Evidence of meeting #3 for Industry, Science and Technology in the 41st Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was gasoline.

A recording is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Tricia Anderson  President and Chief Executive Officer, Canadian Independent Petroleum Marketers Association
Mark Corey  Assistant Deputy Minister, Energy Sector, Department of Natural Resources
Jeff Labonté  Director General, Petroleum Resources Branch, Department of Natural Resources
Peter Boag  President, Canadian Petroleum Products Institute
Michael Ervin  Vice-President and Director, MJ Ervin and Associates, As an Individual
Allan MacEwen  President, MacEwen Petroleum Inc.; Chairman of the Board, Canadian Independent Petroleum Marketers Association
David Collins  Executive Vice-President, Wilson Fuels; Canadian Independent Petroleum Marketers Association
Dan McTeague  Director, tomorrowsgaspricetoday.com, Lib.
Mollie Johnson  Deputy Commissioner of Competition, Legislative and International Affairs Branch, Competition Bureau
Tom Huffaker  Vice-President, Policy and Environment, Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers
Michael Greenberger  Professor, University of Maryland School of Law, As an Individual
Richard Bilodeau  Acting Assistant Deputy Commissioner, Civil Matters Branch, Division B, Competition Bureau

4:55 p.m.

President, Canadian Petroleum Products Institute

Peter Boag

I think we'd go back to many of the factors we've talked about today and the underlying factors with respect to crude oil pricing. Certainly due to geopolitical events in the oil-producing regions of the Middle East, we've seen advances in the price of crude. It's also the beginning of the summer driving season. That's the time for a high demand for gasoline as refiners are starting to build inventories for the driving season.

So it's a combination of factors, all going back to those underlying principles of the price of crude, supply and demand dynamics of retail gasoline, and some increase in taxes in some jurisdictions. All of those factors together were probably behind it, if you look back historically. I look at historical information to try to read what happened, but certainly I think those would have been some of the factors responsible for the price increases we saw earlier this year.

Michael, you may have some additional information.

4:55 p.m.

Vice-President and Director, MJ Ervin and Associates, As an Individual

Michael Ervin

I think a lot of the concerns stem from the fact that consumers have seen close to record high pump prices. But crude prices were not at the records we saw in 2008. What happened in 2008 was that while crude prices were high, there was already a marked decrease in demand for gasoline in the United States. This led to a surplus of gasoline inventory such that crack spreads, the refiners' gross margin, were zero at that point in time--slightly below zero. We didn't see that seasonal crack spread that usually happens in the springtime in the United States, and by extension in Canada.

In the decades that we've been looking at crack spread seasonality, it didn't really happen in 2008. That created a situation where prices at the pump, although they were high, were about 15¢ per litre higher than they normally would be, given the normal seasonality of crack spreads.

If you jump forward to this year, we have seen increasing crude prices and normal crack spreads, so that's why the pump prices were much higher than perhaps consumers would have thought they should have been, when comparing them to 2008 in particular.

4:55 p.m.

Conservative

Cheryl Gallant Conservative Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON

Mr. Ervin, you talked about futures markets and how they might affect the price of a barrel of oil. Can you talk a little bit about futures, and moreover about speculation?

4:55 p.m.

Vice-President and Director, MJ Ervin and Associates, As an Individual

Michael Ervin

That's one of those debatable areas. Does speculation really cause crude prices to rise higher than they should? You can put the shoe on the other foot. Speculation caused crude prices to fall precipitously in 2008, when the world economy started tanking, and those very same speculators were actually betting on the downside. There's no question that this increases the volatility of crude oil prices. Does that actually translate into higher wholesale prices? Yes, if those futures prices are sustained over a period of time. When you see the speculation go up and down on a day-to-day basis, we don't see the pump price going up and down on a day-to-day basis as well because refiners don't buy today's NYMEX price. They buy the spot price, basically. So there's a relationship, but not as strong as one would think.

4:55 p.m.

Conservative

Cheryl Gallant Conservative Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON

Mr. Ervin, what's the relationship between speculators and oil companies? How closely are they linked, if at all?

5 p.m.

