Evidence of meeting #51 for Procedure and House Affairs in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was information.

A video is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Lyall King  Director, Risk Mitigation Programs, Communications Security Establishment
Lisa Ducharme  Acting Director General, Federal Policing National Intelligence, Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Cherie Henderson  Assistant Director, Requirements, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Adam Fisher  Director General, Intelligence Assessments, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

11:25 a.m.

Director, Risk Mitigation Programs, Communications Security Establishment

Lyall King

I will reiterate that, especially when you have online information playing out in a public domain.... We talk about online influence that is available for people to see and for anyone to pick up, look at, interpret and share. We, inside, are also trying to understand what is behind that. We are trying to understand what and who is driving that information exchange. Those aren't always simple, quick or easy things to do.

However—and we did this routinely throughout the election period—we shared when we had information, whether or not it was open source. We said, “Look, this is in the news, so we are having a look at this to try to understand what's behind it”, in order to alert and advise. Information was shared. It's decisions on what to do with that information....

We are in a different role and realm than the media and public. We have other considerations to think about when we're sharing and treating information, especially classified information.

11:30 a.m.

Bloc

Marie-Hélène Gaudreau Bloc Laurentides—Labelle, QC

I only have 30 seconds left. In my second round of questions or in the extra hour that follows, I will ask you a question for the people who are watching us and who are concerned about all the electoral process.

What can be changed? I'd like your opinion. We're talking about trust, but we're also talking about citizen participation in action.

I'll ask you a question later about the famous foreign agents registry.

11:30 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Bardish Chagger

Thank you, Ms. Gaudreau.

Ms. Blaney, you have six minutes.

11:30 a.m.

NDP

Rachel Blaney NDP North Island—Powell River, BC

Thank you, Chair.

Of course, all of my questions go through the chair as they must. I want thank all of the people who are here testifying before us. For me the biggest concern I have is that Canadians have faith in our system, and that if there are problems within our system we fix those and we don't create a bunch of fearful speculations but rather a conscious effort to bring clarity and understanding. I feel that this is an area that we all need to do a little bit better in, to be quite frank.

We know that China and other foreign actors have had involvement in Canada's politics and have been going on for quite a long time trying to interfere, and that's very concerning. We see that, in the 2019 election, there were some pretty profound things that happened. We're hearing that there hasn't been an impact on our elections, but I think people's fear is growing and that really concerns me.

I'll direct my first question to Mr. King, and if anybody else wants to answer it please feel free to join in.

I feel, based on the research I have done, that Canada is far behind so many other countries and that concerns me greatly.

My first question is around the registry. What kinds of discussions are happening internally? I know you can't give us all of the details, but I think Canadians want to know there is information out there that we've heard. There isn't clarity on how that has impacted us in a way. There's not clarity, quite frankly, around what MPs and their parties can do to protect themselves. I'm concerned that there could be something happening and I would be merrily going along my way doing my work during an election and I would have no idea.

Is the registry being discussed, and what are other ways that we can look forward to in elections so that MPs can protect themselves from these kinds of things? Are there specific questions of ourselves and our parties? I heard Ms. O'Connell talking about those things and saying the Conservatives.... How would they know when to ask? What are the things that we need to be watching for as parties, as political folks, as MPs, as people who are running to be MPs, to have a better awareness and ask the correct questions so that hopefully we can get the information we need to do the things we need to do during the election process?

I know that was a lot to take in.

11:30 a.m.

Director, Risk Mitigation Programs, Communications Security Establishment

Lyall King

I will probably pass to my service colleagues maybe to talk about the foreign registry, or a few of those points.

Just briefly in terms of protection of MPs maybe I should just start by saying there's a constant learning process here for us as well. What we did in 2019 worked reasonably well, and we tried to take some lessons from that and reuse or change. There is a need to constantly evaluate where we are. I would say, comparing us to other nations and specifically the Five Eyes, we've gotten very good comments and feedback from our Five Eyes partners on the way we operate in this domain. You are correct that there are probably some gaps there undoubtedly, and I think we should look to highlight and close those where we can.

