Evidence of meeting #26 for Foreign Affairs and International Development in the 43rd Parliament, 2nd Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was technology.

A video is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Clerk of the Committee  Ms. Erica Pereira
Bruce Christie  Associate Assistant Deputy Minister, Trade Policy and Negotiations, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development
Sandra McCardell  Assistant Deputy Minister, Europe, Arctic, Middle East and Maghreb, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development
Bessma Momani  Professor, University of Waterloo, As an Individual
Chris Kilford  Writer on Turkish and Middle Eastern issues, As an Individual
Christian Leuprecht  Professor, Department of Political Science, Royal Military College of Canada, As an Individual

4:30 p.m.

Liberal

Ruby Sahota Liberal Brampton North, ON

I'm not so much speaking to it. I just wanted to ask whether an emailed copy could be sent to us.

4:30 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann

Okay.

The motion has been read.

I'm not sure, Mr. Harris, if would you be in a position to circulate it by email or even through the clerk's office.

4:30 p.m.

NDP

Jack Harris NDP St. John's East, NL

I think we could ensure that the clerk has one. I don't know if we have all of the addresses in a gang's email list. The clerk may.

4:30 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann

Madam Clerk, is that something we could accommodate, just to support the discussion? The motion was read into the transcript, so it's officially before the committee for discussion, and interpretation was provided—at least, I have no points of order that suggest otherwise. If we could get it to members, that would probably be helpful.

Thank you, Ms. Sahota.

I have Mr. Harris and then Mr. Oliphant.

4:30 p.m.

NDP

Jack Harris NDP St. John's East, NL

I just wanted to add to the motion itself. I think it speaks for itself, and the committee passed a similar motion recently upon delivery of the previous documents. We were concerned, of course, that the only exception to our motion made on October 29 was related to cabinet confidentiality.

Instead, we got documents which were redacted beyond that purposely by Global Affairs Canada, which spelled out what forms of redaction they used there, which seemed to be, by the advice given to the committee, similar to the ATIP kinds of exclusions that would be made. The documents essentially were clearly available to the public, and the committee agreed to release them before. I think we can confirm—perhaps the clerk can help us on that—that these particular sets of documents were also following the same mechanism to ensure that the documents were expected to be made public.

4:30 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann

Thank you very much, Mr. Harris.

Mr. Oliphant.

April 13th, 2021 / 4:30 p.m.

Liberal

Rob Oliphant Liberal Don Valley West, ON

In principle, I'm supportive of this. I think it's similar.

I have two questions. One is for clarification, and I may ask the chair to suspend the meeting until we can get a copy of the motion. I'd like a comparison of this motion with the previous motion to see if it's the same or different. If it's the same, obviously we'll support it. I'll support it and I assume my colleagues will.

For my second question, I wanted clarity. I don't have the blues—the record of proceedings—in front of me. Did the last motion only apply to the documents that we had received to date? I'm seeing the clerk nodding. It was a limited motion, so this is a necessary motion to extend the same activity to the new documents, which we have now received.

I just want to clarify, secondly, whether it is exactly the same wording as the first motion. If it is, we can move on and get right into our witnesses, which is quite important. If it is different, I need to look at any difference that it might entail. I need to see that.

4:35 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann

Thank you, Mr. Oliphant.

Mr. Harris, are you in a position to confirm that? We could suspend for a few minutes if that's necessary to get the text of the original motion, if committee members wish to look at it. If you're able to clarify this to Mr. Oliphant's satisfaction, then maybe we can just do this verbally.

Mr. Harris.

4:35 p.m.

NDP

Jack Harris NDP St. John's East, NL

I think the motion was based on the previous motion. The question of reserving the right to be granted unfettered access to the unredacted documents was not in the motion itself, but it was a condition recorded by the clerk as part of the decision that was made at the time. Instead of doing it that way, I've included that in the motion.

If the members of the committee wish to see the motion before voting on it, perhaps we could table it and bring it up later on in the meeting if there's a way of doing that in the procedure without me having to regain the floor and use my time to do that.

If it's agreeable by consensus with the committee that we'll get everybody copies of the exact motion and the previous one to compare it with, we can vote on it later on in the meeting.

4:35 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann

Thank you, Mr. Harris.

Does it seem agreeable to colleagues that we'll carve out 10 minutes at the end of the second panel to briefly revert to and review the text? I don't see any objection. Are there any discussion points on that?

Mr. Oliphant, would you be okay with that?

Why don't we do it this way? We will come to a landing at 5:20 with our second panel of witnesses. By that time, we'll have received the text of the original motion. We'll take 10 minutes to vote on Mr. Harris's motion as presented.

