Evidence of meeting #29 for National Defence in the 41st Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was forces.
A recording is available from Parliament.
12:10 p.m.
Conservative
Cheryl Gallant Conservative Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON
You said there is no evidence that a dedicated weapon exists in space. How would a magnetic pulse be deployed? Is there even evidence to suggest that this type actually exists?
12:15 p.m.
Director, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba
Are you speaking of an electro-magnetic pulse weapon, an EMP?
There's no evidence that an actual weapon exists. There are only reports of the United States and others testing them and developing them, partially for potentially offensive reasons or for defensive reasons. There is a long range of different types of weapons that you can imagine being deployed in outer space. These are potential dual-use technologies coming out of the civilian sector that are then going to be transferred into the military sector.
You would need to talk to a scientist about how you would actually use them, because I don't know how they would use them. I've learned over my years to stop trusting what scientists tell me.
12:15 p.m.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative James Bezan
Thank you very much.
Mr. Alexander, you have the final questions in the five-minute round.
12:15 p.m.
Conservative
Chris Alexander Conservative Ajax—Pickering, ON
Thanks very much.
Professor Fergusson, we spent a lot of time, in the 1990s especially, worrying about the proliferation of chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological weapons. Do you think that threat has increased, has remained stable, or has gone down over the last decade or decade and a half? How should it affect our thinking about readiness?
12:15 p.m.
Director, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba
I have puzzled over that issue for a long time. The nuclear proliferation threat I think has gradually increased over time. The Achilles heel of the nuclear proliferation treaty—which we're seeing now played out fully in the case of Iran—is that you signed onto NPT and publicly said you wouldn't acquire nuclear weapons, but in return you had access to nuclear technology. Then over time, when political circumstances change and a new regime decides it wants to go down that path, it now has the technology and the fundamental knowledge and scientists to do this. This is the exact case of Iran today. If you go back, the foundation of its nuclear program was a function of NPT and the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology to the shah's regime, courtesy of the United States, West Germany, and others. Once you've got that piece, you now can start to move.
So I think on the nuclear question that it has slowly increased, along with the increasing evidence of the development of long-range ballistic missile delivery systems. But I've always believed that in this world the nuclear equation stands separate from the chemical and biological. I don't see any significant increase, I don't see any significant evidence, I don't see any significant sense, whether it's by states or by non-state actors, that they see any significant political utility in chemical and biological weapons. For the crazy, the criminal, the little evidence we have there is of concern, but I certainly don't put the chemical and biological.... I would say that has stabilized or gone down.
12:15 p.m.
Conservative
Chris Alexander Conservative Ajax—Pickering, ON
On a completely different subject, in my view, the consensus after the experience of Afghanistan is that using our defence resources or allied defence resources in support of nation building should only be done on a very targeted basis, in a very disciplined way.
Trying to have military people, commands, engaged with civilian-style institution building is highly problematic. We have heard that from the development community and the humanitarian community consistently over the years, even those that are pro military. But there is a role in training, which I think you implied earlier, certainly of foreign militaries and sometimes of police, and that's exactly how we're engaged in Afghanistan. Do you think this is a major task for which the Canadian Forces should be ready in the future?
You mentioned Africa. Obviously, we are engaged to some extent in Africa in this kind of task, but there are needs there and in some parts of Asia, Latin America, and so forth. Indeed, there are perhaps ongoing needs among some of our NATO allies in specialized fields in Europe. What is the scale of that challenge? We can't predict the future, but how do you assess the probability of our being involved in that field?
12:20 p.m.
Director, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba
Probability in the field of Africa or nation building with armed forces?
12:20 p.m.
Conservative
12:20 p.m.
Director, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba
I think it is extremely problematic, and I think there are lessons, which will become better known as distance from Afghanistan is gained, that this has been problematic. I think the presence is beyond the need to be sensitive to local cultures, when you're at the village level in these operations. But that's not nation building per se. I mean, part of it hinges upon what nation building is. But when you have military officials acting at higher levels in the nation building process, at the levels of national governments and provincial districts, providing non-military advice, I tend to think it's extremely problematic, and it hinges back upon what it is we are designing and maintaining armed forces for. It's a readiness question as well.
