Foreign Affairs Committee on Feb. 5th, 2019

[David Graham, Liberal, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

If, for example, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea announced that they were going to invest in democracy in Canada, how would we react?

In other words—

[Christopher MacLennan]

Surprised, probably would be....

[David Graham, Liberal, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

But they call themselves democratic.

How do we define democracy for the purpose of promoting it, for the purpose of this study?

[Christopher MacLennan]

For the purpose of this study, obviously there is no one definition of democracy. For us I think it's a couple of core elements.

A democracy is about popular sovereignty, with a wide understanding of what citizenship means. It means it's constitutional. There is the rule of law that determines how these things take place, how the democratic processes are to unfold. It also includes an open and free media and open and free accountability processes to ensure that governments are held to account.

[David Graham, Liberal, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Fair enough.

I have a note here that says we spend $12 million on International Foundation for Electoral Systems, $8.2 million on International Foundation for Electoral Systems, and $5.7 million on National Democratic Institute projects. These are all American organizations.

Are there equivalent Canadian organizations or is it all centralized in this way?

[Christopher MacLennan]

It's not centralized. There are Canadian organizations as well. There's the Forum of Federations and CANADEM, which does electoral observations. There is a long list actually of Canadian organizations, particularly in the judicial area and judicial strengthening, that are available. There's a B.C. organization responsible....

[David Graham, Liberal, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

I'm going to pass my remaining time to Mr. Wrzesnewskyj.

[Borys Wrzesnewskyj, Liberal, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Graham.

I'd like to return to this whole question of alternate models that are being providing to other countries, different governance models. We see the Chinese being very active. They've increased their activity. They have this program of development in many countries that are undergoing important changes.

Are we tracking in any way whatsoever...? It comes back to Mr. Graham's question. Are we tracking these other actors, whether it's China or Russia, in terms of how they're involved and the resultant outcomes in terms of movement towards democracy or away from democracy? Are we tracking that?

[Christopher MacLennan]

I don't know if I would say we are tracking it, because sometimes it's a very intangible thing. It's not always a direct relationship between actions and which countries they're taking place in.

We're keenly aware...and this goes back to the conversation from the 1990s and the notions of the end of history. China, since basically the 1990s or since 2001 maybe when they joined the WTO, provides an alternative model for many developing countries about reducing poverty and creating economic growth. There are many developing countries that are looking to that model as one that will help them reduce poverty but also maintain their controls in their society.

[Borys Wrzesnewskyj, Liberal, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Recently, the Chinese ambassador to Canada wrote an op-ed piece in which he used certain phraseology that we're beginning to encounter in other developing parts of the world: "western egotism” and “white supremacy”. This is almost like code wording. “Western egotism” is the assumption that democratic rights and human rights are innate, and “white supremacy” that the international rules-based order we developed post-World War II was just a system of white supremacy.

Would you like to comment on that?

[Christopher MacLennan]

In the area of democratic assistance, we're keenly aware that every place we're working in has its own culture and its own approach to governance, and you have to be respectful of these. There is no monolithic way to have a democracy. Our democracy is very different from the democracy south of the border.

What we will always do, no matter what country we're operating in, is understand that there are certain core principles and elements to what we believe is a democracy, and we believe they're universal. We don't believe simply that democracy is only for westerners. We believe that in fact there are ways to adapt basic, core democratic principles to the local cultures we're working within. There are alternative views in the world, and that's exactly what we're trying to counter.

[The Chair]

Thank you very much.

We're going to jump to MP Laverdière for a short question, to wrap up.

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My question will be brief. What is happening with CANADEM? I think the nature of the relationship between the government and CANADEM has changed. Could you tell us about this and the reasons for this change?

[Christopher MacLennan]

I'm sorry, but I don't necessarily have an answer to your question. I'm not sure I understand correctly.

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

Okay, thank you.

[The Chair]

I want to thank you both for being here with us this morning and for kicking off this study with some very interesting discussion.

Members, I am going to suspend for a few minutes while we get our next panel online.

[The Chair]

We are very pleased to have two panellists with us from Washington, D.C., by video conference.

