National Defence Committee on May 19th, 2016

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you, and please have a seat. We don't have a ton of time, so I'm very interested in getting this meeting started.

I want to thank Lieutenant-Colonel John Selkirk, retired, and Brigadier-General Pierre Boucher, retired, for joining us today to discuss the reserves.

Gentlemen, thank you for coming. You have 10 minutes for your opening comments, and then we'll ask our questions.

[BGen Pierre Boucher, President, Réserve 2000 Québec]

Mr. Chair, ladies and gentlemen, I am Brigadier-General Pierre Boucher, and I am the president of Réserve 2000 Québec, which I am representing here today. I am here with my colleague, Lieutenant-Colonel John Selkirk, who represents Reserves 2000.

Réserve 2000 Québec's mission is to defend and promote the interests of the Canadian Armed Forces in general and, more specifically, the interests and values of the militia, also known as the army reserve, in Quebec, and its members. Réserve 2000 Québec is made up of retired members ranked up to honorary colonel.

Réserve 2000 Québec works with Reserves 2000, which operates in the rest of Canada. That organization is represented here today by my colleague, Lieutenant-Colonel John Selkirk. We both have a lot of experience with the reserves.

I have 28 years of service in the reserves, or the militia, plus 18 years as honorary colonel. I was the commanding officer of the Régiment de Maisonneuve, District No. 2 Quebec, and the Eastern Area (Militia). I was the chief of staff (reserve) at army headquarters, and honorary colonel of the Régiment de Maisonneuve, as I said, for 18 years. I was then chair of the Council of Honorary Colonels of Canada, and I am now president of the Quebec Branch of the Last Post Fund.

My colleague, Lieutenant-Colonel John Selkirk, also has extensive experience in the reserves. He began his service as a student in the militia, also known as the army reserve. He was then an infantry officer in the regular forces for 20 years. After leaving the regular forces, he joined The Brockville Rifles, a militia regiment, as deputy commanding officer and commanding officer for six years. Finally, he was lieutenant-colonel and honorary colonel of the same unit for nine years. He was also a member of the Council of Honorary Colonels of Canada and has been executive director of Reserves 2000 since 1998.

I will let Colonel Selkirk talk about Reserves 2000 and Réserve 2000 Québec's shared perspective. Then I will pick up from there to conclude.

I will turn the floor over to Lieutenant-Colonel John Selkirk.

[Lieutenant-Colonel, Retired) John Selkirk (Executive Director, Reserves 2000]

Thank you very much, Pierre.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for this opportunity to address you and to take your questions about the army reserve, or the militia, as it's still known in many circles in Canada.

Reserves 2000 is a nationwide alliance of Canadians who are dedicated to preserving a vital and viable army reserve. Réserve 2000 Québec is Reserves 2000 in the province of Quebec. We may operate in two different languages, but we speak with the same tongue.

A defence review provides a rare opportunity to change Canada's defence establishment, and hopefully, for the better. The army reserve, the vital connection between Canadians and their army, will undoubtably benefit from a fundamental examination of its purpose and current capabilities. In the past 50 years, defence white papers and the products of other defence reviews such as the Canada First defence strategy have said very little about the importance of Canada's reserve forces. Perhaps this was because wide public input was not sought or perhaps the views of reserve supporters were ignored. But today, in light of the post-Afghanistan deployment, the value of Canada's army reserve is recognized as never before. It is vital that a detailed discussion of its future be an integral part of this defence review process.

Part-time soldiers provided over 20% of the soldiers who were deployed to Afghanistan, and they now make up about a half of the total number of soldiers in the Canadian army. They are located in 117 Canadian communities, in 123 units across the country, and have proven their value many times over in recent years in a wide variety of operations at home and abroad. There's no reason the army reserve should not contribute more defence capability, but given the perilous situation reported this month by the Auditor General, it is painfully obvious that the time to re-evaluate assumptions governing the army reserve, which have been in force since the middle of the last century, is long past due.

