Evidence of meeting #36 for Procedure and House Affairs in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was threat.

A video is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Cherie Henderson  Assistant Director, Requirements, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Newton Shortliffe  Assistant Director, Collection, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Michel Bédard  Interim Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel, House of Commons
Tobi Nussbaum  Chief Executive Officer, National Capital Commission
Trish Ferguson  Acting Deputy Chief, Ottawa Police Service
Larry Brookson  Acting Chief Superintendent, Parliamentary Protective Service

October 27th, 2022 / 11 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Bardish Chagger

I call this meeting to order.

Good morning, everyone.

Welcome to meeting No. 36 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs.

The committee is meeting today to resume its study on expanding the parliamentary precinct to include parts of Wellington Street and Sparks Street.

Our first panel consists of officials from CSIS, who will provide the committee with a security briefing on their work.

Our second panel consists of witnesses and organizations who have been recalled to committee to provide additional information.

I would like to let the committee know that all of our virtual witnesses have undergone the pre-committee connectivity and audio test.

In panel one we are welcoming today Cherie Henderson, assistant director, requirements, and Newton Shortliffe, assistant director, collection.

Before we start, I remind everyone that all comments by members and witnesses should be addressed through the chair.

Ms. Henderson, please go ahead with your opening statement. Welcome to PROC.

11 a.m.

Cherie Henderson Assistant Director, Requirements, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Thank you.

Good morning, Madam Chair and members of the committee.

My name is Cherie Henderson and I am the assistant director of requirements for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. I am joined today by my colleague, Newton Shortliffe, the assistant director of collection. I would like to thank you for the invitation to speak to you today and to respond to your questions.

I would like to begin by speaking briefly about the mandate of the service, to help situate the activities of CSIS at home and abroad. All our activities are grounded in the CSIS Act, which clearly articulates our mandate and authorities.

First and foremost we investigate threats to the security of Canada. Our act defines the threats we are authorized to investigate: espionage and sabotage, foreign interference, terrorism and extremism, and subversion.

We provide advice to the Government of Canada on these threats, including through the production of intelligence assessments and reports. CSIS may also take measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada.

Lastly, at the request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of National Defence and with the consent of the Minister of Public Safety, CSIS may collect foreign intelligence within Canada in relation to the intentions, capabilities or activities of a foreign state.

Importantly, CSIS is specifically prohibited from investigating lawful advocacy, protest or dissent, except when it is carried on in conjunction with activities that constitute a threat to the security of Canada. We are also bound by and uphold the charter rights of all Canadians.

As indicated in our 2021 public report, which I invite you to read online, the key national security threats facing Canada—foreign interference, espionage, malicious cyber-activity and violent extremism—are all accelerating and evolving.

We continue to see uncertainty regarding the global balance of influence, with shifting power structures posing new and complex challenges to the international rules-based order. These include the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban and the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine in February of this year.

Here at home, foreign interference poses one of the most important strategic threats to Canada's national security, targeting Canada's sovereignty and democratic institutions. Last year CSIS released a report to the public on foreign interference threats to Canada's democratic process. In our report we advised Canadians that foreign states and their proxies target politicians, political parties and electoral processes in order to covertly influence Canadian public policy and public opinion, and to undermine our democracy.

We are also increasingly seeing states leverage media to spread disinformation or run influence campaigns designed to confuse or divide public opinion, interfering in healthy public debate and political discourse.

Additionally, here and around the world, the continued impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has reinforced the unpredictability of the current threat environment and in some cases exacerbated the threats.

One of those is most certainly the threat from ideologically motivated violent extremism, or IMVE, which is fuelled by extreme views around race, gender and authority. It is a threat that thrives on division and festers in the online space. We continue to see an increase in IMVE attacks in Canada and around the world. Lone actors remain the primary IMVE threat, as demonstrated by the tragic June 2021 attack in London, Ontario.

As our director told the Special Joint Committee on the Declaration of Emergency this past May, in the case of the “freedom convoy”, CSIS was concerned with the threat of IMVE, and specifically the potential for serious acts of violence.

