Subcommittee on International Human Rights Committee on Feb. 23rd, 2026

[Tamara Kronis, Conservative, Nanaimo—Ladysmith, BC]

Thank you so much, Mr. Chair, and thank you to all the witnesses for sharing your experiences and your perspectives on this important issue.

We have heard universally that displacement in the world is growing, but I'd like to pick it apart a bit in terms of its two main sources. Whether displacement is internal or external, these days, it's a combination of the concept of forced displacement, which is the involuntary movement of people, and a more insidious form of displacement that has been occurring: strategic depopulation. In some cases, it is not clear who the actor is who is instigating it, but nonetheless, this tactic is often used indiscriminately to intentionally empty a geographic area for one reason or another.

Mr. Smolansky, I was hoping that you might expand a bit, because I think you hinted at this in your opening remarks, on the potential political impacts of this kind of displacement on things like voter eligibility or participation in key electoral districts. I suspect you've experienced this and have some knowledge of it happening in Venezuela.

[David Smolansky]

I can say regarding voting eligibility that, at least in the case of Venezuela, Venezuelan migrants and refugees have been illegally banned from voting. We have not been eligible to vote for more than a decade. It is estimated that approximately five million out of the nine million Venezuelan migrants and refugees could vote, because they are over 18 years old. That is what the constitution says, but we have not been able to do it. This is political discrimination. If I may add, we are suffering from a violation of our political rights—in this case, to vote—but at the same time, one of the tragedies that we are facing more and more is our right to our identity.

Millions of Venezuelans—it is difficult to estimate how many today—have an expired passport or don't have a passport. They have restrictions on mobility. I don't want to put this in the first person, but let me just share my story. I've been banned; I have a legal ban for life from public service in Venezuela. I was mayor, and I was illegally removed from office, forced to be in hiding for 35 days until I fled my country disguised as a priest and went to Brazil. I've been in exile for nine years, and my passport expired in 2019. There is no possibility to renew my passport, due to political reasons. However, I have the opportunity in front of this Parliament, in front of these witnesses, to share my story. This is the story of millions of Venezuelans. As I said in my remarks, if we want to have a true restoration of democracy and freedom in Venezuela, we need what started in July 2024 with the elections and with people voting in free and fair elections.

[Tamara Kronis, Conservative, Nanaimo—Ladysmith, BC]

I believe you were in Canada when the most recent episode in Venezuela's political history occurred. I'm wondering if you might comment on the role that disinformation played in your own experiences and in Venezuela's situation, as well as how it benefits actors in international relations who may not want the best outcome for countries in terms of democracy.

[David Smolansky]

The role of misinformation in Venezuela is huge. The regime has a very strong propaganda apparatus with support from nondemocratic external actors, such as China. There are different reports on how Chinese technology has helped Venezuela's regime with expansion of propaganda and, at the same time, with censorship.

For example, if Venezuelans in Venezuela don't have a VPN, they cannot access X, Twitter. They don't have access to independent media. They have to use a VPN. It has become a very important issue and a concerning one.

This started 16 years ago. When Twitter was starting, Hugo Chávez created what he called the communicational guerrilla, with thousands of users of X—now it's bigger, with trolls and bots—attacking and threatening anyone who thinks differently from the regime and doing so every single day.

By the way, I have to add something regarding expired passports. I have to be grateful to Canada, which is one of the few countries—

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Quickly, please.

[David Smolansky]

Canada is one of the few countries that allow expired Venezuelan passports.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you.

Thank you, Ms. Kronis.

I would like to invite Mr. Brunelle‑Duceppe to take the floor for five minutes.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Ms. Schaefer, we're obviously talking about displaced persons. We often talk about externally displaced people. However, many populations are internally displaced in conflict zones.

What are the most significant operational challenges you face in meeting the needs of internally displaced persons where there's conflict?

[Anne Kathrin Schaefer]

Operational challenges to respond to people who are internally displaced in conflict situations are quite different from natural disasters, even though the two cannot really be delinked. In the majority of cases, especially today, as we were looking at with Sudan, Somalia or Mozambique, we have an overlap of both natural disasters and conflict drivers.

The majority of the challenges are either directly linked to political funding or availability of local opportunities. The Secretary-General has implemented something that's called the solutions agenda. Canada was a champion in 2025.

In the solutions agenda, the entire system, the humanitarian architecture, is trying to pivot towards so-called solutions for internal displacement, in which locally led, internationally supported policies are created in order to support local integration, to support communities and to absorb the number of people who have been displaced. In the countries that we're mostly dealing with—say, Sudan or the Democratic Republic of the Congo—we have a huge number of internally displaced who are not able to be absorbed. The local system is simply unable to deal with such a shock because it is a weak system to begin with.

