Thank you, Mr. Chair.
We are pleased to be here today. As you mentioned, I have some colleagues with me.
We have been following this study with great interest. The witnesses you have lined up have been quite impressive in terms of their backgrounds. You will have noted, I'm sure, that you have quite a variety of opinions in terms of how you should proceed. That likely confirms what you already knew when you started this study, which is that this is complex material. It's no great surprise that you're getting a range of views.
My read of the testimony so far is that the only issue you have not had conflicting testimony on is the issue of whether or not there should be studies of tax expenditures. Not all witnesses have weighed in on that front.
Our intent today is to take you through a fairly quick presentation that highlights some of the themes you have been hearing about so far with great regularity. I don't feel it's our place to advise you on what to do as parliamentarians. I do feel it's important that you understand the consequences of some of the choices you have and what they would mean in terms of the supply process. That's my intent.
I'll take you through some of the themes we would like to comment on today. The first is the alignment of budget and estimates. The second is the cash and accrual issue, which has been around for quite some time. The third issue is around what Parliament should vote on—program activity or the current structure of capital, operating, and Gs and Cs. I'll make a couple of quick comments on the deeming rule, and then I'll turn to my colleague, Sally Thornton, to speak to maybe some small things we could do to improve how the information is actually reported.
In our deck, Mr. Chair, we have a distinction between the budget and the estimates. The issue here is not whether they should be linked. It's clear the budget and the estimates have a relationship to each other. I think what may not be well understood about the relationship is that they both feed each other.
The estimates from the previous year are certainly used by my colleagues in the Department of Finance in formulating their next budget. That budget will then influence the main estimates for the following year. It is very much a circular relationship. You will never have complete alignment between the two. I think what we're talking about is whether there is a way to strengthen the links between the two documents. You will never see a complete alignment.
I know that some members or some witnesses have expressed views that they should be totally aligned. I think that's a little simplistic. The reason I say it's simplistic is that you do have the basis of accounting to consider—is it cash, is it accrual—but you also have to understand that to get into the estimates document, an expenditure item needs to be approved by Treasury Board.
So to get perfect alignment, you need time for items to get through the Treasury Board process and to make sure the due diligence and challenge function is done. If you respect that process, you will see things in the budget that do not make it into the estimates document for potentially several years. That's an important point to consider.
The budget document is a policy document. It does set out a broad plan. Estimates are all about expenditures for the current year. They are—I know you've heard me say this before—an “up to” amount, the basis to establish a ceiling for what departments can spend.
There's also a view that supplementary estimates are a bad thing. We will never get rid of supplementary estimates. Things will happen during the year that require expenditure authority. We've had three the last few years. Is the right number two or three? That's debatable. We will never have a system where we're going to Treasury Board for approval where we don't need supplementary estimates. So I just thought I'd make those points.
What can be done to strengthen the relationship? Certainly the greater the amount of time between the budget and the estimates, the stronger the link you'll have. Some years the budget is tabled before the main estimates, and some years the budget is tabled after.
I'll give you a sense of the process behind the two documents. Expenditure authorities and documentation for expenditure approvals are largely cut off around December to make the main estimates that are tabled in March. If you were looking for alignment between the budget and the main estimates, just remember that in terms of cut-off for expenditure items from our internal executive approvals, we're looking at December.
If you were to establish a greater amount of time between the budget and the main estimates, that would allow for greater alignment, but it also might delay some of the things that actually have to get parliamentary approval. I'll speak to that later on.
You could have a process where main estimates are presented in the fall. That would give you greater alignment between the mains and the budget, absolutely. It would also mean that departments are operating on interim supply for six or seven months. I don't think parliamentarians would enjoy a system where it was six or seven months into the year before they were dealing with main estimates, so do understand that distinction. But the greater the amount of time between the two documents, the greater the potential for alignment. There are certainly some things we can do to maybe strengthen the links between the two.
I've already touched on changing the actual timing. It would allow for some additional items to be reflected, but not all, as I mentioned.
If you think about events like H1N1 or the earthquake in Haiti, where there are actually urgencies where we have expenditure approvals required, you're always going to see the need for supplementary estimates. Do remember that the budget is an accrual document and the main estimates and the estimates documents are cash basis, so you will always see a difference between the two numbers. What might be helpful is a way to do a crosswalk between those two numbers so people at least understand the differences.
I'll just touch on cash and accrual for a few minutes. It is overly simplistic to say we have a purely cash system. Our appropriations are modified cash basis, but you do need to understand the context and the other documents that are used in our system. The budget is full accrual. The financial statements of the Government of Canada, which link back to the budget, are full accrual. Estimates and appropriations we have on a modified cash basis, and there is reporting in the public accounts, volume two, on the same basis of accounting.
I'm not aware of any system in the private sector or in the public sector that doesn't need both types of information. The question for us today really is what is the right basis for appropriations? No one here is saying accrual accounting is a bad idea. I think it's actually critical for the budget. Independent accounting standard setters have said accrual accounting is absolutely critical for financial statements. There is no such pronouncement on appropriations. So I think we have some flexibility there.
Understand that if we were to change the basis of appropriations from cash to accrual, it would represent a significant change. It would be a change in legislation. It would be a change in systems. It would be a major change in how departments work. Two points impact there. Such a change would require several years to implement. This is not a change that could be made overnight. And there would also be a cost to this. Do understand that the systems and our controls are currently built around ensuring that departments do not exceed their cash appropriations. If we were to redo the system to make the control on a different basis, there would be time required and there would also be some dollars required.