In terms of protection for MPs, certainly during the election I know the cyber centre, which is part of CSE, had a 24-7 hotline that was available for MPs to reach out to. We provided specific guidance to MPs on how to protect themselves with respect to their personal devices' information really from the cybersecurity perspective. I know there are other discussions in and around security for MPs from a physical perspective through probably the RCMP. These were themes that came up and the service does reach out as well and try to engage with those communities.

I don't know if the service wants to reply on that piece and maybe the registry a bit.

February 9th, 2023 / 11:30 a.m.

Adam Fisher Director General, Intelligence Assessments, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Yes. Thank you, Madam Chair. Through you, maybe I'll put those in two buckets: policy, and some of our briefings to folks who can be impacted by foreign influence activity.

On the policy side, there's the foreign registry, of course. Behind the scenes, certainly the service and our partners are engaged in giving advice to government on what we see as potentially useful tools that could address foreign influence activity.

Something I would emphasize is that we're up against adversaries who are very sophisticated. They're using the full state apparatus in terms of their targeting against Canada. It's not a static threat. It evolves. They watch very closely how we react and how we adapt, and they look for ways to work around that.

My point is that there's no one silver bullet to deal with this. There needs to be a continuous process, a continuous conversation and engagement to address it.

In terms of awareness amongst Canadians, and the political class as well, that is something the service, outside of the SITE task force has been putting a lot of effort into in the last few years. That's both in general terms, so engaging with parties in a classified setting, and in an unclassified setting with broader audiences, to educate them about the threat. We have a number of unclassified publications on foreign influence activity, which give you a good idea of the flags to look for in terms of foreign influence activity.

I also want to say, where we can—because a lot of what we're dealing with is highly classified intelligence—we try to engage with individuals we know are being targeted. I say that outside of any specific case or example.

11:35 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Bardish Chagger

Thank you.

Mr. Calkins, it's up to five minutes for you.

11:35 a.m.

Conservative

Blaine Calkins Conservative Red Deer—Lacombe, AB

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I have a question for you and whoever can answer this. Australia's intelligence service recently intercepted a foreign interference plot, and the situation became so grave that the director-general of security, Mike Burgess, confirmed that espionage and foreign interference in democracy in Australia have now supplanted terrorism as the nation's principal security concern. You're probably aware of that. He also expressed that Beijing used dating apps to mine confidential information from thousands of Australians with access to classified information. That's not me; that's you who would be the equivalent here in Canada.

In response to Australia's new laws making it a crime to engage in covert, deceptive or threatening conduct on behalf of a foreign government, and so on, we're trying to figure out here, as parliamentarians, what we should be doing. However, it's really difficult to figure out what we should be doing if we actually don't know what's going on.

Right now I can read Bloomberg's various very credible news articles coming out of Australia, where they say that they've intercepted people who are bankrolling money. We've had the same allegations here in Canada, yet nobody will say anything. If Beijing's willing to do it in Australia, I don't know why they wouldn't be willing to try it in Canada as well. All I hear is “media reports”, but I can't seem to get a single official from the Government of Canada to confirm or deny that there is actually money that's being bankrolled.

I can look at the documents you provided. I look at “Cybersecurity Threats against Electoral Infrastructure”. It's been fully redacted. “Cybersecurity Threats against Political Parties and Government Officials” is fully redacted. “Foreign Interference—Political” is fully redacted. “Overt Influence” is fully redacted. “Overall Threat Assessment” is fully redacted. I look at the other sides of the pages here and see that “Foreign Interference—Public” is fully redacted. I don't know what to communicate with my constituents.

It's a really awkward position to be in, because I don't want to impugn anybody's reputation here—that's not what my intent is. I actually believe that our government officials are doing the best they can. I believe you're very good at monitoring. I'm not so sure that we're good at interdicting or stopping, because I haven't see any results that tell me so. I have no media reports. I have no information that tells me that we've actually stopped anything, but I do have a former colleague who tells me very clearly that Beijing was interfering in his election. At that last meeting, the former ambassador to China said that just a threat to one riding alone undermines the integrity of our process. I believe the government is now saying that the overall election result has to be the bar in order for us to become public with information, not just undermining the integrity of one electoral district.

