Evidence of meeting #20 for Foreign Affairs and International Development in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was chinese.
A video is available from Parliament.
5 p.m.
Professor of Chinese Studies, King's College London, and Director, Lau China Institute, As an Individual
You're in good company. Everyone's done that.
5 p.m.
Professor of Chinese Studies, King's College London, and Director, Lau China Institute, As an Individual
The trade flows between, for instance, America and China, I think are at historic highs. Between Australia and China, despite the terrible relationship, I believe they're also at historic highs, largely because of iron ore. Two-way trade between the U.K. and China has increased. It's not like having a big trading relationship—China's the biggest trading partner of 125 countries, I think—and also having significant security and values issues is unusual. That's the norm now. That's the norm.
5 p.m.
Edmonton West, CPC
I think you talked about how important it was domestically for Beijing to talk about the reunification. Do you see Beijing ramping up its propaganda, for lack of better words, about the reunification for domestic reasons?
5 p.m.
Professor of Chinese Studies, King's College London, and Director, Lau China Institute, As an Individual
I think—
5 p.m.
Edmonton West, CPC
Is it like a regime in trouble that starts such sabre-rattling? Is this why they're doing it, or is this a longer term...?
5 p.m.
Professor of Chinese Studies, King's College London, and Director, Lau China Institute, As an Individual
I don't think it's indicative of the regime being in trouble. It's possible that it would be a screen, but I don't think that's the case in this instance. I think it is that for domestic politics, for any domestic politician, what's not to like? Xi Jinping is a politician. He's not God. He's a politician, an opportunistic—
5:05 p.m.
Edmonton West, CPC
He almost has God powers in China now. If that's the case, he's very secure. He's president for life. Why is he continuing with this propaganda, for lack of a better word, about reunification?
5:05 p.m.
Professor of Chinese Studies, King's College London, and Director, Lau China Institute, As an Individual
It's simply because he believes it. The leaders in Beijing believe that Taiwan should be part of China. We shouldn't underestimate that. We don't believe that, maybe, but that's what Chinese leaders believe. I think it's been effective as a point of unity with a very diverse and different kind of audience, the Chinese domestic audience. They are receptive to nationalism.
They're not alone. Many audiences domestically, like the Russians and maybe even the British, are receptive to nationalism. There's nothing unusual about that.
5:05 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann
Thank you very much, Mr. McCauley.
We will go to our final intervention with this panel.
Mr. Sarai, you have three minutes. Please go ahead.
5:05 p.m.
Liberal
Randeep Sarai Liberal Surrey Centre, BC
Thank you, Chair.
My question is for you, Mr. Tsang. In light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, what's the economic impact for Taiwan? Is it harder for Taiwan to attract investment and capital when Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine heightens the regional security concerns?
5:05 p.m.
Professor, SOAS University of London, As an Individual
It has certain effects in terms of companies looking at investing in Taiwan and thinking about the risk that Taiwan would face. It's something that's often stated, but it was not asked before the Ukraine war. The risk calculation has not actually changed as a result of the Ukraine war. If anything, the Ukraine war gave Taiwan a much better scope to prepare itself for its longer-term security.
In the short to medium term, the negative economic impact on Taiwan is there, but it may well be smaller than its negative economic impact on some other countries, including both Europe and potentially even China. Taiwan is not subjected to any of those potential sanctions. Some of Taiwan's industries are less immediately affected by the war in Ukraine than in some ways the Chinese economy is. China is much more dependent on energy. The shooting up of energy prices thus increases the cost of production in China in some ways more than the same in Taiwan.
5:05 p.m.
Liberal
Randeep Sarai Liberal Surrey Centre, BC
On a different front, in terms of Japan, how important is the relationship between Taiwan and Japan in keeping that balance in the region? Do you see Japan getting closer and strengthening its defence systems? Is it enough of a deterrent, along with the U.S., for any invasion from China toward Taiwan?
5:05 p.m.
Professor, SOAS University of London, As an Individual
I think Japan is changing in the last three or four years, taking Taiwan's security very seriously and moving increasingly to a situation that, if a military crisis should develop across the Taiwan Strait, the Japanese will find ways to give support to the United States military. I think Beijing is already working on the assumption that if and when Beijing uses force against Taiwan, they will be taking on not only the Americans but also the Japanese and the Australians.
5:05 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann
Mr. Sarai, thank you very much.
Colleagues, on our collective behalf, let me express our appreciation to both professors.
Thank you for being with us so late in your day and for the important testimony you've given us. We very much appreciate it. Thank you. We'll now invite you to disconnect.
Colleagues, I wonder if we could quickly get to the point of business that I raised with you. The motion with respect to committee travel needs to be bought before SBLI tomorrow. Are colleagues okay with the budget as received? Is there consent to adopt it?
Go ahead, Mr. Bergeron.
5:05 p.m.
Bloc
Stéphane Bergeron Bloc Montarville, QC
I wholly support it, Mr. Chair.
I just have a comment to make. The proposed dates still seem a bit problematic to me. I think it would be hard to make them work.