Vice-President and Director, MJ Ervin and Associates, As an Individual

Michael Ervin

Certainly oil companies do risk management in terms of buying futures for crude oil and buying or selling futures for gasoline. Those are referred to as wet barrels. In other words, institutional buyers such as municipalities will actually buy in these markets in order to normalize their price. But there are speculators who buy and sell before taking physical delivery, and that speaks to some of the volatility, to be sure. But it is as much of a risk reduction strategy as it is speculative. I reserve the word “speculative” for people who trade in dry barrels, not actually taking physical delivery.

5 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative David Sweet

Thank you very much, Mr. Ervin and Madam Gallant.

Yes, Mr. Regan.

5 p.m.

Liberal

Geoff Regan Liberal Halifax West, NS

I think it would be helpful to all members here if we asked the officials from the Department of Natural Resources if they could provide us later material that would indicate to us what information they provide about gas prices and what information they've stopped providing about gas prices over the past decade.

5 p.m.

Assistant Deputy Minister, Energy Sector, Department of Natural Resources

Mark Corey

Yes, we could do that, absolutely, yes.

5 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative David Sweet

Great.

We're going to suspend for a moment, but just before we do, I need a motion from one of the members. We have some expenses for our two panels of witnesses today. The budget will adequately be covered with $9,100. There's no guarantee that this will be the entire expense, but that's what will be needed if everybody claims.

May I have a motion to accept that amount so we can have that budget for this hearing?

Thank you, Mr. Carmichael.

(Motion agreed to)

We'll suspend for five minutes and bring the next panel in.

5:05 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative David Sweet

To try to give you as much time as possible, I'll briefly introduce the guests.

Thanks for coming.

From the Competition Bureau we have Mollie Johnson, deputy commissioner of competition, legislative and international affairs branch. Richard Bilodeau is acting assistant deputy commissioner, civil matters branch, division B.

From the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers we have Tom Huffaker, vice-president of policy and environment.

And a familiar face is the Honourable Dan McTeague, director of tomorrowsgaspricetoday.com.

Why does that sound like a commercial when I introduce you?

June 22nd, 2011 / 5:05 p.m.

Dan McTeague Director, tomorrowsgaspricetoday.com, Lib.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

5:05 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative David Sweet

We also have by video conference Michael Greenberger, professor, University of Maryland School of Law.

I'll begin now with Madam Johnson. We'll have ten-minute opening remarks, and then we'll go to our question rotation. It's ten minutes per organization.

Madam Johnson, you have ten minutes.

5:05 p.m.

Mollie Johnson Deputy Commissioner of Competition, Legislative and International Affairs Branch, Competition Bureau

Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. On behalf of the Competition Bureau I am very pleased to be here today to take part in your study on gas price fluctuations.

As the chair mentioned, my name is Mollie Johnson, and I'm the deputy commissioner of the Competition Bureau’s legislative and international affairs branch. With me is my colleague Mr. Richard Bilodeau, acting assistant deputy commissioner of the civil matters branch. He has appeared before this committee on this issue in the past. We're both very happy to be here today to answer your questions.

Like you, we understand the importance of gasoline to Canadians in our everyday lives, and to the economy in general. No one wants to pay higher gas prices. As consumers, this is something to which we're all sensitive.

Over the years the bureau has done a significant amount of work in the petroleum sector, and I hope that our experiences will be helpful to the committee.

As there are some new members on this committee, I thought it might be helpful to take a few moments at the outset of my remarks to provide you with a better understanding of the bureau’s role and responsibilities, before turning to the issue at hand today.

The Competition Bureau is an independent law enforcement agency headed by the Commissioner of Competition that enforces the Competition Act. Our goal is to ensure that Canadian businesses and consumers prosper in a competitive and innovative marketplace.

The Act applies, with very limited exceptions, to all sectors of the Canadian economy, including the petroleum sector, and sets out criminal and civil penalties for a variety of specific anti-competitive practices. These include: entering into agreements with competitors to fix prices, allocate markets or restrict output; abusing a dominant market position; and engaging in misleading advertising and deceptive marketing activities.

We are also responsible for reviewing proposed mergers to determine whether they will likely cause substantial harm to competition.

The last two years have been particularly dynamic for competition law in Canada. As you may recall, in 2009 Parliament passed the most significant amendments to the Competition Act in 25 years. Some of you here today were part of that process, and we thank you for your efforts.