I'm wondering if you could give me some clarification, because I'm very frustrated right now with the lack of information, the lack of transparency and the responsibility of trying to figure out how to solve this problem as a policy-maker and as somebody who votes on legislation.

What is the bar? Should the bar be interfering in a single election in a single riding, or should it be for the entirety of the country? Should the presence of any money being discussed by a foreign actor then warrant public information? At what point does the public...? Because the public has to maintain confidence in our systems, in our institutions. I have to tell you, as somebody who represents the public, there is not a lot of public confidence in some of our public institutions right now. I don't want to go down that road, and I'm not trying to foment that feeling. I'm trying to protect our institutions. I'm just frustrated.

Can you clarify for me—because going into an in camera meeting doesn't seem to resolve any of the questions I have—if any election or any candidate for any party in this country has been affected directly by foreign interference in the last two elections? We hear about 11 in Toronto. We hear about Kenny Chiu. Has the needle been moved in a single riding in either of the last two elections? Is it yes or no?

11:40 a.m.

Director General, Intelligence Assessments, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Adam Fisher

Thank you, Madam Chair. Through you, I'll take a stab at that. There was a lot in that question.

Maybe I'll separate what occurs during an election and outside an election, first of all, through the protocol and otherwise. There's a policy in place and protocols in place during the election for very good reason, because we want to be careful that we're not interfering with the democratic process. There are thresholds that need to be met there. It's not determined by the SITE task force. It's determined by the panel of five in terms of when something is publicly communicated. That's during an election period.

Outside an election period, as I've said, we are communicating more. I'll take the point that you can always do better, and I think certainly within the service we're looking for opportunities to be communicating with Canadians and politicians in an unclassified setting. Certainly, I think the effort is there.

As I said, you had a lot in your question, and I've forgotten what the rest of it was. I'm sorry.

11:40 a.m.

Conservative

Blaine Calkins Conservative Red Deer—Lacombe, AB

It was a rant.

11:40 a.m.

Director General, Intelligence Assessments, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Adam Fisher

I would say as well that we can't speak to specific ridings, specific candidates.

Our measure is not whether foreign influence activity has moved the needle. When we see foreign influence activity, that's enough for us. That engages our mandate. That engages an investigation. That brings advice and assessments to government. Whether it changes the course of an election in a riding is not something we measure, and it's probably not something we could measure even if we wanted to, making that link between the two.

11:40 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Bardish Chagger

Thank you.

11:40 a.m.

Director General, Intelligence Assessments, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Adam Fisher

Certainly when we see it, we report it.

11:40 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Bardish Chagger

When the beep happens, I have to end it, but I do want to make sure we get the valid information. Exciting news: this is a public meeting. You can go back and watch the game tape and send us more fruitful answers. We always welcome them.

Mr. Turnbull, you have up to five minutes.

11:40 a.m.

Liberal

Ryan Turnbull Liberal Whitby, ON

Thanks, Madam Chair.

For me, I'm worried about the repercussions of the direction that unfortunately the official opposition is moving in, which probably has some real risk associated with it. I'm wondering. When you treat allegations in a published article—the Sam Cooper story is what I'm referring to—that are really uncorroborated and unvalidated as fact, what are the risks of that?

11:45 a.m.

Assistant Director, Requirements, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Cherie Henderson

Thank you for the question.

I'm not going to speak to any specific cases and I'm not going to speak to the allegations within the media article. What I will say goes back to what my colleague said and what one of your colleagues recently questioned. It was just in regard to this ongoing persistent threat of foreign interference and the fact that, as a nation, we need to create greater awareness of that threat. The threat does not only happen during an election process. It is an ongoing persistent threat that we are facing and that, as Canadians, we need to increase awareness of.

When we talk about being able to defend ourselves against the threat, we need to be able to have open conversations and be as transparent as we possibly can be.

Our director has come out and said publicly that foreign interference in our processes in our democratic institutions is one of the most serious threats that we are facing. It's not the most serious, because terrorism is still extremely serious but it is insidious. It takes its time and they can certainly play us against each other in trying to get their interference activities moving forward.

11:45 a.m.