I imagine that, once the budget request is under review, we could adjust the dates to reflect key political and military considerations at the time.
Is that right?
5:10 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann
The clerk is telling me that is the case.
Is there any other commentary on the budget, colleagues? If not, I would ask for your approval, or at least see if there's any objection, either virtually or in the room.
Seeing none, Madam Clerk, we have approved the budget. I will be happy to deliver the message tomorrow that there is unanimous support from the committee for these travel plans. Thank you very much.
Colleagues, with that, we would like to welcome our second panel this afternoon.
Joining us is André Laliberté, full professor at the school of political studies, in the faculty of social sciences, and the research chair in Taiwan studies at the University of Ottawa.
We also have Joseph Wong, Roz and Ralph Halbert professor of innovation, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy and professor of political science at the University of Toronto.
Welcome to the committee, both of you. We will give each of you five minutes for your opening statements and then engage in the discussion with members.
Professor Laliberté, you can go ahead with your opening statement. The floor is yours.
5:10 p.m.
André Laliberté Full Professor, School of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences and Research Chair in Taiwan Studies, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I'd like to begin by acknowledging the work of Weldon Epp, director general of the north Asia and Oceania branch, and Jordan Reeves, the executive director of the Canadian trade office in Taipei. They are doing a great job representing our interests in Asia at a challenging time.
I followed the proceedings closely when they appeared before the committee in February. I am saddened to see that the scenario discussed then has now become reality, with Russia's aggression in Ukraine, which has been going on for more than two months already.
I realize that the senior officials who implement our policies prefer not to speculate, but developing policies means considering various scenarios. The one that concerns us today involves aggression by the PRC against Taiwan. I want to take a moment to stress the importance of terminology here. This is not about reunification, as the Chinese government purports; it is about an irredentist claim to subjugate a sovereign state, pure and simple. After all, Taiwan has never been part of the PRC.
Military action against Taiwan would deeply upset the stability of value chains in the crucial semiconductor sector and, without a doubt, impact the global economy. Such an attack would represent a serious threat to democratic regimes in Asia and shift the strategic balance in ways we can neither foresee nor easily manage.
It is essential not to incur that risk. Avoiding it means making absolutely clear that such action would be illegal under international law, regardless of the anti-secession law passed by the National People's Congress of China. I hope that Canada will be as quick to stand with Taiwan in support of its right to self-determination as it was for Ukraine, and rightfully so.
Some may not see that comparison as valid because, unlike Ukraine, Taiwan does not enjoy diplomatic recognition by the international community. I would point out, however, that Taiwan is a sovereign state according to the criteria set out in the Montevideo convention: it has a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.
First, Taiwan has been permanently inhabited by indigenous peoples, who arrived long before the first Chinese settlers. They set foot in Taiwan at the same time that the Europeans arrived here, on Turtle Island.
Second, Taiwan not only controls its territory, but has also harnessed the resources of that territory to become the world's 25th largest economy. In addition, Taiwan has equipped itself with the capacity to defend its territory by spending a significant amount on defence, with the 22nd largest military budget in the world.
Third, Taiwan has not just a functioning government, but also a government whose legitimacy is unchallenged. The same cannot be said of the country across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan's government is chosen through competitive elections in what has long been considered Asia's most democratic regime.
Fourth and finally, through the tireless efforts of its representatives, Taiwan has demonstrated its capacity to enter into relations with other states. Over the years, those representatives have shown exceptional professionalism in the face of China's sustained efforts to force the rest of the world not to recognize the country that Taiwan represents.
The basic premise of the entire discussion on China–Taiwan relations is that peace depends on dialogue between the two parties. Taiwan initiated the dialogue in 1991, when President Lee Teng‑Hui declared that the Republic of China in Taiwan was renouncing all claims to the territory governed by the People's Republic.
Since coming to power, President Tsai Ing‑wen has been equally pragmatic, adopting the same attitude. Since the beginning, the Chinese Communist Party has been the one refusing to engage in any dialogue, imposing its own conditions.
No matter what political scenarios are being considered in the medium-term in Taiwan, one thing is for certain: Taiwan's citizens no longer believe China's promises under the “one country, two systems” arrangement. Polls clearly show that the majority of Taiwan's population identifies as Taiwanese, not Chinese or half-and-half.
The continued refusal to legally recognize the nation of Taiwan significantly jeopardizes the validity of international law, when countries yield to a position of power rather than respecting the principles on which that law is based.
5:15 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann
Thank you, Professor Laliberté.
We will now hear from Mr. Wong.
Professor Wong, please go ahead for your opening remarks of five minutes.
5:15 p.m.
Dr. Joseph Wong Roz and Ralph Halbert Professor of Innovation, Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, Professor of Political Science, University of Toronto, As an Individual
Thank you very much. This is truly an honour and privilege for me to be able to speak in front of this committee.
I'm actually Zooming in from Accra, Ghana, right now, so you'll have to forgive me if the connection is a little wonky at times. I will do my best.
