Evidence of meeting #72 for Justice and Human Rights in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was complainant.
A recording is available from Parliament.
3:30 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Anthony Housefather
Colleagues and guests, we are going to start today's meeting.
I'd like to welcome our witnesses to the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights as we resume our study of Bill C-51.
Today we are delighted to welcome, as individuals, Ms. Laurelly Dale, barrister and solicitor of the Dale law firm. Welcome, Ms. Dale.
3:30 p.m.
Laurelly Dale Barrister and Solicitor, Dale Legal Firm, As an Individual
Thank you for having me.
3:30 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Anthony Housefather
We have Ms. Carissima Mathen, who is the vice-dean, associate professor of the faculty of law in the common law section of the University of Ottawa. Welcome, Ms. Mathen.
3:30 p.m.
Professor Carissima Mathen Vice-Dean, Associate Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, Common Law Section, University of Ottawa , As an Individual
Thank you.
3:30 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Anthony Housefather
Here today also is Ms. Elizabeth Sheehy, who is a professor also at the faculty of law in the common law section of the University of Ottawa. Welcome, Ms. Sheehy.
3:30 p.m.
Professor Elizabeth Sheehy Professor, Faculty of Law, Common Law Section, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
Thank you.
3:30 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Anthony Housefather
Representing the Vancouver Rape Relief and Women's Shelter, we have Ms. Hilla Kerner, who is a collective member. Welcome, Ms. Kerner.
3:30 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Anthony Housefather
I understand that Ms. Kerner has requested to go first.
Ms. Kerner, the floor is yours.
3:30 p.m.
Collective Member, Vancouver Rape Relief and Women's Shelter
Thank you.
I'm hoping my accent will be clearer in the beginning.
The women who work in a rape crisis centre did not need the “Me too” campaign to know how common it is for women to experience sexual assault and rape. Being a girl and a woman in this world means we are likely to be sexually assaulted. If we are poor, indigenous, women of colour, or women with cognitive or physical disabilities, we are even more likely to be sexually assaulted. I would say it's almost guaranteed and, yes, me too.
In preparation for this submission, we looked at almost 6,000 cases of sexual assault and rape of women who called our rape crisis centre in the last five years. Twenty-five hundred women were raped by their husbands, boyfriends, or lovers, and another 422 women were raped by their ex-male partner after they broke up with him. Two hundred and thirty-four women were sexually assaulted, most often raped, by their male supervisor or co-worker. Eleven hundred women were sexually assaulted by someone they knew professionally, often through social circumstances like a party, mutual friends, or someone they had a first or a second date with. Three hundred and thirty women were raped by their own fathers when they were young, and another 471 women were sexually assaulted or raped by other family members or family friends. Five hundred and nine women were assaulted by men who were a stranger to them.
We appreciate the Minister of Justice's efforts to advance sexual assault provisions with the amendments proposed in Bill C-51. We have one objection, and that is to the addition of “no consent is obtained if the complainant is unconscious”. Of course an unconscious woman cannot consent, but this is already captured under the existing law which says, “No consent is obtained” if the “complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity”.
The addition can be misused by defence counsels to argue that unconsciousness is a threshold for incapability, and since we too often see cases where judges do not know sexual assault laws, the intent behind the laws, and the intent of Supreme Court judgments instructing the application of the law, there is a serious danger that the judges will accept the defence arguments in this matter.
We support the proposed articulation that no consent is obtained if there is “no evidence that the complainant's voluntary agreement to the activity was affirmatively expressed by words or actively expressed by conduct”.
We also support the expansion of rape shield provisions to include communication of a sexual nature or communication for a sexual purpose. We support the right to legal representation for victims in rape shield proceedings.
About the amendment concerning victims' private records, it has been exactly 20 years since the passing of Bill C-46 which amended the Criminal Code with specific provisions regarding the production and disclosure of records of the accused in sexual assault proceedings.