Army reserve soldiers are cost-effective. All other benefits and attributes aside, the maintenance of part-time army reservists is more cost-effective than that of their full-time counterparts and the civilian employees of the Department of National Defence. The recent Auditor General's report shows that in fiscal year 2014-15 the Canadian army budgeted $243 million of Canada's $20-billion defence budget to pay and train 19,471 part-time soldiers. That's $243 million out of a total budget of $20 billion, which works out to 1.2% of the $20-billion defence budget. A very small portion provides a half of the soldiers in the Canadian army. That works out to $12,480 a soldier. At the same time, the last government stated in the last Canada First defence strategy that the all-in cost of adding one full-time soldier is $150,000.

The Auditor General also reported serious flaws in DND accounting of army reserve costs. He pointed out that flaws in current DND accounting, overheads, the fact that 1,500 full-time army reservists are included in the army reserve budget, unsubstantiated charges for base support to reserve units, and other discrepancies such as monies that were spent on other programs other than the army reserve, yet that money was appropriated for the army reserve; all that obscures the cost of giving a good all-in cost for a part-time soldier. Consequently, his report didn't try to do that. Reserves 2000 has made the calculation that a reasonable all-in cost per year for one part-time soldier should be approximately $25,000. There's the $12,000 or so that I mentioned, which is the pay. The rest of it adds up to somewhere around $25,000 per soldier. In other words, if a regular full-time employee costs $150,000, you could have six part-time soldiers for the price of one full-time.

As some 50% of the current defence budget is consumed by full-time personnel costs, it seems quite clear that shifting more responsibility for defence capability to part-time reservists should be an attractive option for a financially pressed government.

Can the army reserve meet the challenge?

We are well aware of the tired old argument that part-time soldiers, except for an order in council, have no obligation to go to full-time service and therefore cannot be counted upon in an emergency. But over the past two decades, history shows us that army reservists have willingly, and with enthusiasm, turned out in all the numbers required to surpass any demands made on them by the army for missions both at home and abroad.

There's also the argument that a part-time soldier is not as well trained as a full-time soldier. This is particularly important for expeditionary missions. Those missions require a tremendous amount of team building and team integration before any unit can be deployed. Other than the few high-readiness units that the resource-strapped regular army is capable of maintaining on a day-to-day basis, all army units require intense pre-deployment workup. It's been an operationally proven fact that reservists in the ranks of the deployments for Bosnia and Afghanistan were equally as capable as their regular brethren by the time the unit left Canada on deployment.

In domestic operations, the skills of part-time soldiers are abundantly obvious. Reservists maintain high levels of expertise and basic military skills through their regular weekly, monthly, and summer training schedules. They're able to react very quickly to disasters, often because they are already on the scene.

Canadian communities value their units. In addition to adding affordable depth to the Canadian defence establishment, reserve units provide their home communities with many more intangible advantages every day. The army reserve provides all the advantages of timely, available federal infrastructure and organized, well-trained local backup for first responders.

Countless mayors and reeves of Canadian municipalities are on record with ringing endorsements of their local units and are quick to raise substantial objections whenever the future of their unit is threatened. These municipal leaders are also quick to rally all the support at their disposal to drive home the advantages of having reserve units in their communities. These range from being a source of good part-time jobs to good youth employment, providing job-readiness training, leadership, and citizenship training, to being a significant economic driver, which spreads throughout the community. That comes from the payroll of the full-time staff, the part-time jobs, and the substantial purchase of goods and services.

The smaller the community, the more valuable its reserve unit because good part-time jobs are fewer and there's less redundant infrastructure than in larger communities. Taxpayers located outside major metropolitan areas feel they have the same rights to the advantages a reserve unit brings to their town as their urban cousins.

