Evidence of meeting #65 for National Defence in the 41st Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was police.

A recording is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Colonel  Retired) Michel W. Drapeau (Professor, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
Clayton Ruby  Lawyer, As an Individual
Glenn Stannard  Chair, Military Police Complaints Commission
Gilles Létourneau  Retired Judge of the Federal Court of Appeal and the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada, As an Individual

4:20 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative James Bezan

Thank you.

Your time has expired.

Ms. Moore, you have five minutes.

4:20 p.m.

NDP

Christine Moore NDP Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Mental health and social situation are elements we have to be able to take into account in the justice system. We know that members of the armed forces with mental health problems, for various reasons, are more likely to end up in the military justice system.

A recent American study of 90,000 soldiers revealed that those diagnosed with PTSD when returning from missions were 11 times more likely to end up in the military justice system than those who return from missions without any mental health problems.

Let's talk about summary trials. In summary trials, the sentencing officer takes into account social factors, family situation and other factors. When you go see a nurse, a medical assistant or a social worker, these people are bound by medical confidentiality. You can therefore be sure that your medical condition will not be disclosed.

If you are put on summary trial, you may end up in front of your commander, and maybe you don't want to tell him about your mental health problems because it is confidential information. This can lead to difficult decisions, where you may wonder whether, in order to get a fair sentence, you should disclose your medical condition or social situation to someone you would rather not disclose it to. However, if you keep it to yourself, you risk getting a harsher sentence.

Doesn't having to stand trial before someone who will continue to monitor you create a risk of breach of medical confidentiality?

4:20 p.m.

Col Michel W. Drapeau

You have just put your finger on the issue. People suffering from mental or medical problems, or both, are probably not in any physical or mental position to defend themselves. However, that is what they are required to do under the current rules.

Not only do these people not have the right to counsel or to any representation, they also do not necessarily know the rules of procedure. There really aren't any. Even if they wanted to use their medical condition in their arguments before their commander, who would be acting as judge in this situation, they would not be able to present these arguments very effectively.

Does the commander who is acting as judge have to take medical condition into consideration in sentencing? There is nothing set out about this, because there are not really any rules of procedure. It will depend on the circumstances and how the judge is feeling. It will depend on the witness, who is standing at attention while being escorted. Is he or she going to sit down and start disclosing the medical condition?

These are not trials with normal rules. The normal rules you are alluding to do not exist in these situations.

4:20 p.m.

NDP

Christine Moore NDP Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC

Does Bill C-15 contain provisions to the effect that mental health will be taken into account? Were provisions on mental health added?

4:20 p.m.

Col Michel W. Drapeau

I do not know of any.

4:20 p.m.

NDP

Christine Moore NDP Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC

Okay.

Let's go back to what Ms. Gallant mentioned earlier. Is it possible to keep summary trials efficient and effective, to give a ruling expeditiously while resolving the situation and ensuring that members do not end up with criminal records?

Is it possible to keep the process effective and efficient without saddling people with criminal records?

4:25 p.m.

Col Michel W. Drapeau

The answer is yes. Let's look at the example in England. When an appeal tribunal was set up for summary trials, the number of these trials went down considerably. In fact, often, the decisions under appeal were deemed to be invalid.

A good military leader does not simply use disciplinary measures to impose discipline. It can be done through leadership and other means. Do they need this tool to impose discipline immediately, especially when this leads to detention, for example? Is this necessary? I believe a number of other countries have said no.

In France and Belgium, for example, there are no military tribunals in times of peace. Is the French army therefore less disciplined than it used to be? I do not believe so. I believe military leaders use summary trials because it is a very effective tool for the chain of command. There can be absolutely no appeals and no questioning of the decision. They impose their will, whether it is fair or not, and that is that.

However, there are other ways of doing things. We have come to this point where you, as legislators, have to look at this to find a better way, one that is fairer and more respectful of human rights.

4:25 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative James Bezan

Mr. Chisu, you have the last set of questions in this round.

4:25 p.m.

Conservative

Corneliu Chisu Conservative Pickering—Scarborough East, ON

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and thank you very much, Colonel Drapeau, and you, Mr. Ruby, for appearing at our committee.

I have a question for Colonel Drapeau.