We have been members of CASAC, the Canadian Association of Sexual Assault Centres, since 1978. Early on, members of CASAC faced the need to protect a record; so in 1981 CASAC members passed a resolution to protect the confidentiality of records and to protect the confidentiality of what women told us regardless of legislation. Seeking women's records from rape crisis centres is a clear and blunt attempt to undermine a victim's credibility and violates their privacy and dignity. It is also a direct attack on rape crisis centres and our role in supporting individual victims, our demands that violent men be held accountable, and our overall fight for women's equality and liberty.
When Bill C-46 passed, the feminists who advocated for it described it as second best, because the full demand was for no records at any time. The current proposed amendments regarding women's records in the possession of the accused gets us closer to that demand, and we support this.
Alas, good laws mean nothing when judges do not know the law and therefore do not uphold the law. We are aware of the recent attempt by Parliament to address this issue, and we are looking forward to speaking to the matter when Bill C-337 is discussed at the relevant committee in the Senate.
Judges' ignorance is only one element in the utter failure of the criminal justice system as a whole to hold men who commit violence against women accountable. Of the 6,000 cases that I mentioned earlier, 1,800 were reported to the police. About 30 resulted in charges, and fewer in convictions.
The common sexism and diminishment of women in all aspects of our private and public lives teach men to see and treat us as things and not as full human beings. Pornography is a devastating and effective promotion and reinforcement of men's sexualized violence against women. Prostitution is a devastating and effective promotion of the sexual commodification of women, where women are used as a commodity that can be bought and sold by men.
The problem is not that men do not know if a woman really consented or if she really wanted to have sex with them; the problem is that they don't care. They are allowed not to care, because they know they can rape women with impunity.
We often use the term rape culture to mean the acceptance, the collusion, the promotion of male violence against women. Men use rape culture to sustain rape structure, a structure that keeps men in domination and keeps us women in submission. The accumulation and the impact of all the individual rapes that men commit against individual women sustain all men's power over all women.
Of course, we know it's not all men. We know that not all men are wife beaters, sex buyers, rapists, or pornographers, but for sure, many are. We know that because of all the women who call our and other rape crisis centres, and because of all the women who are living in our and other transition houses. And now,anyone who pays attention knows it too, because of all the women who say “Me too.”
We believe men can change, but not as long as they get permission and encouragement to violate our bodily integrity and autonomy. We need to shake the pillars of the rape structure and start by holding men who commit violence against women accountable. So far, the Canadian state and its criminal justice system has been failing to do so.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms promises us, “Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law.” It is now 2017, and we women still do not have it, not the equal protection nor the equal benefit of the law.
Thank you.
3:35 p.m.
Barrister and Solicitor, Dale Legal Firm, As an Individual
Thank you, Mr. Chair and committee members. It is my honour and privilege to be here.
My name is Laurelly Dale. I'm a criminal defence lawyer of Dale Legal Firm. I've been practising for more than 10 years. I practise in two areas: downtown Toronto and northwestern Ontario, covering the large district of Kenora. I attend today to focus on clause 25 of the proposed amendments in Bill C-51, specifically the amendments to add proposed new sections 278.92, 278.93, 278.94.
I've listened to the testimony of Breese Davies and the Criminal Lawyers' Association. I'm a member of the Criminal Lawyers' Association; however, I attend today as an individual. I'm not here to repeat their submissions. Ms. Davies takes a position that the amendments are overly broad and should be specified. I can indicate that I am in opposition of the proposed amendments in their latest form, entirely.
Our laws are progressive. They must be fair. They must uphold the principles of our supreme laws, namely the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. They must not be reduced to social media hashtags. We must not feed into the myth that all complainants of sexual assault are survivors of sexual abuse and therefore are always to be believed.
The amendments that I am here today to discuss have also been referred to as the Ghomeshi amendments. They violate section 7 and section 11(b) and (d) of the charter, ultimately allowing for the conviction of the innocent. Violations occur in a variety of ways. Today I'll focus on the main three.
