Foreign Affairs Committee on May 12th, 2022

[Dr. Joseph Wong]

I'll be very brief. Over the past 20-plus years in which I've had the privilege of observing elections and being engaged with scholarship on and in Taiwan, it is becoming unequivocally clear to me that people in Taiwan have increasingly less and less appetite for any prospects of reunification with China, and the situation in Hong Kong, I think, has only fuelled the discourse in Taiwan that the one country, two systems approach is simply unworkable and unpalatable.

[Ali Ehsassi, Liberal, Willowdale, ON]

Thank you.

I'm also reminded of the youth-driven protests in Taiwan in 2014, I believe it was. Is it your opinion that younger Taiwanese are even more nationalistic than older Taiwanese?

[Dr. Joseph Wong]

You certainly see that in the survey data. I think that the protests of 2014 were an excellent display of democracy at work and a young democracy working out its rules of the game. Indeed, I think that younger Taiwanese, just in terms of the generational differences and the cohort effect, simply have less and less connection with China. The questions, even the categories used in surveys, are confusing to many young people in Taiwan. There's a sense of, what do these questions even mean?

[Ali Ehsassi, Liberal, Willowdale, ON]

Thank you for that.

Now given that time is very limited, I'd like to squeeze in one last question.

Professor Brown was of the opinion that, although we should be vigilant, an attack is not imminent. He doesn't see that. Is that your read of the situation as well?

[Dr. Joseph Wong]

Yes, I think that the Chinese government is going to be much more strategic about this. They're learning about what's happening in Ukraine so I think there's definitely reason for pause, though I don't think that this in any way has softened the Beijing government's resolve to seek the unification of Taiwan with China.

[Ali Ehsassi, Liberal, Willowdale, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Ehsassi.

Thank you, as well, to the witnesses.

We now go to Mr. Bergeron for six minutes.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for being here today. I appreciate their insightful comments.

I would like to make a small clarification regarding something Ms. Fry alluded to, Europe's so‑called lack of interest in Taiwan. I just want to point out that, in November 2021, Europe sent a delegation to Taipei. I take that as a sign that the Europeans do have some interest in Taiwan.

I have to tell you, Professor Laliberté, that I was delighted to hear you talk about the criteria set out in the Montevideo convention to define statehood, or a sovereign state. I thought to myself how Quebec met all of those criteria. No doubt, we'll have a chance to discuss that another time.

I was fascinated when you spoke of Taiwan's commitment to no longer represent all of China. Polls show that the people of Taiwan now feel more Taiwanese than Chinese.

Before I get to my question, I'd like to share an anecdote, if you don't mind.

I was in a U.S. airport once and I stumbled upon a group of people who were clearly Chinese. I could tell from the conversations they were having, but after a while, I realized that there were two groups within the larger group and that they were not speaking to one another. I tried to figure out what was going on. You'll tell me that the same thing happens when Parisians are around people from other parts of France. In any case, I noticed that the members of one of the groups had passports from the People's Republic of China, and the members of the other group had passports from the Republic of China.

That brings me to my question.

It seems that something of a legal fiction has existed since nationalist leader Tchang Kaï‑chek found refuge on the island of Formosa, where the Taiwanese government claimed to represent all of China, while in western China, the People's Republic of China, claimed, and still claims, to represent all of China.

Given the fact that the Taiwanese feel less and less like Chinese and more and more like Taiwanese, how do you square Taiwan's renouncing the claim that it represents all of China with the fact that the country is still formally called the Republic of China?

[André Laliberté]

That brings me back to what I said initially. It's not a legal fiction. The Republic of China has existed since 1911 and took refuge in Taiwan. Taiwan is a geographical name, and the Republic of China still exists. Taiwan's president, Tsai Ing‑wen, is fully aware that, if she decided to change the country's name tomorrow, it would spark nothing short of a war. The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China passed a law clearly stating that, if the name is changed, it would be war. That is crystal clear, set out in no uncertain terms. Obviously, Taiwan's government would not dare do such a thing.