You mentioned or claimed that no training was required to preside at a summary trial. I served in the military and I know that I needed to do that course, actually. Are you aware that training is required now?

4:25 p.m.

Col Michel W. Drapeau

Yes, I am aware, sir. There is now training given to those presiding either in a capacity as an officer presiding at a summary trial or as a delegate officer, but that doesn't make them lawyers and it doesn't make them trained in law.

4:25 p.m.

Conservative

Corneliu Chisu Conservative Pickering—Scarborough East, ON

Well, they are not lawyers, but the summary trial is to simplify things for those who don't have lawyers, isn't that right? That is the meaning of a summary trial. Not everybody can be a lawyer, just as not everybody can be an engineer.

I would like to ask kindly, Mr. Ruby, this question. I understand that you have a long and interesting history in the civilian court system, and you are in fact an authority. Thank you very much for your contribution.

Could you please explain to the committee about your interest in Canada's military justice system and outline any past experience you have had with it? Can you please advise the committee of your experience in relation to military law, such as the number of courts martial you have appeared before or how many military members you have ever advised in relation to a court martial or summary trial?

I just want to say that when you are signing on the dotted line.... For example, we have in the army an age limitation. I'll bet I would have stayed in the military, but I was not allowed to stay anymore. It is the Charter of Rights and Freedoms that gives an exception to the military.

If you could, please answer my question.

4:25 p.m.

Lawyer, As an Individual

Clayton Ruby

If your question is meant to imply that I have very little connection with the military, you are absolutely spot-on. You have intuited that quite correctly.

I acted in the one case that prohibited the armed forces from discriminating on grounds of sexual orientation. I'm proud of that. I defended a captive in front of the Court Martial Appeal Court who was the principal person punished under the Somalia inquiry. Beyond that it's minor, if any.

That said, bear in mind that you have someone here with a great deal of experience, and you're going to hear my colleague and friend Gilles Létourneau, who has vast experience as a judge in military matters as well as otherwise, so you're going to get a lot of help.

You won't get that kind of help from me, but I hope what I have said about what the nature of sentencing is and what the Constitution provides is helpful.

4:25 p.m.

Conservative

Corneliu Chisu Conservative Pickering—Scarborough East, ON

Thank you very much.

Mr. Drapeau, you have cited changes to the summary trial system in the U.K., Australia, and New Zealand as much fairer judicial processes. While comparison can be useful and can be extended to other countries—also to NATO members or others—it is important to consider that each nation has a unique legal structure and tradition. For example, the U.K. is bound by the European Court of Human Rights, and Australia is bound by its Constitution.

However, in an independent review, Chief Justice LeSage of the Superior Court of Ontario stated that the Canadian summary trial system is vital to the maintenance of discipline at the unit level and is therefore essential to the life-and-death work the military performs on a daily basis. In dismissing your concern over constitutionality, he stated that the summary trial system was constitutionally sound.

Given that former Chief Justices Dickson and Lamer of the Supreme Court of Canada and former Chief Justice LeSage all supported the current structure of the summary trial system as constitutionally compliant, why make changes to the system based on other countries' specific constitutional requirements? I understand making it here, but—

4:30 p.m.

Col Michel W. Drapeau

It's quite simple. You have two experts in two separate fields telling you it needs to be changed, to be addressed, and to be more sensitive to and compliant with our charter itself.

You've alluded to tradition. Our summary trial is a carbon copy and flows from the U.K. military law, which was transported to Australia and New Zealand. The European court said they needed to change, and the U.K. has changed it. In the process, they've also changed not only the summary trial but the military justice system by civilianizing the Office of the Judge Advocate General and making sure a senior member of the bench now takes that position. Every judge in a military tribunal court martial in the U.K. is now a civilian judge.

I think we can learn a thing or two from our mother country. Their tradition that was passed on to us has changed recently. I am suggesting not to adopt it, but to at least look at it, be sensitive to it, and see why we should not follow suit. Maybe there is a good reason for not following suit, but I don't see it anywhere.

4:30 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative James Bezan

Thank you. Time has expired, and our hour with these witnesses is up.

I want to thank both Monsieur Drapeau and Mr. Ruby for joining us and for providing their expertise and input into our study on Bill C-15.

