commend the receptor countries, as they are not only receiving and, in many cases, documenting the Venezuelans, but they are also providing social assistance to them. Committed officers from the ministries of health of the receptor countries are present at the border and in sectors with a presence of Venezuelans to provide services, particularly of vaccination to children. In most cases, the assistance provided is funded 100% from the financial resources from the national public budgets.

For these reasons, there is a strong need to support the sanitary authorities at national and local levels in enhancing public health surveillance in areas that are receiving Venezuelan migrants. Among the health factors that we described, there is also a need to provide psychosocial support to Venezuelan migrants and refugees who are experiencing mental health problems as a result of the traumatic experience of their displacement.

Considering the magnitude and complexity of this unprecedented crisis and to contribute to a coherent and harmonized response, the UN Secretary-General has requested that UNHCR and IOM coordinate and scale up the operational response.

For these purposes, both organizations have set up a regional inter-agency coordination platform. This platform, which my colleague José Samaniego will explain in detail, provides a great opportunity for the international community to stand together with the Venezuelan refugees and migrants, the receptor communities and the governments to provide support to deal with the most important massive exodus that Latin American countries have ever experienced.

Thank you so much.

[The Chair]

Thank you very much to both of our witnesses for your testimony.

We'll move straight into questions from the members.

We're going to begin with MP Aboultaif, please.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Thank you for appearing today before this committee. Venezuela is a very important topic.

I'm very familiar with Venezuela on many fronts, and this situation has been going on for a long time. It did not start with Nicolás Maduro; it started with Hugo Chávez in the past. He established the groundwork, dividing society, doing all kinds of identity politics, if you wish—rich versus poor—and created a welfare state. They both drove the country out of money. Their currency is down. The Venezuela we once knew, the rich and comfortable well-to-do country in the region, is now probably one of the poorest in the world.

That situation is definitely not just affecting Venezuela, but also the region. We see similar situations with Syrian refugees, as well as in Bangladesh and Myanmar, with people running from a less fortunate country. Right now, Bangladesh is in need of help and assistance for over a million people. That is also affecting the socio-economic state of the country.

You mentioned the three million Venezuelans who have fled their country: one million to Colombia, half a million to Peru, about 200,000 to Ecuador, and probably about 150,000 to Argentina and Brazil. Many of these countries are not doing great economically. That could leave them also in a dire situation, trying to absorb and look after the Venezuelans as a neighbour country or as a country in the region.

Is it a concern that the increase of Venezuelan refugees is going to leave a burden on the mentioned countries? Has it been taken into consideration in your plan, or in the international community's plan, to deal with the impact on the host countries when it comes to the three million people, knowing that it could take between 10 and 15 years on average before the people come back from the refugee settlement?

I would like to have some feedback from you on this situation, and the impact of these refugees on the host countries.

[José Samaniego]

Would you like me to reply right now, or take other questions?

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

No, go ahead, please.

[José Samaniego]

Yes, indeed.

As you said, the outflow of Venezuelans is having a big impact on all neighbouring countries. I would, however, highlight the situation of Colombia and the other two countries of the Andean region, Peru and Ecuador, because there you can feel more the impact at a national level. In the case of Brazil, it is more a local impact, concentrated in the northern province of Roraima.

On the impact on the fiscal resources of the country, as I mentioned, there are already some studies sponsored by the World Bank. For example, in the case of Colombia, they estimate that per year, the Colombian government has to disburse $1.6 billion to attend to the Venezuelan population. Similar studies are now being carried out in Ecuador and in Peru. You can already notice that the arrival of Venezuelans is not only having a short-term humanitarian impact on its neighbouring countries, but it is also straining the whole reception capacity in the countries.

Of course, you can notice this situation much more in the border areas, mainly in the border areas of Norte de Santander or La Guajira in the case of Colombia, and Roraima in Brazil, but also in some cities, capitals—medium-sized and large cities—that are receiving large numbers of Venezuelans. Two weeks ago, we had a very difficult situation in Bogotá, where a sort of temporary settlement was creating...[Technical difficulty—Editor] and, of course, putting a lot of pressure on their neighbours.

I would say that the main sectors affected in the short term are probably health, as Alejandro Guidi was mentioning, and also education. They are having big problems in absorbing the new students, and the capacity of the schools, mainly at the borders, is quite limited.

In the medium to long term, the big challenge is access to the labour market. We have to see that these persons have good levels of qualifications. They have the right to work, but as you said, the situation in the receiving countries is also difficult. We have to remember that in Ecuador, for example—

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

I have a short question on this.

We know that the humanitarian situation is somehow out of control, in a way, moving forward.

What about the political situation? How do you feel that the international community is doing on approaching this? If the political situation can be resolved, I think that will relieve a lot of the situations that are going around, especially with refugees.

[The Chair]

I'd ask you to limit the answer on this to about one minute, and then hopefully we can pick it up in a subsequent question.