Among other things, those amendments introduced a new two-stage merger review process to allow for more efficient and effective reviews of mergers. They also created a more effective mechanism for criminal prosecutions of hard-core cartel conduct, while establishing a new civil agreement provision that allows for the review of the competitive impact of other forms of competitor collaborations. They also authorized Canada's Competition Tribunal to award administrative monetary penalties against companies that abuse a dominant position in the marketplace.

With these amendments now in force, the bureau is now even better placed to protect Canadian consumers and businesses from the harm caused by anti-competitive activity.

When it comes to the petroleum sector, as with other sectors of the Canadian economy, our role is to detect and take principled action against anti-competitive behaviour that violates the provisions of the Competition Act. As you know, the bureau has a history of examining the petroleum sector. We have appeared before this committee on several occasions, and we've carried out examinations of the industry as a whole and in specific markets. From that experience, the bureau has developed a familiarity with the workings of the industry.

With respect to our examinations into price spikes, our investigations have not found evidence that these price increases resulted from anti-competitive conduct contravening the act. Rather, the bureau concluded that in those particular instances of price spikes, higher retail gasoline prices were the result of increases in the price of crude oil and other factors affecting the balance between supply and demand. Those other factors have included, for example, low inventories of gasoline in North America, and in the case of higher prices following Hurricane Katrina in 2005, severe damage to North American refining capacity. Factors such as these do not raise issues under the Competition Act unless, of course, they are the result of anti-competitive activity.

This takes me to the issue of our mandate. Not surprisingly, many of the complaints that we receive in this sector have come and continue to come when there are spikes in gasoline prices. I think it's important to note here that we do not determine what is or is not a fair price for any given product or service. We are not a price regulator, and high prices in and of themselves do not fall under the purview of the act unless they are the result of anti-competitive conduct. If, however, high prices result from a cartel, or an abuse of dominance, then we do not hesitate to investigate and take the appropriate action.

For example, the bureau’s investigations into this industry have led to criminal charges for price-fixing, such as those laid in Quebec in the beginning of 2008. Our investigations in this case have also resulted in a number of guilty pleas, fines in excess of $2.8 million, and imprisonment terms of a total of 54 months.

The bureau has also secured remedies to preserve competition in markets in which proposed mergers would likely have resulted in a substantial lessening or prevention of competition, most recently in the 2009 merger of Suncor and Petro-Canada, when we required the companies to sell 104 retail gas stations in southern Ontario, and to share storage and distribution network capacity in the greater Toronto area for ten years.

To conclude, Parliament has provided the bureau with a specific role, and that is the pursuit of principled enforcement actions against individuals and companies engaged in anti-competitive behaviour. The responsible enforcement of the act is the most effective way for the bureau to have a positive impact in the Canadian economy for both consumers and business. Especially now that the 2009 amendments to the act have all come into force, we believe we have the effective tools to appropriately address anti-competitive behaviour in this and any other sector of the Canadian economy.

Mr. Bilodeau and I look forward to taking your questions.

Thank you very much.

5:15 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative David Sweet

Thank you, Madam Johnson.

Now we move to Mr. Huffaker, for ten minutes.

5:15 p.m.

Tom Huffaker Vice-President, Policy and Environment, Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and committee members. We're delighted to be here today. I'm Tom Huffaker, one of the vice-presidents of the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers.

The Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, or CAPP, represents the Canadian upstream oil and gas industry. Our members, and there are over 100, range from the very small to the very large, the largest Canadian companies, and the global super majors. Our members account for over 90% of Canadian oil and gas production.

As representatives of the upstream industry, I'm going to restrict my remarks to upstream issues and crude oil, not gasoline prices or retail issues, which I'm not really qualified to comment on. Mr. Boag of CPPI, who you just heard from, others on this panel, and others on the previous panel I believe are more qualified to comment on those downstream and retail issues than we are.

As you know, crude oil is a global commodity. The price is set in global markets for a variety of reasons. We operate in a period of relatively high oil prices right now. Price volatility, however, is part of our reality and always has been, as it is in other commodities and industries, and we expect it to be so in the future. As an organization, we don't engage in price forecasting.

While I won't comment on the current relatively high gasoline prices, in which crude prices obviously are a significant factor, I will take a minute to talk about the benefits the upstream oil and gas industry brings to Canada. In particular, we would note that even in times of challenging gasoline prices, very positive things come to Canada from a relatively high-price environment.