Unfortunately, the army reserve is at a breaking point. The current state of Canada's reserve army is perilous and uncertain. The Auditor General is the authority. He reported that strength has been shrinking by about 5% per year for the last five years. Although 21,000 reserve soldiers were budgeted for in fiscal year 2014-15, the actual number who were trained and attended regular parades was only 13,944.

Active strength is the holy grail of unit viability and many units, especially those in smaller communities, are now in danger of being unable to function due to the shortage of leaders and soldiers. This situation must be changed and bold steps must be taken to maintain this irreplaceable asset and cause it to thrive for all the tomorrows that we can envision.

At the same time, it must be recognized that the cause of shrinking units is not of their own making. The problem lies firmly at the feet of failed national policies that have produced inadequate recruit quotas, failed and highly flawed recruiting policies and procedures, and insufficient summer employment opportunities to give young soldiers who form the bulk of the units enough pay so they can continue to serve on a part-time basis while attending school.

Canadians have demonstrated great affection and support for their local army reserve units. To them, the loss or amalgamation of units would be of great concern and is, quite frankly, unacceptable.

We look to this committee to recommend that the army reserve be revitalized, expanded, nourished, and properly equipped to provide more cost-effective defence capabilities, while at the same time providing communities with the opportunity for individual Canadians to grow while serving their nation on a part-time basis. We ask you not to fail the army reserve.

This committee has great influence on the defence review. From Canada's earliest beginnings, the militia, the citizen soldier, has been the very backbone of our military establishment. Such soldiers are needed today more than ever before. It's time to step up and help these fine, young volunteers who are forever willing to put their lives on hold in the interest of their country. Please do the right thing, and help them remain at the ready.

That concludes my remarks, and I'm very happy to take any questions you may have.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you for your testimony, gentlemen. I'm going to open the floor to....

Go ahead, but we're running a little bit late.

[BGen Pierre Boucher]

The reserve force has always been and must continue to be an important national institution that is well integrated in the community and helps to shape better Canadians.

It already has certain operational roles, such as Arctic response company groups, which effectively address current and future needs, and could assume additional roles if it had more personnel. Some of the new missions the reserve could contribute to include combatting threats such as cyber warfare, NBC defence and security operations to assist civilian authorities at a favourable cost/benefit ratio. Given the fragile and unpredictable international situation, one of the roles of the reserve force should also be to serve as a base for significantly augmenting personnel.

In order for the reserve force to be completely effective, the following improvements are needed. First, it needs a pool of reservists from which the reserve force can develop its own senior supervisory staff. In other words, it needs unit critical mass. Second, it needs a stable, adequate budget that is dedicated solely to its activities. It also needs a review and decentralization of the recruitment process because one of the biggest problems the army reserve has right now is the undue length of time it takes to recruit a soldier. It needs training that is adapted to the reality of reservists and offered to them based on their availability. It needs conditions of service that are conducive to member retention, such as guaranteed summer jobs for a minimum of six to eight weeks and operational duties. Lastly, it needs adequate equipment that is readily available for training.

Given the challenges it will have to address, the national priorities it will have to set, and its relative capacity to invest in defence, the Canadian government will have to give serious consideration to the reserve force when it reviews the national defence policy. If the suggested improvements are made, the reserve force will not only be able to offer relevant capacity, but will be able to do so at a lower cost.

That concludes our opening remarks.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you very much for your testimony and for being here today.

We'll open up with a seven-minute round of questions. I would ask you to be disciplined in your timing. I'll let you know, so if you're unsure, look at me. We went a little over in the opening remarks. I know everybody wants to ask questions.

I'm going to give the floor to Mr. Rioux.

You have seven minutes.

[Jean Rioux, Liberal, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Welcome, gentlemen.

Mr. Boucher, you certainly convinced Pierre Paul-Hus and me in Trois-Rivières that the committee needed to hear from you. As you know, we don't have much time. Please know that we have a great deal of respect for you. Our Minister of Defence was a reservist.

I have just seven minutes. I will ask you questions that relate to what you told us in Trois-Rivières.