Let me begin by saying that it's very clear that Taiwan and its fate are central to the legitimation formula of the authoritarian regime in Beijing. As noted by Kerry and Steve before, the very fate of Taiwan and the ability of the Communist Party in China to make claims on Taiwan and to eventually unify it with the mainland are absolutely essential to the legitimation formula for that regime. In other words, as Kerry points out, the identity politics trumps, in many cases, the economic politics.
This puts Taiwan in a very precarious situation, and I would suggest to you, in an even more precarious situation as time passes, because on the one hand it means there is less and less space for Taiwan to manoeuvre in the international arena, and we have seen tremendous effort by the regime in Beijing to limit this space for Taiwan.
It comes, however, precisely at the time when support for Taiwan internationally, I would suggest to you, is at one of its all-time highs. About 10 years ago I'm reminded that Charles Glaser wrote a very influential piece in various foreign policy magazines in the United States, suggesting that perhaps that was the time for the United States to let Taiwan go, and that this was increasingly a problem for American foreign policy. That was 10 years ago, and increasingly that seems to be a very antiquated view of Taiwan.
Indeed, Taiwan presents itself to the world, I would suggest to you, as the paragon of democracy. It leads the region in terms of women's participation in politics, including the election of the president for two terms. Taiwan presents a model to the industrial world in terms of social policy. Its national health insurance program is a model that countries should emulate, and in terms of its progressive policies with respect to the LBGTQ community and so forth.
I also believe that Taiwan has lots to offer in terms of its lessons with respect to relations with its indigenous peoples, and I think there are plenty of opportunities for Canada to continue to collaborate with Taiwan on that front.
Of course Taiwan is an extraordinary economy, and we have seen that any blockages in the global supply chain, particularly as it relates to the semiconductor sector, can be crippling. It presents a strategic value that I think is quite unprecedented.
However, I say this to say that there is less and less space for Taiwan to manoeuvre, precisely at the time when Taiwan's value and the stakes of Taiwan's future is higher than ever before, which means the possibility of conflict, and the stakes of that conflict are ever more dire.
The question I want to contemplate, then, is this: What do we do with China? It strikes me that one way out of this very difficult situation is to increase the prospects for China and the Chinese regime to entertain the prospects of democratic transition.
Here I want to offer some reflections on this. Professor Laliberté, I think, has done an extraordinary job of describing to us the situation in Taiwan, and I want to talk a little bit about China.
The conventional wisdom in our theories of democratic transition is that democracies will emerge from the ashes of collapsed regimes, that we look for and wait for regimes to crumble under the weight of their own illegitimacy, and from that, then, democracy emerges. That is indeed one way in which democracy has emerged in a lot of the world.
However, the modal pathway for democratic transition in Asia, actually, is not democracy emerging from the ashes of a collapsed regime, but, rather, democracy emerging through the leadership of strong political parties. Indeed, Taiwan is the best example of this. The KMT was a regime that democratized during the late 1980s and into the early 1990s precisely at a time when it was weakening, but it was still a very strong political party. It was a party that was very confident. In other words, democracy proved to be incentive-compatible for this authoritarian regime.
This is a paradox, because what I'm essentially arguing here is that precisely at the time in which a regime is strong and it has little reason to democratize is also the best time for a regime to entertain democratic transition, because it's probably going to lead to the most stable democratic transition. I think everyone would agree that no matter what you think of the regime in Beijing, no one wishes for a regime that collapses, because under the weight of that collapse we're talking about potentially 1.4 billion people suffering.
That's the paradox here. What we should then think about are the implications of this, particularly as they relate to our own foreign policy and how we think about China.
First is that we ought not to wish for the collapse of China and we ought not to wish for the collapse of the Chinese Communist Party regime. I think that would be disastrous for a good portion of humanity.
Second is that it doesn't seem to me that isolation is in any way going to provide the kinds of inducements or incentives for the Chinese regime to entertain democratic transition. In fact, we know that isolationism will likely increase the authoritarian measures employed by the regime.
Third, and this is the most important, is that we should be thinking about the prospects of democracy in China being the result of strategic inducements on the part of the rest of the international community. The recognition that democracy is indeed incentive-compatible with the authoritarian regime, and that democratization of the regime is something that would not lead to the collapse of China....
It's through this that we can open up the political space for more opportunities on how we might be able to continue to recognize Taiwan as the sovereign democracy that it is.
5:20 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann
Professor Wong, thank you so much.
I have a very brief housekeeping rule that Professor Laliberté was able to observe during the first panel. I have a 30-second reminder card when time allocation is up, because some of the interventions from members are quite tightly timed. In the shortest case, it's two and a half minutes each. Keep an eye on that if you could. That would assist us in the management of the committee's time.
We will go to round one, with allocations of six minutes.
Ms. Gray, welcome to the committee. You'll lead us off for six minutes.
5:20 p.m.
Tracy Gray Kelowna—Lake Country, CPC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you to the witnesses for being here today.
My questions are for Professor Laliberté. I wanted to start with the current situation in the Taiwan Strait.
How could trade with Taiwan be impacted with respect to creating supply chain issues?
5:20 p.m.
Full Professor, School of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences and Research Chair in Taiwan Studies, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
Do you mean if there's a conflict?