Evidence of meeting #58 for National Defence in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was sanctions.
A recording is available from Parliament.
2:25 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Stephen Fuhr
Thank you very much.
We will go to the agreed order and duration of questions. The first question goes to Mr. Fisher.
You have the floor.
2:25 p.m.
Liberal
Darren Fisher Liberal Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS
Thank you very much.
Thank you, folks, for being here. I appreciate your feedback.
Ms. Mason, you spoke about the fact that a diplomatic approach was the best bet to end the North Korean threat. I want to talk a bit about sanctions and hear some of your thoughts on them: whether they traditionally work or whether they're working in this particular case with North Korea. If the U.S. were to soften its stance, do you think North Korea would be more open to diplomacy, or would it continue to advance its research and development?
Also, in your opinion, do the last two decisions to ramp up sanctions directly correspond to the proliferation of what North Korea has been actively doing in the last year or so?
2:25 p.m.
President, Rideau Institute on International Affairs
I think it's obvious. It's clear—manifestly clear—that sanctions have not worked. The long history of sanctions has not worked to prevent North Korea from continuing to develop a nuclear weapons capability. The classic statement about sanctions is that they must be part of a larger strategy, that the best they can hope to do is slow things down, and that in the meantime you should be pursuing an effective solution. In this case, I'm arguing for a negotiated solution.
It was interesting in the Iran case. Again, Iran is an example of sanctions and a broader negotiating strategy. One way that sanctions can bite a bit happens where the government is answerable in some way to the public, such as facing an electorate, so that the economic impact of the sanctions is felt by the public and they let the government know that they don't like it. That of course doesn't apply in North Korea at all.
Sanctions, however, are important. I certainly wouldn't argue that the sanctions be lifted. They're important in a broader context to send a message to other states that this is not a cost-free exercise. North Korea has an incredible tolerance of sanctions because the regime is all-powerful. As the Russians have said, the North Korean regime would let its public eat grass before they would give up.
However, it's still important that the sanctions stay on. This is a statement by the international community that this behaviour is not acceptable, and it's also important for the broader messages being sent, but no, they manifestly fail to stop North Korea. That's why we need to try other things, and I'm urging diplomacy.
2:30 p.m.
Liberal
Darren Fisher Liberal Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS
Okay. You spoke about tolerance to sanctions. I'm going to go to Ms. Berger, if I may, for a moment.
China is directly responsible for 90% of North Korea's trade. If China were to stop trading with North Korea right now, what would happen, in your opinion? Does that cripple them? Does it make us or the UN have to step in and take over issues there? Or does it make them respond more negatively?
2:30 p.m.
Senior Research Associate, Middlebury Institute of International Studies, As an Individual
In order to answer that, I have to come back to your earlier question and throw in my two cents on it.
Sanctions as a strategy make sense if they're aligned towards a reasonable and a feasible objective. I think the reason we're all sitting here saying that sanctions aren't working is that the objective that has always been outlined for the sanctions is the denuclearization of North Korea. I don't believe that is a realistic objective so long as the regime in North Korea has the character that it currently has.
Partly, it's not the fault of sanctions that we can't make it happen, in my mind. That's not to say that sanctions are not useful tools in meeting other objectives short of that—in my view—quite lofty goal. For example, there might be a chance that sanctions change North Korea's cost-benefit calculation to come to the negotiating table and negotiate something that looks like nuclear restraint. That cost-benefit calculation is probably different for them from what it is for denuclearization. Similarly, sanctions are there as well to prevent North Korea from proliferating dangerous technology to others. That's an objective that's feasible and is worth maintaining sanctions for.
To come back to your question on China specifically, I still need to be convinced that if China were to implement even the sanctions it has already agreed to in the UN Security Council, doing so would sufficiently change a cost-benefit calculation in Kim Jong-un's mind to make him say that he's ready to give it all up. I'm doubtful that this is a calculation we can affect, even if China were to co-operate on it.
In terms of other objectives, I think Chinese participation would be more significant, for example, on such objectives as preventing proliferation to others or changing North Korean calculations over the merits of nuclear restraint and responsible nuclear behaviour. That's a separate discussion that I think is really worth thinking through in more depth, rather than just using the standard narrative that has become so mainstream now, which is that sanctions don't work.
2:30 p.m.
Liberal
2:30 p.m.
Liberal
2:30 p.m.
Liberal
Anita Vandenbeld Liberal Ottawa West—Nepean, ON
Thank you.