12:20 p.m.
Conservative
Chris Alexander Conservative Ajax—Pickering, ON
If I could clarify the question, though, you did mention that nation building was a probable area for which the Canadian Forces should be prepared. What did you mean by that?
12:20 p.m.
Director, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba
No. If I mentioned that, let me correct myself. I don't think the Canadian Forces should be prepared for nation building. If anything, the development forces, the people who have the expertise in nation building, the people in the civilian world, need to alter the way they think and train for these types of missions in insecure environments and when working with the military.
The problem is not the military's problem. The problem is on the other side of the fence. That's what I would argue.
12:20 p.m.
Director, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba
I think the lessons of Afghanistan increasingly will be that the western nations will be reluctant to do this again for a long time.
12:20 p.m.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative James Bezan
Thank you.
That ends our second round. We are going to go with three more questions in our third round, one per party.
Ms. Moore, you have five minutes.
12:20 p.m.
NDP
Christine Moore NDP Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC
I would like to ask some questions about the F-35s and fighter jets in general.
The F-35 is not necessarily the best choice if we look exclusively at our domestic operations. In fact, the aircraft has less range and requires a longer runway. So it is more difficult to land it on an airstrip in the Arctic. In addition, it is a single-engine jet, which leads to additional risks in the event of an engine failure.
Why did we not consider the possibility of having two smaller fleets of fighter jets, one more suited to our domestic requirements and the other to our overseas requirements? Can you tell us why that solution was not envisaged?
You say that having a fleet made up exclusively of F-35 fighter jets would limit our air force, and that many other fighter aircraft have good capabilities and are less expensive. One of the only notable differences with the F-35 is its stealth capability, but that is something the Americans already have.
12:20 p.m.
Director, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba
To the first question you asked, certainly two smaller fleets can be considered, but when you get to two smaller fleets, you're not just talking about having dedicated, less capable fighters, whatever you want to call them, for domestic roles versus those you would deploy overseas. You're also talking about long, extensive support lines, logistic lines, and training lines, which have to be in place to support different planes and different training requirements. All this in fact adds greater money to the cost. If you look at the process, it's something the active community, to my knowledge, hasn't really looked at closely.
By the 1980s and into the early the 1990s, there was a conscious decision on the part of all of the major western actors when it came to aerospace capabilities that the solution to the problem, given advancing technologies, was to develop multi-role platforms, to eliminate specialized platforms and move them all into one platform capable of doing everything. This has been the logic that has been driven by technology and costs, and shrinking—relative to constraints—defence budgets.
That's where this idea of having a single platform that can do everything came from. Its fundamental idea remains, which is a fundamental military idea that the combat is what we're looking for, and it cannot perform the rest of the roles. I'm not sure if I would agree with you that the F-35 is not optimal. It can certainly do the air sovereignty role. I'm not concerned, given my knowledge of the existing forward operating locations.
The engine question is an interesting question. It comes back to the reason we bought the F-18, or why the military tried to rationalize the F-18. I don't think that's a major problem, but an engineer would have to tell you the increased probability of losing one engine of an F-35 in the Arctic.
The key has been this notion that you don't want to dedicate separate platforms because of the cost of all of them. It's a cost-driven thing that leads you to buy the more expensive, advanced ones to do all of the roles, rather than go down to two or three fleets. National Defence hasn't been consistent there, but that has been the logic for a long time.
Concerning other air capabilities that are less expensive, I'm not convinced at the end of the day when you start talking about expenses how much they would end up being less expensive. I think you have to be very careful. People pull numbers out of production line hats. This is what the per unit cost is. Companies competing with each other are happy to tell you what the per unit cost will look like before you start to enter into the production line. It depends where the production line is. It depends what unique demands you want. To my knowledge, any of the other options, except for the Super Hornet, don't have two engines. They are all one-engine planes, if my memory serves me correctly. That doesn't fix anything. Above all, they are less capable. I think you're mistaken to think this is just stealth as the unique capability. There are a lot more advanced capabilities on this plane that do not exist on the existing previous generation platforms that you cannot ignore.
