Justice Committee on Feb. 11th, 2013

[The Chair, Conservative, Mike Wallace]

Can anybody answer that question?

[John Davies]

Sorry, I cannot answer that question.

[Wayne Marston, NDP, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

No, that's fair. I didn't think anybody was a physicist here, but the reality is that it will probably be top of mind for people.

In terms of developing nuclear weapons, deliverable weapons, for a terrorist group or for somebody who wants to do some serious damage, the fissile material requires highly specialized knowledge, physicist-level knowledge, to do this. Many times we hear where different countries are suspected of being close to getting yellowcake, and they're getting close to getting other aspects of the processing to get to this point. How do you transfer that to the level where somebody could actually do it from a physical standpoint? Again, I'm not asking for the science. I'm talking from the policing perspective.

I presume it would mean that it would have to be small enough to be transportable to get it to Canada, that it wouldn't be something we would anticipate developing in Canada. What would be your outlook on the potentials for that?

We had the U.S.-Russian joint threat assessment on nuclear terrorism. In that assessment, they would be talking about the risk factors. How do you see that relative to Canada? We're somewhat different target-wise, hopefully, from the United States, but still we have concerns.

[John Davies]

I'm going to try to start.

I can't speak to the science behind the conversion, but I think there is a broader point of the ongoing interest of certain terrorist groups in weapons of mass destruction. Previously al Qaeda has clearly indicated an interest in obtaining anthrax and in obtaining improvised nuclear weapons. The technical hurdles to doing that are still very high, but I don't think you can discount the effects of any kind of an attempt, even a small initiative by al Qaeda or any terrorist groups using weapons of mass destruction—not necessarily just the physical harm, but you can think of the economic repercussions, the psychological effect. I think it's not just the scientific ability to go up the knowledge curve to be able to pull off a nuclear attack; it's the aspirational attempt, which is still a big part of the threat assessment.

[Wayne Marston, NDP, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

Just like 9/11, and the implications of 9/11 from the psychological side of it, not only the damage that occurred to the World Trade Center. Had the towers not fallen, the symbolic attack would have been significant.

I believe I'm running out of time.

[The Chair, Conservative, Mike Wallace]

You have a minute and a half, sir.

[Wayne Marston, NDP, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

That's okay. I don't mind having more time. It's always a good thing.

[The Chair, Conservative, Mike Wallace]

Now you have a minute.

[Wayne Marston, NDP, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

He's from a neighbouring riding. You can tell.

In closing, I just want to say that I appreciate the work you do. There is a hard balance between transparency and clarity to the public and keeping close to your vest what you need to.

I just want to thank you for being here today.

[The Chair, Conservative, Mike Wallace]

Our next questioner is Ms. Findlay from the Conservative Party.

[Kerry-Lynne Findlay, Conservative, Delta—Richmond East, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you all for being here today to enhance our understanding of this legislation.

Mr. Davies, when you testified before the Special Senate Committee on Anti-terrorism on June 4, 2012, you said this:

...Bill S-9 represents a concrete step in strengthening Canada's criminal laws relating to nuclear terrorism. It will further allow Canada to ratify and implement two important international treaties, thus signalling our commitment to nuclear security.

I note today in your remarks you talked about the bill being “an indication of Canada's commitment to engaging in international efforts to combat proliferation” and “signal to our international partners the importance Canada places on having a robust regime to address threats to global security”. Clearly, you're putting this within the international context of us working with our partners.

Public Safety Canada's role, as I understand it, with regard to proliferation and terrorism is to coordinate and support interdepartmental efforts at the federal level, as well as to leverage expert knowledge to better examine the threat, identify the risks that Canada faces, and develop sound policy and advice to help guide the government.

In that context, do you feel that Bill S-9 would complement existing national security policy and operational frameworks that are currently in place?

[John Davies]

Yes, I do very much. I think there are a lot of benefits to Bill S-9.

The Minister of Justice talked about the importance of particularizing the offence around counter-proliferation in the Criminal Code and extending the sentencing. I think both of those around proliferation offences send an important signal, a strong message, that the government considers this an important issue.

Also, there are more tools for law enforcement and for prosecutors: the reverse onus on bail, wiretapping provisions, and so on. There are more tools in the tool kit. Any national security issue is about expanding tools as much as you can to give flexibility and other options for law enforcement and for prosecution.

For us as well, this is obviously an important international commitment that we're living up to here. It strengthens the international regime around counter-proliferation. It's a good momentum piece for Canada and for the world going into the next Nuclear Security Summit in 2014.