The combination of major disruptive events like the pandemic, the ever-increasing influence of social media and the spread of conspiracy theories has created an environment ripe for exploitation by influencers and extremists. This environment has the potential to inspire individuals to commit acts of violence.

In the lead-up to the “freedom convoy”, CSIS closely monitored known IMVE threat actors to assess any threat of serious acts of violence. This operational posture was informed by context. For one, CSIS had observed a rise in anti-authority violent rhetoric, particularly as it related to public health measures. CSIS was also aware of the opportunities that large gatherings and protests could offer IMVE actors to carry out acts of violence and recruit like-minded individuals.

11:05 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Bardish Chagger

Thank you, Ms. Henderson, for those opening comments. We look forward to learning more within our round of questions and answers.

We will be starting with Mr. Calkins for six minutes, followed by Monsieur Fergus.

Go ahead, Mr. Calkins.

11:05 a.m.

Conservative

Blaine Calkins Conservative Red Deer—Lacombe, AB

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I really appreciate your being here, Ms. Henderson.

I noticed that when you talked about IMVE, you said it thrives on division. I notice that the divisive policies of the government when it came to vaccine mandates wasn't included on the list of things you just gave when it came to the convoy threats, but that's fine. I would just like to have that noted.

When the government says things about its own citizens and takes a divisive approach in its political strategies, I think it creates or exacerbates the very real problems we have with the state of the mental health of a lot of Canadians and some of the people who were inspired to do the things they're doing, but I don't want to get involved in that. I think we're going to have an opportunity to talk about these kinds of things in the next study, on foreign interference and so on.

I will move on now to dealing with the issue at hand, which is the operational security of the parliamentary precinct.

University of Cambridge historian Christopher Andrew has stated that intelligence failures are more often not in the collection of information but in the failures of sharing, analysis and execution. Given the lessons learned from the 2014 Parliament Hill shooting and more recently from the convoy, would you say that intelligence information is being shared properly within the parliamentary precinct? Furthermore, would increased co-operation between all parties in the national capital preclude the need to expand the parliamentary precinct?

11:05 a.m.

Assistant Director, Requirements, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Cherie Henderson

What I would say is that we absolutely work very closely with all of our police partners, specifically the RCMP, but all police partners of jurisdiction. We have a very robust process with the RCMP in regard to making sure we hold what we call one-vision meetings, where we ensure that any information we collect or the RCMP collects that could lead to threats to national security is shared, so that the appropriate body can engage under its mandate.

We have constantly continued to strive to improve information sharing and to ensure really good communication between all parties. There's always room for improvement, but it is an ongoing effort to ensure that every party that could potentially be impacted by a piece of information receives that information and can respond to it under its mandate.

11:10 a.m.

Conservative

Blaine Calkins Conservative Red Deer—Lacombe, AB

During the recent convoy in Ottawa, did CSIS have a relationship and a communication exchange with the Parliamentary Protective Service or the Sergeant-at-Arms?

11:10 a.m.

Newton Shortliffe Assistant Director, Collection, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

As the assistant director of collection, I am responsible for all the regions that are responsible for the investigations on national security issues that the service does.

When there is a major incident such as the convoy incident, incident groups are created. This is led by law enforcement. Different partners will participate in that and will interface with those groups in order to share information to ensure that intelligence can be passed and to have discussions about what is going on.

The service did participate in those structures during the convoy. I know that our capital region, which is responsible for the national capital region, has an excellent relationship with parliamentary security, as well as with the RCMP.

I don't know if parliamentary security, however, participated in the particular incident group in which we were interfacing during the convoy, because the point of these groups is to create a single point of contact in and out at the working level so that we reduce the amount of fog that might otherwise be created by the information flows.

11:10 a.m.

Conservative

Blaine Calkins Conservative Red Deer—Lacombe, AB

As a former member of the Board of Internal Economy during that particular process, I would suggest to you that more work needs to be done in sharing that information.