I want to make sure that all members get time to speak.

[José Samaniego]

Well, the main focus of our support is at the protection and response levels.

In this sense, we are supporting the national plans developed by the countries. Colombia has just issued a national response plan for the Venezuelans, called CONPES. Other countries are doing the same. Our work is really to complement these programs, focusing more on the immediate needs and also on the support to the main host-affected communities.

The governments are at the same time working with the development banks to identify resources in their own budgets, but also to mobilize funds for more medium- and long-term responses.

[The Chair]

Thank you.

[José Samaniego]

Alejandro, I don't know if you maybe want to add to that.

[The Chair]

That's the end of time on that, but we'll pick it up, I'm sure, in a subsequent question.

We're going to move now to MP Wrzesnewskyj, please.

[Borys Wrzesnewskyj, Liberal, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, gentlemen.

What we're seeing in Venezuela is democracy transformed into a populist dictatorship, which is now sliding into failed state status, the slow-motion disintegration of a state at a terrible human cost. We know some of the statistics: 50% of Venezuelans have lost an average of 24 pounds and 30% of children are malnourished.

I'd like to turn to our UN colleagues. One of your sister structures, the UN Human Rights Council, suspended Venezuela in 2015. We've seen various international bodies condemn Venezuela, suspend Venezuela, and once again the UNHCR on September 27 of this year passed a resolution expressing deep concern. Since then another 300,000 people have sought refuge in neighbouring countries, another 1% of the population, and 7% are already refugees.

How many millions more can neighbouring countries accommodate? There are all these international bodies condemning Venezuela publicly, stating publicly that these are crimes against humanity that are taking place within Venezuela. Millions of people are seeking refuge, and the outflow is continuing. Do you have estimates for how many millions more neighbouring countries can accommodate?

This is for any of the gentlemen.

[Alejandro Guidi]

Thank you, sir, for your question.

I would say it is, of course, very difficult to estimate numbers in terms of how many more people neighbouring countries can receive. I believe that the neighbouring countries have been very generous. We commend the efforts they are making and have been making, in fact.

One important aspect that we should consider and take into account is that the areas—and I think José mentioned this a little bit—where people are arriving are the poorest areas of these countries. In the case of Colombia, it's Norte de Santander, and in the case of Brazil, Roraima. These are among the poorest areas of those countries. One of the strategies that these countries have had is to relocate people from these areas other areas of the country where the people can receive some kind of assistance and also be better integrated.

[Borys Wrzesnewskyj, Liberal, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Thank you.

Let me continue along that train of thought. Clearly neighbouring countries are already strained. We're seeing another mass outflow. It could reach a point where it destabilizes neighbouring countries as well. Your agency has an unenviable task of trying to figure out how to deal with the refugees, but the UN body itself seems to be unable to act.

Where I'm heading is that back at the 2005 World Summit there was an outcome document that talked about the responsibility to protect—that state sovereignty is a responsibility and that the responsibility for protecting citizens is the responsibility of the state; however, there is a residual responsibility of the broader community of states when crimes against humanity occur. I believe crimes against humanity have been documented. The UN document talks about timely and decisive action and manifest failure. In the case of Venezuela, the case has been made that they are, in fact, the perpetrators, the victimizers, the cause of crimes against humanity.

When will the discussion about the responsibility to protect kick in?

[José Samaniego]

It may be a point, because, as you mentioned, there are two levels in this response. I would say the first is the diplomatic and political level, and the second is the humanitarian and protection level.

I believe that at the political level, discussions are taking place at the UN and also at the OAS to see how countries can apply pressure to ease the situation of the population, achieve a more open position with regard to the inclusion of the Venezuelan population inside their country and ease political tensions.

As you well know, in the region at the level of the governments, the Grupo de Lima, which I understand Canada is also supporting, is working at this political level. I believe that the decision of the Secretary-General, the measures taken by the UN and UNHCR, and the decision to activate the Quito process were essentially taken because it is imperative to respond to the humanitarian dimension of the crisis and to somehow support the countries that are receiving Venezuelan citizens.

To refer to the UN, at the more operational level we are working outside of Venezuela with a regional platform, but we are also working inside Venezuela. There was a recent decision by the Secretary-General to scale up the presence of the different actors, mainly to support access to social services but also to support civil society in the country.

I would say that what we are seeing is how to complement and have a more coherent response inside and outside Venezuela at the operational humanitarian level. Meanwhile, we all hope that the countries will activate their diplomacy to find a solution to the situation in Venezuela.

[The Chair]

Thank you very much.

We will now move to MP Laverdière.

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The member spoke in Spanish.]

We are seeing that Colombia, Brazil, Peru and Ecuador receive the bulk of migrants. We have seen camps, particularly in Brazil. Where do most of these people live? Do they live in specific communities or camps? Could you give us more details on that?

Mr. Samaniego, would you like to respond?