We have Derek Mitchell, president of the National Democratic Institute. Mr. Mitchell was named president of the National Democratic Institute, NDI, in 2018, having previously served as U.S. ambassador to Myanmar from 2012 to 2016. As a prior role, Ambassador Mitchell served as principal deputy assistant secretary of defense from 2001 to 2009 and also as a senior fellow for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

As well, we have Dr. Daniel Twining, president of the International Republican Institute. He was named president of the IRI in September 2017, having previously served as counsellor and director of the Asia program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. His past experience includes serving on the U.S. Secretary of State's policy planning staff and acting as foreign policy adviser to U.S. Senator John McCain. Dr. Twining holds a doctorate in philosophy from Oxford University, where he was a Fulbright Oxford scholar.

Welcome, gentlemen.

Ambassador Mitchell, you're going to go first, since you're on video conference. I might add that you're probably avoiding some really cold weather later today, so being where you are is probably a wise move. May I have you begin with ten minutes of testimony. Then we'll go to Dr. Twining, and then we'll turn it over to the members for lots of questions, I'm sure.

Please go ahead, sir.

[Derek Mitchell, President, National Democratic Institute]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.

We are getting a bit of a thaw down here in Washington, so it's nice to get out of the polar vortex for a few days.

I'm sorry I can't be there with you this morning, but I really am grateful for the opportunity to speak to you all on this topic.

I want to start by giving a little bit of historical context. I see us in three phases of democracy support work. Many of you know that in the United States, the NDI, the IRI and the National Endowment for Democracy were all established during the Reagan administration during a speech at Westminster he gave in 1982. That was the first phase of democracy support. That was during the Communist era, during the Cold War era, and they had very much an ideological bent, but this whole realm of democracy support really hadn't been defined precisely. Our institutes were among those who really sought to define it 35 years ago.

The second phase came with the end of the Cold War, as was mentioned before, the end-of-history phase when it seemed that the tide was coming in and that there was historical inevitability to democracy. It was just a matter, in our view, of working with democratic processes and institutions and with peoples around the world to just let it simmer for a generation or two, and things would naturally come our way. That inevitability was baked into the programming we did. We felt that the expansion of democracy, that the third wave of democratization, was taking off in a very comfortable way for 15 or 20 years.

I think we are in a fundamentally different moment now. I would call it “the autocrats strike back“, the authoritarian learning. Those who have a different view of the way their society should be ordered, and those authoritarians out there who saw the spread of democracy to be a challenge to them and somehow threatening to their very existence found a way to learn and push back in this moment. They took advantage of popular frustration, with expectations quite high that democracy perhaps.... In some societies, they felt that if they just went democratic, then it would be easy. They would become rich and powerful like the west.

It was evident that it wasn't going to be that simple; it wasn't going to be that easy or short term. Economic inequality emerged. Corruption emerged. Mindsets, we found, changed more slowly than institutions and processes. You found folks who would take over, who had the old mindsets, who would use the processes and maybe develop some of the institutions, but wouldn't necessarily ingrain the democratic mindsets in development. You had corrupt environments that people got frustrated with and associated with democracy.

You also had demagogues exploiting the politics of fear. That can happen in any country and in any democracy. Identity politics and immigration, we're seeing that in many different countries, focusing on the other. The general perception that democracy is not delivering became a defining issue for many of these democracies, even those democracies that we felt were entrenched, even our own democracies. That was creating a backlash, a recession.

One other development that was a wild card in all this was the rise of digital technologies, Silicon Valley and the social media platforms that were used and exploited by those who wanted to undermine unity and undermine democracy, to provide platforms for hate and division and to create uncertainty and play with the democratic forums. People didn't recognize soon enough just how pernicious that can be to democracy.

We've learned a bunch of lessons. Our different organizations have learned these lessons, many of which I've already discussed: that building a culture of democracy is not easy; that it takes time and it's as important as institutions and processes; that we need to develop a culture, and culture and mindsets change much more slowly; that we have to be patient and we have to work hard at that; that democracy has to deliver; and that economic inequality, corruption, fear and insecurity all work against democracy.

We have to be alert to it. As Madeleine Albright likes to say, people don't just like to vote, but they like to eat, and I think they also need to feel that the government works for them.

