Evidence of meeting #37 for Procedure and House Affairs in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was information.

A video is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Stéphane Perrault  Chief Electoral Officer, Elections Canada
Caroline Simard  Commisioner, Office of the Commissioner of Canada Elections
Marc Chénier  Deputy Commissioner and Chief Legal Counsel, Office of the Commissioner of Canada Elections
Michelle Tessier  Deputy Director, Operations, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Alia Tayyeb  Deputy Chief of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Communications Security Establishment

12:35 p.m.

NDP

Rachel Blaney NDP North Island—Powell River, BC

My next question is that, of course, when we look at this process, there has to be a balance between what we expect voters to do to inform themselves and understand and how government should ensure that accurate information is available to the public. How do you envision this task being balanced between the two?

12:35 p.m.

Deputy Director, Operations, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Michelle Tessier

Perhaps I can start, and Alia can answer after that.

A lot of it is awareness and communicating to Canadians, to various communities, that, if there's any concern, if they see any information that they feel is questionable, and certainly if they feel threatened, our RCMP colleagues and other law enforcement partners are certainly available to address any potential threats.

It's really very much an awareness issue, so that Canadians know that they can address any questions or concerns to us, to the RCMP or to Elections Canada. We can answer questions and create awareness, so people feel they have the information they need and are well informed when it comes to the elections and their ability to vote.

12:35 p.m.

Deputy Chief of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Communications Security Establishment

Alia Tayyeb

Thank you.

I don't want to speak on behalf of Elections Canada, but I worked with them during the election campaign and I'm aware that this is something they are also seized with by improving their outreach to communities about the importance of participating in the democratic process. They may be able to offer more information on that as well.

12:35 p.m.

NDP

Rachel Blaney NDP North Island—Powell River, BC

Thank you. I have only a couple of seconds, so I will cede those.

12:35 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Bardish Chagger

Thank you always, Ms. Blaney.

Next we will go to Mr. Cooper and then Ms. O'Connell.

Mr. Cooper, you have five minutes.

12:35 p.m.

Conservative

Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB

Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to the officials. I will direct my questions to whichever official is best positioned to answer them.

The first question I'll ask is this: Did the Chinese communist regime interfere in the last federal election?

12:35 p.m.

Deputy Director, Operations, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Michelle Tessier

As I mentioned, I can't get into—as I'm sure you can appreciate—operational details of our investigations. What I will say is that we know that the Chinese Communist Party is involved and interested in promoting its own national interests. It is an actor in foreign interference. We have said that publicly. I can state again that we are concerned about the activities regarding threats against the security of Canada, including foreign interference by the Chinese Communist Party.

12:35 p.m.

Conservative

Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB

I understand that you can't get into operational details, but could you speak perhaps a little more broadly about some of the activities the Chinese communist regime is involved in in terms of interference?

12:35 p.m.

Deputy Director, Operations, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Michelle Tessier

Yes. As I mentioned earlier, we know that China, among other countries, tries to target elected officials at all levels of government to promote its own national interests and to encourage individuals to speak or act, if you will, as proxies on behalf of the Communist Party of China.

There is even open information that talks about these types of activities and their use of proxy agents in other countries who they will use to represent their interests. That remains of concern to us in terms of its influence activities and how it tries to manipulate some individuals to work in their interests against Canada's national interests.

12:40 p.m.

Conservative

Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB

Would it be fair to say that it's threatening and intimidating individuals on Canadian soil?

12:40 p.m.

Deputy Director, Operations, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Michelle Tessier

It's fair to say that it would use a number of techniques, including threats to communities here, including using proxy agents so that you don't necessarily know it's the Government of China behind it, and including attempts to use community resources. It's fair to say that there are a number of techniques it would use to promote its own national interests against Canada's.

12:40 p.m.

Conservative

Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB

Would it be fair to say that this is occurring on a fairly widespread basis?

12:40 p.m.

Deputy Director, Operations, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Michelle Tessier

I hesitate to give a frequency. Again, I would say we are increasingly concerned. We have seen, as was mentioned earlier, the laws the Chinese Communist Party has passed, making it obligatory for everybody in China, including the private sector, to work on behalf of the government.