Professor Fergusson, I was interested by your comment that an attack on North America would likely not be the first attack, that it would first be on the U.S. bases in South Korea, and then Guam or Hawaii. If there were an attack on Hawaii, it would trigger article 5 of the NATO treaty.
If that were to happen, how would it change the scenario concerning what happens if there were either an accidental or, as you said, a demonstration attack on Canada, if we were already in an article 5 situation?
2:30 p.m.
Professor, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
Why attack Hawaii? First of all, Hawaii is defended with its own batteries as well as forward-deployed naval systems, so it has a defence. If it is attacked, yes, we are bound by article 5 to come to the assistance of any NATO member. Exactly what we decide to do in terms of that assistance in a state of war—because we would be at war with North Korea— is an entirely different issue.
That does not affect or negate, all things being equal, the potential problems that Canada faces. It just expands them in a way, because then we are part of a formal coalition at war, by virtue of which we are now a target—a legitimate target. We then expand the number of probabilities to accidental, intentional, and demonstrated.
2:30 p.m.
Liberal
Anita Vandenbeld Liberal Ottawa West—Nepean, ON
Wouldn't it also work the other way, so that if Canada were targeted, that would also trigger article 5?
2:30 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Stephen Fuhr
I'm going to have to hold it there and go to Mr. O'Toole.
You have the floor.
2:30 p.m.
Conservative
Erin O'Toole Conservative Durham, ON
Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you very much to all of our witnesses for participating. I have a couple of specific questions.
I'll start with you, Dr. Berger. Thank you very much for appearing. I've seen some of your commentary on television in recent weeks and months and I found it fascinating. You focus on how the act of demonstration is very clearly part of the goal of the regime in North Korea. You also mentioned that we are past the point of looking at them under the old rubric of “developing”. They're now demonstrating.
Regardless of the presidential change in the United States, is it fair to say that the era of strategic patience is over?
2:35 p.m.
Senior Research Associate, Middlebury Institute of International Studies, As an Individual
The way I would probably best describe the current approach by the Trump administration is non-strategic impatience, if we can put it that way.
In terms of strategic patience, it is a strategy that is low risk, and I think that's probably one of the reasons why it was adopted by the United States. Also, it just is the product of looking at this extremely difficult situation and realizing that many of the approaches you can take are potentially high risk. You can define risk in a number of ways, but domestic political response is one of the things that politicians factor into that: that it's high risk and has potentially low chances of success across the board, so you're dealing with that in some variations of degree across your policy options.
Yes, in looking at this situation, I don't feel that there's a huge amount of support for something that is labelled strategic patience. Strategic patience was fundamentally about hoping that the approaches you were taking at a particular point in time would bite at some point in the future and prevent North Korea from achieving an ICBM capability and the ability to threaten the continental United States. We're there now, so there's nothing to be patient for.
2:35 p.m.
Conservative
Erin O'Toole Conservative Durham, ON
Yes, and that's been clear from almost all our expert testimony today.
I know that both sides of the House of Commons always want to put diplomacy first, as we should, but we have the recent experience of Daniel Jean, the Prime Minister's envoy, who went over with a delegation of six to talk about the Pastor Lim case. They also talked about regional issues and security and, weeks after that, we saw the Japanese missile firing.
What are your general thoughts on diplomacy? I hear some people say that diplomacy works when there's a “rational actor” on the other side. It seems as though Canada's diplomatic effort actually led to an escalation or had no bearing on their own decisions regarding their missile testing. Can we deal with them as a rational actor?
2:35 p.m.
Senior Research Associate, Middlebury Institute of International Studies, As an Individual
Yes, absolutely I believe North Korea can be dealt with as a rational actor. I would suggest that the two developments you mentioned—the presence of the Canadians in North Korea for what was ultimately a humanitarian mission and North Korea's nuclear missile testing program—are completely unlinked. I would go to the second assessment you made, which is that it has no bearing on the nuclear and missile program of North Korea.
However, yes, they are rational. We can look at North Korea's nuclear and missile programs and assess that there are primarily two drivers for them. The first, of course, is to secure the regime, and we have to talk about what regime security means. I believe it means ensuring the continuity of a Kim-based leadership in North Korea, and deterrence assists in that aim by keeping the United States away from military action on the Korean Peninsula. Similarly, North Korea is driven in part by domestic politics as well. Here we have a leader who is trying to demonstrate legitimacy in an office that he has not held for very long and who is doing that on the back of nuclear- and missile-testing successes.
Both of those are rational goals for North Korea. Everything I've looked at in North Korea over the years in terms of their development suggests that they're perfectly rational. They just think about things that we might not.