The absence of long-term funding through, for example, the international development banks is one of the main continuous drivers. Of course, we need strong local governments that are able to lead development so that we don't have a situation in which we create aid dependency or in which an international team is dictating how local solutions should look. This should be a locally driven and a locally owned process that is primarily implemented by local governments and local communities.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Given what's happening just about everywhere in wealthy countries, it's clear that international aid and development assistance are melting away like snow in the sun. This can also be seen with the Canadian government.

There's currently a fairly considerable reduction in international aid and development assistance. At the same time, there's much more investment in defence. There's a kind of connection there. A number of governments—not just the Canadian government—are reducing international aid but increasing their defence budgets. We have seen this in Europe. We have seen this with the United States Agency for International Development, or USAID. We have seen this in Japan, where there's almost nothing left.

At that point, we're inevitably headed in the wrong direction when it comes to displaced persons. In countries like Canada, we're going completely against the current of what we should be doing.

Right?

[Anne Kathrin Schaefer]

Yes, the international funding landscape for humanitarian assistance right now is dire. We don't have to sugar-coat that. This is the reality we live in. This is why it is more important to ensure that, when we talk about humanitarian assistance, we do not limit humanitarian assistance to life-saving assistance but that we pivot from the onset—we call it “solutions from the start”—towards systems in which we ensure that people can try to get empowered and self-reliant as quickly as possible without needing continuous assistance through humanitarian aid.

It's very simple. You can start with handing out a tent, or you can start by building a temporary shelter that can be transferred or converted into a more permanent shelter. If you start with a tent in a camp, it is much more difficult to pivot than if you start with local absorption capacities and the ability to build a shelter that can be transformed into something more permanent. This is how simply it starts.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you.

Ms. Ndiaye, you work in an important observatory on international migration, refugees, stateless persons and asylum.

Can you give us a specific example of an initiative that's working and that could serve as an international model?

[Ndeye Dieynaba Ndiaye]

Thank you for the question.

International law is currently struggling to address the issues, but there are indeed initiatives.

In terms of a model that works, I can give the example of the Norwegian model. It works. It's not perfect, but it works because it enables immigrants to settle through a gradual immigration policy. It also enables them to return to their country if they want to.

Canada is capable of doing that. However, as I mentioned earlier in my remarks, Canada should redefine its immigration policy based on the needs in the country, but especially based on what's happening around Canada. I'm thinking in particular of the crises, conflicts and wars that cause people to leave their country.

As part of our research projects, we're currently studying the cases of people who left Senegal and travelled through Nicaragua then Mexico and the United States to arrive in Canada.

There are other models in Europe that work.

I can also give the example of the Economic Community of West African States, or ECOWAS, zone in Africa. From a legal standpoint, there's free movement. People should be able to move around to settle, but the challenges on the ground are extremely complex. In our work, we often encourage Canada to develop partnerships with these populations to build wealth, while involving diasporas in the development of migration policies. We mobilize all existing theories, such as that of codevelopment. Diasporas currently provide three-quarters of development assistance.

There's a growing imbalance, then. Financial contributions are important. It's also important to mobilize expertise and skills.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you. I let you speak for two more minutes, because it was the first time you were asked a question.

Now I would like to invite Madame Anita Vandenbeld to take the floor for five minutes.

Welcome, Anita.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

My first question is for Mr. Smolansky.

You said something that is quite telling. It was that, more so than war and more so than natural disaster, erosion of democracy is a driver of migration. That's particularly obvious in Venezuela, with a lack of civic space, a lack of freedom and a lack of rule of law. You also mentioned returning, and having those democratic freedoms is one of the conditions people look for before they're able to return. I wonder if you could elaborate specifically on how the lack of democracy drives people to leave and what the conditions for return would be in that regard.

[David Smolansky]

Thank you for the question.

For us, this has been our main lesson, especially because Venezuela, during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, was a country that received at least four million migrants. They were not only from Latin America but also from Europe, like my family.

As of right now, hundreds of Venezuelans are fleeing the country daily. Since the last presidential election, a bit more than 600,000 Venezuelans have fled. We estimate that this might be the largest outflow for political reasons. There is hope right now that democracy could be restored soon, but until it's restored, people do not feel safe to go back.

