Evidence of meeting #14 for Subcommittee on International Human Rights in the 45th Parliament, 1st session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was united.

A video is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

Members speaking

Before the committee

Michael Doran  Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East at Hudson Institute, As an Individual
Ronald J. Deibert  Professor of Political Science and Director of the Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto, As an Individual
Kahn  Research Fellow and Senior Editor, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Chan  Advocacy Officer, Hong Kong Watch
Rahyab  Founder and Chief Executive Officer, Resilient Societies
Tohti  Executive Director, Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project

Jean Yip Liberal Scarborough—Agincourt, ON

How does transnational repression among Hong Kong communities in Canada compare with that in other countries?

4:30 p.m.

Advocacy Officer, Hong Kong Watch

Landson Chan

Compared with other countries, I would say that it is just as bad here. Look at the United Kingdom right now. We are seeing a trial going on for the HKETO spies.

It seems like it's quieter in Canada at this time, but if we look back to the election campaign in 2025.... I spoke to Joe Tay personally, and we discovered that there were a lot of activities during the election period. For example, I didn't mention that he was accused of tax evasion in Hong Kong during the election period. The charges they pressed were dropped right after the election period.

Jean Yip Liberal Scarborough—Agincourt, ON

Thank you.

Dr. Deibert, you talked about digital repression. How is AI used in digital repression?

4:30 p.m.

Professor of Political Science and Director of the Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto, As an Individual

Dr. Ronald J. Deibert

AI is exploding very quickly. It has come upon us all of a sudden, and it's penetrating everything. It's no different in the world of transnational repression.

From our vantage point, what we are looking at when we do evidence-based research on the threat actors engaged in transnational oppression.... AI is used across the spectrum. It can be used, for example, in the creation of deepfake videos to try to cast false aspersions on somebody or put out false news about somebody. It's also used in targeting—trying to better understand how to get access to a person and what they're doing, in terms of data available to a state. AI can be used to analyze all of that at scale. It can be used to undertake reconnaissance on a person's device.

There's a whole spectrum of harms associated with AI, which is why I recommended that the government take these harms seriously and start putting forward regulation that can at least help us address these harms in a more comprehensive fashion.

Jean Yip Liberal Scarborough—Agincourt, ON

Aside from regulations, is there something the government can do with the AI capabilities of disinformation? It can really grow, because it recalibrates and learns and so forth.

The Chair Liberal Fayçal El-Khoury

May we have a rapid answer, please, because time is up.

4:35 p.m.

Professor of Political Science and Director of the Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto, As an Individual

Dr. Ronald J. Deibert

I actually think that overall a lot of the solutions to these problems have to come at local levels and at a grassroots level rather than the government doing something centrally. I'd be happy to expand on that.

The Chair Liberal Fayçal El-Khoury

Thank you, Ms. Yip.

I would like to invite Madam Kronis to take the floor for five minutes, please.

Tamara Kronis Conservative Nanaimo—Ladysmith, BC

Thank you so much, Mr. Chair.

I'm going to address my questions to Professor Deibert.

If we think of the world as a big house that we all live in, the global digital ecosystem is arguably the plumbing, and you have an incredible view into that. I remember in the late 1990s, when I was one of your students, that the Citizen Lab was an idea you had. It was this incredible thing you wanted to start. Now, 25 years later, it is really in a position to be able to investigate novel threats to democracy, human rights and global security from a digital perspective that gets at some of that, that melds together that international finance, the defence, and all of the pieces.

In your opening remarks you talked a little about how people flee oppressive regimes and they come to Canada only to find that they actually haven't gotten nearly as far away as they thought. What we've heard from a number of the witnesses today is of their own personal experiences or the experiences that people they know have had with transnational repression.

What insights do you have for us, sitting and listening and taking all of this in?

4:35 p.m.

Professor of Political Science and Director of the Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto, As an Individual

Dr. Ronald J. Deibert

As part of the research, which tends to be technical in nature because we're doing forensic analysis and network scanning and all of this detective work, we also, with a very focused lens, talk to people and understand their lived experiences. What I'm hearing across the table is very consistent with what we hear from victims, especially around the chilling effects that have been described. I have talked to people who had their phones hacked by one or another government that they fled from and the mere presence of a phone makes them anxious. They have a feeling of helplessness around technology, around the Internet, that makes them feel like they don't want to engage anymore, which is really quite interesting if you look back to 25 years ago. Most people assumed that all of this technology would enable liberalization and democratization. We're seeing the exact opposite. People are retreating into isolation, not connecting to their diaspora networks, not picking up their phone and not going on social media because that's where the harms originate.

4:35 p.m.