I would like to highlight for you the experiences of some other countries. Some of this I've spoken on before, but some is new. The Australian government, as you know, were the leaders to go to accrual appropriations, and they have since switched back to go to a net cash basis. You have heard information on this in the past.
It's the Netherlands' experience that I would like to highlight for you. In the Netherlands' experience, they did a study of other countries, but they are the only country I know of that took a focus around what appropriations mean for parliamentarians. It's a bit of a unique decision or assessment they put on things.
There are a couple of things—complexity and transparency. Their conclusions are from a parliamentary perspective. Cash results in more transparency and less complexity, and the two of those are clearly linked. From an accountability perspective, when they looked at other countries there was definitely acknowledgement that cash works in terms of monitoring expenditures. If you are dealing with something more complex than that, which would encompass the assets of the government and its liabilities, clearly accrual is a more appropriate model. That's why we have accrual accounting for both the budget and the government's financial statements. I just thought I would highlight the work of the Netherlands in that case, because they did look at the experience of other countries, but very much with the view of parliamentarians.
We should spend a few minutes on the basis for appropriations. This really comes down to how Parliament controls votes. When you see the word “vote”, that means a department needs Parliament's authority to actually move money between votes. If you think about the current structure we have, most departments have operating and maintenance votes, they have a capital vote, and they have a G and C vote—grants and contributions. Some of our smaller departments have a program vote, which is all of those things rolled into one vote.
Currently we have 135 organizations that get appropriations. There are 191 votes for those 135 organizations. If you think about how you might change that structure, the number of votes is important. The more votes you have, the more cumbersome the system becomes in terms of letting departments actually manage. So there's a balance in there somewhere.
There has been some discussion at this committee about changing to a program basis for votes. I'd just like to maybe spend a few minutes on what that might mean.
All departments have programs and activities. Those are rolled up into a high level called strategic outcomes. If we were to go to a strategic outcome basis for votes, you would be dealing with just under 300 votes. We currently have 298 strategic outcomes. That's an increase in the number of votes—again, more complexity. That's an option. One thing you could do to sort of lessen that number is, again, take your smaller organizations and move them to one vote as a way to reduce it.
If you went to program activities as the basis for voting, it's 593. So you're dealing with a substantial change in the number of votes, which would actually become quite cumbersome.
I've heard some witnesses say, “Move to programs”. Over 2,000 programs—so if you can imagine combing through 2,000 different votes, it becomes, I would say, overly burdensome. So do keep in mind that if you're contemplating a change to a program structure vote, the number of votes becomes important, because it does become cumbersome to manage if you go over those.
Of those 135 organizations, just to give you a sense of their size, only four of them have voted expenditures over $5 billion. If you go between the $1 billion and $5 billion mark, you have 21 organizations, then eight between $500 million and $1 billion, and then 102 of less than $500 million. So if you were to actually conceive of a structure where the smaller organizations only had one vote, that is a possible way of actually implementing a program-based vote without creating so many votes that it becomes cumbersome. Do keep that in mind.
I do want to mention that there is significant information already available on program activity. The main estimates currently are based on votes. Operating and maintenance, G and C, and capital are your vote structure. That is supported by information around expenditures by program activity and type of expenditure.
So there is a way to provide information to parliamentarians about which programs the money relates to without actually changing the vote structure. That is also an option: to strengthen the information around programs.
Part III of the estimates—our RPPs and departmental performance reports—have additional information as well. So one thing the committee might want to consider is whether there is a way to strengthen the provision of program-based information underneath the current structure.
What I will say about the current structure of having votes that are operating, capital, and G and C is that it's easy to actually understand them. Everyone has the same vote structure. If you move to program-based votes, you have to understand the programs of each department to actually understand the votes. One benefit of the current system is the comparability between departments. You can look at National Defence and understand why they have a bigger capital vote than, maybe, HRSDC. So that is one thing to consider: programs are very much unique by department.
On program activity, I think I've already touched on most of these, Chair, but the level of detail in the vote is something that's important for this committee to consider. There are resource implications. Again, it's the same as if you went through a change from cash to accrual. If you move from the current structure to a program activity basis, it is complex and would take some time—that's not to say it's not doable—and there are some policy issues that we would have to get our mind around.
Specifically, the one I will highlight today is that if you went to a program-based vote, there would be expenditures that would have to be allocated across different programs. You're likely dealing with some sort of formula there. It's not a bad thing, but it just means that it wouldn't have the exact nature, whereas in the current structure you have capital and operating, and people know the difference. You're into a case with a program-based structure where certain people may work part time on one program and part time on another, and we would have to allocate their time.
I don't plan on saying much on deeming, except that I do want to mention that the nice thing about the deeming rule is that it forces a study to come to an end—or no study at all, but it forces an end to the process. The longer that process goes on, the implication is that the longer departments have to operate on interim supply. So just be aware of that constraint.
Currently, departments operate on interim supply for April, May, and June. For most departments, that's three-twelfths. If you were to extend beyond that, you're into the summer, when parliamentarians are typically not here, so you could be extending into the fall. So do understand that if you are considering changing the deeming rule, there is a direct link to how long departments would operate under interim supply if that gets changed.
I think I will now turn to my colleague, Sally Thornton, who will talk briefly about what improvements we might make on the reporting of information to parliamentarians.