4:35 p.m.

NDP

Jack Harris NDP St. John's East, NL

Thank you, Chair, and thank you, colleagues.

4:35 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann

Thank you very much.

I thank our witnesses on the first panel for their testimony, their service and the information they provided today. We will let them disembark our virtual ship. We will suspend briefly to empanel our second panel and then resume with our discussion on the exports permits in relation to Turkey.

We will suspend.

4:35 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann

Welcome back, everyone. We're now ready to proceed with our study on the granting of arms export permits with particular attention to Turkey, and with our second panel this afternoon.

For the guidance of our new witnesses, I encourage everyone to set their microphones to mute when they are not talking and to address their comments through the chair.

When you have 30 seconds left in your time for questions, I will signal you with a piece of paper. Interpretation is available using the globe icon on the bottom of your screen.

I would now like to welcome our witnesses.

They are Dr. Bessma Momani, professor at the University of Waterloo; Dr. Chris Kilford, writer on Turkish and Middle Eastern issues; and Dr. Christian Leuprecht, professor in the Department of Political Science at the Royal Military College of Canada.

Dr. Momani, we will ask you to lead off. The floor is yours for five minutes of opening remarks.

4:40 p.m.

Dr. Bessma Momani Professor, University of Waterloo, As an Individual

Thank you, everyone. I'm very happy to answer questions, more so about Turkish foreign policy and certainly about the regional context. I'll give a little bit of background to some of the issues we're speaking to today, specifically the export permits to Turkey. My friend Christian is going to add to the context in terms of the utilization of the particular systems in question, but I thought I'd give a little background to some things I think are important to note.

Of course, Armenia and Azerbaijan had a very short conflict very recently, and we've talked a lot about the fact that Turkey had given the Azerbaijanis an advanced arsenal. I think it's important to point out that by virtue of its relative economic situation, Armenia hasn't really had a chance to update much of its arsenal. It has been composed almost entirely of very old systems, mostly Russian rockets. The Azeris, because they've had a lot of oil wealth, have been able to invest over the past 20 years, not only in a very diverse arsenal of weapons, but more importantly, in modern ones, including missiles, rockets and drones.

I think the attention that's been brought to the use of drones is certainly very important, but I think it's also important to point out that it's partly because the Armenians didn't have very good air defence systems that really made the drones so effective. Certainly these particular drones were really helpful, because they were able to give the Azeris a big advantage on the battlefield.

The other point we're going to talk about at some point is that the cameras put on these particular drones were also being used for other purposes. In fact, many Armenians have pointed out that they were used to make very explicit propaganda videos, so this is something else that we must consider. It's not just about their tactical advantage; they also had a very interesting messaging advantage.

One thing I'd like to point out that would be important in the conversation about where we're going is that this particular war is a shift and change in modern warfare. Drone technology is really going to change the battlefield, partly because drones are low-cost, they're cheap, and we're going to see more countries using drones, particularly those that don't have a strong air force. If you don't want to invest a lot of money in having an air force, you can use drones to effectively mimic what air power can do at a fraction of the cost. We're going to see a lot of smaller countries get access to these very cheap tactical aviation tools, which also sometimes have precision-guided weapons. They can be very effective because they destroy much costlier equipment, such as tanks, vehicles, artillery units and so forth. Some say these drones were able to effectively wipe out approximately a third of the Armenian tanks, so they really did have a big impact on the battlefield.

Similarly, this technology is pretty widespread. The Turks, the Chinese and the Israelis are all in the business of exporting drones. It should be pointed out, though, that in Turkey, which has been manufacturing drones for the past decade in an effort to up its game in terms of its indigenous armaments industry, most of the software for these particular drones has to be imported. Having to import parts means it's not in a space to say it's completely indigenous and able to stand on its own. Hopefully, that is a helpful point to folks here.

Last, while these particular drones have been used in the Azeri and Armenian conflict, the technology has also been used, as others pointed out, in the Libyan civil war. As well, we know it's been used to support the Syrian rebels and also to target Kurdish insurgents, both inside Turkey with the PKK, and inside Iraq.

I'll leave it there. I'm very happy to answer any questions.

4:40 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann

Thank you very much, Professor Momani.

We'll now to turn Dr. Kilford for five minutes of opening remarks, please.

4:40 p.m.

Dr. Chris Kilford Writer on Turkish and Middle Eastern issues, As an Individual

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and members of the committee, for the kind invitation to speak today. I'm speaking to you from the unceded Coast Salish territories here in Victoria.