First are the section 7 and section 11(d) violations to the accused's presumption of innocence and fair trial by declaring these records inadmissible and requiring defence disclosure.
The second major area of concern is the section 7 violations as, for the first time ever, they interject the complainant as a party to the criminal proceedings against the accused. It is the state versus the accused, not the state and the complainant versus the accused. Tied into this is the violation arising from allowing the complainant to be part of this hearing, usurping the very valid reasons for excluding witnesses, and allowing them to make submissions.
The last violation relates to the potential delays that this will ultimately cause, violating the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Jordan, upheld by Cody, by creating at the very least an additional three- to four-day pretrial hearing for the accused, and by the addition of the third party.
The onus is on the crown to prove allegations of sex offences. It is its obligation to prove each and every element to the offence. The accused is not required to do anything. The crown attempts to prove its case by putting forth the evidence of the complainant. Sexual assault cases are most often about the credibility of the complainant, as there is no other evidence. Crown evidence of the offence is presented to court on the basis that what the complainant is saying is true. The defence is then allowed the opportunity to test the evidence of the crown and demonstrate that the complainant is not credible.
Testing is through cross-examination and must always be relevant. The accused can then choose to testify or call other evidence. The crown is then able to cross-examine as well. The trier of fact, considering all admissible evidence, makes the decision.
Minister of Justice Jody Wilson-Raybould claims that the amendments will boost protections for sex assault victims and ensure trial fairness. I ask how this can be achieved in light of these charter violations. The justice minister indicated in committee last week that the amendments would not create defence disclosure obligations. I ask how this would be possible when this is clearly the procedure set out in the section.
Relevancy and materiality can be canvassed at the time of introducing the material during cross-examination. Why must the accused disclose evidence that he or she wishes to use in cross-examination? We must not water down reasonable doubt in these cases. The presumption of innocence is the cornerstone of our criminal justice system.
Under clause 25, all correspondence in the possession of the accused is presumptively inadmissible unless they can persuade the judge that it should be disclosed in accordance with eight substantive factors. I point out that seven out of eight of these factors are drafted with the purpose of protecting the complainant, and only one references the accused's right to make full answer and defence. I concede this is not a popular perspective, but it's one that must be stated, that the accused is presumed innocent and we must protect their charter rights.
As well, it's important to note in interpreting this section that the information in the possession of defence is communication that's authored by the complainants themselves. This is information that the complainant has intentionally chosen to withhold from the police and the crown attorney that is relevant to the alleged incident.
The Ghomeshi amendment requires defence to give this information to the complainant and the crown ahead of trial. To notify the complainant in advance that defence can expose their dishonesty invites the complainant to come up with a fabricated answer. The amendment serves to allow the complainant to correct their mistakes at the expense of trial fairness to the accused.
In acquitting three accused of sexual assault, in a recent decision in 2017, Ontario Superior Court Justice Molloy in Nyznik states at paragraph 17 the following:
Although the slogan 'Believe the victim' has become popularized of late, it has no place in a criminal trial. To approach a trial with the assumption that the complainant is telling the truth is the equivalent of imposing a presumption of guilt on the person accused of sexual assault and then placing a burden on him to prove his innocence.
The current system works. In the recent case of D.A.E., found at tab 5 of my materials, defence counsel utilized the material in their possession, and based on the totality of evidence, considering that this was utilized during cross-examination, the judge still convicted the accused.
Found at tab 5 is a recent Ontario Superior Court case, where it was held that myths about victims and sex offenders have no place in our criminal justice system. At paragraph 60 the judge states:
I agree with the trial judge that we must be vigilant to reject...stereotypical thinking about the behavior of women. At the same time, we must not adopt...assumptions about men and their tendency to rape.
The public outcry from Ghomeshi should not be used to undermine the presumption of innocence. Trial by media should not invade the rights of the accused.
I'll briefly touch on the second major amendment, as previously stated.