I think what we've done, though, is provide some resilience that international networks like NDI, IRI and others have developed. They actually work, and we're seeing push-back in many countries with the expectation of democratic process. Even if there is a recession of democracy, in fact, the expectation of democratic process is there and there are resilient networks that exist that we can work with.

We need to be working on technology. We're slow to understand that the impact of technology is a lesson.

We also need to recognize inclusivity. Democracy and democratic societies must be fully inclusive. As Secretary Albright, our chair, says, democracy without women is impossible. We've learned over and over that, when women are engaged in politics, democracy is more resilient, development is more sustainable, compromise is more likely and peace processes are more lasting. Likewise, all segments of society must be part of democracy—youth, ethnic and religious minorities, LGBTI, and people with disabilities.

Without that inclusivity, you don't have the grounding, the foundations of democracy, and I have to say that—and I hope it's not a partisan thing to say—in the United States I think democracy will win out. We are being saved by women, people of colour and others who are going out and fighting for democracy in the United States. I think it's our wild card, and I think it demonstrates lessons learned for other countries. We need to be focusing on that.

I think this is absolutely a critical time. This is a critical moment. I think it's actually the defining issue of our time. When we look at national security and we look at our national well-being, what are the defining values, norms and rules of the international system in the 21st century? How will we define it?

I heard a question in the previous session that China talks about white supremacists or western egotism. In fact, what we had created in the previous century had worked for everyone. It had actually tied the hands of the west to allow everyone to grow. We've seen a remarkable development in the world in the past 50 years, a remarkable development, even for China and even for the underdeveloped nations.

It works. Democracy has worked. Freedom has worked. But now, there are challenges to that system and to those rules, values and norms that I think will have an impact on our own security and the security of others, and to human dignity, frankly. When I talk about some of the headwinds we have seen in recent years, the push-back of autocrats, I have to say that, in recent years, the last several years, the United States has been AWOL. There has not been leadership. But in fact, all countries need to be playing this.

This is not simply a western thing, or certainly not just a U.S. thing. We need Canada. Canada has been playing a strong role just in the past few weeks on Venezuela, in an exemplary fashion. This is not a U.S. assignment. NDI is a U.S. organization, but we have networks of people all over the world, and we represent something that works for people around the world.

I would very much encourage Canada and other countries to be part of that. We're trying to encourage Japan to be part of that, and anyone else who stands for these values, norms and rules as others try to shape them in their image going forward.

Very quickly, I don't want to take up much more time, because I do want to hear from Dan and the questions, but as for recommendations as to how you should think about this, I think there are things you're already thinking about in Canada, such as women in front. You have a feminist foreign policy. I think that's great. That is strategic, not just a nice thing, but it's a strategic thing for all of us and our security. I think you're in a good position to lead.

Number two, political parties need help. I think you have very strong political parties and activists who can share skills and strategy.

Number three is the youth bulge. Do not ignore the youth bulge. Young people under 30 are a majority in many of the countries in play around the world: in eastern Europe—they're on the move—in Africa absolutely, in Latin America, the Middle East, North Africa and Asia. This is a critical asset to invest in over the long term. This is not a short-term game but a long-term game we're talking about when it comes to democracy. They are also most at risk of radicalization, of extremism, so they are a point of opportunity but also a challenge, if we don't address that.

In terms of technology programs, Canada has great internal capacity through your Citizen Lab at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy. We have been working at NDI with your Citizen Lab. Technology programs are very important.

As for citizen education and civics, you're already taking the lead on that. Focusing on Latin America, if you're thinking about a particular area, I think what you've done with the Lima Group is outstanding and exemplary.

In terms of connecting to economic aid, you're in TPP and CETA, and you are otherwise well placed to ensure that democracy delivers, that trade agreements and such are done with values, that we're working to build a common set of rules and norms, and that it is delivered to marginalized populations and regions equitably. This is all extremely important going forward. I think you are very well placed.

If we are now in a moment of democratic recession, it requires a democratic stimulus. Now is the time for us all to reinvest, recommit, and not succumb to fatalism but to lean forward.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope I didn't go too far past my time.

[The Chair]

No. You were good. Thank you very much, Ambassador Mitchell.

