Subcommittee on International Human Rights Committee on March 29th, 2012

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

Today is March 29, 2012. This is the 30^th meeting of the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Today we continue looking at the human rights situation in Iran. We have with us Ms. Sheryl Saperia, Canadian director of policy for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

We'll turn things over to you and give you some time to talk. When you're finished, we'll go to questions as we always do.

Please begin.

[Sheryl Saperia, Director of Policy, Canada, Foundation for Defense of Democracies]

Mr. Chair and honourable members, thank you for the opportunity to be here today.

As you know, all four aspects of the Iranian threat are intrinsically linked. A regime that seeks nuclear weapons capability is rightly perceived as exceptionally dangerous when it is simultaneously implicated in human rights violations within its borders, support for and direct involvement in terrorism outside its borders, and issuing genocidal statements of intent with regard to other sovereign countries.

If we are serious about confronting this fourfold Iranian threat, it is my belief that we must focus on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the IRGC. The IRGC is at the epicentre of the Iranian regime. It is a dominant security, political, and economic force within the country. It is in charge of Iran's nuclear and ballistic missiles program. It owes its loyalty and affords powerful support to the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, who would be the ultimate decision-maker behind an attempted genocide within Israel or anywhere else.

The IRGC is also responsible for the violent suppression of Iranian protesters in the aftermath of the 2009 presidential elections. The IRGC has been labelled by some as the world's most deadly terrorist organization. It is this terrorism element of the fourfold threat posed by Iran, and specifically by the IRGC, that I would like to focus on in my remarks today.

Canada has already imposed sanctions on various IRGC branches and individuals under the Special Economic Measures Act. This is important. However, we need to be using every peaceful tool during this critical time when economic and diplomatic measures are being leveraged in the hopes of obviating the need for a military strike.

One crucial measure that we have not yet employed is the designation of the IRGC as a terrorist entity in Canada.

Canada's sanctions have been in response to the IAEA's November 2011 assessment of Iran's illicit nuclear program; in other words, these sanctions relate to Iran's nuclear activity. However, the IRGC is a terrorist organization and should be listed as such. Even if Iran were to cease its illegal nuclear program tomorrow, this does not alter the fact that the Iranian government has traditionally allocated a nine-digit figure in its budget for international terrorism that is channelled through the IRGC. The IRGC has been involved in terrorist attacks around the world, including recent attempted attacks in Thailand, India, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. It has also provided assistance to the Taliban and al-Qaeda in killing Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan. Moreover, the IRGC has offered critical support in the form of financing and training to groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, both of which are listed entities in Canada. Indeed, Hezbollah has been referred to as a wholly owned Iranian subsidiary. It makes no sense to list Hezbollah but not the IRGC.

Let me identify for you five reasons why listing the IRGC as a terrorist entity is sound Canadian policy.

First, it is a measure that can be implemented quickly and unilaterally. If, according to subsection 83.05(1) of the Criminal Code, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness has reasonable grounds to believe that

(a) the entity has knowingly carried out, attempted to carry out, participated in or facilitated a terrorist activity; or (b) the entity is knowingly acting on behalf of, at the direction of or in association with an entity referred to in paragraph (a)

then the minister can make a recommendation to the Governor in Council to place the entity on the list. This test, as applied to the IRGC, should be easily met.

The entity has been involved directly in terrorist activity, such as the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, which killed 29 people, and the 1994 bombing of the Jewish community centre in Argentina, which killed 85 people. It has also acted in association with entities that have carried out terrorist activity, including Hamas, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Second, listing the IRGC has support among Canadians as well as western allies. The U.S. listed the IRGC as a whole in 2007, while other countries, such as the Netherlands and Britain, have urged the European Union to add the IRGC to its list of terrorist organizations. If Canada were to lead on this issue, other countries, perhaps benefiting from political cover from precedent by a country that is not the United States, may be more likely to follow its example, resulting in further isolation of the Iranian regime and increased pressure on companies around the world to limit their dealings with the IRGC.

Third, the measure, especially when employed in tandem with multiple countries, could greatly weaken the IRGC economically. This is because a terrorist designation renders it illegal for Canadian individuals and companies to have any financial dealings with the listed entity. Given the fact that the IRGC has serious commercial interests—indeed, it is a multi-billion dollar conglomerate—it would surely be detrimentally impacted by the legally imposed curtailment of business dealings with companies and financial institutions in Canada.

Fourth, listing the IRGC in its entirety is more comprehensive than current sanctions in terms of the targeted parties and the severity of the penalties. A breach of the Criminal Code provisions, for instance, can lead to a fine of up to $100,000 and imprisonment for up to 10 years, compared to a fine of up to $25,000 and imprisonment for up to five years for a breach of SEMA sanctions. But listing the IRGC as a whole should be complemented with efforts by western governments to identify and designate IRGC front companies and individual leaders as well.