12:25 p.m.
Conservative
12:25 p.m.
Liberal
John McKay Liberal Scarborough—Guildwood, ON
I briefly wanted to carry on the conversation about the submarines. The government of the day was persuaded by the military that these were absolutely necessary for strategic and surveillance purposes and all the rest of the stuff, and of course the program has been somewhat less than optimal since. Apparently, our country has survived quite nicely, thank you very much, between when we didn't have the submarine capability and now. Here we are 10 years later. We're getting ready to fire our first torpedo. This is a pretty exciting day.
The vice admiral was here. Of course, he put out a pretty stout defence as to why we need these things. Your argument seems to be that it's really questionable whether we needed them when the government bought them in the first place. It's even less arguable that we need them now. There are other “platforms” to find out what we need, where we need it, and how much information we need. It's not likely we're going to get involved in any very serious conflicts with anybody. We're not going to be taking on the Russians, Americans, or the Chinese with respect to our submarines, so really, what's the point?
Therefore, is your advice to the government that this is one of the things they should just drop? This has just been a bad deal, and it's only getting worse, and the likelihood of it actually having any utility through to 2030 is quite minimal.
12:25 p.m.
Director, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba
My advice for the government would be to take a very close and detailed independent study of the current state.
12:25 p.m.
Director, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba
I say that because there are things I didn't mention. One is what I would call the “elephant in the room” about submarines. The United States and the United Kingdom have gotten out of the conventional submarine business. We're one of the key allies left, when they get working, in the conventional business. They potentially make a significant contribution to the training and development of technologies, tactics, and doctrines for dealing with potential adversaries overseas that our allies may have to face.
Is that worth the investment? What do we get out of that, paying all this money to do this for our allies? What return do we get, relative to all the other costs? That’s why I think we need—
12:30 p.m.
Liberal
John McKay Liberal Scarborough—Guildwood, ON
Do you think this is a glorified training operation? Is that the argument as to why you keep the thing?
12:30 p.m.
Director, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba
The only argument I would potentially be convinced by is if there's strategic political value that stems from that.
12:30 p.m.
Liberal
John McKay Liberal Scarborough—Guildwood, ON
Thank you.
The final question has to do with General Leslie's report, which has been the great elephant sitting in the room, or there's a whole bunch of elephants actually sitting in the room. General Leslie's report thus far has not been responded to by either the minister or the CDS, which is very consistent with Professor Bland's observations about some of these reports—which is that they just gather dust. The military, one way or another, is going to be facing budget cuts in either absolute dollars or percentage dollars. Leslie has set forth a potential series of responses, which is the only thing that's publicly out there.
The British military went through the same thing. In fact, they had a report, and seven months later they were actually implementing it. So my question for you is, what do you like in Leslie's report and what don't you like, in 25 words or less?
12:30 p.m.
Director, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba
In twenty-five words or less, what I like in Leslie's report is that it has put on the table the issue of what I call the long-standing problem of western militaries’ tooth-to-tail ratios—no one likes to use that term anymore, but I like to use it—where we've expanded, where the tail keeps expanding. This tail expansion is partially a function of the forces changing missions, doing things they traditionally have not done, where they engage with other government departments, with new technologies, etc., which then expand. It's also in response to broader government policy on—to use terms I don't like, but I'll use them because governments love to use them, and not this one but all governments—transparency and accountability, which also all grow the tail.
It's useful to put something on the table. I am very suspicious of it because I don't think it's a balanced report whatsoever. I don't think the legacy of what the Canadian military called military transformation was a good one in terms of dealing with the various issues he's arguing about in this report. I can point back to General Hillier's transformation process and his call that we were going to sort out the problems, get more people at the sharp end, into the tooth part of the forces and the tail, and instead the entire opposite occurred.
What I would suggest about that report is that it deals with one part of the problem. The second part is missing, and that is an external inquiry or examination of the military side of this equation. That's what's missing here, in my view.