It is important for my colleagues here to understand your connection to the regular force. How has the relationship between the reserve and the regular force changed over time?

Let's talk about your problems with recruitment and membership. You gave me personnel numbers in Trois-Rivières. Analysts gave me some numbers, and I heard some numbers this morning. Can you tell us what they are and what they should be? I know that our goal is to have 28,500 reservists. Where are we on that?

You made it clear that there is a problem with equipment. You are considered second class. That is the message we got.

If there is any time left after you have answered those questions, I would like you to tell me about the connection to cadets.

[BGen Pierre Boucher]

First of all, it is important to talk about the evolution of the militia. During my years of service, I always referred to this unit as the militia. Now it is called the Army Reserve. We could debate that for quite some time, but it's a question of semantics.

Until 1970, the militia's role could be summed up as one of national survival. From 1970 to 1992, the militia took control of its own budget and training. It came a long way and achieved great things by 1992. That is how I see it, but this has been an issue of great debate. Because I commanded the Eastern Area during that time, I know that significant efforts were made to develop a strong militia.

At the time, the militia had quite a bit of flexibility in terms of our budgets, which we managed ourselves, as well as enrolment, which we managed effectively. Beginning in 1992, the regular force took over the militia and began managing our budgets. At that point, we returned to basic training, which was a bit of a disappointment for many reservists and militia members.

From 1992 to 1999, things continued to evolve, and around 1998-99, the Total Force concept was implemented. It remains in effect today. This concept does have some positive aspects. Basically, all militia members are supposed to be at the same level as the regular force members. The problem, however, is that regular members perform their duties full time, while militia members do so part time.

Most of our militia members or army reservists are students, and because they are students, they also have obligations in that regard, which have to be taken into account. In order for the reserves to be effective and to meet its needs, we have to think about the staff.

However, there has been a reduction in our personnel. At present, reserve recruitment is a major problem. We used to be able to recruit people pretty easily. We were able to use something called pre-enrolment. In other words, we could begin equipping and training individuals while their security checks were still being done. The appeal that young people felt for the reserves did not go away. Enrolling a young person today takes anywhere from six months to a year. Put yourself in the shoes of a student who is told:

“Don't call us. We'll call you.”

This wait time of six months to a year can cause people to change their minds. As a result, recruiting is hard.

Security standards must be met, yes, but it's also important to understand that, during training, a solder does not have access to secret documents. That's why I think it would be okay to give these young people a job, while promoting a sense of belonging within Canada.

Some experts told us they had a problem with the National Defence Act. If those problems could be resolved in the past, I don't see why they can't be resolved now. I see the ambiguities that could be involved, but I think they could be dealt with very easily.

In the 1990s, the Canadian Forces had nearly 20,000 members, although now that number is only 13,944, based on the figures John provided.

Why has that number decreased? It is simply because of that problem.

The courses also need to be adapted to the reality facing our reservists. For instance, some of them are only available at certain times of the year. We therefore need to turn to them when it's possible for them.

Summer jobs are also a serious problem in the case of reservists. In the past, we were able to guarantee them a summer job for six to eight weeks, but now, we can only offer them three weeks. If students are promised only three weeks of employment during the summer, they're going to look elsewhere. They'll quit.

All of these factors contribute to the problem.

Autonomy, something we focused on quite a bit during the meeting in April, is important. Back in the day when the militia, or the army reserve, controlled its own budgets, those budgets could be allocated appropriately. I don't want to get into all the details, unless you would like to. Now we have less control over our budgets. They are controlled by others, and we don't know for sure that 100% of the budget allocated to the militia by the House of Commons actually goes to the militia.

These are some of the serious problems we have seen. To sum up, recruitment, control of budgets—

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Excuse me, General, I'm going to have to cut you off to go on to the next question. We can circle back in a few minutes and finish that thought.

I'm going to give the floor over to Mr. Paul-Hus.

