National Defence Committee on May 1st, 2012

[James Appathurai]

The fact that we reduced the number of these warheads in Europe by more than 90%, as I pointed out, shows that they are indeed paramount to our strategy. Russia, however, is maintaining them. We believe we could bring down this number much further, but we need to discuss it with the Russians, and, as I said, they are not yet willing to address that with us.

[Tarik Brahmi, NDP, Saint-Jean, QC]

I imagine it will be discussed in Chicago as well, during the summit. Isn't it an important part of the discussion?

[James Appathurai]

I am not sure whether the topic will be discussed in Chicago, but I am certain it will appear in the documents.

[Tarik Brahmi, NDP, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you.

I want to come back to another point, what you said when you were asked about the role Canada should play in the smart defence strategy. You gave the example of the Czech Republic and its nuclear, biological and chemical defence capabilities. You said that Canada didn't have the authority to reduce one of those aspects. Isn't that a bit contradictory? We are talking about how some countries do not want to get rid of their entire arsenals or their military capability.

[James Appathurai]

I did not say that Canada didn't have the authority to reduce or not reduce one of those aspects. It is up to Canada to decide what it wants to do.

I said that Canada has a range of capabilities that are very valuable to NATO. We do not want Canada to abandon its arms and focus on just one thing. That is not at all in line with smart defence. What that strategy means is that, more and more, certain countries do not have enough resources to afford total defence capabilities. If they continue to strive for total defence, they will end up with many areas of limited capability without any real capability. They are better off investing more in one area of capability.

Furthermore, smart defence sets out a list of projects, on three levels. General Abrial could explain everything. These projects concern essential capabilities. Groups of countries will develop the capabilities, with one country heading a specific project. I believe there are about 14 level-one projects. Canada is taking part or is planning to take part in these projects, like all NATO countries.

I did not mean that Canada should specialize in a single capability.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Merci beaucoup.

Mr. Strahl.

[Mark Strahl, Conservative, Chilliwack—Fraser Canyon, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, sir, for your presentation.

As you summarized for us, the strategic concept paper outlines three essential core tasks: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. We heard from the assistant deputy minister, Jill Sinclair, who told us that Canada's preference or focus has been on the crisis management side, whereas Europe's focus has probably been more on collective defence.

My question for you is, how does Canada work with our allies to ensure a balanced and effective approach on how these three core tasks can be met, and what is the dynamic at NATO when trying to balance those three focuses?

[James Appathurai]

That's a very fundamental question. As NATO gets bigger, you have more countries that have slightly different priorities. Let's put it that way. The countries in the south look at the Mediterranean and want to ensure that it's peaceful so they want to reach out there. The countries that have had, let's say, more mixed relations with Russia are still concerned about Russia and want to ensure that NATO builds that relationship and can maintain its strong defence. Canada, like others, has been more expeditionary. The French and the British, for example, also look in that direction.

It's a question of balance, and that's why there are three. Canada does, I think it's safe to say, work very actively to ensure NATO's expeditionary capability remains strong and focuses on that, but no one in Europe doubts Canada's commitment to collective defence either. I think, as Canadians say very often—but it's true—there are graveyards full across Europe that demonstrate Canada's commitment to collective defence, so that is not in doubt. If you want to see it, you should come for Independence Day in the Netherlands and watch Canadian troops walk down the street, and see how many young children are out on the street. Dutch kids go to Canadian gravesites and tend them to this day, so I don't think there's any concern about that.

The final point I would make is that we believe in NATO that with some exceptions expeditionary capabilities are usable also for collective defence. We still need to move them around to where they're needed within NATO territory or somewhere else. We still need some heavier capabilities in reserve. We have plenty of that. But the more we invest in expeditionary capabilities, which Canada is pushing, we believe at NATO headquarters the better we are at collective defence as well.

[Mark Strahl, Conservative, Chilliwack—Fraser Canyon, BC]

On the last one I mentioned, cooperative security, one of the things we heard about in our study on readiness was cyber-security. You mentioned it as kind of an emerging area of concern for NATO, and I think that's the impression we got everywhere. It's an emerging threat.

My question is, what is NATO's role in combatting cyber threats? Are they actively looking to prevent them? Are they developing best practices? Are they looking to protect just your own infrastructure? What is NATO's role in cyber-security, and how would that benefit a country like Canada, which is also seized with that issue?

[James Appathurai]

I can give you four points.

One is, yes, we are first and foremost now reinforcing our own systems, including the systems connecting NATO to national systems, including this country's.

Second, we've created what's called a centre of excellence in Estonia where we bring together the experts who can, first, provide best practices and support allies, but who can also support partners. So if a country comes under attack, we have basically rapid reaction teams that can go in and provide the best possible advice and support to those countries.