I believe the advice we were given as parliamentarians in various debates here in the public sphere was largely done without knowing the information that we probably ought to have or should have known. I would like, if you can.... I don't want to put you on the spot right now, but I think there needs to be a way for parliamentarians to engage in the debate on issues as important as the ones we're discussing here today, so that at least parliamentarians can have actual informed debate rather than speculating. There was a lot of speculation and a lot of uncertainty about what was true and what wasn't true insofar as what the intents of some of the people involved in the convoy were.

Given that Wellington will be seeing many changes over the next few years, including the new block 2 plan and renovation to the Parliament, as well as the West Memorial Building and the heating and cooling plant, do you believe that the expansion of the precinct should be left to a panel of experts? Should you be providing advice as one of those experts?

There was an NDP MP here who I didn't agree with much and who said that as parliamentarians we shouldn't be picking out the colours of the drapes in the building, but we should be providing oversight rather than actual planning. Do you think that should be left to a panel of experts and, as such, have you been consulted as a potential member of that panel?

11:10 a.m.

Assistant Director, Collection, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Newton Shortliffe

The role of the service is to conduct investigations relating to threats to the security of Canada. We look at individuals and groups who may pose different kinds of threats. We provide advice on what we're seeing in that regard, but in terms of policy decisions regarding, for example, what the nature of the security should be in the parliamentary precinct, really that's for others and is not something I would be comfortable commenting on.

11:10 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Bardish Chagger

Thank you for that exchange.

I will note that it was really nice how, when one group of people was questioning, everybody else was quiet, even though some of the comments might not have been well received. I hope that continues now with Monsieur Fergus's six minutes.

11:10 a.m.

Liberal

Greg Fergus Liberal Hull—Aylmer, QC

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I hope my questions will not prompt any comments from my honourable colleagues, from whichever side.

I would first like to thank Ms. Henderson and Mr. Shortliffe for their testimony.

I would also like to invite Ms. Henderson to finish her presentation before I ask my questions. I don't think that will take her long and I think it will be beneficial for the committee.

11:15 a.m.

Assistant Director, Requirements, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Cherie Henderson

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I can finish off, if that's okay for the committee.

What I will say is that CSIS was also aware of the opportunities that large gatherings and protests could offer IMVE actors to carry out acts of violence and recruit like-minded individuals.

Finally, CSIS was concerned about the threat posed by lone actors. That is why, throughout the events of January and February, CSIS remained engaged with the RCMP and other law enforcement partners to ensure timely sharing of information.

As I've mentioned, the service is mandated to investigate a variety of threats to the security of Canada, and that is what we work on every day in collaboration with domestic and international partners.

I understand that your study centres on expanding the federal jurisdiction for the operational security of the parliamentary precinct. From a CSIS perspective, we understand that our institutions and parliamentarians can be and are at risk. Tragic past events have shown as much, almost eight years ago to the day. That said, the service acts on its mandate regardless of where the threats emanate from or are directed.

To conclude, although our work at CSIS is often undertaken outside of the public eye, I want to ensure this committee that the service is steadfast in its commitment to keep all Canadians safe.

Thank you.

11:15 a.m.

Liberal

Greg Fergus Liberal Hull—Aylmer, QC

Thank you for finishing your presentation, Ms. Henderson.

Is the Canadian Security Intelligence Service best placed for commenting on security in the parliamentary precinct? Would the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or other organizations be in a better position to offer us expertise in that regard?

11:15 a.m.

Assistant Director, Requirements, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Cherie Henderson

Thank you for your question. I am going to answer in English, so that the nuances are clearer.

What I would like to say is that CSIS looks at and investigates threats all across the country. Those threats could potentially be directed at any area or any individual. We collect that information, analyze it, develop our assessments and provide it to the other bodies. Those bodies, such as the RCMP or relevant police services, can then use that information to help assess the threat with regard to a particular situation.

While we may not be commenting particularly with regard to the parliamentary precinct, we can speak and provide information with regard to the threats we are seeing across the country—or in some cases, what we are seeing around the world—that are impacting the situation in Canada.

11:15 a.m.

Liberal

Greg Fergus Liberal Hull—Aylmer, QC

I would now like to ask a more theoretical question, but I assure you that I am taking what you just said into consideration.