Sir, you have the floor.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I could sit down with our guests and answer some of these questions. I served with the reserves for 22 years, and I even commanded a unit.

I think what's important this morning, for the committee, for the people who haven't experienced it, is to understand the message. I want people to hear the message straight from your mouths, gentlemen, and not from mine.

In the 1990s, the reserve and regular forces were integrated, as a professional way to conduct operations, of course, to form what is known as the Total Force. I think the underlying objective of Total Force at the time was a good one. The aim was to bring together and train the forces differently. However, years of experience have shown us that, considering the cultural aspect, a reservist's work is different. Reservists can be professional in their military work, but how they enrol, work and come to work, considering their other obligations, as a student or whatever, is very different.

Can you confirm here this morning that, as part of the defence policy review, the government should completely review the Total Force concept and give command back to reservists directly, as was the case in the past?

[BGen Pierre Boucher]

John, do you want to respond to that?

[LCol John Selkirk]

If I may answer that question, yes. One of our major objectives has always been to return the command in control of the army reserves to reservists. I'm not speaking for the air force or the navy, but we feel that would be best for Canada if that happened.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Do you think the regular force members would react by saying that operational capability would suffer if single command were returned to the reservists?

[LCol John Selkirk]

Undoubtedly, there will be arguments made, and there's no doubt this close working arrangement the two components have had for the last number of years has increased the operational capability of reservists, and I'm sure you saw that in your time.

I don't think putting the reserve army back under a reserve chain of command would mean that that operational capability and that expertise would be lost.

I think the regular army has seen how valuable our soldiers are, and there would be no move not to try to employ as many of our soldiers as possible, which means that unlike 20 years ago, when that just didn't happen, this is happening now and I don't see it going away.

I think a lot of the benefits would remain, but the issues that have caused the fall in strength are issues of over-centralized policies coming from Ottawa that don't work in every part of this massive nation of ours. That's what we need.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Regarding recruitment, it is also important to understand the situation. When someone wants to join the regular force, it is usually about having a job or career, with a contract, for a minimum of three years or even 25 years. For some people who don't really know what they want to do, being a reservist is a good place to start. Meanwhile, other reservists might know what they want to do. For some people, it is a part-time job, but they are aware of the fact that they are part of an organization that could be called up, if needed.

Do you think that any changes need to be made to recruitment centres or to recruitment standards? Let me explain. Could a reservist enrol with a minimum of education, that is, enrol temporarily, on the condition that he take a course, and then enrol permanently once he passes the course? Maybe something like that could facilitate things? Right now, the enrolment process is the same as the one for a regular force member, and that means a six-month waiting period. That is unacceptable.

[BGen Pierre Boucher]

I completely agree. At this time, candidates fill out the same forms, whether they are applying for the reserve or regular force. That is not the problem. The problem has more to do with the medical exam and the security check. If we could solve that problem, we could easily enrol candidates.

Filling out forms can be done rather quickly. The person just has to come in and fill them out.

As for the medical exam, in my view, if a doctor believes that a candidate is fit for military service, that should be enough. However, the file has to be sent to Borden, in Ontario—I'm not sure if that is where they are still sent—and it takes three or four months for a decision to made regarding whether that individual is fit for military service. The person making the decision never even sees the individual. That is one problem that could be solved.

Furthermore, as I mentioned, the security check takes a really long time. I've been told that, out of all the security checks that have been done for the entire reserve force, no enrolment application has ever been rejected for that reason. Although, take that with a grain of salt; that is just what I've heard.

We are told that we have to make sure that young soldiers in training don't have access to certain documents, but they don't have access to any secret documents during their training.

As for weapons handling, I acknowledge that we teach that to soldiers when they first get into the reserves, but they can also get this kind of training from private companies, right here in Canada.

These arguments mean that the entire process is delayed between six and eight months. If we ask a young student to wait, he won't; he'll find something else.

Recruitment is a major problem.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

The major challenge, then, is not necessarily about having more money, but rather being able to use the money allocated to the reserves properly, by managing it directly.