Liberal

Ryan Turnbull Liberal Whitby, ON

Without interrupting you, I just want to build on that.

Disclosing some of the information that folks with national security clearance rightfully had access to and are looking at every day, having that exposed out there in the public, to me, is a very dangerous game. Isn't it doing the bidding of some of these foreign actors? Wouldn't China just love it for us to have that information out there in public?

11:45 a.m.

Assistant Director, Requirements, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Cherie Henderson

Again, I'm not going to speak to the specific allegations in the article.

What I will speak to is the fact that we need to have an ongoing greater conversation on national security within this country. We need to take the opportunities to have that and educate all Canadians and make sure that Canadians know where they can go to get information. I take the point that maybe we can do better, as my colleague said, but we certainly are trying to reach out and educate and bring that greater awareness so that people can tell perhaps truth from fiction.

11:45 a.m.

Liberal

Ryan Turnbull Liberal Whitby, ON

Thank you.

Just building on that, we heard earlier this week from former ambassador David Mulroney that there were credible threats of foreign election interference well before 2015. There has been some discussion and almost implication that somehow the current government and the security apparatus that's there haven't done a whole lot to progress on protecting our democratic institutions, which I think is false.

Could one of you on the panel speak to the many steps that have been taken to essentially prepare ourselves and improve our process since 2015?

11:45 a.m.

Assistant Director, Requirements, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Cherie Henderson

When the service operates, of course, we do not operate out in an overt manner. A lot of our work is done in the background to support everyone in building strength and resilience against any type of threat. What we engage in, you will not always see. That's why it's so important to have this ongoing national security conversation to raise awareness, because every Canadian can support defending against foreign interference.

11:45 a.m.

Liberal

Ryan Turnbull Liberal Whitby, ON

I have one last question.

Just because the public protocol in the last election wasn't triggered—the public wasn't necessarily notified; we couldn't, and for good reason, as I understand it—that doesn't necessarily mean that security agencies weren't in the background, working away to mitigate and interdict the different risks and threats that were there. Is that right?

Could you speak to what was being done in a general fashion?

11:45 a.m.

Director, Risk Mitigation Programs, Communications Security Establishment

Lyall King

Thank you for the question.

That is correct.

I think part of the problem is that, by nature, we have to live and operate in the shadows to an extent, given the nature of the source material and the methods of collection, etc., that we employ. However, we worked very hard in the lead-up for months and months. It wasn't just during the election period. I think that is what I would be very clear about. This is an ongoing thing.

During the election period, you see other mechanisms come into play, like the critical election incident public protocol—the CEIPP—but, in fact, we work very hard. We have to make sure that our operations and our actions are backstopped with good information. When we find something, we can't just take action willy-nilly, nor should we be able to. We should be under processes and procedures that are reviewable by oversight bodies, and we are. We need to meet thresholds to take action, but that does not mean that we are not feverishly at work, trying to identify and get that information to be able to take action.

11:50 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Bardish Chagger

Thank you.

Go ahead, Ms. Gaudreau. You have two and a half minutes.

11:50 a.m.

Bloc

Marie-Hélène Gaudreau Bloc Laurentides—Labelle, QC

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Since I'm going to have more time later, I'm going to ask the witnesses an extremely specific question, and I invite them to answer it in turn.

We're not talking about foreign interference here. The subject of foreign interference can be very broad, in terms of disinformation, possibilities or elections, which we are talking about more specifically. How is it that the United Kingdom talks about steps that could be taken, and the United States talks about Russian interference? I'd like to know why we're not talking about it here.

11:50 a.m.

Director, Risk Mitigation Programs, Communications Security Establishment

Lyall King

Thank you for your question.

I would say that we speak about foreign interference consistently, certainly in the lead-up.

Again, I've referred to some of the publications that we try to put out there, both in the service and the cyber centre, to educate the public about what foreign interference is, where it can happen and how people should be aware. They try to educate, so we speak about it and we speak about it when we can.

The difficulty, as well, during election periods is that we are different from the U.S., absolutely, and we have to observe other things, like the.... My mind is blanking. I apologize. There are things we can communicate and things we cannot communicate. That's why we have the critical election incident public protocol in place to be able to track—