Naturally, Taiwan has hard-core sovereignists, but they really are a minority of the population. They would like to see the country's name changed to the Republic of Taiwan to reflect the reality, but short of a revolution in mainland China, it won't happen in our lifetime.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

I want to make clear, Professor Laliberté, that I never claimed the Republic of China was a legal fiction. The legal fiction I was referring to was the odd situation—unique in human history, in fact—where a country purports to represent a larger entity and where another country purports to represent that exact same larger entity.

I fully understand what you're saying. I was discussing it with people from Taiwan yesterday. I realize that a change of name would be sufficient justification to trigger an armed conflict.

Nevertheless, how do you reconcile, on one hand, Taiwan's renouncing its claim that it represents all of China and the feeling the Taiwanese people have of being less and less Chinese and more and more Taiwanese with, on the other hand, the fact that the state's official name contains the word China?

I realize they can't change the name, but how do Taiwanese authorities deal with that paradox, if you will?

[André Laliberté]

It's possible, just as it would be for a European country, for instance. China is a nation, in English and in French, but it also refers to a culture, and the Taiwanese openly admit that. Even though the most recent figures show that 64% of them identify as Taiwanese whereas only 20% identify as both Chinese and Taiwanese, the Chinese identity still matters. It represents their culture and the language they speak. Fukienese, the language spoken by the majority of Taiwanese, is, after all, the language spoken in the nearby province of Fujian.

The Taiwanese are willing to admit that, culturally, they are Chinese, so it may not be as preposterous as it seems for Taiwan to be named the Republic of China. It does have a basis.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

You talked about Europe. Would you say that all Europeans can claim to be European while also being Danish, German, French or even British, and that the same could be said of the Taiwanese, who belong to a wider cultural makeup than just the traditional territory of the Middle Kingdom?

[André Laliberté]

You're dragging me into some—

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Professor Laliberté, I'm sorry to interrupt.

In order for us to stay on schedule, I would ask that you please respond very quickly.

[André Laliberté]

Yes, the European idea works in a broad sense.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Thank you very much, Professor Laliberté.

Thank you, Mr. Bergeron.

We'll go to Ms. McPherson, please, for six minutes.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

What a fascinating conversation. Thank you very much to the witnesses for this.

I'd like to start with Mr. Laliberté.

Your response to my colleague with regard to the U.S. strategy of intentional ambiguity was that it's not the right strategy now and Canada should be moving towards a position of clarity.

We heard from both of you that this is about identity politics for China. There is an ideology there. As we all know, moving someone along in an ideology is close to impossible. It feels a bit like we're in that situation where you're explaining to us that we need to be clear in our position with regard to Taiwan, yet our position will never move China. It will not be able to reconcile any movement we make.

I'm struggling with how to read that from you. Could you elaborate on that for Canada's position in particular?

[André Laliberté]

Are you talking about the issue of identity in Taiwan?

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

If you are saying that intentional ambiguity is not a good strategy and that the strategy Canada should take with regard to its position is one where we are clear on where we should stand with regard to Taiwan, yet we know that this is an ideological issue, how do we square that?

[André Laliberté]

Canada is in a particular place and we have to be more prudent because of our limited capacity, but Canada certainly should, I think, be clear about this idea that whatever understanding that China and Taiwan eventually arrive at should be through peaceful means.

There's a recognition that Taiwan is a distinct society—I weigh my words here—because of the fact that it's a population that has chosen its own government. It's a fact. The discourse coming from the PRC is that they talk about Taiwan being part of China since time immemorial. I would hope that our diplomats reject that discourse and simply say this is bad history and we don't have to accept that.

There's no reason in the world why we should take at face value what our Chinese vis-à-vis are saying when we know that it's wrong history. It's factually wrong. I'm not saying even it's morally wrong. I'm saying that this is not a fact. I'd be happy to give a seminar to go in depth into that question.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

I suspect we may need a seminar because it is very complex, but I do like the idea of peaceful discussions that are prudent and provide clarity. Really, can we ask for more?

Dr. Wong, I was going to ask the next question of you. You spoke about Taiwan being a model of democracy for Asia. One of the things that I have done an awful lot of work on before I was elected as a member of Parliament is the United Nations sustainable development goals. We know that Taiwan has actually made a very strong effort towards achieving the sustainable development goals and that they have demonstrated that they are interested and willing to be a good international partner. We've not necessarily seen China adhere to those international fora with the same level of good intention.