As for recruitment, it is a question of simplifying the administrative procedures, which doesn't cost anything, in fact. That would solve 90% of the reserves' problems.

[BGen Pierre Boucher]

That's right.

It is important that the reserves be allowed to control the budget allocated by the House of Commons and decide how it is used.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

That's pretty much the time. Thanks very much.

I'm going to give the floor to Mr. Garrison.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for appearing today. I also want to thank you for your service to Canada, and I would include advocates in Reserves 2000 as providing service to Canada.

Locally, I have had the privilege of getting to know retired colonel Richard Talbot, who I am sure you know is the former commanding officer, and I guess, still the honorary colonel of the Canadian Scottish Regiment. What you are telling me today is not a surprise, because Richard has already been in my office, very forcefully bringing these issues to my attention.

I think you've done a very good job this morning in laying out the problems that reserves face, but also the contribution that reserves make. There is not enough public awareness of that contribution. Your testimony is very important on that point, both for the affordable depth question for the military, but also for the other impacts in the community.

I know that on Vancouver Island, especially in terms of opportunities for youth and part-time jobs, Colonel Talbot has been very big on pointing out what we've lost and used to have.

I am going to ask about recruiting. We just had some discussion, and I'd like to go back to that for a minute. You say that medical clearance and security clearance are the two obstacles. Is that because of a lack of resources within the military, or a lack of attention and priority given to the reserves?

I know that's a difficult one for you.

[BGen Pierre Boucher]

I will respond first, and then I'm going to ask my colleague to also respond to that question.

I am partly responsible. At the time of the transfer, I was Chief of Staff of the Army Reserve, and I agreed to the transfer of medical exams. I was promised, at a time when it was really hard to get doctors for the units, that approvals for medical exams would be accelerated. The transfer was done, then, but it has caused huge delays.

What's more, we could even use civilian doctors, through individual contracts, for enrolment purposes, which could help speed up the enrolment process.

The most important issue is still security. I am well aware that that is important, but with a little good will, that problem could be solved.

[LCol John Selkirk]

Mr. Garrison, I would say this: there is a lot of effort being put into improving the recruiting, especially on this terrible wait time—167 days—when a kid can go down and be hired by McDonald's within a week or so. We're just not able to compete.

On October 9, 2015, the chief of the defence staff signed an implementation directive which calls for an increase in the size of all reserves—that's all three services, plus the medical, plus, plus—by 1,500 positions, which hopefully will be 1,500 more soldiers, by July 2019. However, given the fact that the whole of the primary reserve is already about 5,000 under strength, if we add that 1,500 to it, how are we going to get from here to there without this massive change to policy, to attitude, to the culture of how we do business?

I can tell you that I have talked to as many people of ours across the country as I could in the last week or so, just to try and get a feel before coming here, and although he signed that directive in October, which is well over six months ago now, I asked what they are seeing at the unit level in terms of improvement. Nobody is reporting that there is any real improvement.

Whatever happens, I don't know how you make it happen, but there has to be a massive shake-up here.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Thanks very much for your honesty on that point. I know it's a difficult thing to do to produce the change. We say it's not just money, but sometimes it is money.

In terms of providing summer opportunities, I'm actually a bit shocked that we're down to offering people three weeks. In many cases we're offering people three weeks of opportunity during the summer. That's much too little to actually recruit people and retain them in the reserves.

[LCol John Selkirk]

That is the problem. For the first year, the recruit is employed almost all summer just getting to the first stage of training. But it's after that.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

It's a retention problem.

One of the things that Colonel Talbot raised with me is the important role of reserves in case of a natural disaster. His pitch to me was that on Vancouver Island the reserves are now lacking the resources to be called out in terms of a disaster. In other words, it used to be that they could independently deploy to respond to a disaster, but now key resources are lacking for them to do that. Would you say that's the case across the country?

I see you are nodding.