We are seeing increasing authoritarianism, if I can allow myself to say that word, in terms of the Communist Party of China's strategies in this regard.

12:40 p.m.

Conservative

Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB

Can you speak to the use of Chinese language media by the regime?

12:40 p.m.

Deputy Director, Operations, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Michelle Tessier

We are concerned about the use of media by many of the hostile state actors, including China. We know there are attempts. We've talked about disinformation and misinformation attempts using all types of media. The media are very much a victim or a tool that is used for foreign interference.

12:40 p.m.

Conservative

Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB

[Inaudible—Editor] content farms?

November 1st, 2022 / 12:40 p.m.

Deputy Director, Operations, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Michelle Tessier

I'm sorry. I didn't hear the question.

12:40 p.m.

Conservative

Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB

What about content farms, content mills and information saturation?

12:40 p.m.

Deputy Director, Operations, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Michelle Tessier

I would say all available vectors in media would be able to be exploited by hostile state actors, so all types of media are certainly vulnerable to exploitation.

12:40 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Bardish Chagger

Thank you.

Ms. O'Connell, you have five minutes.

12:40 p.m.

Liberal

Jennifer O'Connell Liberal Pickering—Uxbridge, ON

Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to the witnesses.

I want to follow up on that line of questioning in terms of using media outlets. I believe, Ms. Tessier, you mentioned earlier that foreign state actors often use local media to spread disinformation or misinformation. You said just now, in that exchange—I'm paraphrasing here, of course—that all types of media could and would be used.

For CSIS, or CSE or any Canadian agency, for example, if a so-called media group like Canada Proud or Rebel News started using Chinese or Russian types of disinformation in their local disinformation or misinformation campaigns, what mechanisms would you have to then tell Canadians that this local source of information is being used by foreign state actors like China or Russia?

12:40 p.m.

Deputy Director, Operations, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Michelle Tessier

I want to highlight what we said earlier, that we respect.... Obviously, we are in a democracy. We respect the media, and we do not want to be seen as interfering in the media. I want to underline that. That is certainly not an activity the service would undertake.

Without being able to get into great detail, we would look from an investigative perspective to try to determine what the nature of the threat was. Of course, we'd use the whole gamut of tools at our disposal.

I go back to the importance of working with the community and how important it is for us to work with stakeholders in the community to protect the community. That's why it is important for community members to be able to reach out to us should they feel that this type of activity is going on. It is certainly not the service that will be monitoring all media.

I want to be careful here. We recognize the right in a democracy to have the freedom of expression that exists, but we are concerned when our mandate is called into question. That is when hostile states working in a clandestine fashion are working against Canadian national interests or threatening the community. Our mandate is quite defined in that respect. I would want to reassure the committee that it is where our focus would be.

12:45 p.m.

Liberal

Jennifer O'Connell Liberal Pickering—Uxbridge, ON

Thank you.

Following up on that, isn't that part of foreign state actors' attempts to undermine democracy in places like Canada, and, I'm sure, in other countries as well? It's to undermine democracy, our pillars of democracy and our trust in institutions. Foreign interference and the messages they send are not necessarily, “We like this person or that person or this party”; it's to sow doubt in our institutions. For example—I don't know—the Governor of the Bank of Canada, the local media that asked tough questions of certain parties.... Isn't it a factor that it's not very clear-cut support of this government over that government, but foreign interference is to sow doubt in our democratic institutions? That could take form in many different messages.

12:45 p.m.

Deputy Director, Operations, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Michelle Tessier

You are absolutely correct. That is very much one of the vectors used to, as an example, try to find a divisive issue in society and amplify it one way or the other.

I'm pleased to say that the increased awareness and discussion about foreign interference highlights how society is becoming much more attuned to the threat it represents.

12:45 p.m.

Liberal

Jennifer O'Connell Liberal Pickering—Uxbridge, ON

Did you see COVID as an opportunity? You mentioned taking a divisive issue and turning that against governments. For example, Canada Proud was criticized for spreading misinformation about vaccine rollouts. Did you see an increase in disinformation or sowing doubt in Canadian society? Did you see that vacuum open or increase during COVID?