I think there are a lot of benefits for this legislation.

[Kerry-Lynne Findlay, Conservative, Delta—Richmond East, BC]

Thank you.

Do any of the other witnesses want to comment on this, either from the international or domestic perspective?

[A/Commr James Malizia]

Certainly from a law enforcement perspective, and Mr. Davies touched on it, the added tools that we would benefit from would involve amendments to part VI of the Criminal Code, enabling us, of course, to apply for an intercept of communications without having to demonstrate that we've exhausted all other means of investigation, which are key in very timely and urgent and complex files such as these.

Also on the request for notices of interception, we can actually make a request for them to be delayed for up to a period of three years, which again provides us time and space to conduct our investigations.

Finally, there is the utilization of DNA warrants, given that these offences are considered primary designated offences for the purposes of DNA warrants and collection orders.

[Kerry-Lynne Findlay, Conservative, Delta—Richmond East, BC]

That's it.

[The Chair, Conservative, Mike Wallace]

Thank you very much.

Next is Mr. Cotler from the Liberal Party.

[Irwin Cotler, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

There is a lot of concern now with respect to Iran in the whole matter of a breakthrough, because of the highly enriched uranium threshold, which facilitates the breakthrough capacity for a nuclear weaponization program.

That brings me to the question of Canada. To what extent are we being a good international citizen in that regard? I noted that in 2010 the Canadian government's decision to permit Ottawa-based Nordion to sign a 10-year deal with Russia to import highly enriched uranium for use in our medical isotopes production process was criticized by a coalition of arms control advocates. Similarly, we don't appear to be involved in moving ourselves from high enriched uranium to low enriched uranium approaches.

I have two specific questions.

We now have two nuclear research reactors, one at McMaster University in Hamilton, and the other at École Polytechnique in Montreal that rely on highly enriched uranium as their base fuel. Where do we stand at this point with regard to the conversion of these two nuclear research reactors to a low enriched, an LEU, alternative?

Can you explain why Canada has chosen not to participate in the joint effort among France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United States, to convert their medical isotopes production facilities to use low enriched uranium rather than highly enriched uranium?

[The Chair, Conservative, Mike Wallace]

Those are interesting questions. Can anyone on this panel answer any of those questions?

[John Davies]

I think that is more of a question for the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. I think they're more the lead on that than Public Safety.

[The Chair, Conservative, Mike Wallace]

I'm assuming the RCMP cannot answer that question.

[A/Commr James Malizia]

Yes, I'm of the same opinion as Mr. Davies.

[The Chair, Conservative, Mike Wallace]

They do not have an answer.

Is that it, Mr. Cotler, or do you have other questions for these witnesses?

[Irwin Cotler, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

Most of my questions have to do with this whole question. Let me just put a question that might be more... In other words, if you take the four categories of a nuclear terrorism threat—the use of a stolen nuclear weapon, the use of an improvised nuclear device, the use of a dirty bomb, and sabotage of a nuclear facility—what would cause you the greatest concern and why? Would the greatest threat to Canada's nuclear security come from inside or outside Canada?

[John Davies]

We don't look at the threat assessment for necessarily higher or lower, inside or outside Canada. Counter-proliferation as an issue has a lot of different layers to it. There are issues of financing, export, tracking and control, capacity building abroad, protection of nuclear facilities, and so on. Each one of those issues has its own set of risks framework around it and ways to mitigate that risk. I'm not really answering your question here but I think it's hard to categorize whether the risk inside or outside Canada is really the way to look at it or the best way to look at it.

From our point of view, it's important to understand from an aggregate level the counter-proliferation risk and to be able to explain it a lot more to Canadians. This is a difficult issue. It's complex. Most of the things that come with it take place far away. There are issues of dual-use technologies and very complicated financing regimes and so on.

We're still working on our ability to express ourselves in aggregate on the risk of counter-proliferation.

[A/Commr James Malizia]

I'd like to add that, of course, criminal proliferation networks are complex in nature and always seek existing loopholes, so it would be difficult at this point to rank the threats and say which one would be the greatest from an RCMP perspective.

What I can say is that from the proliferation cases that we have seen, there have been efforts to often misdeclare the origin of goods. That's one example. It's the same thing with the end destination, trans-shipping the goods through different countries, changing the name of the consignee on export documents, changing the businesses that are named along the way, utilizing a number of trans-shipment countries to do that, and then whatever the imagination or the innovative thoughts of criminal networks can bring about. That's what we are seeing, a variety, and to actually pinpoint one particular one would be difficult.