A number of the numbers and figures I'm going to cite come from a report recently done by Peter Tertzakian, the noted energy economist with ARC Financial Corp., a CAPP-sponsored report called “Turmoil and Renewal”. I commend that report to any and all of you as an excellent source of information on the financial structure and prospects for the industry. Mr. Tertzakian projects that over the next five years upstream oil and gas will continue to generate about $100 billion a year in revenue. Total investment yearly on the upstream side over the next five years can be expected to be upward of $50 billion a year, a very large industry, and since 2009 alone we've attracted almost $20 billion in foreign investment.

Turning to the government revenue side, the industry has tended to generate somewhere in the range of $15 billion to $20 billion a year in revenue to government over recent years, and is expected to in the future. Typically about a third of this is tax and about two-thirds of it is in the form of royalties. Exports in 2010 from the upstream oil and gas industry of Canada were about $65 billion, of which about $50 billion was from exports from the oil side.

A number of these figures obviously are price-sensitive. They tend to be higher in relatively high oil price environments. It would be particularly true of investment, the government share, exports, and also of course the employment needs and thus the jobs created by the industry. I would just note that the industry upstream accounts--direct, indirect, and induced--were somewhere in the order of half a million Canadian jobs.

With that, I will stop and will look forward to hearing from the other witnesses and to hearing your questions.

5:15 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative David Sweet

Thank you, Mr. Huffaker.

Now on to Mr. McTeague.

5:15 p.m.

Director, tomorrowsgaspricetoday.com, Lib.

Dan McTeague

Chairman Sweet and colleagues, former colleagues, and perhaps even future colleagues, it's a great opportunity and honour to be here. Thank you for the invitation as to appear as a witness, and thanks in particular to my colleague who's replaced me, Mr. Chisu, a very fine man. I look forward to great things from him ahead.

Chair, it's clear that there's arguably no other issue that gathers more attention, save and except the weather, than the price of fuel and the price we pay at the pumps. While there have been a myriad of inquiries and investigations, as has been indicated before, and of course plenty of ink that has been spilled commenting on the general inconclusiveness of those previous inquiries and investigations, the public remains unconvinced that the price they pay is justified. And they remain cynical about yet another series of inquiries. So you have your work cut out. Let me help you.

Above all, public angst with prices can be summed up in one word: volatility. It is this concern that I believe the committee has the ability to address head-on, rather than engage in a fruitless and half-hearted attempt to merely pay lip service to a common and growing frustration. As many of you know, as a parliamentarian I attempted to draw attention to the anemic state of competition in several sectors of our economy, including the grocery, telephone, telecom, pharmaceutical, and downstream petroleum industries, as well as improve and amend Canada's Competition Act, which was, as you know, redrafted in 1986 to permit levels of concentration that would not be tolerated in jurisdictions like the European Union or in the United States.

Concentration today at the wholesale level for gasoline and distillates, which is diesel, means lockstep pricing in most major urban centres across this country, and ironically, for me, at tomorrowsgaspricetoday.com the ability to predict accurately tomorrow's price for fuel at the pumps. Nowhere else, to my knowledge, does this happen or can it happen, simply because it can't. Under the restrictive language of our Competition Act independent retailers were forced from the market in droves. I believe one of the witnesses previous to this, from Wilson Fuels, quite accurately pointed out the treble drop in the number of players by his company alone. Mergers and takeovers led to fewer players and a rationalization of refinery and terminal operations, which once provided the competitive infrastructure that kept a check on prices. Rather than meet new environmental fuel specifications set out over the years by the federal and sometimes provincial governments, some refineries, such as Toronto's last in Bronte or in Oakville, if you will, were simply mothballed and converted into a storage terminal fed by pipeline or by rail.

The closure last year of Shell's Montreal east refinery also impacted price, particularly here in eastern Canada, and contributed in no small way to price volatility as it terminated supply contracts with independents, replaced production by purchasing from other refiners like Ultramar, or simply opted to import product with a unique and higher--and in this case I would ask you to read more expensive--30 parts per million sulphur Canadian fuel specification from either Europe or the United States. As such, Canadians in eastern Canada have become--and I want to repeat this point, I can't emphasize it enough--net importers of petroleum product, and are, unlike a generation ago, when energy self-sufficiency was de rigueur, highly vulnerable to international price shocks or volatility created by excessive speculation in the commodities futures markets.