I'm going to ask you to leave the table and for our other witnesses to come forward.

We will suspend.

4:35 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative James Bezan

Let's bring this meeting back to order.

We're going to continue with our study on Bill C-15.

Joining us for the second hour is Mr. Glenn Stannard, who is the chair of the Military Police Complaints Commission.

Appearing as an individual is recently retired Justice Gilles Létourneau.

I want to welcome both of you to our study.

Mr. Stannard has a long and distinguished career with the Windsor Police Service, serving for 37 years, nine of those as chief. He was appointed to the commission in 2007 and became the chairperson in 2009.

Mr. Stannard, could you bring us your opening comments first?

4:35 p.m.

Glenn Stannard Chair, Military Police Complaints Commission

Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and members of the committee.

I'd like to thank you for inviting us today to testify relative to this study of Bill C-15.

I'm accompanied today by my general counsel and director of operations, Ms. Julianne Dunbar, who has been with the commission virtually since the beginning of the commission.

I'm not going to bore you with issues relative to the mandate. Many of you will know it, or it's written in our brief. I'll simply say that the Military Police Complaints Commission's mandate is to review and investigate complaints concerning military police conduct and complaints of interference in military police investigations.

Today we're here on one issue, and it's the proposed authority of the VCDS to direct military police investigations, in particular the proposed new subsection 18.5(3) in clause 4. The provision would create a new NDA subsection that would expressly authorize the Vice Chief of the Defence staff to direct the Canadian Forces provost marshal, the head of the Canadian Forces Military Police, in the conduct of specific military police investigations.

The commission takes no issue with the general supervisory role of the VCDS vis-à-vis the CFPM as set out in proposed subsection 18.5(1), nor with the authority of the VCDS to issue general instructions to the CFPM in respect to the discharge of his responsibilities as provided in proposed subsection 18.5(2). These provisions merely codify the existing relationship as set out in the 1998 accountability framework between the VCDS and the CFPM.

The proposed subsection 18.5(3) is an important departure from the status quo, and it runs counter to the present-day accountability framework. On March 2, 1998, the accountability framework gave the authority to the VCDS.

To quote a bit of it:

The VCDS may give orders and general direction to the CFPM to ensure professional and effective delivery of policing services.

It specifically stipulated:

The VCDS shall not direct the CFPM with respect to specific military police operational issues of an investigative nature.

It goes on to say:

The VCDS will have no direct involvement in individual ongoing investigations but will receive information from the CFPM to allow necessary management decision making.

Further,

The CFPM has a duty to advise the VCDS on emerging and pressing issues where management decisions are required.

What is prompting the reversal now?

The accountability framework was reviewed and endorsed by the Military Police Services Review Group in 1998. It was developed the same year that Parliament made amendments to the NDA in Bill C-25, following the troubling incidents during the CF deployment to Somalia in the early 1990s. Also, part IV of the NDA was established, which created a complaints regime for the filing of interference complaints.

You've heard in previous testimony that the independence and integrity of military policing has been further supported through changes to the military police command structure effective April 1, 2011, with all military police members, other than those deployed on military operations, under the command of the CFPM.

The proposed authority for the VCDS in proposed subsection 18.5(3) is thus out of step with the efforts over the past 15 to 20 years to recognize and support the independence of military police within the Canadian Forces, particularly when conducting law enforcement investigations.

In its 1999 decision in R. v. Campbell, the Supreme Court affirmed that when engaged in the investigation of offences, police officers are answerable only to the law and do not act on behalf of the broader government.

You have as part of our brief an independent opinion commissioned by the military police commission from Professor Kent Roach of the University of Toronto Faculty of Law. He concluded that the proposed new clause “violates core concepts of police independence” and that the proposed authorization of interference in particular military police investigations could well run afoul of the Constitution, specifically the unwritten constitutional principle of the rule of law.

As commission chair and as a past serving member in policing for 38 years, with 14 years as chief and deputy chief of an organization, I well appreciate there are differences between military and civilian policing. However, the authority proposed to be conferred in the new subsection is specifically and exclusively aimed at the heart of military policing duties, i.e., the investigation of offences.