As I said in my remarks, there is a so-called amnesty law being discussed now in Venezuela. The president of the Venezuelan National Assembly, which is an illegitimate national assembly, said that Venezuelans who have requested asylum and refuge will not be included in this so-called amnesty law. Therefore, it is concerning that you will have almost one million Venezuelans who have already been recognized as refugees or who are waiting for a response for asylum as refugees. If they decide to go back because things may be getting better, they will not be protected. In that regard, their integrity could be at risk, and they could be illegally detained by this regime that, as I said, has illegally detained more than 20,000 innocents during the last decade.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Thank you very much.

Dr. Ahmed, you talked about something similar: conditions of return. Can you elaborate with regard to the Rohingya?

[Kawser Ahmed]

Thank you very much for the question.

Conditions of return for Rohingyas are incumbent on safety and dignity. These are the two primary conditions. However, as we know, Rohingyas are stateless people. They were made stateless intentionally by the state of Myanmar, starting in 1982. Whenever we talk about their safe repatriation with dignity, we have to really remind ourselves about their legality when they go back. Will they be regular citizens of Myanmar?

In the International Court of Justice, the case was launched in 2020. At the end of last year, the case was heard again in terms of giving a verdict. This question came up again regarding how to deal with the identity of Rohingyas, because from the beginning, the state of Myanmar consistently denied the identity of Rohingyas as Rohingyas.

As some of you might also know, once they have crossed the border and have been hosted in Bangladesh, the Bangladeshis also, technically, do not recognize or acknowledge them as Rohingyas. Officially, they are “forcibly displaced Myanmar nationals”, or FDMN.

This aspect of citizenship is super critical for Rohingyas in terms of their repatriation. However, from our side—research and advocacy—we say that the conditions should be enabled with the discussions of the state of Myanmar. As many of you might know, there are now additional layers, with armed ethnic organizations, especially the Arakan Army operating in that area.

Discussion has not yet taken place, to the best of our knowledge, but this ought to be done.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Thank you very much.

Ms. Schaefer, you talked about the amount of time. The longer the time that goes by, the more difficult it is to return. I think you said that half of displaced people right now have been displaced for more than five years.

Can you talk about how to prevent long-term displacement and a little about the conditions of return?

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Can you provide a quick answer, please? The time is up.

[Anne Kathrin Schaefer]

As I mentioned, the one pathway we have as an international community is to invest more heavily in these solutions from the start in order to enable an environment in which people do not need to remain displaced extensively.

I'd be happy to elaborate later.

Thanks.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you, Anita.

I would like to invite Mr. Majumdar to take the floor for five minutes, please.

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

Thank you very much, Chair.

Let me start with Mr. Smolansky.

You were talking a bit, sir, about how authoritarian regimes work through Venezuela and others—in Cuba, Iran and Russia. I want to give you a chance to unpack that idea further, if you wish.

[David Smolansky]

Thank you.

In the case of Venezuela, we have seen the presence of nondemocratic external actors. I would mention Cuba, Russia, Iran and China.

In the case of Cuba, as I was describing in answer to the first question, it was proven that on January 3, the protection of Maduro depended on foreign agents—in this case, Cubans. It is estimated that almost 20,000 Cubans have been around Venezuela since 1999. I was describing how approximately $63 billion was given to Cuba. That was not free. In exchange, they provided a very sophisticated repressive apparatus. According to reports from UN fact-finding missions, victims and dissidents have said that Cuban agents have participated in and advised on the repression, persecution and torture of innocent Venezuelans.

In the case of China, they have provided technology for surveillance, social control and repression, especially in the peaceful and non-violent protests that happened in 2017. The equipment used was provided by China. Since that year, the International Criminal Court has investigated crimes against humanity in Venezuela.

I also have to say that Russia and Iran have become the main arms providers to Venezuela's regime. In the case of Iran, they have provided technology for drones, not only for surveillance but also for war. At the same time, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has given capacity building to elite forces in Venezuela to make it more sophisticated in its repression and persecution. In the case of Russia, there has been at least $13 billion invested in military equipment.

I want to remark on the AK-47. It is estimated that almost 250,000 AK-47s were bought by Chávez and Maduro. A lot of those AK-47s were given not only to elite forces but also to non-state armed groups that, in Venezuela, are known as colectivos. They are sometimes used to repress, kidnap and force the disappearance of innocent Venezuelans.

This is an autocracy network that has been heavily executed in Venezuela and that has caused, obviously, this situation of human rights violations, crimes against humanity and people fleeing, looking for the opportunities and liberties they don't have in Venezuela.

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

Thank you very much.

Dr. Wilf, you were exposed to a remarkably defunct set of assumptions that have informed a logic train creating a distortion of our understanding of displacement in not just the Middle East but also Gaza. Would you like to take a few minutes of my remaining time to continue to rebut some of the things you were exposed to?