I hope I can be of assistance today in answering any questions you may have. By way of background, besides writing and providing commentary on Turkish and Middle Eastern issues, I also served in the Canadian Armed Forces for 36 years, including time as commanding officer of 4th Air Defence Regiment, so I have a fairly good understanding of air defence, air warfare and the use of drones. I also served in Afghanistan for one year, and between July 2011 and July 2014, in the rank of colonel, I was Canadian defence attaché to Turkey with cross-accreditation to Azerbaijan. I retired from the Canadian Armed Forces in September 2014. I was last in Turkey in November 2019.

To prepare for today, I had a chance to look at all the documentation that you had, especially as it relates to the Wescam surveillance and target acquisition pods that are used on the Bayraktar TB2 drones.

There's no question that after decades of on-again, off-again arms embargoes placed on Turkey by many of its NATO allies, the country has built up a significant indigenous arms industry. Much of it is overseen by the government's Turkish Armed Forces Foundation and the Presidency of Defense Industries, which are both—and this is really important, I think—directly controlled by Turkey's president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Turkey's recent military assistance to Azerbaijan, in the recapture of Armenian-held Azeri territory, is just one example of how far their indigenous arms industry has come. I would argue that use of the Bayraktar drones arguably contributed to Azerbaijan's success more than any other capability in their inventory.

When it comes to Turkey, I can't think of any armed forces anywhere in the world that is currently involved in so many armed conflicts, either directly or indirectly, other than Russia. Russia, for example, has recently warned Turkey to stop selling drones to Ukraine, no doubt worried they might tip the military balance in Ukraine's favour.

Returning to Turkey, it does have a well-trained and capable military, but it's military is beset with many internal issues, with the extensive and ongoing purges following a failed military coup attempt in July 2016. I would also add that the entire country—politically, economically and from a human rights perspective—is also facing numerous challenges. Nevertheless, the Turkish government would undoubtedly point out, if it were not for their intervention in Libya, the United Nations-recognized government would have fallen to General Haftar's forces. This is not to downplay or to suggest we excuse Turkey's regional activities that have brought on our arms embargo, but it is quite often a perspective missing in the wider picture. Based on reports from last year, I understand that Aselsan has developed its own targeting pod and may no longer need the Wescam pods in the future.

In closing, as deadly as they can be, drones do come equipped with these advanced electro-optical systems and if they're flown by well-trained operators following lawful rules of engagement, their use should arguably prevent or at least reduce civilian casualties in conflict zones.

Thank you very much.

I look forward to your questions.

4:45 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann

Thank you very much, Dr. Kilford.

Finally, Professor Leuprecht, you have five minutes, please.

4:45 p.m.

Dr. Christian Leuprecht Professor, Department of Political Science, Royal Military College of Canada, As an Individual

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your invitation.

I will speak in English, but you may ask questions in the official language of your choice.

The aim of our discussion here today, as far as I can tell, is to have a constructive conversation about the robustness of our export control system and whether there's opportunity to provide more certainty in the future with respect to the system we have.

In regard to the conversation from the previous panel, it's also important to understand that the system we have was really built during the Cold War, in which we had a fairly predictable type of conflict. Today, by contrast, we're engaged in anti-terrorism missions, counter-insurgency missions, conflict below the threshold of war, and with countries such as Turkey that are engaged in revisionist and hegemonic foreign policies, and so the system is obviously struggling to cope with this much greater diversity of conflict.

What's at stake is inherently a controversy over defence exports. It's important to understand that defence exports are ultimately an instrument of foreign policy, and that's why the ECL ultimately belongs to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It's also the reason the Minister of Foreign Affairs has considerable discretion to issue, suspend, revoke or reinstate permits. The minister's decision yesterday to revoke permits is quite unusual. Usually you see a suspension, but you don't see them being revoked altogether.

I would say that Canada has a very robust export control system. The system has been improved significantly since 2019 with Canada's accession to the Arms Trade Treaty. It is among the most robust in the world. I'm sure there are things we can do to improve it, but I think we're about as good as you can get. The system works because it's multilateral. We decide with other countries what is to be controlled and how we're going to control it.

The question, then, is whether this was a failure of the export control system. Well, Canada would have never allowed this type of equipment to be exported to the third party in question, that is to say to Azerbaijan. It is thus ultimately a question about end use and the authorization that came with the end use. It would appear that Turkey gave assurances with regard to end use and that the Canadian government, by my reading, was misled by Turkey in this regard.

In the previous panel we had some discussion about what the interdepartmental risk assessment showed. My reading, also based on the comments that both Chris and Bessma made, is that there was a high risk of this technology's being used for purposes that might not align with the assurances given, and that also might not align with Canadian interests over those of NATO and its partners, and we have the evidence already cited from northern Syria and from Iraq. If the ECL worked, then this is ultimately a question about the minister's discretion.