The dual role of MPs in the CF as police officers and as soldiers does not, in the commission's view, diminish the applicability of the legal principle of police independence to the military police when conducting law enforcement investigations. If it were otherwise, one must question why Parliament created the interference complaint mechanism in the 1998 NDA amendments that established the commission.

The 2003 report of the first independent five-year review of the 1998 amendments to the NDA, conducted by former Chief Justice Lamer, is said to provide the basis for many of the proposed amendments to Bill C-15, yet it should be noted that this report contained no recommendations for conferring such power on the VCDS. To the contrary, Justice Lamer's only concern with the 1998 VCDS and CFPM accountability framework was that its non-legislative status provided insufficient protection of the CFPM's policing independence.

As far as the commission is aware, there have been no problems with the accountability framework that justify its revocation at this time, and proposed subsection 18.5(3) runs counter to various efforts over the years to shore up public confidence in the independence of military policing.

If we equate this to civilian policing—and I know there are differences, and maybe during questions some of that may be discussed—the VCDS could be said to be analogous to a police services board. Both are involved in general policy matters, budget, and administrative issues.

There are examples across this country in provincial legislation that prohibit members of the board from interfering with policing investigations. This is not new. I've dealt with this during the last 14 years. Board members, mayors, government officials, and I cannot imagine any of you as government officials wanting to direct the policing investigations in your communities.

There are many precedents. It's provincial, federal with the RCMP, and internationally there is one in New Zealand, but let's just stay in Canada.

The Ontario legislation, as an example, provides all the steps for all the issues that can be dealt with by the board—in this case, the VCDS. The one thing that they can't do is give orders and directions on policing investigations or on day-to-day operations of the police organization.

Knowing that the independence of the police is paramount for them to do their job free of interference, what is the rationale to now include subsection 18.5(3) and apply it to the VCDS? What is the interest in having this provision and then still say that the CFPM is independent?

The commission is recommending at this time that proposed section 18.5, as it is written, be deleted, as it would be a step backwards, in our respectful submission.

Finally—and I'm only going to touch on it briefly because it's in the brief—there's an issue at page 5, as outlined. There is an additional item to correct the French version of the act. As you know, Bill C-15 includes many corrections in the French version of the act to better align it with the English version; however, one correction is overlooked, and I'll refer you to paragraph 250.42(c), which just needs to be.... We see it as a housekeeping item.

Those are my submissions. I look forward to any questions that anyone may have.

4:45 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative James Bezan

Thank you, Mr. Stannard.

I'll just remind committee members that the brief the chair of the commission is referring to was distributed to everyone on January 16, so you have that. I think it was distributed electronically, so if you don't have it in your binders, it's probably in your email.

With that, we're going to move on to our next witness, the Honourable Gilles Létourneau, who is a graduate of Laval University and the London School of Economics and Political Science in London, England. He has worked in provincial court in Quebec and served at the Law Reform Commission of Canada as vice-president for five years. He was appointed Queen's Counsel back in 1991.

He is the author or co-author of some 80 texts, reports, or articles connected with law, legislation, the administration of justice, and reform. He was appointed judge of the Federal Court of Canada, Appeal Division, ex officio member of the Trial Division, and judge of the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada back in 1992. Back in 1995, he was chair of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia. Since 2003, under the Courts Administration Service Act, he has been working as a judge of the Federal Court of Appeal.

Your Honour, you have the floor for 10 minutes.

February 11th, 2013 / 4:45 p.m.

Gilles Létourneau Retired Judge of the Federal Court of Appeal and the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada, As an Individual

Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee. I am proud and honoured to share my knowledge in Canadian military justice with this committee in the context of Bill C-15.

Let me open, Mr. Chair, by noting that I have already provided the clerk of the committee with five copies of a bilingual book, which I recently authored, on Canadian military justice. It is entitled Introduction to Military Justice: An Overview of the Military Penal Justice System and Its Evolution in Canada. I will make reference to the contents of this book as a complement to my remarks today.

I have followed, with much interest, the discussions that have taken place within this committee on Bill C-15. While I acknowledge some of the improvements the bill contains and proposals that have been made for changes to the bill, I have to deplore the lack of a wall-to-wall review of the National Defence Act, which, in my considered opinion, leads to a short-sighted, if not distorted, view of the Canadian penal military justice system.