Third, we are engaging, but much more slowly, with non-NATO countries that are interested in this. Here we're still trying to figure out what we can do and what we can't do, as I mentioned.

Fourth, we're working now more and more closely with the EU when it comes to standard setting, because standard setting is essential. That includes very simple things like supply chain protection. NATO doesn't do that, but the EU does do it. Who built your computer? You can defend it once it's in your office, but who built it, who secured it along the way, and then what's in it by the time it gets to your office? All these questions need to be addressed, because they're very important.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Your time has just expired.

Mr. Opitz.

[Ted Opitz, Conservative, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Welcome. Apologies for being late, but I had another committee meeting this morning.

I'd like to talk about some of the potentially new Balkan members from the EU. You have Croatia that's now signed up, and it looks like they're doing quite well and are quite successful. Bosnia-Herzegovina is interested in NATO membership, as is Serbia. All of those places have come a long way, I would say, since the war.

Can you comment on the likelihood of their succeeding to NATO membership? When you're talking about that, can you also talk about how is the voting structured to allow them to enter into NATO?

[James Appathurai]

Thank you.

There are three countries that are formally on track, and a fourth, which is basically as we discussed, Georgia, and a decision has already been taken.

For Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which I will henceforth call Macedonia, for reasons which you'll understand, the situation is as follows. Bosnia just took a big step, and I think they are now much more on track to join. Montenegro has some steps to take, but basically is in a very good position as well. The name issue between Athens and Skopje is basically what's holding that country up from moving forward. It's the way it is. We can't affect it. All decisions in NATO are taken by consensus—everything. The voting system is very simple; everyone has to agree and they're in. If they don't all agree, they're not in.

In essence, these are the three countries that are formally in the membership action plan process. The fourth is Georgia, as I mentioned. The decision has been taken that they will join. They just need to make the necessary reforms.

[Ted Opitz, Conservative, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

So any one nation has veto power. In the instance of Athens and Skopje, if Athens says no, that's it, that's all?

[James Appathurai]

Consensus is required. Let's put it that way.

[Ted Opitz, Conservative, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Okay. I just wanted to be clear on that. Sometimes it's a percentage vote, but in this case it's all or nothing.

[James Appathurai]

You're quite right that in the EU they have percentage votes. We have no qualified majority voting, so which water glasses to buy has to go to a committee, and everyone has to agree, which doesn't always make things work efficiently.

[Ted Opitz, Conservative, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

There can be some real inefficiencies in that system, that's for sure. We'll see what happens there.

Can you expand on NATO's view on the Arctic?

[James Appathurai]

Yes. NATO is not involved in the Arctic. It has a very clear position. Some allies would like to see a discussion on the Arctic within NATO. There are others who do not wish to see that discussion take place, so it does not take place.

Coming back to your discussion of decisions, it takes consensus to have that issue on the agenda. There is no consensus to have that on the agenda, so we're out.

[Ted Opitz, Conservative, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Sometimes the information sharing among the NATO partners has been problematic in the past, but I think now it has improved. Can you describe the system of information sharing among allies?

[James Appathurai]

In a general sense?

[Ted Opitz, Conservative, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

In a general sense and any specifics you would care to add.

[James Appathurai]

I mentioned this with your colleague. The secretary general has pushed very hard on intelligence fusion, first to improve the confidence that allies have in the systems within NATO, so they're more likely to give it, and that's been done; second, to actually improve the sharing among them, and that's been done; but third, to fuse civilian and military intelligence and provide allies with much more timely and therefore much more relevant intelligence. All that has happened, and it continues to work. But it just sort of triggered six months ago, and it has really worked very well.

Finally, the strategic concept mentions our commitment to consult with partners. They now have the right to ask for consultation, and we hope to use it, and do use it, but hope to use it principally with conflict prevention. When they feel there's something brewing in their neighbourhood, they now can ring the bell and come to the table. We think that's valuable as well.

[Ted Opitz, Conservative, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

On some of the other issues, like Ukraine, for example, as a potential NATO member, how would that work? They're being somewhat challenged in terms of the direction of the democracy and so forth right now, so I think there's time before they're actually considered as a NATO member. However, let's perhaps advance time and say they are ready to be accepted into NATO. How does that conversation go with Russia?

[James Appathurai]

I think we need to first not advance time for a moment, because the current Ukrainian government has chosen what is in essence non-aligned status and revoked their desire to want to join. That's the position we're in now.

Second, there are fundamental concerns, as you've noted, about the state of democracy. Then we go forward, and NATO allies will take the decision on enlargement. Russia was not delighted when some of the current members joined NATO, some of the former members of the Warsaw Pact, or, if you define it that way, of the Soviet Union itself. But once they were in, through the teeth of Russian concern, their relations with Russia have generally gotten better because they're in a position of confidence. So I think it only reconfirmed what was already a strong position. NATO allies alone will decide on membership.