My next question concerns the case of an inmate who takes off and escapes. Once again, this is hypothetical because we cannot assume what sentence would in fact be imposed on an inmate who managed to escape. Whatever the case may be, this does pose a moral problem, and my colleagues in fact previously mentioned this.
If an inmate who has committed a crime or a wrongful act and has been committed winds up in a situation in which he escapes, he could receive a lesser sentence than the one that would be imposed on the person responsible for guarding him and who paradoxically did not allow the inmate to escape out of criminal intent but rather out of mere negligence. As was previously said, he might simply have fallen asleep. That could also be the result of an illness. For example, that person might suffer from sleep apnea, which might have made him fall asleep, thus allowing the convicted criminal to escape.
I think back to my military training in considering this difference in treatment. Like several permanent members of this committee, I have military training. I have course did not acquire it in Canada, but rather in France. That is a different system, but one that is based on the Napoleonic organization of the military code. That system has spread to many countries and not just those conquered by Napoleon in the 19th century. Some other countries have simply drawn on that Napoleonic vision of the military code. So I remember that it was explained to us in one of the basic military training courses that every soldier who was imprisoned by the enemy had a duty—I repeat that this is not an option, but rather an obligation—to escape.
So here is the question that comes to my mind with regard to Parliament's intent in drafting this article not to criminalize this act. We are talking about criminalizing this act not only from a military standpoint, but also from the standpoint of the potential consequences for the military member in civilian life when he leaves his military life to enter civilian life. That moreover is what we imagine for most of our military members who serve our country nobly by wearing their uniform. Is it possible that this intent derives precisely from this moral obligation of every soldier who has been imprisoned by enemy forces to escape? Is that not the origin of section 100? It must be said that it is possible for our fellow citizens to misunderstand that section. That is a paradox that my colleague, of Abitibi—Témiscamingue, raised.
That is my question.