Conservative

Tamara Kronis Conservative Nanaimo—Ladysmith, BC

We heard from the Auditor General this morning that the CBSA is not only behind in hiring the 1,000 agents we've heard about over and over again, but in fact, it has actually lost 3,400 full-time employees.

Are Canadian law enforcement agencies adequately equipped and trained to identify and respond to these threats? If they aren't, are there structural barriers that are eliminating the effectiveness? Is it lack of will? What kinds of insights do you have into that?

4:35 p.m.

Professor of Political Science and Director of the Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto, As an Individual

Dr. Ronald J. Deibert

Yes, that's a good question. Thank you for that.

All I can tell you is what victims report to us. Again, consistently we hear victims saying that when they report a case like we've been hearing about to local law enforcement, there are usually big question marks and they don't know what to do. That's understandable because in a lot of cases we're talking about a foreign government on the other side of the world—if you can even figure out who's doing this. There is not much that they can do.

There are some exceptions. For example, I've learned about the York Regional Police, which has done a very impressive job building up their internal repertoire for how to deal with these cases, so I would point you to them as a model example.

Generally speaking, though, I think there must be much better training, much better education at a local level across the country for frontline entities and agencies to understand what it is they're dealing with. There is still a lack of understanding of what the experiences are here.

4:40 p.m.

Conservative

Tamara Kronis Conservative Nanaimo—Ladysmith, BC

The other thing I find fascinating about your work is that you're embedded in a university. You're embedded in a downtown core. There are protests, incidents and events going on all around you.

What have you observed in terms of the role that transnational repression is playing in connection with university campuses and the ways in which those campuses are being harnessed in some ways to facilitate it?

4:40 p.m.

Professor of Political Science and Director of the Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto, As an Individual

Dr. Ronald J. Deibert

As a university professor, I'm seeing a lot of pressure on universities coming from all sorts of places right now, not just the topic of this hearing. Academic freedom is at risk at the university right now. That's daunting for somebody like me who does work at the cutting edge.

When it comes to transnational repression, of course, students are not immune to it. I will say one thing about it, in general. My impression, and this is based on our visibility into what we're talking about here, is that most governments that undertake acts of transnational repression don't really think about the state within which the victim resides; it's a secondary consideration.

They just want to get at an individual who is from their country and who represents some kind of problem for them. They want to neutralize that problem. The country where a person lives, their location and whether they are a student or a business owner, matter less. That may factor into some risk calculation, which is important for us to understand, so that we can create effective deterrence in this country.

It's not that they're going after Canada or Canadians. They're going after Uyghurs, Iranians, Hong Kongers or whatever. They're largely agnostic on the state in which they live.

Thank you.

The Chair Liberal Fayçal El-Khoury

Thank you.

I would like to invite Mr. Brunelle-Duceppe to take the floor for five minutes, please.

Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe Bloc Lac-Saint-Jean, QC

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Deibert, the fact that you raised the issue of electronic devices is of particular interest to me. I myself have had to get a new phone a few times, because I knew it had been compromised. Let me be clear: I was never concerned for my safety. However, this is the phone I use to communicate with activists or opponents of certain regimes, through encrypted apps. I was told that the officials had nothing against me, but that they were looking to identify people I was talking to via my phone, among other things. So that's a pretty interesting problem to have.

You said there should be a lot of local initiatives. I'd like to get your general reading of things. When it comes to international repression, we're really talking about four countries: Iran, Russia, but also India and China. Recently, we've sensed that the Canadian government is getting closer to India and China, or is experiencing diplomatic and trade thaw with those countries.

Do you not see that as a challenge? In your opinion, should we be more careful about this kind of thaw, whether diplomatic or trade, since these forces are clearly still actively carrying out transnational repression on Canadian soil?

4:40 p.m.

Professor of Political Science and Director of the Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto, As an Individual

Dr. Ronald J. Deibert

I'll respond in English if that's okay.

Those are two separate questions.

Regarding the first one, you're essentially talking about hacking technology and spyware, which is available commercially to governments today. Not all governments have access to the same tools. Not all governments undertake cyber-espionage in the same way. Russia, China and other countries are all slightly different.

There is also a commercial market for some of the most advanced and sophisticated surveillance technology that's available to dozens of other governments. In your question, you limited it to these four. Those four, of course, are major actors of transnational repression, but dozens of other governments also routinely undertake transnational repression thanks to this commercial marketplace

What could be done to solve that? That is an extremely difficult problem to solve, because we're talking about cyber-espionage. It's very difficult to regulate. Canada has signed a pledge, along with 26 other countries, to better regulate the commercial market for spyware. We have made that pledge, but as far as I can tell, we have done almost nothing to live up to those words right now.

