Thank you very much. Yes, I undiplomatically indicated my frustration, and I apologize for that.
Before I jump into this question, I want to add another point. I think the decisive point in then prime minister Paul Martin's decision to withdraw Canada's request to participate in 2005 was that he could get no guarantee from the United States of a meaningful operational role for Canada—a say, as opposed to a passive seat at the table—and he could get no guarantee that Canada would be defended. He wisely thought he could not defend participation to the Canadian public. Those key reasons have not changed in any way.
With respect to the diplomatic dimension, the really encouraging thing about it is that there are so many elements that have not been explored. North Korea has made it very clear, for example, how objectionable they find the military exercises.
Frankly, when one considers the scope of those joint South Korean and U.S. military exercises and then also those of the United States and Japan, they are exercises involving 70,000 South Korean soldiers to begin with, and massive amounts of weaponry, including nuclear-capable planes, and they simulate a decapitation, an attack, a regime change in North Korea. These are extraordinarily frightening simulated exercises. Clearly, over and over again, North Korea has said they want those to stop. That's a very key part of the Russian-Chinese proposal.
Much more basic are discussions without preconditions on ending the technical war that still exists between the United States, South Korea, Japan, and North Korea. There was only a ceasefire, and there have not been negotiations to reach a full peace treaty.
Those are just two examples of the many areas that have not been fully explored.
I come back to the point that Senator Feinstein has called for the United States to indicate dialogue without preconditions. Then the parties can determine the full scope of the various elements they wish to pursue further.