The reason this conversation is so important—yes it's about technology and drones and human rights—is that ultimately, Canadian technology here fundamentally changed the geostrategic status quo, and it changed it in a way that was not in Canada's interest and not aligned with NATO interests. Canada thus inadvertently aided and abetted a change in the geostrategic status quo.

We thus need to ask ourselves harder questions about the export of technology that might have those sorts of implications and that run counter to Canadian and NATO interests. I think the risk assessment should have shown this.

The problem, of course, as the ADM pointed out, is that it's hard to foretell the onset of this type of conflict. It could be weeks, months, or even years away from when the permit is granted. Of course, we know that Turkey was openly egging on Azerbaijan and that there was already extensive military co-operation.

What, then, could have been done to avert this?

One option is post-shipment verification. In my longer submission to this committee I lay out four options of what could have been done. I'm not sure that any of those four options would have made a big difference.

What would have made a difference, however, is if we had embassies in the region. We are selling this technology to a region where we neither have embassies in Yerevan nor Baku. That meant that we had to rely on our embassies in Moscow and Ankara to provide us with the intelligence for the strategic assessment. I would say that if we're going to engage in these types of exports into high-risk areas and regions, we need to make sure that we also have our own representation on the ground.

I would say that it is embarrassing for the Government of Canada that The Globe and Mail sent a journalist to investigate, but we didn't have diplomats on the ground to investigate. That's why we need to ask ourselves some hard questions.

Here are two points to finish on.

There was concern about the redactions to the documents provided. I think if there are concerns, you can always refer the matter to the NSICOP, which could then look at these documents in greater detail. That said, I do that the documents complied with the need for redactions of third party information.

I would just like to close by reminding ourselves that we live in a very challenging, very competitive and hostile global geostrategic environment in which defence exports matter. They matter in instrumental foreign policy, but they matter also as an instrument in providing for a stable world. They allow us to have influence that otherwise we would not have.

People who claim that somehow defence exports make us less safe and that we shouldn't be engaged in this are just fundamentally wrong. They fundamentally misunderstand the world in which we live, where it is key for Canada to make its contributions of high technology. We also, however, have a responsibility to ensure that they are used responsibly and in line with the assurances that all partner countries give us in this regard.

Merci.

4:50 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann

Thank you very much, Professor Leuprecht.

We will now go to our first round of six-minute interventions. Leading us off will be Mr. Chong.

4:50 p.m.

Conservative

Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our three witnesses for appearing in front of us today. I appreciate your taking the time to talk to us.

I don't know if they've had the opportunity to review the government's most recent report, the final report on the review of export permits to Turkey, but there are a number of conclusions in it by the department that I wanted to ask our three witnesses about.

The first conclusion is in answer to a question. The question posed in the report is, “Is the continued export of Canadian military goods and technology to Turkey consistent with Canada's obligations under the Export and Import Permits Act and the Arms Trade Treaty?” The department concluded that “The department assesses that there is no substantial risk that Canadian military goods and technology exported to Turkey would be used to undermine peace and security”.

Do our three witnesses share that conclusion?

4:55 p.m.

Professor, Department of Political Science, Royal Military College of Canada, As an Individual

Dr. Christian Leuprecht

Mr. Chong, I'm happy to weigh in.

I would suggest that it's a conclusion that was reached based on the criteria Mr. Christie laid out, but I think what I'm trying to put forward in my submission is whether or not we are assessing this against the right criteria. We actually need to have a broader geostrategic understanding as to the implications of technology, and perhaps our criteria are framed too narrowly in arriving at the conclusions that we did.

I do not question the conclusions by our colleagues in Global Affairs Canada. I think theirs is a tough job, and I believe in their professionalism and competency.

4:55 p.m.

Conservative

Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON

Following up on your answer, are the criteria too narrowly defined because of the framework legislation, the EIPA, or has the department too narrowly defined the criteria?

4:55 p.m.

Professor, Department of Political Science, Royal Military College of Canada, As an Individual

Dr. Christian Leuprecht

Good civil servants will always try to work within the authority provided by the legislation, so I think there's perhaps an opportunity to revisit either the legislation or the interpretation of the legislation as it is provided to the departments when making their assessments.

I think in light of my remarks about the changing nature of conflict, which my colleagues have echoed, there is perhaps the need to have a broader geostrategic understanding of the potential implications of Canadian technology as part of the assessment.

4:55 p.m.

Professor, University of Waterloo, As an Individual

Dr. Bessma Momani

I'll quickly add to that, if that's okay.

4:55 p.m.

Conservative

Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON

Yes, absolutely.