Hence, my first point is that there is a need for a fundamental wall-to-wall review of the National Defence Act, a review that has to be conducted outside the control of the Department of National Defence so that Parliament can be provided with a legislative proposal that addresses not only the wishes of the military leadership but also, first and foremost, the expectations of our civil society, who demand that our soldiers who serve in uniform be afforded rights equal to those provided in the civilian penal system in Canada and other militaries abroad. This is currently not the case.

In the short period of time I have, I can only give you an overview of some of these problems. In fact, both from a constitutional and a practical perspective, I would like to draw your attention to the shortcomings of this piecemeal approach taken so far by the military to the reform of the military justice system. I shall provide a few examples that will help you understand what I mean by its structural shortcomings and that will highlight the resistance of the Canadian military to real substantive changes that would actually strengthen the military justice system in Canada.

Let me begin with the prolonged struggle to bring about the constitutionality of the courts martial, as an example. In 1990, the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada—I'll refer to it as the CMAC—found the standing court martial unconstitutional. In 1992, while it recognized the constitutionality of separate military tribunals, the Supreme Court of Canada, in the Généreux case, ruled that the general court martial also was unconstitutional. Since nothing whatsoever was done to amend the National Defence Act to remedy this, it should come as no surprise when six years later, in 1998, in the Lauzon case, a unanimous Court Martial Appeal Court concluded that the standing court martial was unconstitutional.

After the Lauzon case, the case law with respect to the independence of courts in general continued to evolve. Military judges' security of tenure became, along with administrative independence and financial security, a component of judicial independence. However, it seems this jurisprudential evolution never reached the Canadian military, because nothing was done to review the status of the courts martial on the issue of security of tenure, so in 2007, in a unanimous and powerful obiter dictum in Dunphy, the Court Martial Appeal Court made a certain number of observations on the issue of renewable terms for military judges. This reconsideration took place in the case of Leblanc, a decision handed down on June 2, 2011. This led to the passage of Bill C-16 last year.

In retrospect, it is interesting to observe that despite the ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada with respect to the independence of provincial judges, in spite of the excellent obiter dictum of Justice Hugessen of the CMAC in Dunphy, and despite decisions handed down by courts martial holding renewable terms for military judges to be unconstitutional, the military prosecutor strenuously objected to the making of a declaration of unconstitutionality requested by the appellant in the Leblanc case. Instead, speaking for the crown, he argued that the security of tenure of military judges, if desirable, was not constitutionally required.

Meanwhile, not to be forgotten is that military judges enjoyed unparalleled powers and dealt with crimes of a most serious nature. Consider this: they were, for instance, the only judges in Canada who, operating under renewable terms, could until 1998 sentence an offender to death.

They were also the only judges not having security of tenure who were called upon to try the most serious offences in our criminal law or to preside at general courts martial.

Also, they have tried offences including murder and manslaughter committed outside Canada. Examples include the Deneault case in 1994, for murder committed in Germany; the Brown case in 1995, for manslaughter and torture in Somalia; and recently the Semrau case, for second-degree murder and attempted murder in Afghanistan.

To sum up, as a result of legislative inaction and military resistance to changes required by the charter, it took nearly 20 years of legal challenges in a civilian appellate court to achieve—although not completely, as we shall see—the judicial independence of the courts martial and their incumbents.

Let me give you another example. Contrary to the Criminal Code, the National Defence Act gave the right to choose the mode of trial to the prosecution rather than to the accused. In 2008, in the case of Trépanier, the CMAC found the provision unconstitutional. Again, notwithstanding a Supreme Court of Canada decision to the effect that the choice of the mode of trial is a tactical advantage that belongs to the accused as part of his right to full answer and defence under the charter and the CMAC's serious concern expressed about the constitutionality of the provision in the Nystrom case in 2005, some three years before Trépanier, the military prosecution again showed no willingness to confer to a soldier facing criminal proceedings this advantage granted to him by the charter. It bitterly fought the Trépanier case, and the court had to intervene to ensure that a military accused's rights were equal to those under the civilian penal system.

With this background information, allow me to bring to your attention concerns l have about some of the provisions of Bill C-15 in respect of either their constitutionality or the unwarranted unequal treatment they afford to a member of the armed forces charged with a service offence based on the Criminal Code.