We're going to go straight away to Dr. Twining, please.

[Dr. Daniel Twining, President, International Republican Institute]

Thanks, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It's wonderful to be here with you.

You see why Derek Mitchell is such a terrific colleague for us at IRI. Our teams at NDI and IRI work very closely together, so despite any judgments you may make about American politics, it's working in the democracy space, our bipartisan ethic.

I would like to begin by thanking all of you for Canada's terrific leadership. On Venezuela, on Ukraine, on women's empowerment, on so many issues in the world today, Canada remains a principled voice. We're just very grateful, at a period when the west—and the community of democracies writ large—is under so much pressure from within and without. Really, I would argue that our democratic way of life, the way Canadians and Americans live, is put at risk by a world in which authoritarian forces are on the march and playing offence. There is a strategic value to this discussion that you are having about modernizing democracy assistance for this new world that Derek sketched out.

Let me very quickly set the scene by talking about what has changed since you, this committee, really looked closely at democracy assistance over 10 years ago. I have four quick points.

One is the re-emergence of great power competition, which is real. I don't need to tell you. Russia and China, in different ways, are projecting authoritarian influence. They are trying to build a world that is more safe for authoritarian forms of government and for their leadership, elements of which are highly inimical to western interests and our way of life. That is a big difference from 2007. That includes Russia's disinformation assault on open societies, including the United States, Canada and our European allies. It includes the corruption and other forms of malign influence associated with China's belt and road initiative and other forms of global engagement, not all of which are insidious, but some of which do undercut our alliances and open societies.

Two is we're living in a world of refugees. I'm sorry to tell you, but you know this. There are more refugees in the world today than any time since 1945. It's worth reflecting on that. More than at any time since the end of the Second World War are people displaced by conflict in this world we live in today. Frankly, that's a failure, and we know why these people are trying to flee. They are trying to flee conflict-ridden societies that are not governed by law and institutions. They are driven by desperation. Migrants out of Central America, for instance, are trying to escape gangster societies where they and their families are not safe. This requires a greater level of engagement from all of us.

Three—Derek mentioned this very articulately—is the digital revolution that has done many great things, but has also empowered and amplified extreme voices in our societies, and created new forms of fragmentation. This is something we do need to come to grips with, because it foundationally affects our democratic order.

Four is the hollowing-out of democratic order by strongmen who preserve some forms of democracy but use their standing to concentrate executive power at the expense of other institutions: parliaments, free media, active civil societies, political competition.

That's the quick assessment. What do we need to do? I'm going to be quite brief here, but I do have five ideas, not inclusive.

One is to realize that we actually live in an increasingly middle-class world. When we think about development assistance writ large, the absolute focus on ending poverty was an appropriate target, I would argue, 10, 20, 30, 40 years ago. Today, given what we are working with in terms of this enormous rising middle-class in the world, I would argue that development assistance should focus on democracy, rights, governance, transparency, accountability and anti-corruption. It should focus on helping governments deliver for their citizens, so that we don't need to keep helping desperate people—migrants, refugees—and we don't need to backfill governments that are not meeting basic commitments to their citizens.

I would argue that democracy assistance actually should supersede other forms of assistance, because other forms of assistance are not very effective where you have a kleptocratic strongman in power, or a failed state.

Two is to really embrace a mission—Canada, America, the west—in helping our partners out there in the world build political resiliency to not only be effective democracies but also to avoid succumbing to insidious forms of influence from authoritarian actors, including China and Russia.

We travel a lot, all of us. I've never been anywhere where anybody wanted to be part of a new Russian empire or part of a new Chinese sphere of influence. People everywhere care so much about their sovereign rights and are very anxious about threats to their sovereign independence from authoritarian great powers. So, helping our partners out there build resiliency, including strong civic institutions, effective media, free courts, etc., to help them maintain their independence, should be a strategy.

The third is to expose corruption. Tom Carothers, who is a scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, has done research showing that over the last five years, 10% of all governments in the world—sometimes through election, sometimes through street revolution—have changed due to civic activism against corruption and that the driving civic force out in the world today is anti-corruption sentiment. You see it today on the streets of Iran, where people are striking. You see it in Venezuela, where Venezuelans are fed up with living in a kleptocratic narco state where the elites live very well and everybody else cannot get enough to eat. This is a powerful force.