Finally, listing the IRGC has tremendous symbolic implications. The decision not to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization promotes a culture of impunity. The IRGC is the spine of the Iranian regime, and Canada must not countenance any interaction with the organization. Listing the entity diminishes its own legitimacy as well as that of the Iranian establishment. It also provides important moral support to Iranian dissidents who may feel isolated and alone in their efforts to effect change within the country.

I understand there may be some concerns regarding the listing of the IRGC, which we can discuss in greater detail during the question period.

For instance, there is a concern that some IRGC members are conscripted and that a blanket designation would unfairly penalize those individuals. There may also be reservations about designating a state agency, in contrast to a rogue organization, as a terrorist entity. Some European policy-makers have been reluctant to target the entire IRGC because it may have some legitimate business endeavours.

Honourable members, I hope you will give me the opportunity to rebut each of these arguments. I would also be pleased to explain how listing the IRGC can enhance the effectiveness of some recently passed legislation, the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act.

In conclusion, designating the IRGC as a terrorist organization is an important measure that Canada should implement in order to further counter the Iranian threat. First and foremost, it's appropriate to list the IRGC because the entity is a terrorist organization. Second, listing makes an important statement about the organization's and the regime's lack of legitimacy; the Iranian regime does not like to be embarrassed on the world stage, and this is a further way to isolate them diplomatically. Third, a terrorist designation can help to weaken the entity financially. This will impede not only the IRGC's ability to conduct and sponsor terror attacks, but also its ability to engage in other nefarious activities, such as nuclear weapons proliferation and human rights violations.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

Thank you very much.

If we are careful to police ourselves, I think we'll have six minutes for each round of questions.

Let's start with Mr. Hiebert.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

Thank you.

Thank you, Ms. Saperia, for an excellent presentation.

You've invited us to give you more time to elaborate on your thoughts about the opposition to listing the IRGC as a terrorist organization. That opposition relates to conscription, the IRGC being a state agency, and its potentially legitimate businesses. I want to give you that time right now. Then, if you have any time left over, I'll probably have some more questions.

[Sheryl Saperia]

Thank you.

Let me focus first on conscription because, based on my own discussions with individuals in government, I understand that this seems to be a really significant concern. Let me tell you why I think this is a weak argument.

First of all, under SEMA, the Special Economic Measures Act, there are several entire branches of the IRGC that are designated as entities with which Canadians are prohibited from having certain dealings. So it seems to me illogical and inconsistent for the conscription argument to be used as an excuse not to list the IRGC as a terrorist entity, but irrelevant to designating entire branches of the IRGC under SEMA. But let's move on from that.

We need to clarify what conscription means in the context of joining the IRGC. It is true that Iranians are conscripted to perform military service, but they have a choice as to whether or not to join the IRGC. So while service in the IRGC may promise better pay—and other perks, for sure—as well as a chance to serve the revolution for those who ideologically buy into that, Iranians ultimately choose whether to join the IRGC. So conscription refers to mandatory military service generally, not to joining the IRGC specifically. Indeed, based on what I've read, retention levels in the IRGC among conscripts are quite low. In other words, it's proof that there is no gun to their heads at all.

So again, when a conscript is called forward to complete his or her military service, he can choose if he wants to serve in the IRGC or the regular armed forces. Many do want to serve in the IRGC, as I've said, because there are some perks, but this choice may be completely disregarded by recruitment officers, especially when their political background is suspect.

The whole philosophy is to enrol people who are devoted to the regime. Those who are up for a draft may express the wish to spend their service period in the IRGC, but they would have to go through a very rigorous test, and many are rejected. That, to me, is the strongest argument as to why conscription just doesn't stick here. Military service is mandatory; joining the IRGC, specifically, is not. In fact, people are turned away.

Moreover, every IRGC member, including those who are performing their compulsory military service, do have to swear a particular oath of loyalty to the ruler—in other words, to the Supreme Leader—and this indicates the doctrinal, ideological, and fanatical nature of joining the IRGC. Given the fact that nobody is forced to join the IRGC, the willingness to take this oath is important.

I want to make two more points about conscription, and then we can move on. Ultimately, the IRGC is the pillar of the Iranian regime, so failing to list the IRGC because some individuals may be conscripted—which they're not, but if they were—is essentially equivalent to exempting the SS from punishment because some Germans were forced into the core service also.

Finally, the only effective way of weakening the IRGC is to target their vast commercial empire. This means that we have to list the IRGC as a whole in order to achieve that objective.

I hope that covers conscription fairly comprehensively. Let me move on to this argument about a state agency versus a non-state actor. If I'm taking too much time, you can let me know, and I'll be pleased to—

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

You still have about two minutes left.