Just how serious the state of competition is in the refining of petroleum products remains a matter of speculation. Despite a noticeable decline in the overall number of vigorous and effective competitors who have exited or merged the market in the past 24 years, and with no significant increase in outputs from the remaining refiners, the prospect of shortage as a driver of higher fuel prices cannot be ruled out. Indeed, outside of tax and retail margins, something that's been discussed here as well, wholesale racks in most of our country tend to be well above--not the same, not below, but well above--U.S. racks and are identical among all refiners, unlike the U.S., where such a parallel movement would almost certainly invite an antitrust challenge in the U.S.

But as Canada has abandoned the equivalent of the US Weekly Petroleum Status Report which obtains from the petroleum industry, weekly accounts for all its products, any assessment of the real impacts of the wave of consolidation of the past score on consumers here, has been left to others to figure out with motorists here paying the freight for a lack of true oversight.

Colleagues, no serious talk of fuel prices should be entertained without first understanding that the traditional means of price discovery for commodities as important and strategic as food and energy has been radically altered through supply and demand values and the hedging of risk between producers and consumers.

In 2000 Wall Street convinced Congress to allow commodity trades to occur outside the jurisdiction of the Commodities Futures Trade Commission. This exemption from oversight, known as the “Enron loophole” for which the exemption was made, had predictable consequences.

As you may recall, there were bogus excuses on the state of the electrical and electricity markets in the U.S.; trades with no capital requirements whatsoever; and of course new unregulated platforms apparently had no restraint whatsoever on the question of position, and no question as to risk adversity. They drove the electrical and natural gas markets to prices beyond economic sustainability, and caused, as you recall, serious economic dislocation. That brings us to today. Incredibly, the loophole was never closed, and over-the-counter trade platforms have since proliferated, along with their distorted effects on price.

When folks--your consumers and constituents--pull up to gas pumps, they usually have a choice: regular, premium, or in some cases super premium. Regardless of the gas grade, however, everyone is now paying a premium--a Wall Street, over-the-counter, traded-derivatives premium.

Canada must be part of international efforts urged by the U.S. and Europe, as part of our commitment to the G-20 in Pittsburgh, to ensure oversight, competition, and transparency on all commodity trades. After all, given the 35% rise this year alone in energy costs to Canadians, and now 25% in food, would it be too much to ask that the price we pay reflect the real global supply and demand picture, rather than allowing some to imperil, through loopholes, our collective economic well-being?

If Parliament is serious about tackling the vexing matter of price volatility, it needs to modernize its thinking about the state of competition in many parts of this country, particularly at the refinery level. It must also avail itself of a weekly inventory report similar to the U.S. model, and clue in to the havoc wrought by excessive speculation in the unregulated swaps and derivatives markets.

I would also finally say--because it doesn't matter that I addressed this or that all of us have attempted this at various times--that we must recognize the implications of taxation. Taxation, particularly as it relates to ad valorem taxes such as the HST or the GST, tends to compound the situation. So governments as a routine have an obligation, and Parliament has an obligation, to recognize that as prices go up, so does the impact of tax and the windfall in revenues. That must be considered and should be considered now, so as not to hurt and affect Canadians.

I also want to point out a very interesting point with respect to my last comment on the question of futures, commodities, and excessive speculation. Today the U.S. released its weekly petroleum status report. As you know, the U.S. is the largest consumer of transportation fuel in the world. It tends to drive the supply and demand picture, so it's important that Canada be part of that. But this morning they reported that refineries there operated at 89.2% of their operable capacity last week. Gasoline production increased last week, averaging 9.5 million barrels a day.

If you want to see an example of the disconnect between supply and demand fundamentals and what is happening on the markets, you only have to look at the fact that tonight, most of the communities in eastern Canada will get a 2.2¢ to 2.6¢ per litre increase--higher supply, increase in price. If we don't understand how dysfunctional this market has become we will only continue to have these meetings; and more importantly, they will be predictably useless and irrelevant.

With those comments, I hope to further explore some of your questions and perhaps provide answers to some of the things you have collected over the past little while.

I thank you.

5:25 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative David Sweet

Thank you, Mr. McTeague.

Mr. Greenberger, you have a maximum of ten minutes for your opening remarks.

5:25 p.m.

Michael Greenberger Professor, University of Maryland School of Law, As an Individual

Thank you very much.

It's an honour to be asked to testify before you today. We in America look with great admiration to Canada, because its regulatory controls softened the most recent great recession. There's a lot the United States can learn from the Canadian regulatory system.