That's where I think we need to do better. We need to work with other countries to better regulate the industry that's putting tools in the hands of these governments to undertake transnational repression.

I'm sorry, but what was the second question?

Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe Bloc Lac-Saint-Jean, QC

Do you think we should be more careful when we talk about a diplomatic and trade thaw with people we know are responsible for transnational repression?

You talked a lot about local initiatives, but I think we also have to do something at the global level—that is, at the federal level—in terms of international relations.

Does that worry you? Do you think we should be more careful about these new actions?

4:45 p.m.

Professor of Political Science and Director of the Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto, As an Individual

Dr. Ronald J. Deibert

Thank you for that.

Yes, I definitely think this is a problem. When you start putting aside the fact that these governments are major actors that have engaged in transnational repression against Canadian citizens, immigrants and refugees in this country, you sweep all of that aside and you say, okay, now we're into a new territory. I think that's a problem because it sends a signal to those governments that we're no longer serious about combatting that problem.

I've seen it in the past. Back in 2018, we discovered that a Canadian permanent resident, Omar Abdulaziz, a Saudi by birth, had his phone hacked with Pegasus spyware by Saudi Arabia while he was in Sherbrooke, Quebec, as a student. The government said very little, if anything at all, about that. I think when you don't speak up, when you don't take a stand, then you open up, you invite that sort of repression to happen.

I think this, frankly, often gets cast as something idealistic, but in fact this is a national security issue for us to the extent that we are a relatively small country. Our national security depends on international law and international human rights. If we are not vocal about that, if we don't take a serious stand about that, we act at our own peril.

The Chair Liberal Fayçal El-Khoury

Thank you, Mr. Brunelle-Duceppe. Time is up.

I would like to ask Madam Dhillon to take the floor for five minutes.

Anju Dhillon Liberal Dorval—Lachine—LaSalle, QC

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'll start my questions with Mr. Deibert.

You spoke a little bit about regulations surrounding AI. What kinds of regulations would you recommend?

4:45 p.m.

Professor of Political Science and Director of the Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto, As an Individual

Dr. Ronald J. Deibert

I think first and foremost, before we even get into regulation, we need to set the appropriate sober tone about this technology. It's all very impressive, as I'm sure all of you have seen, but it's also impressive in terms of the incredible harms that it facilitates across a wide spectrum.

The signals I've seen from this government, and from our Minister of AI, seem to me to be mostly cheerleading and thinking about how we can capitalize from a business perspective on AI. That's not enough. I think especially from a minister of AI, there needs to be a message sent to people, “Look, we understand that this has benefits, but it's also harmful and we need to take steps to address that.”

Regulation, I think first and foremost, has to come in terms of more transparency imposed on the platforms. When you ask ChatGPT, Anthropic or something like that a question, it goes into a big black box. We don't know what's happening within that company, what they are doing with that data, with whom it is being shared. You could be certain that some of those companies are sharing that data with law enforcement and intelligence agencies in foreign countries, and that data may then be used as a weapon in transnational repression.

I think first and foremost, we need to open up the black box of these platforms and subject them to outside, independent scrutiny.

Anju Dhillon Liberal Dorval—Lachine—LaSalle, QC

You mentioned there are several different types of transnational repression and predominantly now it seems to be AI and online. If we could backtrack a little bit in time, what were the forms before this?

4:50 p.m.

Professor of Political Science and Director of the Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto, As an Individual

Dr. Ronald J. Deibert

I think looking at this historically is very illuminating. If you think about it from the perspective of a bad actor on the other side of the planet, and they want to take care of a dissident based in Canada, 25 or 50 years ago, it would have been very difficult. You'd have to send an agent across borders. You'd have to get the agent into the country. They'd have to physically follow somebody. Maybe they'd have to try to plant some device in their room to eavesdrop on what the dissident is doing.

Now, with a click of a button, thanks to this type of surveillance technology I've been describing, you can get inside a person's entire life. You can see everything they're doing, who they're speaking with. You can activate the camera and eavesdrop on a conversation like this. You can go back in time, look at all of the emails that they've sent.

This is a quantum leap not only in surveillance potential, but in the potential for transnational repression. That's why I think we're at a crisis moment when it comes to the tools that are available to actors. I know there's a lot of attention in this hearing to Iran because it's in the news right now, but again, I need to emphasize there are dozens of countries in many parts of the world that are targeting Canadians from many different backgrounds. The experiences that you hear from Hong Kongers and Uyghurs are consistent with what I'm hearing across the board.

Anju Dhillon Liberal Dorval—Lachine—LaSalle, QC

Could you name some of these countries?