A criminal trial, by its nature, is the state against the individual. No one else is a party to these proceedings in any case. The complainant is not a party to the proceedings. The consequences of a criminal judgment do not apply to them. It is a slippery slope, allowing the complainant to participate in other aspects of the case against the accused, such as crown or judicial pretrials. There is, therefore, a risk that innocent people will be convicted.
Further, it is routine at the commencement of a criminal trial for a judge to make an order excluding witnesses. The reason is obvious. It is essential for the discovery of truth. As Justice Abbey stated in Jenkins:
The general and overriding principle which lies behind an exclusion order is to maintain, to the degree possible, in the search for the truth, the purity of the evidence.
Section 7 of the charter is violated, as this amendment permits the complainant to testify knowing what the evidence is beforehand, undermining the accused's trial fairness. Chapters of cross-examination are revealed, and the opportunity exists to resolve issues with their testimony.
The last violation relates to potential delays this will inevitably cause by creating an additional three- to five-day hearing 60 days in advance of the trial.
As noted at tab 9, the Jordan case is the law upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada that relates to delay that is presumptively unreasonable when it is longer than 18 months at the provincial court level, or 30 months at the superior court level. The resources allotted to the accused are not the same as those allotted to the complainant. It is not known whether, post these amendments, other resources would be available, such as legal aid, and whether these pretrial applications would be funded. I echo the comments of Breese Davies with respect to her concern about imbalance of resources.
Last, in my materials I have included a number of materials relating to the consequences of conviction for sexual assault that must be at the back of minds when considering these amendments as well as wrongful convictions. If accepted, the balance of the trial will be entirely upset. Charter violations will occur, and it will ultimately result in the conviction of innocent people.
Those are my submissions. Thank you.
3:45 p.m.
Prof. Carissima Mathen
Thank you.
In recent months, there has been a great deal of debate over Canada's sexual assault laws. Dramatic events have provoked calls for the law to be completely overhauled. While understandable, such calls are overstated. In fact, Canada has one of the most progressive sexual assault frameworks in the world. Nonetheless, there are some changes that would ensure greater consistency between the Criminal Code and Supreme Court jurisprudence, better reflect parliamentary intent, and promote optimal responses to sexualized violence.
Bill C-51 contains a number of such changes, which I am pleased to support. I will focus on the proposed changes to the law of consent in section 273, and to the impermissible uses of past sexual history in section 276. These changes are contained in clause 19, clause 20, and the first part of clause 21.
Clause 19 clarifies the conditions, already set out in section 273.1, under which no consent to sexual touching is legally possible. I agree with the proposal to include a specific reference to unconsciousness and to make clear that other forms of incapacity, short of that state, can impair a person's legal ability to consent.
Some have argued that, given Supreme Court case law, this change is redundant. I disagree. It is always appropriate—indeed, it is laudatory and even essential—for Parliament to confirm common-law rulings with which it agrees. This is especially true in criminal law. Such clear expression of legislative intent protects important principles from later judicial change. I would remind the committee that the court's important decision in Regina v. J.A., in which it rejected the idea of advance consent to unconscious sex, was a majority ruling that was attended by a vigorous, three-judge dissent.
Some have also argued that this change could lead trial judges to insisting on complete unconsciousness before the rule against consent is operative. To the extent that there is such a risk, a proposition I do not necessarily accept, I think that the new subparagraph (b) addresses it.
Let me move now to clause 20 and its proposed change to section 273.2. One of the most important and distinctive aspects of Canada's sexual assault law is that it narrows the accused's ability to argue an honest but mistaken belief in consent, a defence that negatives mens rea.
In its unanimous decision in Regina v. Ewanchuk, the Supreme Court stated that an accused may not rely on mistakes of law about consent as a basis for honest but mistaken belief. The court gave a number of examples, such as the belief that consent is demonstrated by passive or ambiguous conduct.