2:35 p.m.
Conservative
Erin O'Toole Conservative Durham, ON
Thank you.
In my remaining time, I have a question for Dr. Charron. It was interesting that the three general objections you listed for Canada's participation in ballistic missile defence going back to 2005 echoed almost identically the three points made by Colin Robertson, a previous witness: whether it works, the cost, and the impact on geopolitical stability.
How would you say each of those things has changed since 2005? To me, it would seem that in terms of whether it works, the technology has improved. It's confidential or classified, but it's obviously having more impact. Cost has been shared, or potentially shared, as with the U.K. example. Then there's the impact on stability.
Could you talk about how things have changed from 2005 to today?
2:40 p.m.
Assistant Professor, Political Studies, Director of the Centre for Security Intelligence, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
I want to be clear. When I was summarizing the three objections, those aren't my objections. I'm simply telling you what is the perennial one.
In some ways, there have been changes since 2005, because technology changes and budgets change and the like, but those three objections have remained fairly consistent and haven't changed fundamentally. It's a mindset that Canadians have on why not to join ballistic missile defence.
At the same time, however, adversaries such as North Korea have bolted ahead of us. They now have technology that we've assumed is still in development and might not reach us, and I think we've seen that this is simply not the case. Our arguments have stayed quite static, but certainly the technology of our adversaries is bolting ahead.
2:40 p.m.
Conservative
Erin O'Toole Conservative Durham, ON
The threat has increased dramatically, but we haven't reassessed it with that threat in mind.
2:40 p.m.
Assistant Professor, Political Studies, Director of the Centre for Security Intelligence, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
Yes, and here is a related argument. For example, on the Global Affairs website, we haven't updated our basic fact sheet for North Korea. We still list Kim Jong-nam as the country's spokesperson. He's the brother whom Kim Jong-un had killed a few months ago.
We don't list a population for North Korea. We don't list any basic information. This is an example of the ways in which our arguments have remained static. We're not keeping up on this topic, and it's basic things such as generating new information about the status of North Korea that we're not communicating to the public.
2:40 p.m.
NDP
Randall Garrison NDP Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC
I want to start by dealing with an assumption by one of the witnesses and a couple of you on the other side of the table that those who are opposed to ballistic missile defence are somehow presuming that the United States will protect Canada. I want to disassociate myself from that position, because I don't think the thing works, so I'm not presuming that there's any protection there to offer.
I want to thank Dr. Berger for her comments on sanctions. It's a very useful contribution to this debate to talk about why sanctions haven't worked, instead of just throwing up our hands and saying sanctions don't work. That was very useful.
There's a disturbing tendency—and it has come up at the table a couple of times today—to make an assumption that conflict at a higher level is inevitable in this situation, rather than to talk about what might be done to reduce the conflict. I know that Peggy Mason was a bit frustrated at not getting to talk about what a comprehensive diplomatic solution might look like, so I want to give her a chance to say a bit more about what a diplomatic solution would look like.
2:40 p.m.
President, Rideau Institute on International Affairs
Thank you very much. Yes, I undiplomatically indicated my frustration, and I apologize for that.
Before I jump into this question, I want to add another point. I think the decisive point in then prime minister Paul Martin's decision to withdraw Canada's request to participate in 2005 was that he could get no guarantee from the United States of a meaningful operational role for Canada—a say, as opposed to a passive seat at the table—and he could get no guarantee that Canada would be defended. He wisely thought he could not defend participation to the Canadian public. Those key reasons have not changed in any way.
With respect to the diplomatic dimension, the really encouraging thing about it is that there are so many elements that have not been explored. North Korea has made it very clear, for example, how objectionable they find the military exercises.
Frankly, when one considers the scope of those joint South Korean and U.S. military exercises and then also those of the United States and Japan, they are exercises involving 70,000 South Korean soldiers to begin with, and massive amounts of weaponry, including nuclear-capable planes, and they simulate a decapitation, an attack, a regime change in North Korea. These are extraordinarily frightening simulated exercises. Clearly, over and over again, North Korea has said they want those to stop. That's a very key part of the Russian-Chinese proposal.
Much more basic are discussions without preconditions on ending the technical war that still exists between the United States, South Korea, Japan, and North Korea. There was only a ceasefire, and there have not been negotiations to reach a full peace treaty.
Those are just two examples of the many areas that have not been fully explored.
I come back to the point that Senator Feinstein has called for the United States to indicate dialogue without preconditions. Then the parties can determine the full scope of the various elements they wish to pursue further.