In general, to increase the security of a crucial institution like Parliament, the Privy Council Office or the Prime Minister's Office, is it preferable that there be more or less distance between those important offices and the street where cars or trucks are travelling?

11:15 a.m.

Assistant Director, Requirements, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Cherie Henderson

From the CSIS perspective, we wouldn't necessarily comment on the actual physical security around certain areas. What we would do is try to get a very clear appreciation of the threat environment we are currently facing, recognizing that the threat environment changes. At the moment, we know from ITAC that our national threat terrorism level is at medium.

In situations where we are collecting information indicating that there is a potential increase that could lead to an increase in the threat assessment, that needs to be taken into consideration with regard to the protection of certain areas, depending on the threat in those areas. It can change, alternate and move, depending on the threat environment we are seeing at the time. We would hope that information and assessment could be used for your determination.

11:20 a.m.

Liberal

Greg Fergus Liberal Hull—Aylmer, QC

Is the situation safer or less safe in today's world, given trends?

I would ask you to give a short answer.

11:20 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Bardish Chagger

Thank you for that exchange.

The floor is yours for six minutes, Ms. Gaudreau.

11:20 a.m.

Bloc

Marie-Hélène Gaudreau Bloc Laurentides—Labelle, QC

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I would like to thank the witnesses, because they have taught me a lot about CSIS, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. I understand clearly that the role of CSIS is to inform us about potential threats.

I am going to offer some context for the matter at hand: we want to avoid a recurrence of an event like the one that occurred in 2014, an event for which the parliamentary precinct did not have all of the security resources needed for taking action.

I also understand that it is difficult for CSIS to say whether or not an expansion would help it assess threats, so I am going to ask much more specific questions in connection with the chronology of events.

What was the date when CSIS looked at a potential threat? When did it inform the Ottawa Police Service, the Parliamentary Protective Service, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police?

11:20 a.m.

Assistant Director, Requirements, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Cherie Henderson

I just want to make sure I understand.

Are you speaking specifically in regard to the convoy itself, or are you speaking more generally?

11:20 a.m.

Bloc

Marie-Hélène Gaudreau Bloc Laurentides—Labelle, QC

Because of the events surrounding the presence of the convoy, we are trying to determine whether the expansion is necessary to help people like you maintain the security of the site.

What were the dates of your discussions? I am talking about the period when you started to look at the possibility of a threat associated with the arrival of the truckers.

11:20 a.m.

Assistant Director, Requirements, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Cherie Henderson

I wouldn't be able to speak to exact dates. What I can speak to is the fact that, prior even to the convoy starting, in the beginning of 2022 we were all very aware of the current what I would call rise that we were seeing, or the impact of the ideologically motivated violent extremist movement.

This was something we had been very aware of. We can even go back to what happened in Washington on January 6, when we saw Capitol Hill overrun. I think that shocked a lot of people. We have always been watching this, and we were constantly watching to determine whether any individuals we were specifically looking at within the IMVE milieu were starting to engage with the convoy. We're always concerned that anything creating—

11:25 a.m.

Bloc

Marie-Hélène Gaudreau Bloc Laurentides—Labelle, QC

I'm sorry to interrupt you. I would really like to know on what occasions you discussed the subject.

I know the watch you keep is extremely important, but I want to know what dates and what organizations you spoke with to determine whether there was a serious threat, an alarm signal. I would like to know on what occasions your discussions took place.

What we have to do is determine whether an expansion is possible and how things could be facilitated so that the operational services protect our security.

11:25 a.m.

Assistant Director, Requirements, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Cherie Henderson

I don't have any specific dates. What I can say is that as we continually monitor and investigate anything that could be a potential threat to the security of Canada, we constantly and regularly engage with the RCMP and our police partners. These are the same rules of engagement we followed with the RCMP and our police partners during the events that happened in January and February.

If there was anything that came to light, we would automatically make the—

11:25 a.m.

Bloc

Marie-Hélène Gaudreau Bloc Laurentides—Labelle, QC

I will amend my question: when did someone communicate with you to determine whether something was happening, and who communicated with you?