I had the pleasure of being in Ottawa two weekends ago at the Canadian Economics Association conference, at which I talked. I learned a great deal, and we in the United States have a great deal to learn.

My comments really reflect agreement with much of what Mr. McTeague just said, and I want to expand upon that.

We are today, in the United States, engaged in a massive debate about whether the cause of price increases in crude oil, and its important derivative, gasoline, is a reflection of supply and demand or what we in the United States refer to technically, because of our statutes, as excessive speculation.

There's no doubt that when Congress passed and President Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank financial regulation reform bill on July 21, 2010, the United States Congress weighed in heavily on the great concern about excessive speculation--which has nothing to do with putting money towards production--being not the sole problem here but a great cause of the problem.

In hearings about three weeks ago before the United States Senate finance committee, the CEO of ExxonMobil, when asked what the price of crude oil should be if supply and demand fundamentals were at work, said between $60 and $70. As you know, if you're looking at WTI, it's up at around $100. If you're looking at the Brent price, it's considerably higher than that.

In mid-April, Goldman Sachs, in an analyst's report, said that the present price of crude oil is reflective of excessive speculation, to the tune of about $25 to $30, and has nothing to do with supply and demand. At the same time, President Obama, in a press conference, said that the problem here is not supply and demand; it's one of speculation.

Let me talk a little bit historically about how speculation adversely impacts the market. One of the first pieces of legislation Franklin Delano Roosevelt sent to the New Deal Congress in 1934 was what became the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936. In those days, the only futures markets were agricultural markets. For 10 to 15 years before the Great Depression, farmers had complained about speculators coming into the markets that are designed to hedge either the producer or the consumer of production--hedging vehicles in the futures market. Excessive speculation distorted those markets and unmoored them from price-demand fundamentals.

President Roosevelt established the framework for the Commodity Exchange Act. When the act was passed in 1936, one of the goals of the regulation was to limit excessive—and I emphasize the word “excessive”—speculation in these markets. And the tools to be used to limit speculation were position limits. What were position limits? They were determinations made by commodity regulators, on a market-by-market basis, that drew a line between the liquidity needed in the market or the speculation needed in the market to create appropriate liquidity for the producer and the consumer of the commodity, and a ban or a bar on so much speculation that the market would become unmoored from price-demand fundamentals.

The futures markets are price discovery markets. You know how much to charge or pay for a barrel of oil by looking to the futures market. If the futures market is unmoored from price-demand fundamentals, the price everyone pays is unmoored from price-demand fundamentals.

From 1936 to 1991, with the regulation of these markets, while there may have been volatility, the volatility was always explained by supply and demand fundamentals, such as during the Arab boycott, in 1973, when they stopped exporting oil to western countries.

In 1991 Goldman Sachs received the first of a series of rulings--not by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, which is the regulatory agency involved, but by its staff--that if investment banks were selling bets on the price direction of commodities.... That is to say, a customer approaches the bank and says, “I want to bet on the direction of a commodity” without the customer owning it. It's just a simple bet just as you'd bet on a soccer match. You don't own the soccer team, but you're betting on the results. Goldman, through its subsidiary J. Aron, convinced the staff of the CFTC that in hedging that bet, they were acting, in this instance, as an oil producer or an oil consumer. They had a business need to hedge their bets, and they therefore gained exemptions from the position limits.

So from 1991 to the summer of 2008 there were many people in these markets who were deemed commercials, who were doing nothing more than hedging betting. The betting has gone from about $13 billion in 2004 to about $450 billion today. The principal vehicle, although there are many for these kinds of bets, is as follows. Goldman and Morgan Stanley offer wealthy customers--pension funds, private equity, other banks, wealthy investors--the ability to come to the investment bank to place a bet. You can only place a bet that the price of the commodity will go up.

The vehicle is a commodity index swap, an unregulated entity prior to Dodd-Frank, which is a basket of 25 commodities assembled by the investment banks, allowing the customers to place a bet that the basket will go up. The basket is very heavily weighted toward WTI, the United States benchmark for crude, and Brent. The basket became more heavily weighted to Brent quite recently, which is an explanation offered for the divergence between WTI and Brent, Brent being a much more expensive but much less reliable fuel source.