[Sheryl Saperia]

Two minutes—got it.

Does it count if I talk extra quickly? Will that be...?

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

No, but you're very good at it.

[Voices]

Oh, oh!

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

Coming back to the agency, if you have any time left, I wonder if you could highlight for us what IRGC ties might exist to companies operating in Canada.

[Sheryl Saperia]

In terms of a state agency, the reason that fears are unfounded about the idea of listing a state agency as a terrorist entity in Canada is that, first of all, the Criminal Code, in which the provisions for the listing process are set out, does not prevent cabinet from designating a state agency. The language in the Criminal Code uses the word “entity”, which is extremely broad.

So there is nothing in the legal language itself to preclude the IRGC from being listed. Some may contend that IRGC actions are undertaken in the context of their official duties as a state military force, and therefore might fall outside the scope of the definition of terrorist activity, but this too is a flawed argument, because many of these activities run afoul of international law and therefore still come under the definition of “terrorist”, which is within the Criminal Code.

Another reason is that the IRGC is a powerful, independent, and wealthy institution with a very unusual mandate: to protect the ideals of the Islamic revolution. It's not to secure the country or its borders. There already is a conventional military force, called the Artesh. We are not advocating that the Artesh be listed here.

So from this perspective, banning the IRGC is actually not much different from banning a non-state actor, because it is not a conventional military force.

Finally, with regard to the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act, which was recently passed as part of Bill C-10, this bill will allow victims of terror to file civil lawsuits against local and state sponsors of terror. In part, with regard to suits against state sponsors, this will require the government to create a list of foreign states that it designates as sponsors of terror.

So I want to ask: if the government is prepared to label a foreign state as a terror sponsor, why in the world would it balk at designating an agency of that state as a terrorist organization?

That covers the state agency. Do you want me to move on to—

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

Unfortunately, what I really want you to do—I hate to do this—is stop, because it is now Mr. Marston's turn to ask you a question. Then we'll let you get back to answering....

[Sheryl Saperia]

Okay.

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

Mr. Marston.

[Wayne Marston, NDP, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

Thank you.

I travelled one time with this young woman. She can pack a lot of information into a short period of time, and we appreciate that.

A number of people in different places have expressed some of the concerns that you've tried to address here about conscription and that, and the fact that young people, whose egos are a little more open, when they get the opportunity to be in a group like the IRGC see that as an elevation within their society. It's not necessarily that they're complete ideologues who have bought into everything.

I would ask you one direct question. Are you aware of any other state agencies that have been added to the terrorist list?

[Sheryl Saperia]

No. There haven't been.

[Wayne Marston, NDP, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

So this would be a first.

[Sheryl Saperia]

Correct. That's why I did feel it was valid to address this particular issue of listing a state agency.

[Wayne Marston, NDP, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

Yes.

I hate the term “devil's advocate”, but I have to play it a little bit here. You talked in your presentation about different attacks around the world that have taken place, and that this group was responsible for them. What evidence was there of that complicity?

[Sheryl Saperia]

Let me back up for one second, because I'm actually going to rethink my answer to your question about whether any terrorist entities are state agencies.

[Wayne Marston, NDP, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

Okay.

[Sheryl Saperia]

The answer is that actually there are, because Hamas and Hezbollah both play political roles, very legitimate political roles, within their country. So it is not the case that this would be unprecedented.

With regard to your second question, about the actual evidence, there were very concrete cases and investigations. I'd be happy to provide that information to you after the fact. Certainly with regard to the direct involvement of Iranian and IRGC officials in the Argentinian terrorist attacks, that is very well documented.

As I said, I'd be happy to provide you with further information.

[Wayne Marston, NDP, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

If you could just give us the point of reference, we could check it out ourselves. It's not that I doubt the information in any way; I think it's just fairer to look at it like that, because we are being asked to look at this in a different fashion from in the past.

It is very clear that the leadership in Iran has talked for years about the wiping out of Israel. There's no doubt, and nobody's denying that fact. With the attack on the pro-democracy people in the country, as we heard in testimony here, there are as many as one being hanged about every eight hours. There's a terrible thing happening there.

Some people have stated that a lot of the words pointed at Israel are actually intended as a distraction, as opposed to reality, away from what they're doing to their own people. I certainly think that had they the opportunity, they would certainly attack Israel. The question, though, when you're dealing with nuclear weapons, is that dropping a bomb on Jerusalem, or dropping a bomb in that part of the world, would destroy an awful lot of Arab people as well, Palestinians as well, so it's that whole thing about....

Do you see any way that it is a distraction from what they're doing to their people?

[Sheryl Saperia]

In terms of threats, with regard to Israel...?

[Wayne Marston, NDP, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

Israel, in particular, yes.