In my opinion, the limitations on the definition of consent set out in section 273.1 are properly regarded as mistakes of law. I therefore support the move in clause 20 to specify those limitations as ineligible for the defence of honest but mistaken belief. I am, though, concerned that the current wording of proposed subparagraph 273.2(a)(iii), which refers to “any circumstance in which no consent is obtained,” could confuse the distinction between fact and law in relation to consent.
Assuming that the intent is to remove the accused's ability to rely on legal as opposed to factual mistakes, I would recommend either inserting into this new clause some reference to the term “mistake of law”, or making it clear that these are circumstances where consent is deemed not to obtain. Using the word “deemed” would clarify that the intent here is to prohibit the accused from relying on legally impermissible understandings of consent. It would also be a very powerful message from Parliament about the nature of the limitations on consent in section 273.1.
I also agree with the proposal in subclause 20(3) to ensure that an honest but mistaken belief in consent must rest in some way on evidence that consent was communicated. This change is consistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning in R. v. Ewanchuk. Such evidentiary thresholds are not uncommon. I think it is appropriate to ensure that the defence is based on evidence that relates in some way to how Parliament has defined consent for the purposes of sexual touching.
Finally, let me move to one change contained in clause 21 that relates to sexual history, or what is colloquially known as the “rape shield” provision.
The treatment of the complainant's prior sexual history has been a persistent challenge for the criminal justice system. Current section 276 of the code was part of a groundbreaking law reform effort in 1992. Subsection 276(1) states that sexual activity evidence is inadmissible to support an inference that, by virtue of her past sexual conduct, a complainant is more likely to have consented to the alleged assault or that she is less credible as a witness. These are called the twin myths of sexual assault. It is important to understand that the use of such evidence for such purposes is prohibited.
Under subsections 276(2) and 276(3), there is a separate process for considering the admissibility of past sexual activity that is offered to support different inferences. Unfortunately, the distinction between subsection 276(1) and the rest of section 276 has become blurred. Some judges have applied the framework outlined in the later subsections, subsections 276(2) and 276(3), to inferences that are clearly prohibited by subsection 276(1).
There is no balancing process capable of supporting the admission of evidence intended to advance the twin myths. By clarifying that subsections 276(1) and 276(2) cover distinct uses of sexual history evidence, the proposed change addresses this problem. It is consistent with the specific, unanimous, and complete rejection of the twin myths in R. v. Seaboyer, later affirmed in R. v. Darrach, and with the original animating intent of Parliament.
That concludes my prepared remarks. Thank you.
3:55 p.m.
Liberal
3:55 p.m.
Elizabeth Sheehy
Honourable members, I am testifying on this bill as an individual with expertise in sexual assault law. I was just asked this morning as a representative of the Ottawa Rape Crisis Centre. Our executive director was unable to be here. She is travelling across Ontario working with 11 police forces, trying to persuade them of the benefits of what's called the Philadelphia model in terms of policing. She asked me, as secretary of the board, to speak on their behalf. I am a law professor and an expert in the area of sexual assault law, with over 30 years of experience teaching, researching, and advocating for the rights of women who have experienced sexual violence.
The Ottawa Rape Crisis Centre is the third-oldest rape crisis centre in Canada. It was established in 1974. For 43 years, they have been providing crisis line support, face-to-face counselling, and group counselling to thousands of survivors annually. In the current climate, those numbers are increasing exponentially. It's a feminist organization that has fought tirelessly for legal and policy change at the local, provincial, and national level to secure women's rights to report sexual assault, and for these crimes against women to be investigated, prosecuted, and adjudicated with professionalism and attention to women's equality rights.
The Ottawa Rape Crisis Centre has challenged police practices of unfounding of women's sexual assault reports and documented police failures as early as 1975. Currently, our executive director, Sunny Marriner, has led the country in successfully advocating for the Philadelphia model, a model that requires review of police files on sexual assault investigations by independent violence against women advocates.