Can you talk a little bit about that and perhaps expand on it? How could Canada support Taiwan through those areas, but also how could Canada support Taiwanese civil society? We know democracy is built upwards. Is there a way for us to be supporting the civil society from the grassroots?

[Dr. Joseph Wong]

That's a terrific question, actually.

I wanted to go back, if I might, on the question of strategic ambiguity just for a moment. The concept worked very well for the time, because it really was a way of talking about strategic engagement. When strategic ambiguity first emerged in U.S. foreign policy circles it was a very comfortable dual mission of both engaging with China, particularly economically, but with the aim of some hope for prospects of some kind of transformation. That was the sort of ambiguity. I think the reason why it has less purchase these days is that in fact China has sharpened its view of what strategic ambiguity is and has made very clear that, in its world, it really is a binary world between the autocratic world and the democratic world. Therefore, they've taken that agenda from our own strategic ambit.

The point I'm trying to make is that we ought not to think that democracy and talking about democracy, be it in Taiwan or in a prospective China, is necessarily antagonistic. If we can reclaim that balance, actually, we can reclaim the kind of strategic ambiguity that allowed us to do that work for a long time.

With respect to Taiwan's democracy, I think in fact this is one of the main ways in which Canada can continue to support Taiwan. When I talk to Taiwanese officials, particularly those in the foreign service, I continually stress that ways to collaborate with Canada would be in areas that are related to the SDGs and that are related in terms of public health. Are there lessons that can be shared with us in terms of pandemic preparedness? We know that Taiwan made enormous strides in the post-SARS world and in fact provides now tremendous lessons to the rest of the world.

Again, I've talked to our colleagues in Taiwan about more engagement around indigenous issues, reconciliation and TRC, and so forth. These are areas that will strengthen and knit together Canada and Taiwanese society more robustly and, frankly, in ways that are going to contribute to the strength of Taiwan's democracy and the resilience of the democracy over time.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Thank you so much.

Thank you, Ms. McPherson.

Colleagues, we're at 5:50. To take us to the full hour, which I have pegged at 6:05, I would propose that we do exactly what we did in the last panel, which is a compressed second round of three-minute and one-and-a-half minute attributions, if that's amenable to colleagues.

I would ask Mr. Morantz to lead us off with three minutes.

[Marty Morantz, Conservative, Charleswood—St. James—Assiniboia—Headingley, MB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Professor Wong, I was fascinated by something you were discussing earlier, about how democracy came about in Taiwan through strong political parties moving towards democratization. You hypothesized—I think this is what you said—that one potential for a lasting peace between China and Taiwan would be the democratization of China. I think that's what you said. I found that absolutely fascinating.

Is this just a hypothesis that you have? Do you have reason to believe that this could actually happen in the real world? Are there indications of anything like this on the horizon? I would like you expand on that in the last couple of minutes that we have.

[Dr. Joseph Wong]

Sure.

I think eight years ago I would have thought.... In looking at the tea leaves at the time, certainly there was a school of thought, in looking at Xi Jinping and his consolidation of power, that this was a preamble for potentially a kind of political liberalization that we saw in Taiwan, that we saw in Korea in the 1980s and that we saw in post-war Japan as well.

I'm less and less optimistic that this is the case, precisely because now so many of the issues that have arisen in China are so central to the legitimation of the Chinese Communist Party regime. That worries me however, because, as we look for cracks in the regime and for the potential collapse of a regime, that will definitely ensure that democracy does not emerge, which will potentially be disastrous.

I think there are still ways in which we can try to make the case, the positive inducements, that democracy is not incompatible with the Chinese Communist Party—in fact, just as the KMT did in Taiwan. It democratized. It won elections. It continued to govern for about a decade. It ceded power when it lost, just like any other democratic party. Taiwan continues to be stable.

If that scenario could be painted out for our colleagues in China and for some progressive thinkers within China, I don't think it's impossible. I hope for that simply because of the way in which we're going right now. As I prefaced my comments, the space for Taiwan is becoming less and less. The stakes over Taiwan are becoming higher and higher. That means that the prospects of conflict become ever more dire.