Let me start with the summary trial. I won't repeat here what has been said by the two previous speakers. I endorse their submissions and their fears. I think the system is unconstitutional, and it is still in place only because there's no means of contesting it other than a declaratory relief in the Federal Court, at the expense of the soldier, with two layers of subsequent appeals.

It has been mentioned that the British have changed the system. I won't repeat the fact that there's a right to counsel and so on, but as a general rule, imprisonment or service detention cannot be imposed when the offender is not legally represented in the court of appeal in a summary trial or in a court martial. There can be no imprisonment or detention unless he's represented by counsel.

Mr. Drapeau has alluded to the fact that changes have taken place in Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, France, Belgium, Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Lithuania, and the Netherlands, and despite the fact that the requirements of independence, impartiality, fairness, and justice are the same in Canada as they are in England—and if anything, they are more compelling here, because in Canada they are entrenched in the Constitution—our soldiers in uniform are still denied fair treatment at a summary trial. I'll be pleased to answer questions on that.

I can see how under Bill C-15 the provost marshal is appointed by the Chief of the Defence Staff and removed from office by the CDS. However, for example, if you look sections 56 and 58 of the Quebec Police Act, you will see that the director general of the Quebec Police Force is appointed not by the Minister of Public Security, who is responsible for the police, but by the government. The director is removed by the government only pursuant to a recommendation of the Minister of Public Security after an inquiry.

This process provides not only an actual and better guarantee of independence to the incumbent but also increases in the general public and in the individuals subjected to the police powers a perception of real independence, as well as their confidence in the administration of justice.

According to section 6—

4:55 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative James Bezan

Can I get you to sum it up? Your time has expired, so if you want, please just make a closing comment.

4:55 p.m.

Retired Judge of the Federal Court of Appeal and the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada, As an Individual

Gilles Létourneau

You want a closing comment?

4:55 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative James Bezan

Yes, please.

4:55 p.m.

Retired Judge of the Federal Court of Appeal and the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada, As an Individual

Gilles Létourneau

Okay.

At present in Canada a soldier is a soldier before being a Canadian citizen. Why? By prosecuting him before a court martial, the military justice system deprives the soldier of his fundamental and precious right to a jury trial. When he appears before a summary trial, he is deprived of a right to counsel as well as a right to have his verdict or sentence reviewed on appeal.

As a proud member of the Canadian society, a society devoted to the promotion of equality of all before the law, I would like to close by reiterating some of the proposals found in the book that I filed with you today. Foremost, I urge this committee to study the international trends towards the civilianization of military tribunals to promote equality of all before the law, which can be achieved only by conducting a fundamental structural and organizational revamping of the National Defence Act in order to enhance its access, consultation, and legibility as well as its structure, internal arrangement, and form; and on a substantive level, to correct the flaws in the National Defence Act resulting from an imperfect duplication of the Criminal Code provisions, by taking into consideration the charter and military needs and by reviewing the provisions that attract constitutional criticism.

We as a society have forgotten, with harsh consequences for the members of the armed forces, that a soldier is before all a Canadian citizen, a Canadian citizen in uniform. So is a police officer; he is a Canadian citizen in uniform, but he’s not deprived of his right to a jury trial. Is that what we mean by “equality of all before the law”? Is not the soldier who risks his life for us entitled to at least the same rights and equality before the law as his fellow citizens when he is facing criminal prosecutions? I make a distinction between “disciplinary proceedings” and “criminal prosecutions”.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

5 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative James Bezan

Thank you.

In the interest of time, knowing that we only have about 20 or 25 minutes left, I'm going to go to five-minute rounds.

Leading us off will be Mr. Allen.

5 p.m.

NDP

Malcolm Allen NDP Welland, ON

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you to both the witnesses.

Mr. Létourneau, my friends across the way have referenced both Justices LeSage and Lamer around the issue of constitutionality from their perspective. There are two parts to my question here. I don't disagree that they said it—I think I actually read that—but were they actually sitting in a position of authority and deeming it? They're eminent jurists, there's no question of that, but were they actually ruling at trial stage, or is this simply their opinion?

The other question is this: has the Supreme Court actually given us an opinion as to constitutionality vis-à-vis what we might call a “summary trial”?