To speak for myself and the Ottawa Rape Crisis Centre, we support the bill overall. We read it as a significant effort by government to remedy discriminatory practices in the criminal justice system and to inspire trust on the part of women to report sexual violence. There is some urgency to this reform, as women flood traditional and social media with their disclosures of perpetration, yet the reporting rate by women has plummeted from one in 10 to one in 20 in the last several years. We are therefore at a crisis point in terms of the credibility of the criminal justice system for crimes of sexual violence.
I start by noting that we support the provision requiring that all bills include a charter statement assessing compliance with the Constitution of Canada. We trust that this compliance review will include an assessment of each bill's impact on women's equality rights protected by section 15, and women's section 7 rights to security of the person and to trial fairness. When assessing criminal laws that will impact an accused person's rights, the charter requires us to also consider the countervailing charter-protected interests of complainants.
We see the bill as modernizing the criminal law in keeping with current social realities in terms of the role that social media plays in both sexual activity and sexual violence by men against women. We thus support the provision that characterizes communications that are sexual in content or purpose as sexual activity for the purposes of the rules governing the admissibility of sexual history evidence. Moreover, this provision is consistent with legal decisions from some courts in advance of the bill that have interpreted sexualized text messages as sexual activity for the purposes of the rape shield provision, so in some ways this is not a major change in law.
We also support the provisions that provide legal standing and access to legal representation for complainants who face defence applications to introduce their prior sexual activity as evidence into the trial. The provision mirrors the provisions regarding complainants' rights to standing and representation to respond to defence applications to admit their private records. It was previously inexplicable to us why women had standing to defend the privacy of their confidential records but not their private sexual activities.
We think that the bill's extension of the records regime to private records in the hands of the accused, even those without sexual content or purpose, is also an important advance in terms of protecting women's privacy. Although we recognize that the provision has a broader reach, it means that no advantage can be gained by extrajudicial interception of private diaries or other such records. It's true that the defence will lose the element of surprise when required to have such records vetted for admissibility, but it must also be recognized that complainants in sexual assault trials themselves experience forms of jeopardy that require recognition and accommodation.
Bill C-51 also serves to codify some aspects of sexual assault law already established by the Supreme Court of Canada in interpreting the statutory regime. While strictly unnecessary, we support the amendments that do not add confusion to the already exceedingly complex law of sexual assault.
For example, the Ottawa Rape Crisis Centre supports the provision requiring evidence that a complainant expressed her voluntary agreement to sexual contact in order for an accused to rely on the defence of mistaken belief in consent, even though this is not a legal change, but simply a reiteration of the law interpreted by the Supreme Court of Canada almost 20 years ago in Ewanchuk.
We do have serious concerns, however, that the provision purporting to codify the J.A. decision misses the mark. It introduces the potential for confusion and may inadvertently limit legal interpretations on the meaning of incapacity. We say this because the introductory notes to the bill describe this provision as a codification of J.A. However, long before J.A., courts had ruled that unconscious people cannot consent—how could it possibly be otherwise—and, in fact, J.A. stands for a much more significant principle: that you cannot consent in advance of a sexual activity during which you are unconscious.
It would be wonderful if the bill actually codified J.A. and put that principle into law, particularly because, as Professor Mathen noted, it was a majority decision, not a unanimous decision. I think it would be wonderful if, in fact, this law codified J.A. It does not at the current moment.
The other problem that we worry about.... It's true that the bill does not foreclose the possibility that incapacity can include states approaching, but not reaching, unconsciousness. I think the bill ought to go further and explicitly state that proposition. It does not at the current moment. It simply leaves open the possibility that there are other ways in which one could be incapable. In fact, we think it ought to go further and begin to map out the considerations that judges should look at in determining incapacity short of complete unconsciousness.
Those are my submissions. Thank you.
4 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Anthony Housefather
Thank you very much for those very cogent statements from all of our witnesses. It was excellent testimony.