I would argue, when we think of Russia's assault on the west and our open societies, that with regard to Vladimir Putin who apparently is worth $95 billion, it's worth investigating, understanding and helping Russian citizens understand where that money came from because, actually, a lot of it was their money before the Kremlin oligarchs consolidated a form of power that made them all very rich.

Innovating in the democracy space to expose and to help partners on the ground expose corruption in their societies is a very powerful tool, including in countries that, frankly, may not be pro-western, pro-American. People care so deeply about this issue.

The fourth is to invest in recreating political balance in societies where politics have become imbalanced through strongman forms of control. That's stronger parliaments. That's more engaged women, youth and other marginalized communities, getting them much more involved in politics in their countries. That's free media. That's legal assistance and other forms of assistance. It's all to try to recreate the balance that has been lost through strongman forms of control.

An important part of this is investing in the next generation. In countries like the Philippines and Turkey, young political leaders, and young leaders writ large, do not want to live in a country that's run by one man in perpetuity. That's also true of young leaders in the ruling parties, leaders who actually want some space to emerge in their own right. Investing in young leaders as part of an effort to create balance is valuable.

Finally, invest in citizen security. Rather than build a wall on the southern border of the United States, I would argue that it would be much more effective to spend that money helping Central American societies govern themselves in just and effective ways so that all these desperate people don't want to leave. The same is true in the Middle East. The conflagration that has been Syria and the conflagration that has been Yemen are driving desperate people away. We've seen it in Southeast Asia in Myanmar: the Rohingya crisis. I could go on and on. Really, at the end of the day, we should be addressing the problem at the source.

The U.S. ambassador to Nigeria told me when I was there that there are going to be 400 million Nigerians by the year 2100. He said that if Nigeria cannot effectively govern itself and provide opportunity, 100 million of those people will leave. Guess where they will want to come? So, this is a big task for us, including in Africa.

Let me wrap up, in 10 seconds, by just arguing that we're in a competition with authoritarians—authoritarians externally and authoritarians within open societies. They're using what the National Endowment for Democracy has called sharp power. They're not using military instruments. They're using sharp power, which is like a malign form of soft power—a set of sharp power tools to erode, hollow out and assault democracies and democratic institutions. It's time for us in the west to modernize and revitalize our democracy assistance tool kit to try to level the playing field.

Thank you.

[The Chair]

Thank you very much.

We will go straight into questions from members.

We are going to begin with MP Alleslev.

[Leona Alleslev]

Thank you very much for the incredible and powerful testimony from both of you. It's highly complex with a lot of moving pieces. It feels as though the erosion is increasing exponentially, and it's not limited to them. It's also within our own democracies.

Can you help us to understand and prioritize what we should be doing at home? We still believe that we don't have, necessarily, a problem with our own democracy. Can we achieve democratic institution support in other countries while our own home flank is rapidly under pressure as well?

[Dr. Daniel Twining]

I would argue very briefly that in America we have been working on our democracy for 200 years and we obviously have a lot more work to do, but you are seeing why we have checks and balances, mid-term elections, a separation of power between the executive and legislative, strong institutions and a vibrant media.

When I travel in the world, our interlocutors, NDI and IRI partners, don't say that democracy in America is under such stress that we have no standing to talk to them. They say our system is incredibly resilient, and it's a system, not any form of personalized rule. They need our help. We can offer it in humility, not saying we're trying to project some American or Canadian model. We're not trying to impose anything, but just those foundational building blocks of a successful democracy and a successful civil society are things that we know something about in America, in Canada, and we can help other countries establish them. I think the point that our democracies are continual works in progress is a powerful one that speaks to people.

[Leona Alleslev]

I was thinking around social media and the undermining from other great powers within our own democracy while perhaps we're not either keeping up or paying attention to be able to address it. I didn't necessarily mean from within our own structures, and yet those same instruments are being used to even greater effect in those emerging democracies. Do we need to address that?

[Dr. Daniel Twining]

Derek, do you want to take that one?