Using these exemptions, these investment banks have come into the futures market and laid off their risk from their bets with their customers to buy long positions that correspond to the commodities in the commodity basket. That is why we are experiencing a price spike today not only in crude but also in copper, rice, cotton, wheat, etc.

The United States Congress, when it passed Dodd-Frank, passed a provision that said in markets that were previously regulated and in markets that were previously unregulated, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission shall impose aggregate position limits to limit this kind of speculation in order to bring the markets back into conformity with supply and demand fundamentals.

On January 26, 2011, in the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, on a four-to-one vote, there was a proposed rule that essentially codified the status quo ante. In other words, they acknowledged that the speculation hedging should continue. The vote was four to one, with two commissioners firmly in support and two commissioners saying they likely would not support this rule when it came back in final form. On that day a signal was sent to these markets that Dodd-Frank would not be implemented. There weren't even three of five votes for a weak regulation on speculation.

As you know if you look at the date, since January 26 the price of oil has gone up in the neighbourhood of 35% to 40% because that was the day a signal was sent.

Congress is beginning to again go through an exercise of trying to recraft what they did in Dodd-Frank. Although there is tremendous resistance to the regulation, the House Republican-controlled Congress just voted for a 15% decrease in CFTC staff, which would take that commission, with $300 trillion of jurisdiction and new legislation, down to 500 employees.

But there is an effort being made to once again limit speculation in these markets to get the CFTC to adopt strong limits. One might ask what Canada can do. I would suggest that Canada can do what France just did. President Sarkozy, in anticipation of the G-20 meeting for agricultural ministers that is coming up, announced that France was in great support of meaningful position limits. The European Commission is moving in this direction. If I had to say who the culprits are out there now in terms of governments, I worry greatly about my own government, the United States, and the United Kingdom--

5:35 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative David Sweet

Mr. Greenberger, that will have to be your final word. I've given you some latitude on the time, but--

5:35 p.m.

Professor, University of Maryland School of Law, As an Individual

Michael Greenberger

I appreciate that. Thank you.

5:35 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative David Sweet

Thank you very much.

We'll move on to our first round now, for seven minutes.

Mr. Carmichael.

5:35 p.m.

Conservative

John Carmichael Conservative Don Valley West, ON

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to begin by directing my question to Mr. Huffaker.

I understand consolidation, and our earlier witnesses talked to consolidation in the retail industry and a lot of the issues around throughput, how to generate the volume on thin margins. I believe the retailers used a margin of 5%--which I have to believe is a gross margin--and from there they deduct all their hard costs, including credit costs and some of what we heard about earlier in the testimony.

Mr. Huffaker, could you just give us a brief understanding, for those of us who are new to this committee, of how the price of a barrel of oil is constructed, how that throughput factor affects the retailer? I don't know if you have that experience, but I'll leave it with you. As I was thinking of it, one of the other retailers talked about a 48-hour turn on his inventory, and obviously that's part of the throughput--you have to put more through, and the faster you put it through, obviously, the better you are at recovering on your margin.

I wonder if you could just talk about that thought on constructing the cost of a barrel. I'd be appreciative if you could also comment on the Canadian perspective relative to speculation. We heard some of that earlier, and Mr. Greenberger has just referred to that as well.

5:40 p.m.

Vice-President, Policy and Environment, Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers

Tom Huffaker

Mr. Carmichael, thank you. I'm afraid on some of these questions we go to the retail end. I'm apologizing in advance. I may be a frustrating witness before this committee. I really would refer to the folks who are expert on the retail end, and people like Mr. Boag, who was with you earlier. I have no experience, personally, on the downstream or the retail end of the industry, so I'm really not qualified to comment there.

The comment I would make is around the tremendous competitiveness in the Canadian upstream oil and gas industry. I mentioned the fact that we have over 100 members. If you roll in the small players, who all compete very aggressively.... There are several hundred upstream oil and gas producers operating in Canada in an extremely competitive environment.

Obviously, the cost of finding, development, and extraction feeds into the cost of a barrel of oil, but the price for the crude oil is set in international markets. We've had a fair amount of discussion around to what extent that is driven strictly by supply and demand, to what extent speculation may have an impact on that, and I would add to what we've heard that obviously there are situations in which political risk is also a significant piece of that. I would say all of those things flow into it.

Again, I apologize if I didn't get to a great deal of your question, but I really don't feel qualified to answer it.