Now we're going to start with Mr. Nicholson.
4 p.m.
Conservative
Rob Nicholson Conservative Niagara Falls, ON
Thank you very much.
Thank you very much for your testimony. It was very helpful on one hand, but it actually underlines how complicated these areas can be.
Ms. Kerner, thank you very much again for your testimony. One of the things that you pointed out is the codification of the provisions that sexual activity can't take place when the complainant is unconscious. You were concerned about that, that it might be limiting. You may notice that Ms. Mathen did point out that there's a second part to that section which says that the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity for any reason other than the one referred to in previous paragraph.
Wouldn't you agree that it's not really limiting it to that, but it is codifying that? On the other hand, I think it's very clear in the next subparagraph that, in fact, it's not exclusive to that, that there are other ways that consent can be—
4:05 p.m.
Collective Member, Vancouver Rape Relief and Women's Shelter
I think it's true, but as Liz Sheehy said on behalf of the Ottawa Rape Crisis Centre, we share the same position as other women's groups. In general, the current system actually does not work. The Alberta Court of Appeal judgment that was released a few months ago ordering a new trial for the acquittal of Bradley Barton, who, by his own admission, killed Cindy Gladue, shows how many stereotypes, myths, and actual ignorance judges have in their interpretation and understanding of sexual assault law.
Until we fix that, until we have a system that works properly and, of course, provides a fair trial for the accused—it's in nobody's interest to have unfair trials because we want democracy; we want it for women, and we want it for everyone else—I think there is a lot of room for mistakes in understanding by judges.
4:05 p.m.
Conservative
Rob Nicholson Conservative Niagara Falls, ON
Wouldn't you agree that it's all the more reason then to codify these different provisions rather than, as you say, to let the courts just interpret them anyway they want to? By codifying it here, we are giving the courts direct instructions or description of what is and what isn't illegal.
4:05 p.m.
Collective Member, Vancouver Rape Relief and Women's Shelter
Probably Liz Sheehy can respond to that too, but I think that's the wrong codification.
If the legislator is interested in setting a lot of examples of what incapability means, that will be helpful, but to raise the threshold is dangerous.
4:05 p.m.
Conservative
Rob Nicholson Conservative Niagara Falls, ON
My own thought was it codified the threshold but it wasn't.... Ms. Mathen, you made the point, and Ms. Sheehy as well, that there are benefits to codifying the different decisions, rather than just letting them sit out there, and certainly it must be of some assistance then as well to lawyers practising in this area. They're not just relying on their interpretation of the common law decision in this area, but it's transcribed into legislation.
Wouldn't you agree with that? It's not just a question of codifying what has already taken place, but it adds some certainty, I would guess, to anyone practising in this law, when it is transcribed into legislation.
4:05 p.m.
Prof. Carissima Mathen
It does. It adds certainty. It adds notice. It ensures consistency between the Criminal Code and the common law. I would just point out that, of course, statute is superior to common law, and whereas common law can be revisited on a much lower threshold, statute is accorded a higher regard. For those reasons I think it's really important for Parliament to decide, from time to time, which elements of the common law it agrees with.
You can also make the converse argument, but certainly if it agrees, then I think it is very laudable for Parliament to engage in reflecting those principles in the statute.
4:05 p.m.
Elizabeth Sheehy
I agree with codification, if the codification represents the decision. My point is this. It doesn't clarify this confusion. Calling this a codification of J.A. adds confusion. It is not a codification of J.A. A codification of J.A. would refer to the specific principle that you cannot consent in advance to sex that will occur while unconscious.
The second thing I want to note is that yes, it's true. The provision, as Professor Mathen points out, is open-ended, but one interpretation of that provision might be that it refers to other forms of incapacity, such as disability, as opposed to states that fall short of unconsciousness. I worry that we will be giving some sort of signal to judges that the key is unconsciousness, and there may be other forms of mental illness, for example, or mental disability that can amount to these other forms of incapacity.